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ABSTRA.Cl' 
Antony Conrad Garrett 
The Quest for Autonomy: Sociology's Advocatory Dimension 
This work is an historical account of the development of sociology in 
Britain. It examines the institutional and intellectual issues affecting 
sociology during the 1920s and '30s, through the years of the Second 
world War and into the immediate post-war period. 
The work focuses on the attempt by sociologists to assert and sustain 
the autonomy of their discipline, within the wider field of British 
social science. Parti,cular attention is _.paid to a series of 'acts of 
justification', representing crucial strategies in sustaining the institu-
tional and intellectual boundaries of the . discipline. The negotiation 
of resources essential to the continuity of the field is considered 
to be an integral feature of sociology's advocatory dimension, wherein 
its practitioners construct and deploy a series of programme statements, 
disciplinary agendas and institutional initiatives, as means of asserting 
the potential of sociology. 
A detailed examination is made of significant 'moments' in sociology's 
development for the period in question, in order to assess the manner 
in which sociologists have contested prescriptions of their activities 
by both social scientists and non-sociologists. Among the issues examined 
in the course of the work are; the funding of knowledge, the wartime 
education debate, the deliberations of the Clapham Committee, an attempt 
by sociologists to construct a synoptic science of society and William 
Beveridge's 'Natural Bases Scheme' for the social sciences at the LSE 
during the inter-war period. All are portrayed as features of sociology's 
advocatory dimension and in terms of their relative significance in 
the social construction of British sociology. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Introduction 
In 1924, Reginald Wellbye published a paper entitled 'Sunlight and Sociology'. 
It represented a serious attempt to establish the connection between 
sunlight and sociology, in so much as the former was deemed to possess 
a 'beneficial physiological influence on the living organism', and that 
it was the function of the latter, through the study of social conditions 
leading to the enactment of appropriate legislation, to safeguard the 
public interest by contributing to the debate on town planning. 
this appear to be merely a sociological curio, or the more bizarre 
of contributions to the Sociological Review during the inter-war period, 
it should be pointed out that Wellbye was an influential member of the 
Sociological Society and would, some nine years later, initiate a crucial 
debate on the nature and purpose of sociology during the 1930s and in 
the future. In many respects, Wellbye's (1933) prescription for a pragmatic 
social science represented one of a number of similar programme statements, 
agendas and intellectual initiatives characterising attempts by sociolo-
gists to assert and sustain the nature and purpose of their endeavours. 
It is my intention to examine British sociology's quest for intellectual 
and institutional autonomy during the 1920s and 1930s, and into the period 
of the Second world war. The latter period will also encompass a consider-
ation of a series of arguments which were to be crucial to sociology's 
immediate, post-war form. 
A central theme of the work, one which animates the general topic of 
the quest for autonomy, will be the portrayal of the social construction 
of sociology by its practitioners, as a process of science-building. 
The latter project was, as I will argue, one in which sociologists endeav-
oured over time, to establish a discrete and socially valued field of 
ideas and practice, through a series of 'acts of justification' (Foucault, 
1974) . I will examine such acts of justification through a category 
of analysis which I shall refer to as sociology's advocatory dimension,. 
\,. 
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The decision to introduce the notion of sociology's advocatory dimension 
arose as a result of an attempt to account for an activity characterising 
what I shall refer to as, the sociologists' and their supporters' need 
to sustain the intellectual and institutional viability of sociology 
(however defined, defended or discredited) on the basis of the discipline's 
potential or promise alone. I was prompted to conceive of the pursuance 
of sociology in the aforementioned manner, as a result of an unresolved 
problem referred, to briefly in the work of Philip Abrams (1968); that 
of the difficulty of establishing where the origins of sociology in 
Britain 'end' and how, where and by whom does an autonomous tradition 
commence? LeSt this appears to be an artifical problem, it should 
be remembered that soc'iology did survive the First World War, entering 
quite a different historical frontier from the one it had emerged in, 
prior to the cataclysm. That war had undermined many of the certainties 
and conditions which may have engendered a sociology based previously 
on anodyne and ameliorative principles and practice. In the years following 
the Great war, sociology stumbled on in an intellectually fragmented and 
organisationally factious state. Much of the disarray within the field 
stemmed from a series of frustrations confronting sociologists and their 
disciples from outside the discipline. These influences upon sociology 
were compounded further by the emerging cleavage within the discipline, 
giving rise to two quite distinct intellectual and organisational 'wings' 
within the discipline (Marshall, 1967): one given to developing sociology 
within a socio-philosophical and historical perspective, the other, 
concerning itself in the main, with the construction of an empirical 
science, based on the rigours of the scientific method .. Add to this 
the increasing degree of specialisation and professionalisation within 
the other social science disciplines, and it is understandable that 
the fate of sociology soon began to occupy the time and minds of its 
practitioners. The question of the changing relationship of sociology 
to the other human sciences posed a significant problem for sociologists 
during the period in question, and until that issue had been addressed 
adequately, the definition of sociology - its intrinsic nature and social 
purpose - remained a crucial item on the sociologists' agenda. A preoccupa-
tion with sociology's private troubles, namely its theoretical and 
methodological disputes, while serving to widen the cleavage referred 
to above, also contributed to the increasing difficulty of its practitioners 
to manage sociology's project as a discipline central to the possible 
coordination of the human sciences. 
In the chapters that follow, I intend to focus upon the participants 
in the debates referred to above, the strategies evolved and deployed 
in the process of negotiating sociology's identity and authenticity 
within the domain of social science and culture generally. I shall 
examine too, the contingent relationship between the domain of its ideas 
and the strategic presentation of its case for social recognition, largely 
on the basis of its promise or potential alone. In saying that sociolo-
gists have been given to 'negotiating' sociology's intellectual and 
institutional forms, I do not mean that they have somehow participated 
in a process of overt, collective bargaining. Rather, the notion of 
negotiation is viewed as an activity which involves sociologists in 
recognising that others' prescriptions and expectations of the sociological 
enterprise, will affect directly, the status of the discipline's knowledge 
claims. Thus the construction of sociology is characterised by a distinc-
tive form of strategic discourse, the subtlety and complexity of which, 
will emerge when I examine in detail, specific moments in the discipline's 
history, especially during the inter and intra-war periods. 
Although it is not my intention to examine specific sociological theories, 
methodologies and practices, reference to them will occur occasionally, 
as I focus on the conditions and contexts (in an institutional sense) 
which form the 'framework of change', in terms of the grounding of socio-
logical knowledge in historical, economic, political and social events. 
The discursive organisation of sociology and the philosophLcal protocols 
which engender it, though not of direct relevance to my investigation, 
are, nevertheless recognised as a dimension of sociology which, though 
largely abstract, remain institutionally contingent. 
In the early part of the work, I intend to examine what I consider to 
be two crucial 'moment~ in sociology's inter-war history. The first 
moment comprises an account of a series of inter-war conferences devoted 
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to the evolving relationship between the different social science disci-
plines, with special reference to sociology. The conferences in question 
provided an important opportunity for sociologists to advance their 
project for a synoptic science of society, wherein sociology was to 
play a central, coordinating role. Such a science of society was considered 
by its architects to constitute a scientia scientiarum: a grandiose 
scheme, reminiscent of the projects of 19th Century positivists. My 
aim in focusing, on 
the middle and late 
the sociologists' arguments at the conferences of 
1930s, will 'be to highlight the recurring theme of 
sociology's place in the hierarchy of inter-war, British, social science. 
In particular, I shall consider the sociologists' strategy for advancing 
their case and the attempt by other social scientists to oppose it. 
A second and equally controversial 'moment' in the history of British 
social science will entail an examination of the growth of social science 
at the London School of Economics and Political Science, with special 
reference to sociology. Again it is my intention to enlarge upon the 
theme of sociology's advocatory dimension by an examination of a number 
of issues raised initially in the chapter on methodology. The episode 
in question will 
development within 
This will enable 
entail an extension of my examination of sociology's 
a complex and controversial institutional setting. 
me to investigate the fortunes of sociology within 
a series of opportunities and contradictions, as far as its institu-
tional and intellectual prospects were concerned. The analysis will 
encompass notions of the funding of knowledge; the production of knowledge 
in response to the objects and interests of individuals and organisations 
external to the community of social scientists; and the imposition of 
a particular scheme on which to base the future intellectual and institu-
tional destiny of British social science. 
subsequent chapters will be devoted to a more detailed and comprehensive 
examination of the intellectual and institutional configurat~ons which 
have influenced sociology during the period under examination. This 
will become apparent when I attempt to trace the fate of sociology during 
the intra-war years. The transformation of British society during this 
period will provide an opportunity to examine the social, economic and 
political imperatives affecting the reordering of knowledge, largely 
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on the basis of a universally recognised 'national need'. The war 
years will be viewed as a period of opportunity for social science, 
especially with the marked increase in political interest in those 
forms of knowledge which would lead not only to the successful conduct 
of the war, but the social and moral reconstruction of post-war Britain. 
Whereas the pre-war period had given rise to a widening cleavage within 
the sphere of sociology and a general move toward increased specialisation 
within other fields of social science, the war and its attendant imperatives, 
had led to a re-evaluation of . those forms of knowledge regarded as 
essential 
and social 
to the rebuilding of British 
planning via state control. 
society in an age of economic 
The political changes wrought 
by the coalition government and especially the incoming Labour administra-
tion of 1945 were regarded by many, not least the sociologists, as 
possible opportunities for the realisation of a reconstructionist sociology. 
Although laudable aspirations, could they be achieved, especially 
in view of the need for sociologists to challenge the established hierarchy 
of British social science - p3rt.i:cu1ar~:Y- the institutional and intellectual 
dominance of economics? 
The final part of the argument will focus on two particularly important 
issues, which I feel were crucial to not only sociology's post-war 
prospects, but the future of social science generally. The first I 
shall refer to as the education debate and the second, the research 
council debate. In fact the two 'debates' were, in most respects, 
connected by a common argument, namely, the role of the state in relation 
to the nature and purpose of higher education. 
tion of both the curriculum and the focus 
Henceforth, the determina-
of research (in this case 
within the domain of the social sciences), would arise within the political 
and administrative controversies over the most 'appropriate' educational 
policies to reflect the prevailing national need. In future, sociology's 
development would be contingent upon the increasing organisational 
and financial management of higher education and the institutional 
arrangements for research through the research council system. The 
funding and re-ordering of knowledge through the intervention of the 
state and its mediating agencies, represented a significant transformation 
within those structures of funding and control of the production of 
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knowledge in contrast to the pre-war period. The arguments and strategies 
deployed by the sociologists during the latter period, had been confined 
largely to the domain of a social science increasingly indifferent 
to the cause of a sociology seeking a central role in the reconstitution 
and control of the former disciplines. With the war and its aftermath 
came the possibility of regaining not only the interest of fellow social 
scientists in the potential of a reconst·ructionist sociology, but the 
additional support of politicians and other influentials, in assisting 
the discipline and its practitioners in their quest for intellectual 
and institutional autonomy. 
I will, 
on the 
through 
Provision 
an examination of the deliberations of the Committee 
' \ 
for Social and Economic Research (Cmnd. 6868, 1946) 
and its sUbsequent recommendations for the establishment of a University. 
Grants Sub-committee for Social Science and an Interdepartmental Committee 
for Social and Economic Research, explore the reaction of both sociologists 
"'-, and social scientists to the prospect of increasing state interest 
in the research and teaching of those subjects. Consideration will 
also be given to the question of whether or not the hierarchy of British 
social science had been affected significantly by the outcome of the 
Clapham debate. 
Although the social, political and economic contexts within which sociology 
has developed have changed over the decades since its pioneers proclaimed 
its intellectual and institutional bona fides, one feature of such 
proclamations has remained constant throughout the one hundred and 
fifty years of the discipline's history (based on Abrams' estimation 
(1981)): an in-built sensitivity, or insecurity harboured by sociologists 
over the identity and authenticity of sociology, in terms of its intrinsic, 
cognitive and organisational form, either actually or potentially. 
This may have something to do with its close proximity to other disciplines 
whose practitioners claim similar rights to special insight into human 
action and organisation. Considered thus, this project represents 
a modest attempt to examine and account for a recurring theme in the 
pursuit of sociology by its practitioners: an activity which has and 
continues to preoccupy sociologists, notwithstanding the additional 
task of establishing its substantive content of ideas and practice. 
The following three quotations give a clear indication of the sociologists' 
dilemma referred to above: 
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"We cannot yet assume that Sociology means the same thing 
to all people Not only are there still many who deny the 
bare existence of Sociology, but, what is more serious, among 
Sociologists there are still many deep divergences of view 
as to the nature and province of the enquiries which they 
professedly pursue in common. This divergence is, however, 
not a sign of disease but rather of the raw vigour and exhuber-
ance of youth. An enemy is doubtless entitled to make the 
most of the fact that the enthusiasts for a science have not 
hitherto been able to decide among themselves what their science 
is about." 
Thus wrote Hobhouse in 1908 (Abrams, 1968, pp.247-248) shortly after 
taking up the first Chair in Sociology at the L.S.E. He was conscious 
of not only the internal disagreement among sociologists over the intrinsic 
nature of their specific field of intere& and competence, but the adverse 
affect this was having on the discipline in terms of its public identity 
and performance. Twenty years later, Victor Branford would continue 
to lament the consequences of sociology's private and public troubles 
(Branford, 1928, p.341). 
"Can we not all work together now as we did at the beginning 
of the movement? At the best we are few and of no great strength 
confronting a resistant world, which is anti-sociological, 
when it is not un-sociological; and leavened by a slender 
margin of thinkers, writers and publicists to whom we can 
appeal. By long years of labour we have increased that margin, 
I fear by only an insignificant percentage. In view of the 
work still to do, we need surely more than ever to show a 
united front. The things that separate us, vis-a-vis a public, 
which, even in its educated members, is for the most part 
either indifferent or hostile to a generalised social science." 
Even by the middle 1970s, commentators on the schismatic nature of 
sociology would seek to place a positive construction on the discipline's 
private troubles, thus highlighting once again, the root of the problem 
in sociology's quest of autonomy (Pahl, 1974, p.504): 
"It would be a mistake to dismiss all the inner contortions 
of the subject as products of intellectual immaturity or paroch-
ialism. Indeed, I would argue that the current doubts, controv-
ersies and clashes of intellectual traditions may be seen 
as the essential seedbed from which we may get new growth in 
social theory." 
' 
' 
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Sociology's 'perpetual infancy', as Weber lamented, its perennial imminence 
seems still to constitute its promise. The discipline's unfulfilled 
potential gave substance and impetus to early programme statements 
and agendas for a branch of knowledge and practice, which, as its practi-
tioners realised, depended increasingly upon the construction -and deploy-
ment of strategies to secure a future which seemed to hold nothing 
but uncertainty. 
\ 
CHAPI'ER ONE 
METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
9 
Methodological Considerations 
1. Histories and sociologies of sociology 
Debates about sociology's nature and purpose are perpetually bound 
up in the discourse of its current dilemmas, crises and problematics 
etc., to the extent that widespread, rigorous and increasingly ritualised 
introspection has become a prominent feature of the field that its 
practitioners lay claim to. Central to the latter endeavour, is the 
additional complication, that defining the intellectual and institutional 
form of sociology has never been the prerogative of its practitioners 
alone. The participants in such debates, the issues at stake and the 
locus of discussions have, upon examination, revealed the considerable 
vulnerability of sociology to the different institutional (in the sense 
of the political, economic and social) resistances and opportunities 
which affect directly the development of any branch of knowledge. 
There is thus, in a sense, a multiple tension governing sociology's 
existence, whether accounting for it in its intellectual or institutional 
forms. 
Until quite recently, sociology has had to contend with an often hostile 
and once, almost fatal relationship with the other social sciences. 
Such a contested intellectual position within the human sciences was 
compounded by its precarious 'public presence', whereby it has been 
variously construed as, or indeed offered itself, as a panacea to willing 
politicians and social reformers. At other times, and in more controver-
sial circumstances it has retreated to a respectable and safe redoubt 
within academe, when its status was either confused, abused or threatened 
by what its critics conceived of as, mediocrity or dogma. In becoming 
eventually a permanent fixture of the academic curriculum, sociology 
had attained what most of its early practitioners regarded as an essential 
step in establishing and maintaining the discipline on a secure, institu-
tional basis. This would not necessarily explain how such a profusion 
of institutional and intellectual diversity came to pass, and although 
such an image of coherence and establishment would seem to indicate 
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an undisputed place for sociology within the education system specifically, 
and as part of culture generally, such a conception would be flawed. 
The position of sociology among the social sciences and humanities 
remains somewhat insecure with its disciplinary boundaries continually 
being disputed (Urry, 1981). The relationships of sociology both with 
allegedly non-scientific notions about society .and with other social 
sciences are uncertain and beset with problems of demarcation that 
touch upon each of the various claims which can be made for sociology: 
its purportedly superior precision of fact finding, the internal consistency 
of its theories, its scope, and its relevance. For many. of its practitioners, 
the latter claims form the basis of sociology as an authoritative science. 
To others, such claims cannot 
\ be substantiated, should never have 
been made on behalf of th~ discipline and will ultimately bring about 
its demise. 
I am not
0 
arguing that sociologists, until recently, have never contested 
among themselves or indeed with others, the essential nature of their 
enterprise. This fact gives sociology its socially contingent status 
vis-a-vis other branches of knowledge. Indeed, this aspect of its 
development in Britain represents a central feature of my argument. 
However, what I do contend in terms of both its intellectual and institu-
tional emergence is, that owing to its relatively late development 
as an academic subject and research activity; the scarcity of its practi-
tioners and protagonists in general; the absence of a coherent and 
distinctive corpus of theory and methods, for a substantial period 
of its existence and a further absence of a discernable intellectual 
ancestry, or history of intellectual 'achievement', were all factors 
which tended to induce sociologists during the formative period of 
the discipline, to promote and defend sociology largely on the fragile 
basis of its potential. This feature of sociology's development makes 
it somewhat unique within the wider field of contemporary human science. 
The claim that sociology is an exact, empirical science, or, that it 
is essentially a critical/interpretative synthesis, are consequent upon 
an appropriate history when substantiating either of the aforementioned 
Thus the formative period of sociology may be for some, the 
escape from metaphysical system building into the rigours of empiricism 
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with its associated methodological exactitude, and the allegedly corres-
ponding transition from such enlightenment to the despair recounted 
in the work of Geoffrey Hawthorn (1976). Just as natural science· 
is purportedly an enterprise of intrinsic and acquired social purpose, 
the former to render nature understandable and controllable, the latter, 
an unremitting quest for knowledge in the service of mankind, so too 
is sociology ascribed with a similar purpose, albeit in less Herculean 
terms than perhaps was the case in projects associated with Comte, Saint-
Simon and the positivists who reigned supreme in America from the 1930s 
to the 1960s. , Attempts to reconstruct and subsequently project the 
sociological enterprise upon the basis of a common nature (techne) 
can be only a partial a~count or explanation of either branch of knowledge's 
cultural dimensions. 
It is this disposition toward the contested forms of sociology which 
increasingly involved sociologists in the process of negotiating with 
others, its nature and social function. Such a process entailed often 
very subtle forms of strategy and tactics, which were consciously evolved 
in response to the audience to which the case for sociology was being 
addressed. 
I referred above to the notion of 'others' . By this I mean individuals, 
organisations (public and private), groups . and agencies, practitioners 
within other fields of knowledge, and anyone whom sociologists considered 
crucial to the expansion of their discipline. In referring to sociologists' 
concern with the importance of constructing appropriate strategies 
with which to expand the intellectual and institutional bases of their 
discipline, it is important to remember that shifts in sociological 
perspectives and concerns within the discipline are closely linked 
to the history of British society as a whole. This in turn, has affected the 
kinds of sociological problems that are felt to require investigation, 
in addition to emphasising the power of certain modes of explanation 
and analysis at the expense of others. Thus, the socially contingent 
nature of the disciplines's theoretical and practical dimensions, in 
turn gives rise to sociology's political and moral status among other 
branches of knowledge. All sociological activity, whether it be research, 
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theory construction or teaching, entails the production or reproduction 
of the aforementioned contingent form and ethical status of the discipline. 
Professor Donald MacRae (1974) has suggested a possible project which, 
if successfully pursued, might provide not only a more comprehensive 
and accurate account of the development of sociology in Britain, but 
could also shed some light on the issues raised above, especially the 
manner in which sociology is socially constructed. His notion of an 
'unconventional history of sociol-ogy', though not in itself a radical 
departure from conventional historical accounts, nevertheless provides 
a series of fruitful alternatives to orthodox histories of the discipline. 
The major limitation of MacRae's 'alternative history' is that it is 
essentially programmatic and confined to novel innovations, which are 
suggestive of possible approaches, without any reasonably detailed, 
substantive examples. MacRae's project also imparts a sense of 
incompleteness, or rather, a perpetual confusion and distortion in 
comprehending sociology's historical becoming, in the sense that much 
of its history remains unwritten. These 'faults' he attributes to 
the inadequacy of rendering a truly institutional history and the tendency 
to portray sociology's development as a continuous celebration of curnula-
tive successes in both its intellectual and organisational spheres. 
Of the necessity to focus on the institutional minutiae of such a history, 
MacRae has argued that (1974, pp.405-406): 
"Any history of sociology that is not concerned with its institu-
tional base will be nugatory. This is hard, boring work. 
It is concerned too with trivia, and this in a double sense. 
There are the trivia of the founding, the financing and the 
administration of journals, of university departments and 
of societies either of learning or of social reform and welfare .. 
The reason, then, why there is no satisfactory history of 
sociology, is in part that there is no real history of sociology 
as a social institution. 
In the matters of objectivity and a willingness to account for periods 
of discontinuity and failure in the history of sociology, he insists 
that these dimensions need to be explored and explained, emphasising 
that (1974, p.405): 
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"History must not be a story of success if it is to be valuable, 
nor should it take its parameters for the study of the past 
from the current fashions and strengths of the present. The 
importance of this justice, here, is for sociology itself." 
Further consideration of MacRae's thesis will indicate those elements 
of his analysis that I wish to incorporate in my own account of the 
development of sociology in Britian. 
In essence, MacRae (1974) contends that there exists 'no satisfactory 
history of sociology', nor, we are told, any 'satisfactory histories 
of aspects of sociology' (1974, p.401). This assumption is :fta·med as 
a question, .rather than·.an assertion, thus enabling him to rescue 'critical 
exegesis' from the implied criticism, that all else is 'propaedeutic 
to intellectual history', although he does cite a number of works as 
exceptions to the general rule. MacRae's criticisms and observations 
therefore imply a method, or strategy (as he prefers to call it) , for 
the construction of a 'satisfactory history of sociology'. What, according 
to MacRae, are the shortcomings of existing historical accounts of 
sociology? They can be listed briefly as follows: 
a) 
b) 
c) 
d) 
e) 
A conspicuous lack of the accurate chronicling of institutional 
history, whether it be of sociological societies and associations. 
An absence of institutional histories of the sociological 
teaching and research organisations of nations, or particular 
universities. 
A lack of historical accounts of 'quasi -institutions' like, 
for example, the Durkheim school. 
A dearth of institutional histories of the Foundations and 
charitable bodies directly or indirectly engaged in promoting 
sociological researches. 
The absence of 'collective studies' of sociologists, how trained 
and educated. 
f) 
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A further absence of studies of sociology as providing 'socially 
operative ideology' (MacRae considers Marxism as an example 
of this) which may include - Comteanism in Brazil, Spencerianism 
in Japan, Durkheimianism in Turkey. 
MacRae does acknowledge the fact that a number of important contributions 
have been made to the history of sociology especially in terms of what 
he considers to be, 
for historiography•, 
contributions, or rather, 'necessary prerequisites 
namely sections of Parson's Structure. of Social 
Action (1937), Ginsberg's Essays in Sociology and Social Philosophy 
(1956-61) 1 Aron's Main Currents in Sociological Thought (1965-67), 
and other 'special studies' such as W. Mommsen's Max Weber und die 
Deutsche Politik (1959), and J.D.Y. Peel's Herbert Spencer (1971). 
Although he refers also to the smaller literature of special studies 
of empirical investigation, notably Oberschall's Empirical Social Research 
in Germany, (1965), he includes too, the work of Philip Abrams, The 
Origins of British Sociology (1968) , a text which, I would suggest, 
cannot really be included in such a category. In setting out his strategy 
for an appropriate history of sociology, MacRae considers the probable 
reasons why no one has attempted previously, the kind of historical 
account which he feels is lacking in the field and which would serve 
to fill in the significant gaps in our knowledge of the development 
of the discipline. Again they can be conveniently listed as follows: 
a) 
b) 
c) 
'Sociologists are too busy doing sociology and that on the 
whole, historians have not been much interested'. 
Accurate chronicling is a very tedious and complex task and 
although it would not be necessary to emulate the monumental 
achievements representative of the works of Gibbon and his 
Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, there is, nevertheless, 
a need to attempt such an exercise, especially as the 'story 
of sociology is briefer and narrower'. 
The use of the term story by MacRae is important and I think 
his reasons for incorporating it in his strategy are worth 
noting (MacRae, 1974, p.403): 
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"The word story has entered my text. In the last resort all 
real history is narrative. Sociologists tend to think that 
narrative is easy: in fact it is very difficult and even in 
the fields of political and military transactions the number 
of completely successful narrative histories is very small. 
The history of sociology cannot be merely the history of ideas, 
but even as a history of ideas the difficulties are immense. 
No wonder, then, that what is often called the history of 
sociological thought has so often been dehydrated and second-hand 
biography plus intellectual exegesis." 
The above 'sho~tcomings' in existing histories of sociology and the 
accompanying reasons for their existence, leads MacRae to formulate 
a strategy for the production of an historical account which would 
reflect the components implied in the lists set out above and thus 
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give to sociology's development a more compelling and socio-historical 
grounding. MacRae's suggestions are somewhat unorthodox (at least 
for the period when he began to formulate the ideas upon which his paper 
is based; and when interviewed in 1980 they still provoked an intense 
debate) and rather than risk misinterpreting their relevance to his 
suggested project, I think it necessary to quote the relevant sections 
of his paper. 
MacRae begins his plan for a new approach to the history of sociology 
by singling out a feature of historical writing which he deems a drawback 
to the intended project (1974, p.403): 
"One thing that is not a strategy is biography. In the late 
19th century it was eccentric to define history as the sum. 
of an infinity of biographies, today it is merely absurd. 
That does not mean that one does not need biographies soundly 
based in scholarship. These should concern themselves with 
the milieux of their subjects as the writer attempted in his 
work on Herbert Spencer and as J.D. Y. Peel succeeded in doing 
in his study of the same writer. 
What we do not need are, I think, either works of piety, suppres-
sion and distortion like Marianne Weber's life of her husband, 
Max Weber: Ein Lebensbild (1926) or of psycho-biography. 
The latter element may, of this date permit - which in general 
they do not - a contribution to the psychological disciplines 
but not, the point is analytic, to either history or sociology." 
This 'problem' out of the way, MacRae concentrates on the more productive 
aspects of his strategy (1974, pp.403-404): 
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"One of the possible strategies is that of Lovejoy's justly 
famous first chapter of The Great Chain of Being (1936). 
This strategy can work only for what sociologists rather loosely 
call 'theory'. It is to treat the unit idea as the protagonist 
of the history. To be successful it demands minute scholarship 
and sustained application of a kind not yet, I believe, ever 
given to a sociological theme. It is at once a broadening 
and a narrowing approach: broadening because the genealogy 
of unitary concepts is always complex: narrowing because 
it isolates concepts from men and their circumstances." 
MacRae gives two examples of his notion of a sociological, 'unit idea', 
namely, function and community. A further strategy propounded by the 
author entails a critique of the sociology of knowledge (1974, p.404): 
"Another strategy would be through a critique of the sociology 
of knowledge and of why this activity has been so alluring 
and so, relatively, barren. Such a critique, using sociology 
as its empirical referrent either at large or in specific 
times and places, could not fail to be both valuable and 
historical. Indeed, if sociology is what it claims, its 
strengths and weaknesses manifests themselves in the sociology 
of knowledge." 
MacRae's notion of a critique of the sociology of knowledge assumes 
that all "persuasions" would, through introspection and comparison, 
come eventually to a better understanding of each others' enterprise 
within the discipline. MacRae's suggestion is not as superficial nor 
narcissistic as it may first appear. However, a problematic feature 
of such a project would entail the predetermination of the form that 
such a critique would take, as a critical analysis would necessitate 
the adoption of a specific theoretical perspective. This in itself 
implies some form of objective criteria with which to evaluate competing 
theories and a strategy for adjudication. 
MacRae continues with a series of procedures and categories which, 
when combined, give rise to the scope of his strategic approach to 
an historical account of the development of sociology (1974, p. 404): 
"But the basic requirements are still those of good, craftsman-
like, critical narrative history of men and ideas; of institutions, 
groups and schools; of research techniques, results and inter-
relations with ideas, with theory, with policy and ideology; 
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of the social milieux, formation and on.g~ns of sociologists; 
and the growth of sociological community, its communication 
network - not journals and conferences alone - and the value 
judgements which operate in it." 
In concluding his strategy for a 'satisfactory history of sociology', 
MacRae argues that apart from the intrinsic merit of such a project, 
two additional and important aspects emerge. First, he considers his 
scheme to be "inevitably diagnostic", and second, it would be a further 
step in establishing sociology as a "major form of human self-consciousness 
in our time" (1974, p.405). 
There is much in Donald MacRae's thesis which is both contentious and 
novel. This is due, in part, to his style of argument and his commitment 
to the preservation of sociology from ideological taint and exploitation. 
A number of ideas incorporated within MacRae's notion of a satisfactory· 
history of sociology have appeared in other publications by him (MacRae 
1960, 1961, and 1964). Although he concentrates on the institutional 
element of such a history, there is sufficient evidence in his argument 
to suggest the relevance of both the sociology of sociology and the 
sociology of knowledge, to the proposed strategy. Considered thus, 
it would appear reasonable to categorise his general approach to analysis, 
as methodologically eclectic. 
There is, I believe, another important reason for adopting MacRae's 
eclectic approach to the study of sociology's development in Britain, 
especially in view of my contention that the sociology of sociology 
necessarily entails the incorporation of a sociology of knowledge. 
This relates to the problematic nature of sociology's 'object' of study~ 
the nature of sociological discourse as a means of comprehending and 
accounting for its object of study (in all its complex and contestable 
forms) and the bearing all this has on the chang:ing status of the disci-
pline's epistemological and organisational nature as a social process. 
One recent study in the sociology of knowledge has attempted to explore 
the interdependency of the above approach with that of a wider sociological 
perspective, albeit for a study of scientific knowledge. Michael Mulkay's 
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Science and the 
useful 
views 
Sociology of Knowledge (1979) provides ; new and very 
and insights into an alternative account of customary 
Mulkay has endeavoured to account for the devel-
strategies 
of science. 
opment of scientific thought in terms of the influences of non-scientists 
and by the actions and cultural acquisitions of scientists themselves 
in non-scientific contexts. The interesting feature of Mulkay' s work 
is that with adaptation, its central hypothesis and the mode of analysis 
employed to account for the growth of scientific knowledge in society, 
could serve a similar purpose in examining sociology. There are several 
aspects .of Mulkay's project that I wish to identify and consider briefly, 
as I believe that with an element of experimentation and substitution, 
they support my own methodological intentions, and highlight a common 
feature of both my own and Mulkay's project; that of the primary role 
of science within contemporary Western culture as a major influence 
in shaping the modern episteme. 
Mulkay has considered one particular aspect of the production of scientific 
knowledge which, I believe has implications for an understanding of 
the development of sociology, especially its tendency, during the inter-war 
period and up to and beyond the post-reconstructionist, pre-Heyworth 
eras: the tendency of many of its practitioners to subscribe to, and 
deploy the norms of science as an integral component of their technical 
discourse. The normative structure of science serves as not only quasi-
technical vocabularies of meaning within the social scientific community 
and the activities associated with it, but also as a resource in the 
construction of strategies and negotiating tactics, crucial to the 
expansion of its institutional boundaries. Furthermore, the d~loyment 
of such strategies serve as a means of portraying the discipline as 
but one among a number of other scientific endeavours, seeking official 
recognition and support within those political and administrative 
domains, where decisions affecting the institutional future 0f such· disc),-
plines are taken. Recourse to the aforementioned vocabularies albeit 
somewhat modified, also serve a useful purpose in the public domain, 
where the credibililty of sociology is regularly contested. Mulkay 
has considered the relationship between social norms and the production 
of scientific knowledge, and it is the role of the actor (sociologist/ 
scientist) and the use of purposive vocabularies that is relevant to 
my approach (Mulkay, 1979, p.93): 
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"The meaning of norms is always socially contingent; that 
is, it depends on interpretation by actors in varying social 
contexts. Because any specific norm can be made consistent 
with a wide range of apparently different actions, we cannot 
regard the production of knowledge as a simple consequence 
of conformity to any particular set of normative formulations. 
I have suggested instead that it is more appropriate to treat 
the norms of science· as vocabularies which are employed 
by members in negotiating meanings for their own and their col-
leagues ~ctions." 
The importance -of Mulkay 's observations stem from his belief that the 
process of negotiation, on the basis of a 'considerable variety of 
formulations' (norms as vocabulaiies), leads to interpretations which 
become accepted by participants through the formal and complex processes 
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of 'social interaction and negotiation', (1979, p.94): 
" that is, as members exchange views and attempt to convince, 
persuade and influence each other, these views may be modified, 
abandoned or reinforced." 
Thus social negotiation (in Mulkay 's case, within the field of science) 
is contingent upon such factors as, "members' interests, their intellectual 
and technical commitments, members' control over valued information 
and research facilities and the strength of their claim to scientific 
authority" (1·979, p. 94) . Mulkay also provides important insights into 
the spurious attempt by some observers to differentiate between patterns 
of technical and social norms which provide important sources for scien-
tists in their negotiations. Again his arguments and observations 
apply to an analysis of attempts by sociologists to negotiate within 
similar contexts and for virtually the same reasons (1979, p.94): 
"Not only are social norms socially variable, but cognitive/ 
technical norms are also open to a considerable range of 
interpretation in any particular research area. In other 
words, general evaluative criteria such as 'consonance', 
'replicability', as well as the content of specific bodies 
of knowledge and technique, all require interpretation in 
particular instances in much the same way as do social norms 
(B~hme, 1977) . " 
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Mulkay then points to the feature which has equal relevance to his 
study and mine, especially in terms of intra-sociological debates on 
the nature of its competing forms and the implication of its contested 
status in terms of its future intellectual credibility and institutional 
expansion. As I have stated earlier, the evaluation of the discipline 
and the knowledge it produces, is a social process, involving individuals 
and agencies 'external' to the discipline, and subject to negotiation, 
(1979, pp.94-95): 
"Indeed, it is difficult to envisage how technical resources 
could be employed differently from social resources in this 
respect because, as every case study demonstrates, there is 
no clear separation between the negotiation of social meaning 
and the assessment of knowledge-claims. Both social and 
technical formulations have to be selected and interpreted 
by participants in particular instances: and both kinds of 
resources are inextricably combined in the sequence of informal 
interaction as well as formal demonstration whereby specific 
knowledge-claims come to be ratified. (Thus the distinction 
between social and technical resources must not be reified. 
Cognitive/technical formulations are merely one kind of interpre-
tive social resource)." 
There is another sense in which Mulkay attempts to demonstrate the 
essentially 'socially contingent nature of science' (one which has 
received considerable attention by Yaron Ezrahi (1972)). Mulkay's portrayal 
of the status of science, and its practitioners' dependency on common 
cultural resources to negotiate its intellectual and institutional 
presence, highlights the fact that sociology too is confronted with 
an identical set of extra-disciplinary protocols when faced with 
the need to negotiate its organisational needs and social relevance, 
although Mulkay's thesis does not incorporate the latter reference 
to sociology. What Mulkay does have to say about science in the former 
context, applies equally to sociology (Mulkay, 1979, p.ll8): 
" when scientists enter social contexts outside the research 
community, such as the wider realm of political activity, 
they select from and reinterpret their cultural resources, 
both technical and social, in response to the social context 
and in accordance with their position within it." 
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I will give detailed examples of sociologists and other social scientists' 
attempts to 'select from and reinterpret their cultural resources, 
both technical and social' , whenever they engaged in strategic discourse 
to expand both the institutional and subsequently, the intellectual 
boundaries of their respective disciplines*. Moreover, the general 
practice of seeking sympathetic allies within existing institutional 
arrangements necessary to sociology's development, will provide clues 
to understanding the relative success, or otherwise, of divergent 
forms of sociological theory and practice; the continuity or discontinuity 
of one tradition over another and the establishment of a preferred 
scholarship in opposition to alleged orthodoxies and ideologies. In 
terms of agendas, prpgrarnrnes and priorities for the development of 
sociology, their construction and successful implementation, demonstrate 
the connection between a conceptual scheme (including a philosophy 
of social science) for a branch of knowledge and the material conditions 
which influence its realisation. Indeed, it is the reference to what 
Mulkay regards as the "imaginative inheritence" (1979, p. 99), within 
the composite discourse of scientists and 'others', as the former group 
engages the latter in social contexts and arguments crucial to the 
intellectual and institutional expansion of the domain of science, 
that will provide clues to the strategic presentation of sociology 
by its practitioners, for purposes similar to those of their scientist 
counterparts. It is Holton (1973, p.lOl) who has given a clear indication 
of the consequences for science and subsequently society, of the engagement 
of scientists in debates in the public domain, on the nature and purpose 
of their enterprise: 
* 
"What is interesting is that on certain occasions, during 
the transformation of conceptions from the personal to the 
public realm, the scientists, perhaps unknowi~8(Y smuggles 
the commitment of his individual system, and that of his 
society, into his supposedly neutral, value-indifferent luggage." 
See Appendix One for a brief account of the significance of the 
inaugural lecture in terms of sociology's advocatory dimension. 
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The situation referred to by Holton has more problematical and controversial 
implications for the sociologist when a similar attempt is made to 
produce a repertoire of basic themes or presuppositions to span the 
boundaries between the domain of professional sociology and the wider 
community. Moreover, the contrasting nature of sociological thought 
with that of natural science, places the sociologist in a more contentious 
and intellectually precarious position to that of his or her counterpart 
in the sciences. This is particularly the case when sociologists endeavour 
to defend publicly, the entitlement of the discipline to receive the 
recognition and resources it requires to sustain and advance its endeavour~ 
The key to understanding the relative 'success' of science to sociology's 
case in such public debates, lays partially in the historical ethos 
and authority of science (and the concomitant reverence with which 
the public hold its ideas and practitioners) but mainly in the ability 
of scientists to sustain two interdependent illusions: the logical 
process of discovery, and the separation of scientific knowledge and 
practice from other non-scientific, branches of knowledge. In the 
case of the former, great emphasis and reliance is placed on the inviola-
bility of the scientific method and the formal processes of reasoning 
in science. Science is thus construed as an exemplar for other forms 
of knowledge and practice. In the case of the latter, the purported 
disassociation of science from the more speculative and less precise 
intellectual disciplines, is linked specifically to the position of 
science in contemporary culture (Mulkay, 1979, p.99): 
"This is one of the crucial differences between modern science 
and its predecessors. The cultural and social roots of knowledge 
have been hidden away in modern science, on the mistaken 
assumption that true knowledge should not involve reliance 
on unverifiable assumptions." 
Holton (1973) has presented a number of case studies to demonstrate 
that the cultural connection between science and society today, is 
less distant than it is made to appear. Again, Mulkay (1979, p. 99) 
has developed this argument within his conception of the role of 'informal 
negotiation' as a mediating factor in, and between the wider public 
domain: 
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"There is in practice a continual cultural exchange between 
science and the wider society. Interpretative resources 
enter science mainly through informal thinking, usually with 
only a very limited awareness of their external or1g1ns on 
the part of participants. They are refined and modified 
in the course of informal negotiation; and they are allowed 
into the public annals of science only after appropriate 
reformulation. These interpretative resources are not generated 
by the 'facts of nature', nor by the social life of a segregated 
research community alone. They must be understood at least 
in part as products of the social processes of society at 
large." 
Thus the self-proclaimed and ascribed status of scientific knowledge 
arises - as a distinctly sociological process. In the case of sociology 
itself, its practi tio~ers and their knowledge claims undergo a similar 
process of informal negotiation with a number of added difficulties. 
Although Holton has shown that scientists can often reach their conclusions 
on the basis of very haphazard means, and that all too often there 
is no regular procedure, no logical system of discovery, no simple 
continuous development, and that the process of discovery has been 
as varied as the temperament of the scientist, the ethos and authority 
of science within the public domain and as an exemplar for other practi-
tioners to emulate within their own fields of endeavour, remains a 
vital component of the scientists' strategic repertoire. The apparent 
success of scientists in sustaining the illusion of the 'power' of 
science, rests upon the ability of its practitioners to intervene in 
the processes of nature, rendering it understandable and controllable, 
with the additional benefit of converting such knowledge and practice 
to the 'service of mankind' through industrial and technological processes 
and artifacts. 
The technical competence of its practitioners, the practical performance 
of science, and its integral relationship to the national economy have 
since the last war in particular, become one and the same in terms 
of the attributes of an allegedly prosperous economy and an enlightened 
culture. This is potent imagery and is constantly conjured up in debates 
about the provision and distribution of resources to and within the 
sciences, either by way of the 'science vote' to the Research Councils 
(including the Social Science Research Council) or, the funding of 
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the universities via the University Grants Committee. Despite the 
controversy over the methodological basis of scientific discovery, 
or indeed the assumption that the natural world, as the object of study 
by scientists, is insensible, yet an ordered and orderable entity; 
the powerful and attractive image of the scientist as a manipulator 
of 'natural forces', led sociologists in the formative period of the 
discipline, to present sociology within the scientific mode and by 
way of a social world equally susceptable to the manipulative control 
attending the pursuit of an authentic science. Epistemology, methodology 
and ontology became of necessity, central components of sociological 
debate and analysis. The project of a 'scientific sociology' increasingly 
faltered, both as an intra-disciplinary issue and subsequently, as 
a feature of a public and certainly more political debate over the 
evaluation of those forms of knowledge and practice which were considered 
most responsive to a changing array of social, economic and poltiical 
imperatives, expressed generally, through different versions of 'the 
national need'. 
In referring to Mulkay's argument on the 'social negotiation of knowledge' 
in various kinds of scientific research, the notion of 'context' emerges 
as a fundamental influence on the production of scientific knowledge. 
Although a sociology of knowledge would assume the crucial significance 
of social context to an account of the content, growth, diversity and 
diffusion of ideas in time, it is Mulkay's notion of the 'social negotiation 
of knowledge' which is of importance to my emphasis on the sociology 
of knowledge as an implicit feature of my account of the development 
of sociology for the period in question. Such a methodologically eclectic 
approach to the analysis is essential, in view of the ·historical moments 
:r have chosen to examine and explain. 
2. 'Acts of Justification' and the Social Construction of Sociology 
Although it is not possible to separate the nature of sociology from 
conceptions of its social purpose, both its practitioners and non-
sociologists in particular, have tended to frame an understanding of 
its enterprise within such a comprehension and evaluative context, 
from Comte .to the present day. Sociology's perpetually precarious 
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relationship to other branches of the human sciences, and in turn, 
the position of the latter group of disciplines· within the wider i·ntellectual 
cutlure, derives from a dilemma referred to by Michel Foucault (1974, 
p.348); 
"What explains the difficulty of the 'human sciences', their 
precariousness, their uncertainty as sciences, their dangerous 
familiarity with philosophy, their ill-defined reliance upon 
other domains of knowledge, their perpetually secondary and 
derived character, and also their claim to universality, 
is not, as is often stated the extreme density of their object; 
it is not the metaphysical status or the inerasable transcendence 
of this man they speak of, but rather the complexity of the 
epistemological configuration in which they find themselves 
placed, their constant relation to the three dimensions that 
give them their space." 
Foucault proceeds to trace the origin of the dilemma of the social 
sciences to a precise and 'extremely well-determined epistemological 
arrangement in history', namely the three-dimensional space of the 
modern episteme (Foucault, 1974, pp.346-347). These 'dimensions' comprise 
the mathematical and physical sciences; the 'sciences of language, life, and 
the production and distribution of wealth', which Foucault argues when 
combined with the first dimension, serve as a 'common place', by way 
of a II domain of the mathematicisable in linguistics, biology, and 
economics" (1974, p.347). The third dimension entails that of philosophical 
reflection, itself forming a common plane with the dimension of linguistics 
biology, and economics. Thus arises a paradox, or rather the dilemma 
of the place of the human sciences within the three-dimensional structure, 
referred to above (1974, p.347): 
"From this epistemological trihedron the human sciences are 
excluded, at least in the sense that they cannot be found 
along any of its dimensions or on the surface of any of the 
planes thus defined. But one can equally well say that they 
are included in it, since it is in the intersiecies of these 
branche.9 of knowledge, or, more exactly, in· the volume defined 
by their three dimensions, that the ·human sciences have their 
place. This situation (in one sense minor, in another sense 
privileged) places them in relation to all other forms of 
knowledge: they have the more or less deferred, but constant, 
aim of giving themselves, or in any case of utilising, at 
one level or another, a mathematical formalisation; they 
proceed in accordance with models or concepts borrowed from 
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biology, economics, and the sciences of language; they address 
themselves to the mode of being of man which philosophy is 
attempting to conceive at the level of radical finitude, 
whereas their aim is to traverse all its empirical manifestations." 
In deriving intellectual form and content from within the interstic¥es 
of the aforementioned branches of knowledge, Foucault asserts what 
he considers to be an additional project for the human sciences: one 
which represents a primary task of an authentic science (1974, pp.345-346): 
"Hence that double and inevitable contestation: that which 
lies at the root of the perpetual controversy between the 
sciences of man and the sciences proper - the first laying 
an invincible claim to be the foundation of the second, which 
are ceaselessly obliged in turn to seek their own foundation, 
the justification of their method, and the purification of 
their history, in the ·teeth of 'psychologism', 'sociologism', 
and 'historicism'; and that which lies at the root of the 
endless controversy between philosophy, which objects to 
the naivete with which the human sciences try to provide their 
own foundation, and those same human sciences which claim 
as their rightful object what would formerly have constituted 
the domain of philosophy." 
It is within the contest to establish and retain an autonomous epistemology 
and the consequences this has for attempts by the individual human 
sciences to assert their respective disciplinary independence, that 
gives rise to sociology's perennial problematic. I use the wor·.d 'attempt', 
as the quest for autonomy is perpetually frustrated by two factors 
highlighted by Foucault, one of which refers to the primary role of 
"concepts" (1974, p.357), the other, the consequence that attempts 
to claim exclusive, proprietorial rights over certain of those concepts, 
has for the different human sciences (1974, pp.357-358): 
"Thus, these three pairs of function and norm, 
rule, signification and system completely cover 
domain of what can be known about man ... 
conflict and 
the entire 
All these concepts occur throughout the entire volume of 
the human sciences and are valid in each of the regions included 
within it: hence the frequent difficulty in fixing limits, 
not merely between the objects, but also between the methods 
proper to psychology, sociology, and the analysis of literature 
and myth ... In this way all the human sciences interlock 
and can always be used to interpret one another: their frontiers 
become blurred, intermediary and composite disciplines multiply 
endlessly, and in· the end their proper object may even disappear 
altogether." 
n 
( 
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Foucault goes on to say that the project of the human sciences is not 
futile and that its composite disciplines take on an independent form 
through the use of "formal criterion for knowing what is on the level", 
(1974, p.358) for subjects like psychology and sociology, by way of 
using a 'fundamental' model in addition to distinctive 'secondary models', 
thus making it possible to " know at what point one begins to 'psycholo-
gise' or 'sociologise' ... " (1974, p.358). 
In a later ch"a.J;t:er, I· shall endeavour to give a number of concrete 
examples of sociology's attempt to sustain its claim as not only an 
autonomous branch of knowledge and practice within the social sciences, 
but, during a particular moment in its inter-war history, as the most 
appropriate discipline within that group of subjects to provide the 
organisational and intellectual bases of a synoptic science of society. 
On that occasion, one which coincided with another attempt to reconstruct 
the same group of disciplines within what became known as William Beveridge's 
'Natural Bases Scheme', constant reference was made to the fundamental 
role of appropriate methodologies for the different social sciences, 
with the example of the natural sciences as the exemplar. Again, Foucault 
has alluded to the consequences of this when the architects of social 
science were striving to develop both a discrete epistemology and a 
practical focus for the object of their study (1974, pp.366-367): 
"It is useless, then, to say that the 'human sciences' are 
false sciences; they are not sciences at all; the configuration 
that defines their positivity and gives them their roots 
in the modern episteme at the same time makes it impossible 
for them to be sciences; and if it is then asked why they 
assumed that title, it is sufficient to recall that it pertains 
to the archaeological definition of their roots that they 
summon and receive the transference of models borrowed from 
the sciences western culture has constituted, under the 
name of man, a being who, by one and the same interplay of 
reasons, must be a positive domain of knowledge and cannot 
be an object of science." 
It is thus, as Foucault has argued, that the 'justification' of the 
methods of the social sciences, and the 'purification' of their history; 
the 'ceaseless obligation' on the part of their practitioners to seek 
their own foundation and the 'endless controversy' between themselves 
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and other, more ancient and established forms of knowledge, that will 
provide the focus of my own analysis of the development of sociology 
in Britain over the ·period in question. The aim of my investigation 
is quite simple in terms of Foucault's deceptively subtle and provocative 
thesis: I wish only to discern those moments in the development of sociology 
which characterise Foucault's notion of the 'endless controversy' , 
especially the quest for disciplinary autonomy via a 'foundation' which 
represents intellectual and institutional space within the wider context 
of the modern episteme. My major concern then, will be with acts of justification, 
and their associated forms of strategic discourse, tactical negotiations 
and the consequences that the former 'acts' have had for the 'purification' 
of the discipline.* 
Sociology's development in Britain entailed a gradual incorporation 
within existing and changing institutional arrangements. The latter 
institutional contexts became increasingly influenced by more dominant, 
or. pervasive forms of knowledge, like science and the engineering/techno-
logical 'sciences': : and~,.the concomitant influence of those discipline$1 
practitioners within social settings other than their attributable sphere• 
of influence and expertise. The transitional process affecting sociology, 
its transformation from a disparate collectivity of ideas and individuals 
to an increasingly institutionalised and formal branch of knowledge, 
occurred despite the internal schisms over its intrinsic nature,** 
and more importantly, its social purpose. The dissent among its practi-
tioners 
* 
** 
derived from not only the expected differences between existing 
The works of Baldamus (1.972), and Horkheimer and Adorno (1973) 
have shed additional light on this dimension of sociology's 
development. The former theorist, through an exploration 
of the disicpline 's "collective community" and its associated 
"collective style of thought". The latter authors, in terms 
of sociologists' attempts to attain disciplinary autonomy 
through a "positive science". Joharn Goudsblom (1977, p.lSO 
ff., and 1970, pp.l-45) and Shils (1970, pp.810-814) have 
attempted to set these issues within a wider, social context. 
This is made abundantly clear in Kettler et al (1984, pp.ll8-124) 
when considering the contributions of Karl Mannheim to sociology 
in Britain between the two world wars .. 
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theories and methodologies, but as a result of a significant degree 
of divergence over the aims of the discipline. The crucial point to 
bear in mind here, is the apparent failure on the part of many sociologists 
to recognise the contingent relationship between the two~ the former 
being the legitimate preoccupation of a professor of sociology, the 
latter, an activity to engage the minds and time of 'others'. What 
many failed to appreciate was the effect that the 'others' would begin 
to have upon the determination of the content of ideas and practice 
within sociology itself. 
I have, at several points in the text above, referred to two aspects 
of sociology's extant, and evolving form, namely its nature and purpose. 
Although I have taken them to represent respectively, the general dimensions 
of the discipline's epistemological content and its social actuality, 
it may be germane at this juncture to enlarge upon the .. , significance 
of these two dimensions, especially 'sociology's much proclaimed potential, 
itself an expression of its practitioners and others' comprehension 
of its social purpose, as either a science or non-science, the social 
panacea of the modern era, or, a form of social thought and action 
which would displace social revolution with a techno-bureaucratic evolution. 
This is not to assume that sociology's epistemological nature is neither 
complex nor relevant to a discussion of its purpose , but that its 
cognitive dimension is influenced by the moral and political prescriptions 
imposed upon the practice of sociology, both within and increasingly, 
from mJ:side the discipline. It is within the process of establishing 
the social purpose of sociology, the intra-disciplinary contest, and 
the extra-disciplinary conflict of setting its agendas through time, 
that both sustains and imperils its existence. Notions of promise 
and potential are not necessarily rhetoric, but declared responses 
to the demands made upon the discipline as perceived by both its practi-
tioners and those who sponsor its enterprise, and anticipate, or experience 
the fruits of its labour. Considered thus, the limits of its endeavours 
are not necessarily set by the so-called failure of its practitioners 
to construct a coherent and comprehensive body of theory and practice, 
equivalent to the natural sciences (for some the primary object of 
sociology), but rather, its potentialities and limitations ~rise from 
successful, (or unsuccessful) engagement in debates about the nature 
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and purpose of the discipline, and the controversial implications of 
social knowledge for social action. Such debates, the participants, 
their location, the significance of the occasion, the inherent discourse 
and strategies employed to articulate the case 'for' sociology become 
crucial to an understanding of the development of the discipline through 
time and within a changing social milieu. 
There is another 
misunderstood, or 
construed solely 
sense in which sociology's purpose may be either 
misconstrued. The notion of purpose should not be 
as a form of social utility of knowledge, (I shall 
enlarge upon this conception of the discipline when discussing Philip 
Abrams' (1981) 'models' of sociology's enterprise) rather, and in relation 
to the variety of intentional or designated programmes for the discipline, 
sociology's purpose continues to be portrayed variously as a means 
of intellectual liberation, social critique, a fundamental interpretative/ 
analytical tool, a science (both 'hard' and 'soft'), and the basic 
component of a liberal education. The aforementioned are either comple-
mentary, or contrasting ways of thinking about and accounting for society, 
social action and human agency in time. They also imply appropriate 
forms of methodology. Thus, notions of nature and purpose are inextricably 
linked. Purpose does not necessarily mean that sociology is essentially 
goal oriented or task directed, on either a modest or grandiose scale. 
This depends on both the sociologist's and non-sociologist's conception 
of the field and an appropriate operational definition of the 
discipline, which may not be commonly shared. In many respects, the 
latter problem is viewed by sociologists and historians of the discipline, 
as its central dilemma, giving rise to sociology's apparent hetrogeneity. 
Debates about the nature and purpose of sociology cannot be the prerogative 
of its professors alone. It is this characteristic that distinguishes 
it from natural science, at least to the apparent extent that scientists 
have been more successful in separating the more esoteric and complex 
aspects of their craft from other activities crucial to the development 
of science, namely, 
their disciplines 
funding their research, generally institutionalising 
and professionalising their practitioners. Such 
activities have tended to be less fraught, notwithstanding the intercession 
of 'funders', politicians and civil servants, than has historically 
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been the case for the social sciences, especially sociology. The 
former disciplines, through the efforts of scientists and their particularly 
influential political lobbies, have successfully engendered the social 
credibility of science, in part from the fortunate conjunction of science 
to modern technology and its associated economic imperatives. This 
has been the case in Britain, at least since the war.* 
Whatever sociology was construed to be, became as complex an issue 
as determining and asserting its social purpose. The search for allies 
within the existing institutional arrangements necessary to sociology's 
development (what I consider to be the pursuit of sociology) provide 
clues to understanding the relative success, or otherwise, of divergent 
forms of sociologic;.;il theory_ and practice, the continuity or discontinuity 
of one tradition over another and the establishment of a preferred 
scholarship in opposition to alleged orthodoxies and ideologies. 
I have argued above, that Foucault has made an attempt to situate the 
social sciences within the 'three-dimensional structure of the episteme' . 
More important to my argument though, is the manner in which the human 
sciences, with specific reference to sociology, have managed to consolidate 
and sustain their existence within those Foucaultian 'dimen-
sions'. Again, Foucault has suggested that it is by way of 'acts of 
justification' that the human sciences continue to perpetuate their 
respective enterprises. Indeed, such 'acts' are crucial to_ my notion 
of sociology's advocatory dimension, providing a medium within which to 
* Several attempts have been made to examine the response of 
sociology to the claim that it possesses a 'natural' affinity 
with a radical-liberal tradition within British politics. 
It is in this sense that sociology has been subjected to 
detailed -scrutiny within a context of political imperatives, 
(cf. Bernstein (Re·x (ed.), 1974); Ziff (Abrams (ed.), 1980); 
and in terms of the social career of social theory, Gouldner 
(1971). 
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examine the controversial, unconventional and certainly the complex 
minut.iae of evidence, which MacRae believes would have a crucial bearing 
on accounts of the development of sociology, but often becomes discarded 
in the pursuit of methodolatry. Awkward, seemingly uncategorisable 
information, evidence or data, constitutes a significant proportion 
of the supporting material and its consideration within the advocatory 
dimension. Moreover, and in keeping with MacRae's project for a faithful 
and detailed history of sociology, a comprehensive account should encompass 
that which is often ignored by the historian, or that which is given 
a cursory reference in passing, or, worse still, the use of categories 
and contexts of such huge, amorphous and over arching dimensions, that 
the historical account can only retain its coherence and meaning in 
somewhat general terms, and within academically acceptable limits of 
abstractness. Considered thus, histories of the development of sociology 
such as Mullins (1974), animated by his 'discovery' of the standard American 
sociologist' (1974, pp. 316-317), although incorporating sociologists 
as vital participants in the construction of the discipline, (thus 
rescu.ing the account from an abstracted and disembodied catalogue 
of core ideas and theories), relegates the importance of the individual 
sociologist (and his or her \\Ork) to one of 
elites and in terms of a perpetual 
a name within a circulation of 
citation index. The sociologist 
as a person possessing motives (sincere and alterior), aims, aspirations 
and other sensitivities and needs, are forgotten in accounts like Mullins. 
The aforementioned emotions, features of character and biography exist 
in addition to the degree of erudition possessed by a sociologist, · 
·through his or her specialised command of the subject matter. Moreover, 
it is the combination of these factors, when given expression through 
the political necessity of acts 
sociologist as, simultaneously, 
of justificationj that establish the 
a scholar/practitioner and citizen. 
It is because of the object of the sociologist's study, the fact that 
he or she is part and parcel of that same entity in an intimate and 
interacting, historical sense, and the additional features of a common 
language and culture of which the sociologist cannot dispossess himself 
or herself of, all of which precede, and compromise claims of scientific 
detachment. This is perhaps why the quest for autonomy, by way of 
many strategies, the most noteworthy being the vehicle of an authentic 
science, have become a prominent feature of the wider sociological 
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enterprise. Certainly Alvin Gouldner's work, For Sociology (1973) 
perhaps more than his earlier thesis, The Coming Crisis of Western 
Sociology (1971), represents an attempt to address the issue of the 
inescapable morality of the sociological enterprise with particular 
reference to the plight of the sociologist. 
3. Sociology as Advocacy Abrams' 'Five Models' 
It is important to distinguish what I shall refer to as sociology's 
advocatory dimension from other notions of advocacy, especially that 
attributed to Philip Abrams' use of the term within his conception 
of sociology's 'five models' (Abrams, 198lb). This will then enable 
\ 
me to present the advocatory dimension, with reference to not only 
concrete examples of it as action and discourse in the social construction 
of sociology, but as a category for the analysis and explanation of 
the continual negotiation between sociologists and others in the quest 
for intellectual and institutional autonomy, mainly through what I 
have referred to above as acts of justification . These in themselves 
constitute a dependence upon the strategic presentation of the discipline 
in terms of its substantive nature and social purpose. 
On what was to be Philip Abrams' last public and professional performance 
as a 'professor' of sociology, he was, once again engaged in the promotion 
of the discipline, with a style and conviction borne of a commitment 
to the demonstrable use of sociology. The occasion in question was 
the Annual Meeting of the British Association for the Advancement of 
Science, in fact its one hundred and fiftieth anniversary as an Association. 
The opportunity and the occasion, provided an ideal context in which 
to mount both a strategic defence of the discipline in the face of 
growing, political hostility toward it, and simultaneously, celebrate 
the prospect of sociology's future, through a demonstration of its 
general social utility, and certainly its unfulfilled potential. Ironically, 
Abrams' contribution to the anniversary meeting, by way of its timing 
and poignancy as a stand against the prev·ail.ing political and economic 
imperatives which were eroding increasingly the institutional and 
intellectual development of sociology in Britain, was itself a primary 
example of sociology's advocatory dimension. I shall return 
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to an examination of that occasion later in this section of the chapter. 
Suffice it to say that Abrams' paper, "The Uses of British Sociology 
1831-1981", reflected the passionate, professionalising instincts of 
those earlier sociologists, who sought to enhance the institutional 
and professional prospects of their chosen field, through the establishment 
of their own Section in the British Association. The history of the 
latter episode in sociology's odyssey has been carefully documented 
by Geoffrey Nelson (1975). The importance of Nelson's thesis, in terms 
of its relevance to my argument, ~elates to his emphasis on the strategies 
deployed by social scientists (with special reference to sociologists) 
to gain essential recognition from II existing intellectual elites 
and from society as p whole" (Nelson, 1975, p.237). Nelson regards 
such recognition as a condition of entry to key institutional arrangements 
within society, without which no discipline could hope to achieve and 
sustain, intellectual and institutional autonomy.* Nelson employs 
the notion of a strategic dimension to explain the integration and 
development of sociology within scholarly institutions like the British 
Association. Although his account tends to portray 'strategic events' 
in a somewhat mechanistic and to a certain extent, deterministic manner, 
his deployment of the concept within an historical account is nevertheless, 
most revealing. I tend to assume, that within such a seemingly rational 
and methodical approach to some collectively identified goal, there 
lurks the prospect of unanticipated events and influences; the usurpation 
by 'external' agencies of original aims and motives, and occasionally 
and unexpectedly, serendipity. The notion of strategy tends to imply 
a logical and coherent plan of action - the term is applied usually 
to things military - and yet it is defined as an 'art'. I also assume 
* While I recognise both the importance and relevance of the process 
of professionalisation to the overall development of sociology, 
a concerted move to 'professionalise' the discipline in Britain 
only began after the inauguration of the British Sociological 
Association in 1950. Prior to this event, sociologists' concern 
with their field of interest and practice tended to take the form 
of a 'professional approach' or attitude, rather than a formal 
attempt to establish protocols, selection procedures and the control 
of entry and modes of formal professional pratice etc. It is 
only recently that the BSA h~ endeavoured to formulate and encourage 
adherence to a 'code of ethics' in terms of the practice of sociological 
research. Such a code, in a formal sense, enforceable within a 
profession and supported by the ultimate penalty of expulsion, has not 
emerged in sociology. Accounts of the professionalising process have 
been produced by Hardin (1977), Parsons (Tiryakian ed., 1971), Wilensky 
(1964) and in a broader context by Halsey and Trow (1971) . 
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the notion of a strategy to encompass an enabling mechanism as part 
of the wider process of institutionalisation. Thus the process of 
negotiation, as an act between two discrete parties, becomes crucial 
to my operational definition of strategy and in its particular application 
to the development of sociology in Britain. Negotiation of sociology's 
organisational presence within conventional institutional settings 
has a direct effect upon its substantive nature (as a body of theory 
and practice), and in the sense of its disciplinary status vis-a-vis 
other branches of knowledge. 
Advocacy is portrayed by Abrams as a constituent of his 1five models' 
of 'useful' sociology\. I think it important to distinguish between 
\ 
his own conception of advocacy, as it applies to sociology (as a form 
of enlightenment) and my own conception of it, as a more comprehensive 
category for the development of an historical account of sociology. 
Abrams five models, which are derived from the history of the discipline 
over a period of one hundred and fifty years, portray the potential 
and demonstrable use of sociological knowledge. They can be schematically 
represented as follows: 
Uses of Sociology: 1831-1981 
Abrams argues that his five models of the possible use of· sociology 
have at various times been influential in British sociology. Moreover, 
the models are distinguishable from one another on the basis of their, 
" underlying assumptions about the possible and proper relationship 
between social knowledge and social action" (Abrams, 198lb, Abstract). 
His project entails a sociology of sociological knowledge, in the sense 
that an attempt is made to trace the historical careers of the models 
through the recognition and use of sociology in· Britian, 
from the early part of the nineteenth century to the early 
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1980s. Abrams presents the latter process as a movement away from 
ideas of the use of sociology as a resource for government and towards 
a, ". . . sense of sociology as a resource for politics, away from 'engine-
ering' 
(1981, 
models of applied sociology and towards 
Abstract) . Abrams was convinced that 
'enligli..tenment' models", 
it would be possible to 
identify "scientifically acceptable strategies" for the use of sociology, 
especially as a resource for politics, though in terms of its strength 
as an argumentative discipline, rather than an authoritative science. 
Such a project~ viewed with optimism. 
Borrowing Janowitz's distinction between enlightenment and engineering 
models, as major classificatory categories, Abrams proceeds to construct 
his five models, assigning them a place within those two categories. 
He also outlines an additional task for his project (198lb, p.2): 
"Yet behind such differences in the immediate outcome proposed 
for sociological work lie deeper differences, rooted in assumptions 
about the nature of the social and of sociology as a science 
of the social and in inferences from those assumptions about 
the nature of the gap between social knowledge and social 
action and about the possibility of closing or joining it 
sociologically. To follow the working-out of these deeper 
differences a refinement of the basic engineering/enlightenment 
distinction such as that envisaged in my five types of use 
seems helpful." 
Thus the engineering view comprises two significantly different versions; 
policy science and socio-technics. The former entails (l98lb, p.3): 
" the possibility of authoritative social knowledge and 
hence a firm closing of the gap between knowledge and action. 
The appropriate outcome of social knowledge is planning, 
an increasingly purposive and concerted movement toward a 
better society. Whether presented as facts or as prescriptive 
recommendations sociological knowledge effectively pre-empts 
politics - that pre-emption may indeed be seen as a principal 
use of sociology since politics will probably be understood 
as inherently irrational and the new combination of social 
scientists and policy makers as imperatively rational." 
The latter, socio-technics, constrasts with the abovementioned 'policy 
science' in that it is portrayed as a 'weak engineering model' (l98lb, p.3) :. 
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"The target of activity is still government rather than politics 
and in principle the sociologist is still seen as capable 
of generating conclusive (if not now authoritative) knowledge 
across a wide range of specific social problems (if not now 
the whole ~ange). The tendency will be either to see 
the need to negotiate with policy-makers or to adopt the 
role of technician in relation to them. In either case the 
closure of the gap between social knowledge and social action 
achieved by sociology is significantly less than perfect." 
The enlightenment view comprises two fairly distinct perspectives; 
enlightenment-as-clarification and enlightenment-as-advocacy. The 
former notion of enlightenment-as-clarification entails a process (198lb, 
p.4): 
\ 
\ 
" of competently creating a knowledge-base (whether or 
not that is understood as incorporating theory) for a sociological 
view of the world- and then more or less leaving it at that ... 
sociology enters the world by a gentle osmosis of public 
opinion ... clarification is seen as taking the form of demystifi-
cation, dispelling illusions and unmasking myths, or reformu-
lating issues or problems by elucidating assumptions or revealing 
hitherto unperceived realities of social ·structure or meaning, 
or of changing the possibilities of social action by changing 
the language of public discourse." 
In contrast to this, Abrams develops what he considers to be a "thoroughly 
un-sanguine" model of advocacy' which shares some of the features 
of the general enlightenment view, to the extent that the relationship 
between knowledge and action is an argumentative, or political matter, 
in the sense that, authoritative social knowledge is not to be had, 
as it actively enters the arena of argument (198lb, p.4): 
"In effect, this view of the use of sociology impels the 
sociologist to become a lobbyist for a preferred reading 
of sociological evidence. Taking up Booth's view that a 
coupling of evidence and intensity of feeling is needed if 
sociology is to move the world aright, the sociologist adopting 
the Advocacy model of use will seek to treat sociological 
knowledge as a means of political persuasion. The advocate, 
like the socio-technician will have a close relat~onship· 
with policy-makers but they will be relationships of argument 
or partnership in argument rather than of service .. The assumption 
that policy-making is at bottom a matter of technical rationality 
will not be a prominent feature of the propriety of bringing 
good evidence to the support of a good cause." 
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Abrams' final model is that of 'Education' (198lb, p.5): 
"The reasons for treating this as a distinct conception of 
the use of sociology is (quite apart from the fact that it 
is widely ad,vocated by contemporary British sociologists) 
that it combines elements of the other models in a curious 
mix of its own leading to a quite distinct image of good 
sociological practice. it is seen as a way of producing 
policy-scientists or advocates, socio-technicians or clarifiers, 
whether understood as method, knowledge or scepticism the 
distinctive use of sociology in this conception is teaching." 
The 'education model' is thus perceived as an active synthesis of the 
other four models, and through which sociology itself, as an academic 
subject, serves as a mechanism for the production of educ·a+&l individuals, 
schooled and skilled in the arts of the aforementioned models. It 
is somewhat puzzling that Abrams does not devote more attention to 
the education model, especially in view of its fundamental role in 
the creation and transmission of those ideas and practices central 
to the other models. 
It will be seen from the model of advocacy postulated by Abrams, that 
he views its 'use' as complementary to the task ·of enlightened political 
argument and social policy formation. Through a "preferred reading 
of sociological evidence" the sociologist endeavours to persuade politicians 
and policy-makers of the need for both reasoned and ~reasonable arguments, 
as a basis for enlightened social policy. The distinction between Abrams' 
conception of advocacy, as it applies to sociology, and that of my 
own notion of sociology's advocatory dimension is as follows: whereas 
Abrams regards sociological advocacy as sociology and sociologists 
in pursuit of enlightened, political decision-making, I regard sociology's 
advocatory dimension as the historical and extant activity of sociologists 
in pursuit of their discipline. A further and substantial differen·ce 
also exists between mine and Abrams' use of the concept of advocacy, 
and it is this distinction which I feel tends to confine Abrams' account 
of the use of sociology to a more contemporary period than his stated 
span of one hundred and fifty years. This entails his consideration 
of the 'non-use' of sociology (198lb, p.20): 
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"There is actually not all that much sociology to be used .. 
The establishment of an extensive. theory-saturated and self-
conscious basis of knowledge is the crucial condition for 
any of the uses of sociology I have discussed to flourish. 
In effect, Abrams' statement tends to confine the construction and 
application of his models to the large-scale development of sociology 
in the decades following the post-war period, in Britain at least. 
This is why the educational model is so important to the institutional 
expansion of the discipline, and why prior to the Second world war, 
the notion of sociology's use (within Abrams' framework of analysis) 
depended largely on its few, influential practitioners' claims for 
the discipline's potential; hence the proliferation of programme statements, 
agendas and ·model curricula. Moreover, Abrams has himself suggested 
that, notwithstanding the rise and fall of other sociological traditions 
within British sociology, 'Socio-technics' continues as the dominant 
paradigm (198lb, .7): 
"Nevertheless, Socio-technics once launched in the 1830s 
proved impossible to suppress. Alone among my five models 
of use it has a continual actual history in British practice 
from 1831 to the present Indeed, the history of British 
sociology as a whole has been permanently tied to an interest 
in augmenting and advancing this type of use of social knowledge." 
It is Abrams' opinion that "... using social knowledge Socio-technically 
has been the pivot and trigger of the history of British sociology 
II (l98lb, p.ll) although other models of use have always received 
some recognition. 
There are two further points to make about Abrams' project. They are 
again features which distinguish his use of the concept of advocacy 
from my own, in addition to highlighting certain elements of his analysis 
which tends to assign too great a degree of exclusivity to the models 
used to form its basis. 
First, I would suggest that there is a greater degree of model-overlap 
and integration: the models are both historically and analytically 
less distinct than the evidence would suggest. · Second, notions of use 
and usefulness are contingent categories. By this I mean that any 
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intrinsic or social value attributed to sociology depends upon the 
respective interests and assumptions of those who participate in the 
process of negotiating the political meaning and social potentialities 
of the knowledge produced by sociologists. The construction of sociology's 
nature and purpose, both as an intra and extra-disciplinary project, 
through time, remains as conflict ridden today as it did during the 
discipline's formative period in Britain. The context of the aforementioned 
negotiations, in terms of sociology's contested form, has always been 
a fluid and cornpiex combination (through temporal and cultural dimensions) 
of competing claims for institutional space and intellectual authenticity, 
with the role of strategic discourse as crucial to the exercise as 
assertions of sociology's theoretical and methodological diversity. 
Negotiating sociology's social function and cognitive identity thus 
becomes a crucial exercise in the light of Abrams' contention, that 
there is not 'that much sociology to be used' , especially in relation 
to a 'theory-saturated and self-conscious basis of knowledge'. The 
latter point has also been made by John Urry (1981) in reference to 
the 'parasitic' nature of sociology, especially the tendency of the 
discipline since the rnid-1960s, to advance on an ever-increasing, dependent 
basis (Urry, 1981, p.27): 
" the term 'sociological discourse' refers to the set 
of social practices characteristic of the members of such 
a discourse such practices being structures in terms of 
common concepts, beliefs, theories, traditions, institutions, 
methods, techniques, exemplars, and so on. In most cases 
those individuals who happen to bear the official label 'sociol-
ogist' are agents who are part of, and contributors to, this 
on-going set of reproducible social practices known as 'sociolog-
ical discourse' . However, this is not always the case, in 
part precisely because of sociology's parasitic and hence 
rapidly changing nature. There is thus an important disjuncture 
'sociological discoursejpracti tioners of sociology' the 
latter may not be agents of the farner." 
In considering sociology's parasitic nature as the discipline's central 
strength, Urry's argument, especially on the organisation of sociological 
discourse, contains a reference to a feature of sociology's development 
which I consider to be a distinctive characteristic of its political 
form, referred to above in the first section of the current chapter 
(1981, p. 37) : 
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"It is obviously the case that sociology involves a large 
degree of political struggle over exactly which aspects of 
which disciplines can be incorporated within it. And this 
struggle is likely to be more complicated and involve more 
diverse interests than in the neighbouring social sciences ... 
In the site of sociology many new developments enter, and 
the radicals of one generation may, five years later, be 
the conservatives of the new generation. Thus, it is not 
the case that sociological discourse needs to be dominated 
by the left - indeed my argument would suggest that domination 
is difficult for any perspective." 
Urry's reference to the 'political struggles of incorporation' is not, 
as he has suggested, a phenomenon of contemporary, British sociology. 
Rather, they have alw.:1ys constituted its developmental form. I shall 
present two detailed examples of this in the following chapter, one 
of which highlights the inter-disciplinary struggle between sociology 
and the other social sciences during the middle and late 1930s. 
H.M. Collins and T .J. Pinch (1978) have devised a very novel and useful 
strategy for investigating and accounting for the 'growth and subsequent 
recognition' of certain areas of science, which have, and continue 
to undergo a very arduous process of incorporation within the field 
of orthodox science. They have taken para~chology as their field 
of investigation, viewing parapsychologists' attempts to undergo "metamor-
phosis" as a "tactic" in acquiring the necessary bona fides of scientist 
for the practitioner of parapsychology, and the status of 'science' 
for his or her discipline. The authors examine too, the efforts of 
those who, in the past and presently, continue to thwart the intentions 
of parapsychologists within an opposing set of 'strategies and tactics' , 
emphasising the latter process as an attempt " to deny them (para-
psychologists) this stamp of legitimacy" (Collins and Pinch, 1978, 
p ... 237) . It would appear from the framework of analysis employed by 
Collins and Pinch, that it represents the closest approximation to 
that of my own category (sociology's advocatory dimension). Likewise, 
it is an attempt to explain the development of a branch of knowledge 
and practice, by reference to its 'extra-disciplinary' dimension, whilst 
not ignoring the significance of a discipline's substantive content, 
and the relevance of the latter in negotiating the intrinsic and social 
value of those forms of knowledge which appear to threaten convention. 
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I shall examine briefly, the essential elements of Collins and Pinch's 
argument. This will serve to clarify aspects of my own framework 
of analysis through a consideration of methodological and substantive 
issues common both to their project and my own. 
The authors are concerned, in the main, with the " social processes 
involved in knowledge production" (1978, p. 237) . Although the analysis 
is confined to the field of parapsychology and its struggle for legitimacy 
within the wider·domain of science~ it is Collins and Pinch's comprehension 
of the 'processes of production' as conflict ridden, negotiable and 
''strategic based", that takes it beyond a conventional account of 
the growth of knowledge as a rational, rule-governed, cu\111\Ulative and 
a solely peer-group, monitored process. More importantly though, is 
their suggestion that the growth of a branch of knowledge can be understood 
by way of reference to two interrelated analytical categories, namely 
the "constitutive" and "contingent" forums. The latter components 
of a discipline are designated as forums of debate (forum often substituted 
by the term 'arena'). In fact, the notion of forum is central to 
their argument as they perceive such domains, especially the latter 
(the contingent forum) , as public space wherein opposing groups of 
scientists and their supporters contest the legitimacy or otherwise, 
of claims being made on the part of 'unorthodox science' . These public 
debates are important because their outcome cam· affect substantially, 
not only the specific credibility of the contesting participants, but 
also the public's perception of the general field of science, and the 
apparent threat to its inviolable constitution, posed by those individuals 
and their allegedly counterfeit discipline. While it may be thought 
that because parapsychology is a somewhat preternatural branch of knowledge, 
possessing a very controversial history, it would be relatively easy 
for the authors to construct an account of its history and ideas on 
the basis of an obvious and anticipated rejection by 'normal science'. 
Quite the contrary: it is because of parapsychology's determination 
to be accepted on the grounds of conventional scientific criteria of 
methodology etc.; the demands of its practitioners' performance to 
be subjected to peer-group scrutiny, and a determination to gain access 
to established and authoritative journals to publish their work, that 
makes the case for parapsychology so important. It is not the alleged 
controversiality of parapsychology that constitutes its sensational 
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career, rather, it is the reaction of the established scientific community 
toward the parapsychologists' case that promotes a greater insight 
into the social production of knowledge. 
Collins and Pinch's use of 'constitutive and contingent forums' to 
classify and examine the growth of a discipline, within the field of 
science in particular, would appear to have a wider application than 
their project suggests. The catgories and their deployment would seem 
also to undermine certain features of a Kuhnian account of the development 
of science. However, I wish only to allude to the aforementioned categories 
in terms of their relevance to my own project, especially the significance 
of the contingent forum, as a key medium for the process of negotiating 
a cultural meaning and subsequently, the social construction of a branch 
of knowledge. 
The authors distinguish between the constitutive and contingent forums 
as follows (Collins and Pinch, 1978, pp.239-240): 
"On the one hand there is what we will call the 'constitutive' 
forum, which comprises scientific theorising and experiment 
and corresponding publication and criticism in the learned 
journals and, perhaps, in the formal conference setting. 
On the other hand, there is the forum i;n which are set those 
actions which - according to old-fashioned philosophic orthodoxy -
are not supposed to affect the constitution of 'objectiv~' 
knowledge. We will call this the 'contingent' forum, and 
would expect to find there the content of popular and semi-popular 
journals, discussion and gossip, fund ra~s~ng and publicity 
seeking, the setting up and joining of professional organisations, 
the corralling of student followers, and everything that 
scientists do in connection with their work, but which is 
not found in the constitutive forum." 
Least it be thought that the authors have imposed a rigid division 
between 'scientific activity' and 'non-scientific, or scientifically 
related activities', note should be taken of the following qualifications 
(1978 1 P• 240): 
" even actions properly within the constitutive forum 
do not have any specially privileged epistemological status, 
so that, the separation of the two forums relates to 
no underlying distinction in the construction of 'scientific' 
knowledge per se." 
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The authors argue further, that it is possible to generalise about 
the type of arguments and actions which may be legitimately expressed, 
in the normal way, within the abovementioned forums, (1978, p.240): 
"In the constitutive forum, actions should be seen to be 
based on universalisable non-contingent premises, whereas, 
in the contingent forum, actions may be of any kind, but 
normally they will not look as though they are constitutive 
of scientific knowledge." 
In concentrating on only the "explicit mechanisms" (1978, p. 241) of 
the forums, the authors cite examples, "where anomalous activity is 
found within a forum, that is when the normal boundaries are seen to 
be crossed, and are allowed to be crossed" (1978, p.241). Crucial 
to the classifactory schemes employed by Collins and Pinch, are the 
notions of "tactics of legitimation and rejection in the constitutive 
and contingent forums.• They cover such areas and issues as; "using 
Symbolic and Technical Hardware of Science" (p.242); "Blank Refusal 
to Believe" (a particular tactic of the critic of parapsychology) , 
(p. 244); 11 Using the Symbolic Hardware of Philosophy • (p. 245); "Association 
with Unscientific Beliefs" (p. 246); "Attacks on Methodological, Precepts" 
(p. 247) ; "Accusations of Triviality" (p. 247); "Unfavourable Comparisons 
with Canonical Versions of Scientific Method" (p. 248) ; "Laundering 
the Funds" (p.254); "Ad Hominem Arguments" (p.255); "Denying Orthodox 
Publications" (p. 25 8); and "Diluting Orthodox Publication" (p. 258). 
Just as Collins and Pinch have sought to stress the importance of tactics, 
in negotiating the meanings and intentions of the parapsychologists 
in their quest for autonomy within the wider field of science, I too 
intend to focus on this feature of science-building, albeit within 
the field of sociology. Furthermore, I intend to take my analysis 
beyond the internal institutions of sociology, which, in themselves 
provide a cognitive and social framework for competing 'schools' to 
assert their respective authority, as individually ·the authentic form 
of sociology within the wider field of the discipline. 
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4. Sociology's . Advocatory Dimension 
In what follows, I shall be concentratingupon the theme of the advocatory 
dimension, giving examples of the discourse, events, organisational 
and individual relationships, the conditions and domains of negotiation, 
the strategies associated with the latter contexts and categories, 
and the effects these have had in influencing sociology's contested 
intellectual and institutional forms. It is , as I have argued above, 
important to understand the method~logical distinctiveness of the advocatory 
dimension, as a means of discovering and accounting for the historical 
becoming of sociology within an historical series of acts of justification. 
The advocatory dimension is not a repository for rhetorical devices 
to engage the attention and support of non-sociologists. By this I 
mean that although it is possible to be retrospectively critical of 
those sociologists who may have deployed the grammer of progress in 
extolling the potential of sociology, it should be remembered that 
in general, recourse to such a strategy tended to occur during the 
presentation (justification) of the disicpline· as science (especially 
harder versions of positivist projects). In such a case, the sociologist 
tended to utilise the normative structure and associated categories 
of science, as a means to illustrate the substantive nature and social 
purpose of sociology. I shall dwell upon this feature of sociology's 
development when considering the importance of the 'science movement' 
as a valuable resource to the construction and presentation of sociology 
both to the scientific community and the public. 
What form have acts of justification taken during crucial moments of 
sociology's history in Britain, and what events and contexts within 
sociology suggest, or constitute activities which do not entail, essen-
tially, the creation of, or innovation within, its substantive domains 
of epistemology and praxis? The following represent several of the 
aforementioned contexts and activities, and although not an exhaustive 
list, nevertheless gives some indication of the array of sociological 
phenomena which are crucial_ to an understanding of sociology's history, 
as either an institution, intellectual activity, or both. 
1. 
46 
Conferences and symposia. These tend to take the form of public 
assizes of sociology. Arnon] the·rrost significant to have taken place 
with a specific theme of identifying an authentic sociology within 
the mainstream of British social science, were the conferences 
of the middle and late 1930s, the Sociological Review 'debate' 
in 1933, and the British Sociological Association Conferences of 
the middle 1950s and 1980. 
2. The establishment of profes~ional associations, specialist interest 
groups, and within the wider community of social scientists, organisa-
tions or societies sponsored by sociologists for the protection 
3. 
* 
of the discipline in the face of hostile imperatives. These groups 
and associations would include the BSA, ALSISS, and extra-mural, 
ad hoc groups such as Hobhouse's 'Sociology Club'. These activities 
can either spring from the events outlined in 1.) above or, coincide 
with them. 
Introductory textbooks. This medium provides the sociologist 
with a valuable opportunity to present to the discipline's novitiates, 
a preferred version of sociology's nature and purpose. While 
it may be thought that the proliferation of such texts can occur 
only with the diffusion of the subject within the education system 
as a whole, introductory or explanatory works on sociology and 
sociologists in Britain appeared during the inter-war period.* 
The scale of publication does not alter the purpose of the textbook, 
which purports to explain what sociology is, or ought to be doing 
as an autonomous branch of knowledge and practice, in addition 
to serving as a practical guide to practicing the craft/science/ 
discipline etc. 
'Modern Sociologists' was a series of 'critical studies of the 
theories of great modern sociologists'. The series was edited 
by Morris Ginsberg and Alexander Farquharson and published by 
Chapman and Hall in the late 1930s. Volumes arpeared on the works 
of Tylor, Pareto, LePlay, Comte, Owen and Marx. 
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4. The nature of strategic discourse associated with crucial moments 
in sociology's development i.e. programme statements, agendas, 
organisational and cognitive tasks and initiatives (especially 
the direction of research). To the preceding can be added, the 
negotiation of institutional space for sociology and the art of 
grantsmanship, especially as a component of the process of conditional 
bargaining between beneficiary and benefactor. The importance 
of the Inaugural Lecture beyond its ceremonial and status confering 
functions. 
5. The submission of evidence to key government Committees of Inquiry, 
which have had either a direct, or indirect influence upon sociology. 
Examples here would include the Report of a Committee on the Provision 
for Social and Economic Research, (1946); Report of the Committee 
on Social Studies, (1965); A Framework for Government Research 
and Development, (1971): Report of the Working Party on Postgraduate 
Education, (1982); An Enquiry into the Social Science Research 
Council, (1982) and the Report of the Committee on Higher Education, 
(1963) . 
6. Public perceptions of sociology generated by the media. Accounts 
of the discipline which occasionally appear in the debates of 
the House of Commons and Lords (Hansard) . Academic and professional 
images of sociology and the sociologist. The role of 'pop sociology' 
in diffusing sociological concepts and terms within common parlance. 
7. The process of professionalisation, especially the role of commercial 
research organisations and the differential status of sociologists 
who work within them, in comparison with those who are employed 
in the public sector and other state agencies. 
8. An exploration of the. role and influence within sociology of what 
C. Wright Mills (1963) has referred to as 'cliques', 'influentials', 
'interest groups' and their biographical experiences as professing 
sociologists or protagonists in support of the expansion of the 
discipline. 
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It is quite obvious from the above list of features of sociology's 
development, that some categories overlap, and generally constitute 
formal elements of more conventional accounts of institutional or intellec-
tual histories of sociology. While this may in fact be the case, and 
I do not intend to dispute the matter here, what I do wish to make 
clear, is my contention, that in the quest for disciplinary autonomy, 
sociologists and their supporters have devised and deployed purposive 
strategies in the pursuit and subsequent consolidation of their domain 
of intellectual and technical competence. These acts of justification 
are constituted less from an unequivocal demonstration of a distinctive, 
sophisticated and coherent body of theory and methodology, than from 
the deployment of what I have referred to previously as strategic discourse. 
The latter became increasingly an integral feature of the sociologists' 
wider discursive repertoire for the social construction of sociology. 
The nature and function of such a discourse can best be demonstrated 
and explained by an examination of examples of it, as a mode of argument 
within strategic presentations of cases made for sociology at different 
periods of the discipline's development in Britain. The examples to 
be considered can be thought of as specific moments in sociology's 
history. A theme common within arguments asserting the intellectual 
and institutional autonomy of sociology, was the constant reference 
to the discipline's promise; whether as an authoritative science, or, 
an enlightened medium for the construction and dissemination of ideas 
upon which similarly enlightened social policy would be founded. 
CBAPl'ER TWO 
SCIENCES OF SOCIETY: INTER-WAR PROJECTS 
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Sciences of Society: Inter-war Projects 
The two sections of this chapter deal with separate, though related 
moments in sociology's ques:t for intellectual and institutional autonomy. 
The first entails an examination of a series of conferences held during 
the inter-war period. The second is concerned with the growth of British 
social science's major centre of teaching and research in those disciplines, 
the London School of Economics and Political Science: an institution 
in which sociology maintained a tenuous and often tense existence. 
Each of the moments in question, represent what I consider to be significant 
events within the history of the human sciences, to the extent that 
their respective outcomes would not enhance sociology's future prospects. 
The case for sociology ~ould not be revived until the outbreak of 
the Second World War and the ensuing review of all forms of knowledge, 
on the basis of quite clearly defined, national imperatives. 
1. Sociology and the social sciences; the promise of a synoptic science 
of society. 
There are several descriptive accounts of the institutional and intellectual 
development of sociology in Britain between the turn of the century 
and the early 1930s (cf., Zueblin, 1899~ Branford, 1906, 1928 and 1930~ 
Harrison, 1910~ Palmer, 1926~ Barnes, 1927; Ginsberg and Farquharson., 
1935 ~ Spiller, 1933; Wellbye, 1933 and Brearley, 1940) . Some of these 
authors were American commentators and tended to portray the discipline 
in a state of intellectual and institutional disarray. In such accounts, 
one is usually presented with a description of the parlous state of 
affairs in British sociology, in comparison with the 'advanced state' 
of the subject in America. Although the accounts given by British 
observers, though not always by practicing sociologists, evidence charac-
teristics of what I have referred to as sociology advocatory dimension, 
it was not until the middle and late 1930s that sociologists began 
in earnest, to evolve a more-or-less coherent strategy which sought 
to establish sociology as the central, coordinating discipline within 
the field of the human sciences. Rather than examine in detail the 
accounts given by the authors referred to above, I wish to focus upon 
a series of public conferences which were convened in the middle and 
latter part of the 1930s. This is for two reasons. First, the inter-war 
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conferences represented the first, major public assize of sociology 
as a discipline in its own right and in relation to other fields within 
the social sciences. second, the case made by sociologists for sociology, 
at the conferences in question, represented the culmination of an intense 
debate within sociology itself. The latter exercise had engaged represent-
atives of the two major divisions within the discipline (see Appendix 
Two for T.H. Marshall's (1967) designation of the major 'cleavage' 
within British sociology). This point was made quite· clear publicly, 
by ViCtor Branford, although privately, he feared that the issues which 
divided sociologists, would continue to undermine their quest for disci-
plinary autonomy (Branford, 1930, p.218): 
"Of the conditions necessary for progxess in sociology, some 
at least can be defined with clearness and assurance. Pure, 
or theoretic sociology needs a working conception of the social 
process of direct filiation with biology, capable of incorporating 
the products of psychological and other relevant specialised research, 
and at the same time well adapted to systematic open-air studies. 
Applied or practical sociology, can only grow effective as it 
affords a plan of co-operation whereby everyone concerned in mainte-
nance of the social fabric, betterment of environment, sustenance 
and development of life, individual and social, may contribute 
his or her own day's work, undertaken for livelihood or for interest." 
The issues which continued to frustrate the prospect of a unified sociology 
became formalised through the initiation of a debate on the role of 
sociology in relation to the establishment of a 'new social order'. 
The latter debate had been inaugurated by Reginald Wellbye in the twenty-
fifth anniversary issue of the Sociological Review in 1933. The inter-war 
conferences provided the sociologists with a public opportunity to 
establish not only the importance of sociology as an intellectual and 
practical endeavour but also an occasion on which to promote a project 
for the unification of the social sciences under the coordination of 
sociology - a synoptic science of society. 
In the years, 1935, 1936 and 1937 a series of conferences were held 
in London with a recurring theme: that of examining the state of the 
social sciences as emergent disciplines. Consideration was given to 
such issues as the position of the social studies in higher education, 
their relationship to the humanities, their individual nature and aims, 
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and their respective relationshipg to one another. The arguments presented 
at the conferences provide a valuable insight into the actual and intended 
status of the different social science disciplines for that period. 
I consider them to be of such importance,* as to examine critically 
the arguments of four of the principal participants. Two of the contributors, 
Morris Ginsberg and Karl Mannheim, were amongst Britain's most influential 
sociologists of the period, and the third, T.H. Marshall was emerging 
as a recognised specialist within his own field. The fourth person, 
Alexander Carr-Saunders, had emerged as a central figure within the 
wider field of social science in Britain, and whose influence would 
have a significant impact upon the development of those disciplines 
during the 1930s1 the intra-war years and the immediate post-war period. 
The sociologists endeavoured to persuade their fellow social scientists 
of the merits and utility of uniting under the controlling ethos of 
a general sociology. Each component subject, whilst retaining a relative 
degree of autonomy, would work collectively toward the production of 
within quite specific and 
Why did the sociologists feel 
a coherent and comprehensive Science, 
well defined intellectual boundaries. 
the need to initiate a reorganisation of social science, and what gave 
them the impression that they and their discipline were eminently suited 
to this enterprise? 
J. Rumney (Gurvitch and Moore, (eds:), 1945, p.582), optimistically 
and with remarkable understatement, attempted a tentative assessment 
of the general feeling of those participating in the inter-war conferences: 
* Indeed, in her article entitled 'Dissolution of the Institute 
of Sociology' (Sociolo~ Review, Vol. 3, 1955, p.l69) Dorothea 
Farq~arson has suggested that these conferences were of significant 
importarce to the development of the social sciences, especially 
their respective relationships to sociology during the period 
in question (Farqlharson., 1955, p.l69) : 
"One of the most effective activities at this time was the 
organisation by Professor Marshall and others of the conferences 
on the relationship between sociology and the allied sciences, 
reports of which were published in book form and have been 
regarded as important contributions to social studies." 
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"The three conferences in general endorsed this closer 
co-operation (although not all the participants were sure 
as to how this could best be done) and bear eloquent testimony 
to the work of Hobhouse, Ginsberg and the Institute of Sociology." 
The above quotation is an extract from an article written during the 
closing stages of the last war. Rumney was quite enthusiastic about 
the prospects of the discipline in the post-war era. His assessment 
conveys a sense of the grammar of progress, wherein sociology is imbued 
with a rational and balanced continuity, the progress of which is only 
occasionally marred by intellectual dissent and institutional variation. 
I shall be arguing that there was significant disagreement amongst 
the conununity of socia~ scientists at that time, especially with regard 
to the possibility of progress within the sphere of science-building. 
I shall now examine the arguments of Karl Mannheim, Morris Ginsberg 
and Alexander Carr-Saunders. Their respective cases in supportofsociology 
deal with two interrelated problems: the actual nature of sociology 
and its extant relationship to other social sciences, with the envisaged 
role of sociology as the basis of a unified (or synoptic) social science. 
1.1 Karl Mannheim 
Karl Mannheim was acutely aware of the precarious position of British 
sociology during the inter-war period. His arguments display a forthright 
approach to the 'place of sociology. ' His forensic advocacy in stating 
the case for sociology appears to be irresistible, if not invincible. 
Mannheim's thesis rests essentially on the major premise; that, " 
a picture cannot be gained from the field of any one of the specialised 
social sciences." (Marshall (ed.), 1936', p.l79).* This 'picture' relates 
to what he considered to be the functioning mechanism and the social 
differentiation of particular societies and of 'society as a whole'. 
He avoids defining the nature of sociology as a distinct branch of 
knowledge, seeking instead, a consideration of it in terms of its function 
* This is made clearer in his notion of I relationism I (cf. Kettler I 
Meja and Stehr (1984, Chapter 2, pp.33-76)). 
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and operational tasks, depending upon, and simultaneously evolving 
in direct relationship to the other social sciences. In support of 
his programme for a co-ordinated discipline, he endeavoured to present 
an image of the future social scientist/sociologist as master of mankind's 
destiny. A vision of sociology as a project for social engineering 
may not have been such an extravagant desire or utopian ideal for 
Mannheim, especially in view of his experiences in Germany. 
Mannheim recognised the central importance of introducing sociology 
as "a basic science" into the curriculum, research work and school. 
If this didn 1 t occur, then an opportunity would have been missed to, 
" educate a generation of citizens on whose correct understanding 
of the functioning of the society in which they live depends on 
whether. the social process is in future to be guided by reason or unreason" 
(~oVj~afe1 rq3r p.l89); and " ... very much depends upon whether we can - before 
it is too late succeed in building a science of society." (1936, 
p.l64) . The latter concern with the urgency of such a programme for 
sociology, is a clear example of what I have referred to as sociology 1 s 
advocatory dimension, in as much as Mannheim is attempting to formulate 
a role for sociology on the basis of its pofevt.tla l rather than adopt 
a passive stance and allow the inherent nature of the subject matter 
to appear as somehow, self-evidently of intellectual value and social 
utility. The point here being that sociology requires a spokesman 
to reveal its potential, to articulate its tasks and ideas. In the 
case of· sociology, its social presence has to be established, space 
for it has to be won in a manner quite distinct from that of science 
and technology, largely because the latter two preceded sociology, 
although science did engage in a protracted warfare with theology. 
The public perceive the social presence of science (notwithstanding 
its abstract nature) through its progeny - technology - which furnishes 
tangible proof of its existence. This in turn manifests itself in the 
ethos and authority of science, and accounts for the power and status 
of scientists even when they enter the arena of politics, although 
their domain of competence lies elsewhere. 
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Mannheim asserts the fundamental position of sociology within the process 
of the construction of a science of society, in terms of a controlling 
and collectivising device, thus striking a blow against the growing 
tendency towards specialisation within the wider field of social science 
(1936, p.l79) : 
" co-operation between the social sciences can be established 
only if the co-ordination of the problems of those sciences 
and the comparison of the results reached by them is made 
the specific discipline which has as its raison d 1 etre the 
construction of a consistent general theory of society 
and that discipline to be sociology as the basic discipline 
of the social sciences." 
and as a critique of increased specialisation (1936, p.l73): 
" the specialised social sciences are no longer in 
to elaborate the theory which underlies their 
investigations, or to follow up the historical 
of the phenomena they encounter." 
a position 
particular 
diversity 
Mannheim had no qualms about the status of sociology. It was a science, 
without which social science could not fulfil its envisaged task of 
formulating a 1 general theory of society. 1 Not so much a grandiose, 
theoretical scheme, or some newly discovered gnosis, but a sociology 
implying action, and involving a special method which would serve 
as the 1 theoretical foundation of the social sciences 1 (1936, p.l81). 
Furthermore, he underlined his claim for sociology by adding that (1936, 
p.l80): 
"It is absurd to expect that there can be any organic division 
of labour in the field of the social sciences without general 
sociology as the basic discipline." 
Considered thus, the absence of a common methodological basis for the 
construction of a corpus of social scientific knowledge, is regarded 
as a major hinderance to the formulation of a general theory of society. 
However, this 1 inadequacy 1 can be corrected. In doing so, we encounter 
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a central feature of Mannheim's argument,* one which entails the widescale 
adoption of sociology as the 'basic social science', (1936, p.l88): 
"Sociology, therefore, is as you see 
a clearing-house for the results arrived at 
social sciences and the other hand, 
of the material on which they are based." 
on the one hand 
by the specialised 
a new elaboration 
Central to Mannheim's thesis is the notion of sociology's 'special 
method' , one which would serve as the procedural basis for his notion 
of a reconstructed social science. Thus conceived, sociology as the 
foundation of the social sciences, would function on three, 'methodological 
planes.' 
The first of the 'planes' concerns the notion of a systematic, or general 
sociology, and entails an exposition of the, "variability of social 
phenomena to their basic elements and concepts, of a more or less axiomatic 
character which makes society possible at all" (1936, p.l81). The 
second methodological plane consists of a procedure which Mannheim 
believed to be fundamental to the other social sciences, yet chose 
to describe it as comparative sociology, rather than comparative method, 
at least in the sense that Ginsberg, Hobhouse and other sociologists 
have employed the concept. 
Mannheim's notion of comparative sociology entails an empiricist conception 
of knowledge via observation and comparison, leading to the isolation 
of causal factors. In some respects it is a weak form of positivism. 
Nevertheless, it is a curious device, in view of the fact that Mannheim 
* In J.S. Eros and W.A.C. Stewart's (e&J, of Mannheim's Systematic 
Sociology, R. & K.P., London, 1957, the authors cite a similar, 
dual function for sociology (1957, p.l): 
"It is on the one hand a synthetic discipline, trying to 
unify from a central point of view the results of the separate 
disciplines; and it is on the other hand an analytic and 
specialised discipline with its own field of research." 
The above construction 
roles, vis-a-vis social 
during 1934-35. 
of sociology's synthetic 
science 1 came from Mannheim' s 
and autonomous 
lecture notes 
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intended the procedure to immunise the production of general concepts 
within systematic sociology from any philosophical or speculative tendencies, 
thus achieving a high degree of objectivity. He was also of the opinion 
that such a procedure could be equated with the idea of the experiment, 
which is a fundamental procedure in the natural sciences. The third 
methodological plane is concerned with the explanatory potential of 
Mannheim's protoscien~e. In outlining the elucidatory power of sociology 
for revealing patterns of social behaviour, whether in abstracto, or 
in 'specific constellations'' he ~aises the issue of structural-sociology. 
The latter also encompasses his ideas on 'statics and dynamics. ' Very 
briefly, his theory of stat.k::s involves the following consideration of 
social equilibrium and persistence (1936, pp.l84-185): 
"The theory of statics deals with the problem of the equilibrium 
of all the social fac·tors (not only economic ones) in a 
given social structure. It tries to show what makes different 
societies work. Which of the block-factors are responsible 
for the continuous reproduction of the main processes, which 
regenerate the same typical situations and the same structure 
again and again?" 
In the case of the 'dynamic' aspect of his structural sociology, Mannheim 
outlines its central task in explaining social change (1936, p.l86): 
"In dynamic sociology we concentrate on those factors .. which 
are antagonistic in their respective tendencies. Here we 
stress the working of those principles which in the long 
run tend to a dis-equilibrium and thus bring out changes 
which transform the social structure." 
It is important to distinguish between Mannheim's consideration of 
sociology as the basic discipline of the social sciences and his notion 
of the nature and purpose of structural sociology. The former, sociology 
as the basic social science, entails the methodological functions and 
the manner in which they sustain the discipline itself, and consequently 
inform and direct the methodological procedures of the component disciplin~s. 
The latter, structural sociology, is an integral feature of his general 
sociological enterprise, indeed, it emerges from one of the aforementioned 
'sociological planes', as a function of systematic sociology. More 
importantly, and this is critical to understanding the basis of Mannheim's 
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scheme for a co-ordinated social science (animated by sociology}, structural 
sociology represented a programme for the construction of such a composite 
discipline. It is important to quote him at length on this matter, 
in order to give a clear indication of the proper role of structural 
sociology within his scheme (1936, p.l88}: 
"My argument is that only structural sociology which is capable 
of a comprehensive synthesis of all these facts which are 
the outcome of the separate social sciences, because it is 
its special task to aeal continually with the elaboration 
and comparison of the social structures as wholes. It is 
only the structural view of sociology which enables us to 
transcend the stage of a mere curnrnulative synthesis, by relating 
the data of the special social sciences to our hypothetical 
conception, which vi~ the functioning of society as a continuous 
adjustment of all their parts to one another. But structural 
sociology could not present this wider hypothesis if it had 
not at its disposal the fruits of the analytical work done 
by the systematic and comparative sociology, or if it did 
not keep in constant touch' with the various specialised branches 
of knowledge." 
It is interesting to note the similarities between the intentions of 
those, who at the turn of the century, envisaged a sociology that would 
"demonstrate the possibility of an approximate synthesis of sociological 
knowledge via the appl~ation of the comparative method 1 1 (Branford, 
1928) and the scheme proposed by Mannheim. The latter's programme 
echoes the earlier call for a synoptic social science based on the 
co-ordinating influence of sociology. 
In terms of sociology's advocatory dimension, Mannheim ha9 opted to 
present the case for sociology based on its potential, rather than 
its extant form. This is understandable in view of the fact that during 
the 1930s, sociology was by far the most underdeveloped of the social 
sciences (at least institutionally and professionally speaking}. Although 
Mannheim did incorporate some substantive and theoretical issues within 
his case 'for sociology', they were of less importance (more illustrative 
and general in nature) , than his central discussion of the role of 
sociology within a synthetic science of society. 
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Thus the relationship of sociology to the other social sciences began 
to emerge as an issue of critical importance. Mannheim's project involved 
a large-scale synthesis of the 'products' of the individual specialisms, 
which, when compared to former programmes for a general scien·ce of 
society, served as· a sophisticated refinement of earlier ideas, conceived 
originally in hope, but without any detailed indication of how such 
schemet might come to fruition. Of course a composite science of 
society did not appeal to all .social scientists. I shall consider 
shortly the origin and degree of dissent, noting the position of economics 
and history. Nevertheless, Karl Mannheim's thesis represented a forthright 
and direct appeal to , the community of social scientists, to consider 
once again, the fundamental relationship of sociology to their respective 
disciplines. In part, Mannheim's projected role for sociology was 
an attempt to arrest the encroaching process of specialisation within 
the field of social s.cience, and the attendant consequences of the 
fragmentation of knowledge. 
1.2 Morris Ginsberg 
Morris Ginsberg's approach to the question of 'the place of sociology' 
entailed a sensitive and balanced explication of the nature of British 
sociology; its status in terms of other disciplines and indeed, its 
limitations. His argument's somewhat sedate tenor we.s in contrast to 
the vigour of Mannheim' s and the scepticism of Alexander Carr-Saunders' . 
Ginsberg opens his case on the confident assumption that, " most 
people will cheerfully admit the need of a general science of society" 
(Marshall, 1936, p.l90). 
As England's foremost sociologist of the period, a position enhanced 
by the occupation of the discipline's only Chair, the burden of responsi-
bility as sociology's senior spokesman, meant that his participation 
in the conferences would have a marked influence on the reception of 
the sociologists' case. The presentation of sociology as intrinsically 
important, in addition to its prospective position within a redefined 
social science, was sustained despite the claims of its critics that 
the process of specialisation would eventually undermine such a project. 
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That sociology might not achieve the recognition it sought, is 
reflected in Ginsberg's argument, thus betraying a fear for the discipline's 
fate should :the experiment fail (1936, p. 200) : 
"In this, as in other connections, the problem of the precise 
allocation of functions to different specialisms is a secondary 
matter. The important thing is to resist the tendency of 
the social sciences to become isolated from one another and 
from general sociology, which can surely only flourish by 
their systemisation." 
Ronald Fletcher has drawn attention to Ginsberg's predisposition toward the 
fruitfulness ·of the synthetic approach to the production of knowledge 
about man and society, and in particular, the need for a sociology 
that was informed by both psychology and philosophy (Fletcher, 1974, 
p.ll): 
"One was his (Ginsberg's) equally insistent conviction that 
no study of man in society could possibly be satisfactory 
unless psychology, sociology, and moral and social philosophy, 
were correctly interrelated with each other." 
Fletcher also points to _Ginsberg's portrayal of the special relationship 
of sociology to the existing social sciences, one which hints at the 
increasingly dependent nature of the discipline to the latter group 
of subjects and which formed the central plank in his argument some 
thirty years previously, (Fletcher, 1974, pp.ll-12): 
" sociology had to see clearly its relations with, and 
had to co-operate with the other social sciences. And another, 
of great importance, was that sociology could not possibly 
be a satisfactory science in isolation if only because 
of the depth, detail, and largeness of scope of its subject-
matter when properly appreciated - with other· .subjects .. su¢h·~:as 
history, jurisprudence, and comparative and historical studies 
of many kinds." 
Ginsberg remained consistent in his belief that sociology's future 
lay in its ability to enhance the essentially limiting perspectives 
of individual, specialist branches of knowledge, extending to the domains 
of social policy and planning, thus raising the issue of the consequences 
for sociology and sociologists, should a concerted effort be made to 
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claim a greater degree of expertise on the part of its practitioners, 
and a corresponding assertion as to the sufficiency and utility of 
their knowledge, which might not be possible to substantiate or sustain. 
Ginsberg became particularly sensitive to these issues as the Second 
World War reached its climax and the fervour of post-war reconstruction 
was at its height. His contribution to the Second World Congress of 
Sociology (Fletcher, 1974, p.l77), gives a clear indication of both 
the dilemma of sociology, as an instrument of social change and as 
a branch of knowledge which might yield to the temptations of professing 
itself as an applied policy science, and subsequently unable to fulfil 
others' expectations of it. These issues were raised in an article 
published in 'The Listener' (Vol., 39, May 20th, 1948, pp.822-823). 
His Congress paper, represented a somewhat cautious advocacy of sociology. 
His balanced and restrained approach to the presentation of sociology·'s 
case, as synthesiser of the products of other social sciences, was 
also evident in his earlier, pre-war conference papers. 
Ginsberg displayed great diplomacy in arguing sociology's fundamental 
role within a synoptic science of society. He appeared to be acutely 
aware of the vulnerability of the discipline, and never omitted to 
consider its inherently dependent status vis-a-vis the other, more 
specialised social sciences. His argument is a careful explication 
of the discipline's uniqueness in one sense, yet universality in another. 
The former relates to what he regarded as (Marshall, 1936, p.l93): 
* 
11 a group of specialisms, in part not covered by the other 
disciplines, and implying a certain attitude to social studies, 
inspired by the recognition of the inter-dependence of social 
facts and the desire to proceed beyond the description of 
particular situations to general rules. 11 * 
The group of specialisms referred to by Ginsberg comprise the 
following areas of investigation under the rubric of 'sociological 
analysis': comparative study of social institutions, comparative 
morals , social statistics, demography and population studies, 
social geography, social psychology, social biology and social 
economics, (Ginsberg, 1936). 
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The latter notion of universality applied to the tendency of various 
special isms within the broad spectrum of social science, to encounter 
particular aspects of social life, interpreted in accordance with an 
analytical framework specific to that particular discipline,(i.e. economics, 
history or political science) which in turn, can be incorporated within 
a synoptic account of its particular relationship to other parts or 
aspects. of society as a whole. Sociology, in Ginsberg's sense, would 
provide the necessary coalescence of specific, yet fragmented interpreta-
tions of elements of social organisation and action. Its task was 
to infuse the specialists' accounts of a particular social phenomenon 
with the special qualities to be derived from the sociological perspective. 
As this perspective was to become a vital component of each specialism 
within the social sciences, the notion of sociology's universal influence 
in providing an integrated and composite view of the functioning of 
society "as a whole", is thus conceived. It is the task of general 
sociology, with its reliance upon elaborate inductive study, via the 
exacting methodological procedure of the comparative method, that must 
be recognised as the most effective form of sociological analysis, 
not only by other sociologists, but by those engaged in the pursuit 
of the other specialisms. 
The task of sociology was regarded as a 1' synthesis of the social sciences'', 
with the comparative method heralded as the superior methodological 
technique, needing only to be deployed "on a large scale u. Moreover, 
the discipline's central concern with the questions of social evolution 
and societal development raised the possibility of discovering ''trends 11 
and the sequential causes that gave rise to them. This in turn implied 
the additional possibility of "rational investigation" and most importantly 
' 
and appealing to those sceptical of the potential of sociology, the 
eventuality of rational social control, which, for Ginsberg, was a 
"necessary assumption of sociology" (1936, p. 206}. * The task before 
sociology was, as far as Ginsberg was concerned, a straightforward 
one: rather grand in scope, but somewhat ambiguou·s in clearly specifying 
* Cf. , Charle3 Bolton, 'Is Sociology a Behavioural Science?', Pacific 
Sociological Review, Vol., 6, Spring, 1963. 
Bolton examines the consequences of pursuing a social science 
which take.s the notion of control as a major criterion for scientific 
success. 
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the detailed means by which such a programme was to be sucessfully 
carried out (1936, p.206): 
" increasing our knowledge of the history of civilisation 
social facts, is, I suggest, the task of 
as a synthesis of the social sciences." 
and contemporary 
sociology regarded 
It is possible to detect in . both Ginsberg's and Mannheim' s programmatic 
statements for a systematised social science, certain idealistic under-
currents which were an integral feature of Hobhouse's vision of sociology, 
encompassing a complex synthesis of philosophy and science. The basic 
elements of Hobhouse's sociological thought* entailed an organic view 
of rationality. Rumney (1945, p. 577) has located Hobhouse within the 
often conflicting attributions of British sociology's 'evolutionary' 
roots, quite removed in fact, from the orthodox, Spencerian school: 
"Social development is indeed the central idea of Hobhouse 's 
sociology. But development not in terms of the unfolding 
of some spiritual principle as with the idealist philosophers, 
and not in terms of biological evolution as with Spencer, 
who equated evolution with progress, but in terms of a harmony 
based on the free and rational cooperation of men." 
Barker (1929) and Ginsberg (1931) have both dwelt upon the political 
implications of Hobhouse's work; the former giving prominence to the 
new Liberalism implicit in Hobhouse's ideas, particularly his attempt 
(Barker, 1929, p.536): 
" to deepen liberal thought: to reconcile its old conceptions 
with new social demands and a new social philosophy: to turn 
Liberalism from Laissez-Faire to a genuine sympathy wi bh 
Labour." 
Hobhouse 's optimistic view of sociology and its potential as an agent 
of constructive social change through enlightenment1 influenced significantly 
the thought of Ginsberg. The latter, in concert with Mannheim, advocated 
* Cf. L.T. Hobhouse The Metaphysical Theory of the State, (1918); 
The Rational Good, (1921); Elements of Social Justice, (1922);· 
and· Social Development, (1924). These texts comprise the essential 
features of his 'sociological system'. 
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a discipline able to make a contemporary response to the demands being 
made on social science in general. The emphasis was on not only what 
are the social sciences, but equally, what are the social sciences 
for? The attempt to define the nature and purpose of sociology in 
terms of its relationship to the other social sciences began to expose 
its vulnerability as an autonomous branch of knowledge. Sociology 
was becoming problematic in a very different sense to that of its earlier 
developmental form. 
Morris Ginsberg remained adamant about the crucial role of sociology 
in relation to the other social sciences: through it they would flourish, 
without it, they would face the prospect of barren isolation. As far 
as the project to construct a synoptic science was concerned, it is 
difficult to establish whether or not he was moved out of a purely 
intellectual commitment to the possibility of such an exercise, or 
whether his scheme for sociology was borne out of a rather disconcerting 
realisation that the other component disciplines were developing rapidly 
both intellectually and institutionally.* The different social science 
disciplines were able to command greater attention in the struggle 
for resources for the expansion of teaching and more importantly, research 
within their respective fields. Could it have been that Ginsberg realised 
that sociology's future lay with the other social sciences, and not 
without them? The prospect of the absorption of sociology within the 
wider field of social science was a strong possibility when considering 
its precarious position within academic and public domains. Sociology's 
somewhat limited body of theory and methods could quite conceivably 
have become diffused within other related fields of social science, 
without those same disciplines having to relinquish either their autonomy,, 
or subordinate themselves as a result of the controlling ethos of 
a single discipline in the,gradual systemisation of a science of society. 
So far, I have attempted to draw from Ginsberg and Mannheim' s arguments, 
the essential elements of what I have previously referred to as sociology's 
advocatory dimension: in particular the construction of a case for 
* In moments of despair, Ginsberg often wished that he had 
a philosopher. An account of his contribution to sociology 
by Freedman in: The Science of Society and the Unity of 
R. Fletche~ (ed.), 1974, Heinemann, London. 
remained 
is given 
Mankind, 
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sociology, dependent upon a presentation of not only the discipline's 
as a discrete body of ideas and practice, but 
significance of sociology for social science 
intrinsic importance 
more importantly, the 
as a whole, in 
which sociology 
The sociologists 
the construction of a synoptic science of society, in 
would serve as the central, coordinating element. 
continually stressed the potential of their discipline 
within a prospective, systematised social science. A remarkable feature 
of their case entailed the virtual absence of any reference to substantive 
issues within sociology itself. · Advocating the role of sociology, 
in what was referred to as a "super - science •, by one of the scheme's 
critics, also involved its practitioners in a process of negotiating 
sociology's future vis-a-vis an increasingly diversifying social science. 
Although the issue of a compromise, or radical revision of the sociologists' 
project was never actually raised at the conferences, it was, I would 
suggest, a prospect that would figure large in the sociologists' assessment 
of the arguments of their antagonists. I am not suggesting that Ginsberg, 
Mannheim or any other member of the community of sociologists attending 
the conferences, would have compromised the principles and practice of 
sociology merely to placate, or entice fellow members of the social 
science community toward an acceptance of the fundamental role that 
sociology should be allowed to play in the development of a 'super- science'. 
This would imply a rather Machiavellian scheme. Nevertheless, I would 
not exclude from my analysis the fact that inter-war sociology had 
developed institutionally and intellectually by only a comparatively 
small degree, and that its practitioners must have been aware that 
the construction of a synoptic science (postulated as early as 1903), 
or, a social science wherein sociology would maintain a controlling 
function, might not have succeeded solely on the conditions advanced 
by the sociologists. Such a project would involve an element of exchange 
and cooperation, with the prospect of 'bargaining' a pertinent issue. 
Much of the process of negotiating space for sociology emerged within 
a hypothetical prospectus for a new science of society. Essentially, 
it represented a claim for intellectual autonomy of a sufficient degree 
to enable sociology to assert its indispensible role within such a 
project. This is in contrast to post-war claims for intellectual autonomy, 
with similar demands for institutional space in the context of an 
expanding system of higher education and the inauguration of continuous, 
large-scale state benefaction for the social sciences. 
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1.3 Alexander Carr-Saunders 
Alexander Carr-Saunders occupied the Chair of Social Science at the 
university of Liverpool at the time of the inter-war conferences. It 
is doubtful whether he would have considered himself a sociologist 
in the sense that Ginsberg, Mannheim or Marshall had accepted the title. 
His main interests lay in the field of large-scale social surveys, 
conducted within the empirical tradition associated. with Charles Booth. 
In fact I the Chair at Liverpool was designated The Charles Booth Chair 
of Social Science and during Carr-Saunders' occupancy of it, he managed 
to attract large-scale benefaction from the Rockefeller Foundation. 
His long and fruitful relationship with that foundation, gave rise 
to the grants which led to the funding of what was regarded as a milestone 
in the field of survey work; the Liverpool Social Survey of 1934, (three 
volumes). The survey was considered to be ". . . one of the finest pieces 
of empirical social study in recent years" (Sociological Review, 1934). 
Not only did it enhance the "reputation of scientific social research", 
(New Statesman and Nation, 1934) it also elevated the status of Carr-Saunders 
as a social scientist. Three years after its publication, he was appointed 
to the Directorship of the L.S.E. - the most powerful and prestigious 
position within the social sciences, both in Britain and its Empire. 
The general tenor of his conference paper, entitled; 'The Place of 
Sociology' , gave a clear indication of his suspicion of the intentions 
of the sociologists and their programme for a synoptic social science. 
The processes of interpretation and comparison were considered by him 
to be fundamental to the systematisation of social knowledge from the 
various branches of social science. Moreover, it appeared that the 
case for a general sociology, with sociologists as the architects of 
a unified science of society, was placed immediately in jeopardy (1936, 
p.213): 
"They (sociologists) are particularly fond of thinking 
that this is their particular province." 
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Carr-Saunders conceived of sociology as part of a wide field of general 
social study, wherein the sociologist could not lay any prior, or excep-
tional claim to the analysis of social phenomena. That sociologists 
should think that they had an advantage over others in the realm of 
social analysis, is attributable to accident, rather than design, and 
by way of foresight (1936, p.215): 
"He (the sociologist) is largely concerned with the family, 
class -and certain other social phenomena. There is no logical 
reason for this; his "pre-occupation with these matters is 
inexplicable except as a historical accident. They have 
not become the subject of ordinary specialised study; they 
manifest themselves through all recorded time and in every 
place and ar~ therefore attractive to the professed sociologist, 
who finding the ground clear has appropriated it." 
Sociology as a motive force within the sphere of social science appeared 
to suffer from an additional deficiency, apart from its questionable 
prospect as synthesiser of the data from component disciplines. This 
related to both its cognitive and organisational structure, especially 
an apparent lack of consensus among sociologists over the actual nature 
and function of sociology. 
to conjecture (1936, p.215): 
This aspect of its nature led Carr-Saunders 
"It is difficult to specify the characteristics of academic 
sociology, or sociology in the hands of its professed exponents, 
because they by no means agree among themselves." 
For sociology to appear in an apparent state of intellectual disarray, 
would not enhance its prospects as the coordinator of a 1 new 1 science. 
Neither Mannheim 1 s nor Ginsberg 1 s papers displayed any overt references 
to the internal divisions that existed within the discipline during 
the period in question. As Martin White had urged in 1928; the presentation 
of a united front in the face of criticism, was an essential feature 
of the image that sociology should convey of itself within academic 
and public domains. 
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Although Carr-Saunders proceeded to castigate sociology and its practi-
tioners for their apparently willful intentions and deficiencies, he 
nevertheless endeavoured to steer clear of any attempt to balance his 
somewhat caustic critique by dealing with what he regarded as one of 
the discipline's major shortcomings - a definition of sociology. There 
is evident in his argument, an assumption that sociology could not be 
an autonomous branch of knowledge, though why this should be so is 
not clearly stated in the narrative. There is thus an element of hypocrisy 
in his critique', to the extent that he is given to remonstrating against 
the sociologists for their lack of consensus in defining their own 
intellectual sphere, while himself abdicating. the responsi'b.ility, foii. 
doing so. The onus was upon others (1936, p.219): 
"What his work (the sociologist's) may be in the theoretical 
sphere it is for others to say." 
Perhaps the most important aspect of his critical analysis of 'the 
place of sociology', concerns the nature and function of the comparative 
method and the role of history in sociological analysis. He maintained 
a general suspicion of the methodological soundness of such analytical 
tools, pointing to the 'exaggeration' of the possibilities for their 
widespread adoption and use within a synoptic science. His insistance 
that sociologists could not lay special claim to the use of historical 
evidence, or facts, in any distinct or original manner, represented 
a further attempt to deflate any claim that sociologists may have thought 
they had on the primary role that their discipline might assume 
in the construction of a synthetic science. carr-Saunders sought to 
reinforce the criticisms levelled at sociology by the historians, in 
emphasising the point that, although most historians had recourse to 
some form of sociological analysis in the course of their investigations, 
they did not lay any special claim to, or monopoly over the use of 
such a framework for analysis, (1936, p.213}: 
"All historians talk some sociology all their lives without 
knowing it ... some of them indeed would repudiate the suggestion 
that they (those working in the social field} were sociologists 
with vehmenence." 
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This implicit sociological dimension was, he believed, characteristic 
of any analysis within the 'social field' and that whilst it may be 
a prevalent feature of such accounts, it was by no means universally 
recognised, nor generally accepted. To this criticism was added another, 
and one which struck at a very vulnerable feature of sociology's professed 
autonomy: the discipline's failure never to have evolved a coherent 
corpus of theory and methods - its own distinctive, substantive content. 
This, argued Carr-Saunders, should seriously undermine its claim as 
a synthesiser of the knowledge generated by the other disciplines within 
the wider domain of social science. Apart from the general tendency 
of sociology to· exaggerate its potential, Carr-Saunders regarded its 
weaknesses as a result\Of its origins in the 'evolutionary and scientific 
movement'. Moreover, it had misconceived the nature and purpose of 
the process of specialisation (1936, p.217): 
"It hopes to surmount specialisation by finding relations 
between special fields of study; but no sooner are such relations 
proved to be fruitful lines of work than they become specialisms 
in turn." 
Considered thus, the essential dilemma of late, inter-war sociology 
is embodied in Carr-Saunders' critique, particularly the phenomenon 
of specialisation within the various fields of social science. I believe 
that he sensed an apprehension amongst the sociologists of increasing 
isolation, eviren ·ced especially in the arguments of Morris Ginsberg. 
Whilst the movement toward specialisation may have adversely affected 
sociology, much of Carr-Saunders' critique derived from the abstract 
division he imposed between his notion of . 'academic sociology' and 
the sociology of the 'professed exponents.' The former being criticised 
for its alleged tendencies for wide-ranging generalisation and speculation, 
whereas the latter, (the professed sociologists), were given to, II 
the ground attack on a vast front •. :', whereby relevant facts may be omitted 
or misinterpreted. 
It would appear from the preceding criticism of sociology by Carr-Saunders, 
that the sociologists had failed to capture the imagination and cooperation 
of their fellow social scientists for their proposed scheme for a 
synoptic science of society. How crucial was this apparent failure· 
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for sociology's intellectual and institutional development? Other 
social scientists attending the conferences made quite clear their 
opposition to the sociologists' project. It is within their criticisms 
that it is possible to detect the encroachment of the process of speciali-
sation within the various fields of social science, as an underlying 
theme of the antagonists' case. 
In order to assess both Ginsberg's and Mannheim's commitment to the 
feasibility of such a project, arid as a test of the climate of opinion 
amongst other social scientists on the subject, it may be germane to 
consider some of the obstacles in the path of.- those proposing to unify 
the individual social sciences under the direction of sociology. In 
doing so, it soon becomes evident that much doubt surrounded the initial 
but confident assumption, that the social science community would be 
as receptive to a general, synoptic social science, as originally antici-
pated. There is evidence of premature judgement of the strength of 
feeling amongst fellow social scientists. In fact, it is possible 
that Ginsberg in particular, underestimated the degree of commitment 
among other social scientists toward the increased specialisation of 
their respective disciplines. Certainly those who were ensconsed within 
the L.S.E. had much to gain by way of the institutional expansion 
taking place there under the Directorship of William Beveridge. This 
level of expansion also had consequences for intellectual growth by 
way of increased research staff, enhanced faculties and student numbers. 
Political scientists, historians, and particularly economists attending 
the inter-war conferences could at least speak from an increasingly 
strengthened institutional position, and in marked contrast to the 
position of sociology. While their arguments questioning the possibility 
of a synthetic science of society may not have been any more convincing 
than those of the sociologists, their authority derived from their 
numerical strength and influence within social science's foremost institu-
tional setting. 
The historian, Michael Oakshott was very critical of the claim made 
by some sociologists that their 'science' 
possessed both a common understanding of, 
of the past (Marshall, 1936, p.81): 
and the study of history 
and approach to, the study 
70 
" in spite of the use a social science may be able to 
make of the facts of the recorded past, it can make no use 
whatever of historical facts." 
And from such a general criticism to a more specific one (1936, p.60): 
"Social science and history must think about the past in 
different ways and with different presuppositions. What 
history says is not denied by science, it is simply irrelevant 
to science." 
One suspects that Oakshott and his colleagues were sensitive to the 
claims being made upon 'their' domain of history as a fundamental basis 
of not only sociology~ but other branches of social science. Oakshott 
considered history to be the preserve of the historian, and any attempt 
to utilise the content of that discipline's rather special fund of 
knowledge, especially by a discipline with scientific pretentions, 
was to engage in a form of pseudo-science, which must cast doubts on 
that discipline's validity as a discrete, or autonomous branch of knowledge. 
Another historian, M. Postan, echoed Oakshott's uncertainties and in 
particular, questioned the need to further sub-divide the existing 
·social science community, especially the necessity of giving sociologists 
an exalted status among fellow social scientists. Postan questioned 
what he regarded as a case of special pleading by sociologists (Marshall, 
1936, p.6)) particularly the apparent need: 
" of a special body of sociologists to co-ordinate and 
generalise from facts which other social sciences gather." 
Opposition to the architectonic science was also based on the contention 
that, as the lesser evil, specialisation was a preferred process to 
eclecticism. Professor G.N. Clarke, (Marshall, 1936, p.59), argued 
that: 
" in a time of re-orientation like ours, it is futile 
to attempt a rigid classification of the sciences, a demarcation 
of spheres, and worst of all to plan a super-science which 
shall combine the results of all subordinate enquiries." 
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Clarke raised the sensitive issue of the effects upon the individual 
social sciences should a particular discipline attain supremacy over 
the others in the ensuing process of co-ordination. His remarks indicate 
the determination of practitioners of the different social sciences 
(and this applied to certain areas of the Humanities) not to tolerate 
a subordinate role for their respective disciplines, should a 'super-
science' become a reality. 
Amongst the economists, G.F. Shove was quite clear about the relationship 
of his discipline to the other social sciences. It is possible to 
detect in his arguments, not only a reassertion of the 'superior' status 
of economics itself, but a subtle attempt to present his case as a 
counter-claim to sociology's, as the basic discipline within a synoptic 
science. Economics would not serve in the capacity of under-labourer 
to any controlling discipline.* Whilst the process of specialisation 
may have been considered by some as detrimental to the progress of 
social science, others regarded it as a safeguard, particularly in 
preserving the privileged status of disciplines like economics (Marshall, 
1936, p.l63): 
* 
"How in view of the increasing and inevitable specialisation 
which is the mark of our time, is it possible to build up 
an educational background, based on the various branches 
of social study, which will do for the new generation of 
economists what 18th century culture did for Adam Smith." 
As Professor J. L Stocks remarked on the position of economics 
in British universities of the period (Marshall,1936, p.59): 
"In universities we find that Departments of Economics 
represent the most highly developed and best organised sections 
of the sociological field~" 
Economics had also infiltrated those most impenetrable barriers 
to the social sciences; Oxford and Cambridge. 
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Attacks were also made on the general utility and applicability of 
Mannheim's and Ginsberg's intended role for the comparative method, 
as a fundamental methodological procedure within a unified social science. 
Oakshott singled it out for special criticism, particularly in terms 
of its purported effectiveness as an instrument for sociological analysis 
(Marshall, 1936, p.BO): 
II the serious logical defects of the 
where comparison begins, as a result 
history ends." 
comparative method 
of generalisation, 
Considering the importance of the historical dimension to sociological 
analysis, and the intentions of its practitioners to proceed with the 
construction of a general theory of society (Mannheim considered such 
a project to be of singular importance for social science) , Oakshott 's 
following comments indicate further his suspicions of not only sociology's 
role in such an exercise, but its wider aspirations and claims of scienti-
ficity (Marshall, 1936, p.78): 
"History and social science can be brought together only 
by those who are ignorant of the nature of either and careless 
of the interests of both - the match-makers of the intellectual 
world." 
There is more than a suggestion of an antagonistic relationship between 
the domains of Oakshott 's history and others' social science. Whilst 
not always referring specifically to sociology, his critique does display 
an open hostility toward those social scientists who proceeded to 'use' 
history as a reservoir of data, to be drawn from when necessary and 
subjected to the some.what suspect comparative method, in the expectation 
of generalising about social change. Oakshott could not be considered 
an ally in the cause of a unified social science. That sociology 
encountered hostility and criticism in its plans for a synoptic science 
may have had more to do with academic/intellectual protectionism, 
than any specific problem relating to the actual feasibility of the 
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project itself.* 
* It is somewhat ironic that forty years later, Gareth Steadman 
Jones (1976) would cr i ti cis.-e histor.ians for invading the domain 
of sociology in a similarly misguided manner. Writing on the 
relationship of history to sociology (Steadman Jones, 1976, p.300): 
"Even if sociology possessed the theory which history required, 
it would be difficult to justify the eclectic manner in which 
historians have sometimes shopped around in it." 
He draws particular attention to the inherent difficulties of 
using sociology in such a manner (1976, p.300): 
" academic sociology is no more a science or even the 
approximation of one than academic history. The vague and 
shifting character of its object, the inconsistency of its 
definitions, the non-cumulative character of its knowledge, 
its proneness to passing theoretical fashions and the triteness 
of some of its laws suggest that its theoretical foundations 
are contestable and insecure." 
Steadman Jones does consider however, the contributions of sociology 
to history (1976, pp. 301-304), yet laments the "primitiveness 
of current historical categorisations in sociology", emphasising 
that this represents a "symptom not a cause of its inadequacy" 
(1976, p.301). 
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1.4 T.H. Marshall 
I have elected to include T.H. Marshall in my consideration of the 
inter-war conferences because he not only made a contribution to the 
specific debate on the role and relationship of sociology to the other 
social science disciplines, but in addition, he published a retrospective 
account of sociology's endeavour to construct a synoptic science at 
the events in question. There is another reason for examining Marshall' s 
arguments. He has, at several points in his career, reflected on the 
position of sociology as, potentially, the most appropriate discipline 
within the wider field of social science 1 to systematically coordinate 
the findings of indivi~ual disciplines within a synthetic human science 
(cf. 1 Marshall, 1967 and 1974). 
In reviewing the issues discussed at the penultimate conference, T. H. 
Marshall attempted to sum up the diversity of themes inherent in the 
debate on the 'place of sociology' and its relationship to the other 
social sciences. His comments apply also to the primary issue of sociology's 
claim to a central and co-ordinating role in a unified social science 
(Marshall, 1937, p.l56): 
"Last year sociology seemed to be a poor relation of the 
old-established subjects, or even a changeling with no right 
to a place in the family at all. People asked "wbat is sociology?" 
and were manifestly dissatisfied with the answers they received." 
The confusion over the nature of sociology related to not only its 
epistemological status and general intellectual autonomy 1 but to the 
particular claim that its practitioners were making in terms of its 
potential within a synthetic science of society. 
Marshall regarded sociology's attempt to establish itself at the core 
of the social sciences, as a campaign of reorganisation and reorientation 
of social study in Britain. At several points in the history of sociology 
in Britain, Marshall has paused to reflect on its development. Moreover, 
these occasions have served as opportunities to consider both the institu-
tional and intellectual influences upon the discipline, in a manner 
that encornp3Ssed elements of his own instrumental role in the formation 
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of the subject from the early inter-war period, into the middle 1970s, 
in conjunction with a general chronicling of sociology's development. 
Marshall '.s references to the appropriate "attitude" to be adopted by sociol-
ogists and the ideological conflicts which he regarded as destructive 
tendencies within the pursuit of a rational sociology, represent more 
than a characteristically, descriptive aspect of surveys of the field. 
Marshall's analyses of sociology's development evidence a significant 
feature of sociology's advocatory. dimension, namely, that intellectual 
diversity, however apparently extreme, can nevertheless be accommodated 
within the scope of the same discipline. This is quite clear in his 
reference to the cleavage in British sociology in the period just before 
the First World War and into the inter-war years, (Marshall, 1967, 
p. 362): 
"There was more than a hint in the atmosphere that the issues 
on which sociologists were divided reflected a struggle between 
progressives and conservatives." 
The grammar of progress is employed by Marshall to explain the curious 
ability of sociology to simultaneously diffuse and synthesise conflicting 
epistemologies. The entrenched dichotomy of the "progressive-reactionary" 
has, somehow and somewhere along the way, given way to a plethora of 
schoools, theory groups , specialist categories of sociologists and 
various realms designated the sociologies of this-and-that (Marshall, 
1967, pp.362-363): 
"And the former hint of a struggle between progress and reaction 
is fading. The drawing together of the two streams of thought 
that I mentioned a moment ago has not eliminated differences 
between schools of thought . . . But the progressive-reactionary 
dichotomy does not survive, because there is progress taking 
place on all fronts, and this is generally recognised." 
The preceding quotation contains a crucial element of sociology's advoca-
tory dimension, to the extent that Marshall, in his role as surveyor 
of the intellectual sc.-ope of soci·olo_gy,, endeavoured to promote an image 
of:the discipline as increasingly complex, sophisticated and both techni-
cally and intellectually diversified. Its earlier crusading science-
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building role haP been progressively superceded by a multi-paradigmatic 
form, infused with a rational ethos, in keeping with the technological 
era in which it was evolving. The attempt to separate the ideas and 
methods that constitute sociology from their cultural contexts would 
appear to have been a success. Indeed, Marshall's thesis required 
that .this should be the case, otherwise sociology would eventually 
disintegrate into conflicting ideologies. Institutional space and 
intellectual autonomy could not have been achieved outside the political and 
bureaucratic structures of academe, nor could).i.t be attained without the 
assistance of the agencies which determine and distribute the resources 
essential to the growth of any branch of knowledge. Sociology, and 
indeed the other social sciences, are particularly vulnerable to the 
political determination of the national need, especially as it affects 
the production of knowledge. 
In 1936, Marshall endeavoured to recast the role of sociology in the 
light of the sociologist's experiences at the previous year{s conference. 
His review of the event contained a reference to the sociologists' 
confidence in their project, though the initial assumption about the 
central role that sociology was to play in the scheme of things had 
been revised. Moreover, Marshall gave his audience a hint as to the 
possible reasons for the negative reaction to sociology's envisaged 
project (1937, p.l56): 
"I think it is because we have been talking so much about 
methods and technique that sociology has acquired for us 
an appearance of solidity and concreteness." 
There is an inconsistency in this admission. Marshall had previously 
argued that, "sociology emerges as a science in its own right," and 
in addition; "For we have not only discovered an enormously important 
field that belongs to the sociologist, but we have seen that methods 
exist which can be used in that field with some hope of success" (1937, 
pp.l56-157). This tends to jeopardise the claim that, ipso facto, 
sociology is a science, if its research methods and techniques become 
to any substantial degree, problematic to the function of such a science. 
I am not arguing that methodological procedures and research techniques 
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are not in themselves problematic for scientists (indeed they are) , 
however, what I am suggesting, is that they are usually considered 
to be the basis of the activity of science itself, irrespective of 
the field of investigation. This issue has been considered in some 
detail by Foucault (1970) , Macintyre (1979) , Bergner (1981) and Ur~y 
(1981). In the previous year's conference, Karl Mannheim had been 
quite categorical about the role and significance of sociology's research 
methods. In particular, the comparative method, as I have exp lai.ned 
above, was acclaimed as the method par excellence, not only for sociology, 
but as a basis for coordinating the other social sciences. It is therefore 
difficult to understand the concern expressed by Marshall over the 
question of 'the solid.ity and concreteness' of sociology by way of 
its methodology. It may have marked a departure from the original 
claim of superiority for certain elements of the discipline's methods 
and research techniques. In fact there are signs of a retreat from 
the original campaign wherein sociology's methodological prowess was 
employed as a central plank in the argument for sociology as the primary 
and coordinating component within a unified science of society (1937, 
p.l61): 
" I feel doubtful how far the comparative method can establish 
social generalisations with causal significance." 
Marshall did qualify his position on the matter of the effectiveness 
of the comparative method* and the claims made on its behalf, with 
the proviso that (1937, p.l62): 
II the comparative method must be combined with the historical 
method." 
The latter condition may have been a concession to the historians, 
a discipline in which Marshall himself had been 'elected' to, through 
a Fellowship at Cambridge in October, 1919. His consideration of 
the implications of the comparative method for sociology, was extended 
to the possibility of giving it an anthropological basis, for use in 
* The conference of 1936 also discussed the possibilities of adopting 
the techniques of the anthropological field worker for research into 
contemporary British society ( cf., Marshall, 1937, pp.l63-164). 
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research of contemporary Britain. Moreover, such a method, coupled 
to the techniques of the statistician, might according to him, give 
rise to a formidable device for sociological analysis and prediction. 
The drawbacks to such a scheme were, according to Marshall, a lack 
of trained workers, the organisational base, and the necessary funds. 
Such a plan, conceived in the late 1930s would be resurrected in 1946 
under the auspices of the Clapham Committee (1946), which virtually 
mirrored Marshal~'s conception of an organisational base for the direction 
and funding of research in the social sciences. 
Marshall was not alone in his criticism of those social scientists 
who continued to thwart the intentions of the sociologists. Although 
I have 
debates, 
made by 
in 1935 
in 1936. 
already 
I think 
him in 
and his 
considered Karl Mannheim's contribution to conference 
it important to consider briefly, one or two comments 
the light of his experiences at the first conference 
subsequent reaction to the events of the one held 
In support of Marshall's advocacy of the fusion of the historical and 
comparative methods as a basic research technique for sociological 
research and analysis, Karl Mannheim, in a rather different approach 
from his original statement of sociology's case at the previous conference 
of 1935, highlighted the role that many speakers at the 1936 conference 
advocated for sociology. Mannheim's impatience is evident in his criticism 
of what C. Wright Mills would come to refer to as 'abstracted empiricism' 
some twenty three years later (1937, p.l80): 
" the mere collection of facts, with the hope that when 
all the million facts are collected a theory will automatically 
spring from them." 
This somewhat sarcastic aside at the empirical tradition within British 
social science may have been a reflection of Mannheim 's predisposition 
toward the centrality of theory as the motive force of sociological 
analysis, a legacy of his intellectual formation within the German 
sociological tradition. Apart from a reaffirmation of his faith in 
the historical and comparative methods, (though there were some discrepancies 
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between his and Marshall's interpretation of the nature and deployment 
of the comparative method)1 Mannheim's promotion of the historical 
method in particular, served not only to counter what he regarded as 
the prevailing empiricism within British sociology, (an asset to Ginsberg's 
position) but gave some indication of the distinct cleavage that existed 
in the sociological community over the question of the appropriate paradigm 
within which to cast the infant discipline (1937, p.l80): 
"There' is in this 
pure description, 
to the exclusion 
society." 
country a tendency to put a premium on 
surveys, collections of statistical data, 
of theoretical and historical analysis of 
When one considers the fact that the aforementioned research techniques 
served as the foundation of social science in Britain, it is quite 
understandable that exponents of those techniques would assume 
that sociology should conform to the accepted (acceptable?) standards 
of empiricial analysis, common to the other social sciences, especially 
economics. A parting shot from Mannheim gives some indication of the 
intellectual arrogance ascribed to the sociologists and the claims 
made on behalf of their project for a synoptic science of society 
(1937 1 p.l80) : 
"I feel like asking those who think the social sciences can 
get on without sociology and theoretical questioning, whether 
if Newton had confined his field-work with apples to counting 
and describing them, he would have found his theory of gravi-
tation." 
The frustration in Mannheim' s remarks is quite apparent. It denotes 
the increasingly precarious relationship between sociology and related 
disciplines, whereby the sociologist had attempted to establish the 
crucial role that the discipline ought: to be allowed to play in the 
construction of a unified science of society. Without the co-ordinating 
function of sociology, any study of society would be partial and incomplete: 
the incorporation of the separate branches of social science within 
the field of sociology and its special methods, would help to arrest 
the fractionation of knowledge about man and society, which, as some 
sociologists argued, was a result of the allegedly negative effect 
of the process of specialisation. 
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The inter-war conferences were probably the last occasions on which 
sociologists made public the discipline's 'private troubles'. The 
Second World War would end the somewhat, abstract debate about the 
appropriate relationship between sociology and the other social sciences, 
in which the former encountered increasing resistence to not only 
its claims for special status in the process of science-building, but 
doubts as to whether or not sociology could demonstrate convincingly, 
that it possessed a specialised methodology and corpus of ideas to qualify 
it for the proposed project. 
The presentation of sociology as the linch-pin in the mechanism of 
social study was not conducted in completely auspicious circumstances. 
The general opposition to the sociologists' case was summed-up rather 
caustically, by Alexander Carr-Saunders (Carr-Saunders, 1936, pp.212-213): 
" sociologists have no monopoly of interpreting social 
experience, because they have no monopoly of generalising 
about it, or even relating different aspects one to another." 
Throughout the inter-war period, and especially the years of the conferences, 
sociologists became increasingly aware that their own conception of 
sociology should not diverge significantly from that of their fellow 
social scientists. To engage in the process of science-building, wherein 
a particular discipline would assume a central and coordinating role, 
entailed a shrewd appreciation of the potential and limitations of 
that same discipline. The claims of other social sciences to have 
reached an advanced stage of development and thus act as suitable candi-
dates for the role envisaged by sociology, were not without foundation. 
I shall give consideration to such claims when I examine William 
Beveridge's preference for economics and social biology. 
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2. William Beveridge: a crusade for social science 
The inter-war conferences provided an opportunity for sociologists 
to present a case for sociology, in terms of 
synoptic science of society. The conference 
its potential within a 
debates can be viewed 
as quite public and concerted acts of justification on the part of 
sociologists. Sociology's special projet was largely a theoretical 
Rather than being construed as a threat to the existing 
of British social science, those who opposed it, regarded 
as increasingly irrelevant to the specialised interests of 
programme. 
hierarchy 
sociology 
the other social sciences. 
The rejection of 
with significant 
of social science 
sociology's 
developments 
within its 
case on intellectual grounds, coincided 
taking place in the institutionalisation 
largest centre of teaching and research 
for those subjects - the London School of Economics and Political Science. 
An institution in which sociology was precariously placed, and seemed 
likely to be increasingly compromised, as the School's Director, William 
Beveridge, relentlessly pursued his personal ambition to create a natural 
basis for social science. This episode raised issues and engendered 
conflicts within the hierarchy of British social science which were 
fundamental to the intellectual and institutional development of those 
disciplines, throughout the 1920s and '30s, and through to the present 
day. It was within such a context that sociology would seek to maintain 
what intellectual and institutional autonomy it had managed to achieve 
since it acquired its first Chair in· the early years of this century. 
William Beveridge's plans for the development of social science at 
the L. S. E. , were based on his organisational and intellectual strategy 
known as the 'Natural Bases Scheme' . 'The Natural Bases Scheme· became 
the major research activity within the School for the period 1919 
to 1937, the year he resigned as Director of the L.S.E. Central to 
the 'Schere' was the issue of the funding of knowledge. The conditional 
nature of such funding will be examined in terms of the ideological 
predispositions of the benefactor (the Rockefeller Foundation), and 
that of the beneficiary (Will.Bm Beveridge and 'his' school). 
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2.1 William Beveridge's philosophy of social science 
It is important first, to understand what can be loosely described 
as Beveridge's philosophy of social science. Although I do not wish 
to engage in a detailed analysis of that philosophy, I nevertheless 
think it important to highlight essential features of it, as it influenced 
generally, his wider conceptual programme to evolve the 'Natural Bases 
Scheme'. 
In examining Beveridge's model of social sc•ience and in turn, comparing 
it with that of one postulated within the official programmes of the 
Rockefeller Foundation> I hope to demonstrate the existence of a common 
conception of the relation between knowledge and action which, although 
denied by Beveridge, when elaborated in a social context, implied political 
theory. He was certainly aware of the ideological underpinning of 
social research, and it may have been this realisation which drove 
Beveridge to condemn bitterly, members of the faculty at the L.S.E. 
during the period of his directorship, and may also account for his 
subsequent recantation of a previously held conviction, that intellectuals 
should actively engage in political and other extra-curricular activities. 
Eventually, and for reasons I will e~a nd upon later, Beveridge changed 
his ideas about the possibility of separating scholarly activity from 
the vagaries of politics and journalism. 
It is difficult to encapsulate the basic tenets of Beveridge's notion 
of a natural scientific base for the social sciences. However, a 
clue to its essential nature seems to lay in the alleged connection 
between the apparently discrete domains of natural and social scientific 
knowledge. It is within a consideration of the promise of a scientific 
social science. * that we can perceive the attraction of science as 
a resource for Beveridge, both as an exemplar and subsequently, as 
a strategic component of the negotiations with funding agencies to 
secure the necessary resources for his project at the L.S.E. Fay (1975, p.21) 
* A more detailed analytical account of the relationship between 
social science and science, particularly the philosophical and socio-
logical aspects of it, can be found in a multitude of texts. For 
example: Keat and Urry (1975); Ryan (1970); Ravetz (1971); Natanson 
(1963); Mulkay (1979); Barnes (1979) and Fay (1975). 
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has said of the attraction of the model of the natural sciences for 
social scientists: 
"Only a social science will give an inter-subjectively verifiable 
(or at least falsifiable) account of how the social world 
operates, and only a social science will give us causal explana-
tions which are of the type that allow one to prevent the 
occurence• of an unwanted event, or permit one to bring about 
the occurence of one that is desired: it is for this reason 
that only a social science, conceived as a body of knowledge 
analogous to that of the natural sciences, can satisfy the 
condition which modern' society demands be satisfied if it 
is to continue without substantial suffering and ultimately 
without a total breakdown." 
It was the apparent ability of the natural sciences to predict results 
that impressed Beveridge and his fellow social scientists, realising 
too, that such an inherent potential formed the basis of the 'power' 
of scientific knowledge. 
Beveridge's idea of a science of society was not out of place in an 
institution whose founders believed that traditional political methods 
could no longer serve the interests of the people. In fact it was 
Sidney and Beatrice Webb's enthusiasm for the power and promise of 
social science within the political realm, coupled to their Fabian 
faith, that gave impetus to the foundation of the L.S.E. 
Jose Harris (1977, pp.284-285) has argued, that apart from the recurring 
problem of academic dissension characterising Beveridge's directorship 
of the L.S.E., the central and pervasive conflict within the School 
revolved around the issue of the nature and method of the social sciences: 
"The debate on the nature of the social sciences was the 
most prolonged and all-pervasive of the subjects in dispute 
When he came to the L. S. E. he was convinced that the 
social sciences were still 'too theoretical, deductive, meta-
physical' and that 'the way ahead' lay in empirical studies 
of social phenomena rather than in deductions based on analytical 
postulates about the nature of human behaviour." 
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Harris points to the influence upon Beveridge of the biologist Thomas 
Huxley, referring to the former as a disciple of the latter. This 
observation, though not in any sense confirmed by Harris, is quite 
accurate, for reasons which will become clearer later. Harris also 
notes what I have alluded to above in consideration of Fay's account 
of an empiricist philosophy of social science. and the manner in which 
William Beveridge conceived it (Harris, 1977, p.285): 
"Men would 'gradually bring themselves to deal with political 
as they do with scientific questions . . . and to believe that 
the machinery of society is at least as delicate as that 
of a spinning jenny and little likely to be improved by the 
meddling of those. who have not taken the trouble to master 
the principles of its action'." 
From this somewhat n~ive and unsophisticated philosophy of social science, 
Beveridge proceeded to formulate his programme for a natural basis 
for the social sciences. Considered thus, his theory comprised a curious 
amalgam of philosophy and ideology and can be expressed in terms of 
the following categories: 
a) 
b) 
c) 
d) 
an ideal of value-free, scientific knowledge. 
the methodological unity of the natural and human sciences. 
a special status for the academic (especially the social 
scientist) particularly a requirement to practice uncompromising 
objectivity in the course of teaching and research. 
social science as a valuable national resource to effect 
beneficial social change. 
Beveridge believed the social sciences, including sociology, to be 
11 too theoretical, deductive and metaphysical 11 , and that their future 
progress lay in the development of'empirical studies of social phenomena, 
rather than in deductions based on analytical postulates about the 
nature of human behaviour- (Harris, 1977, p.285). More importantly, 
he believed· that there existed a gulf between the natural and social 
sciences (as far as they had developed in the 1920s); a gap which could 
be bridged by a careful and detailed working-out of the manner in which 
the latter group of subjec.ts would benefit directly from the proven, 
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technical sophistication of natural science. It was the scientist's 
ability to predict and control natural events through the processes 
of observation and experimentation that drove Beveridge to the conclusion, 
that if this problem could be solved, if the discontinuity between 
natural and social knowledge and the methods employed to obtain it 
could be bridged, then the ideal of the methodological unity of the 
sciences would be realised. 
It is interesting to note Beveridge's conceptualisation of the 'borderland' 
between the natural and sqcial sciences as representing the interstices 
of those branches of knowledge. Whereas Foucault (1970, pp.345-348) 
has attempted a similar presentation of the human sciences within the 
modern episteme, albeit in a more complex and radically philosophical 
setting of the history of ideas, Beveridge's estimation of the tension 
between science and social science was less problematic: the two systems 
of thought could be brought into closer relationship (unity) by creating 
an additional branch of knowledge, that of necessity, would draw upon 
the methodological and theoretical components of existing fields of 
science and social science. Such an instrumental problem could be 
resolved if the 'superior' methods (and ideals) of science could be 
systematically introduced to the social sciences by way of an appropriate 
medium: this was to be achieved by the creation of an additional sphere 
of mediating subjects. Beveridge thus began to draw up an ambitious 
programme for development of research into the natural basis of the 
social sciences, emphasising the need for establishing that group of disci-
plines (Harris, 1977, p.286): 
" a third group of studies is required, dealing with 
the natural basis of economics and politics, with human material 
and its physical environment and forming a bridge between 
the natural and the social sciences. " 
Although the components of this new, eclectic body of knowledge comprised 
Anthropology, Psychology, Geography, Meteorology and Public Health, 
it was Social Biology which was to serve as the primary and coordinating 
discipline; the fulcrum between science and existing social science 
disciplines. Social Biology itself was to embrace genetics, population, 
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vital statistics, heredity, eugenics and dysgenics. Before I consider 
the matter of the Chair of Social Biology, and the manner in which 
it was funded, it is important to give further consideration to Beveridge's 
ideas on the nature of science and its special relationship to social 
study. 
The remarkable feature of Beveridge's commitment to a science of society 
is the consistency of his views on the matter over the decades. They 
were proclaimed initially, via ·a· public address at the L. S. E. in 1920 
and periodically' revived in a number of subsequent books and articles, 
and during negotiations with funding agencies (Beveridge, 1920; 1953; 
1937; 1947; and 1960) .' His oration, delivered to the School on vacation 
of the post of Director in 1937 included the "four methods" he had 
learned from his revered teacher, Thomas Huxley (Beveridge, 1937, p.460): 
" The four methods were, first, observation of facts; second, 
comparison and classification of facts, leading by induction 
to general propositions; third, deduction from general proposi-
tions to facts again, so as to foretell facts in advance of 
ol:5servation; fourth, verification of deductions by fresh 
observations." 
Beveridge believed that, whereas economics and politics were the more 
developed of the social sciences, it was through further application 
of the scientific method that social facts would reveal knowledge 
of the social world and therefore account for human agency within it. 
Social Biology seemed to him the appropriate discipline to coordinate 
those combined branches of knowledge that were to occupy the borderland 
between the purer, natural sciences and the less well developed social 
sciences. The envisaged role for Social Biology in Beveridge 1 s scheme 
caused some concern among the few sociologists at the School1 who were 
equally concerned to promote their own subject as the central, coordinating 
discipline within a synoptic science of society. 
The importance of collecting facts as the basis for theory construction 
within Beveridge 1 s notion of a science of society bordered on the obses-
sional (Harris, 1977, pp.284-285). Such was his dedication to fact-
gathering, that over the years he became increasingly intolerant of 
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those given to historical or speculative theorising in other fields 
of social research. His critic ism of the ideas of Keynes highlights 
that tendency (Beveridge, 1937, p.464): 
"It is the duty of the propounder of every new theory, if 
he has not himself the equipment for observation, to indicate 
where verification of his theory is to be sought in facts 
- what may be expected to happen or to have happened if his 
theory is true, what will not happen if it is false. That 
is the demand that would be made of the propounder of a new 
theory in every natural. science. It is not the demand that 
has been made of Mr. Keynes by his fellow economists." 
Beveridge made some rather scathing remarks about Keynes' 'General 
Theory', partly because it was so widely available to the general public, 
'at a low price' and thus likely to misinform the populace, and consequently, 
harm the scientific image of economics. 
Methodological rigour was a central criterion for the construction 
of a useful social science. Just as the natural sciences had demon-
strated their utility over the decades, so must social science render 
mankind a similar service (Beveridge, 1937, p.471): 
"The practice of observation, as the .basis of theories and 
for their control and verification, is one condition for 
the assured progress of our sciences in service to mankind 
and in public estimation." 
Beveridge was· conscious also of the need for social science. to attain 
intellectual autonomy, essentially as a prerequisite to gaining the 
status and public credibility of other scientific disciplines. He 
was sensitive to the attitude of others towards social science (1937, 
p.461): 
"To-day the Social Sciences have need of friends and, I think, 
of counsellors, also If to-day we consider where the 
Social Sciences stand in public estimation, we encounter 
a paradox ... Year by year appreciation grows of the importance 
to mankind of understanding just those things which here 
it is our function to teach, or solving the riddles of economic 
and political and social organisation. But if one asks whether 
it is to us first and foremost, to economists and political 
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scientists and sociologists, that men look for the solution 
of these riddles, the answer is less cheering. In our field, 
horse-sense is treated as better than knowledge. Men of 
other training - engineers and botanists and chemists - write 
books about economic problems, invading our territory in all 
good faith, as they would not invade the territories of one 
another." 
And finally, with reference to the seemingly perpetual infancy of social 
science, partic~larly the status of its knowledge (1937, pp. 461-462): 
"For other scientists, as for men of affairs, the field 
of our studies is still a wilderness for pioneers, not an 
ordered realm of knowledge. For this failure of our studies 
to secure the same recognition as other sciences, more than 
one reason can be given." 
Beveridge was convinced that the touch-stone of methodological rigour, 
fundamental to the natural sciences, would, if emulated within the 
field of social science, demonstrate convincingly their scientific 
authenticity (1937, p.463): 
"I have given one reason for the conunon failure to recognise 
the Social Sciences - an external misunderstanding for which 
those who pursue these studies cannot be blamed. But there 
are internal reasons, also, for which we can be blamed; there 
are two reasons in particular. We cannot claim recognition 
as scientists, unless our methods are scientific. we cannot 
claim recognition as scientists, unless we dig deep and clear 
the boundary between science and the practical arts of govern.,. 
ment." 
The latter reason is an oblique reference to the bitter feud between 
himself and some faculty members over the conflict of interests between 
the role of a scientist and that of political activist. I shall refer 
to this when considering the conditional grants awarded to the L.S.E. 
by the Rockefeller Foundation. 
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2.2 The Natural Bases Scheme and the role of Social Biology 
It is understandable that sociology should have felt vulnerable during 
the period of Beveridge's campaign. It was a small department, amongst 
a School wherein the remaining social sciences continued to consolidate 
themselves through increased specialisation and the receipt of funding 
for research projects, in keeping with a preferred notion of 'scientific 
research.' Ironically, it would be the very process of specialisation 
and the increasing autonomy of .the various social science disciplines 
within the School, that contributed to the eventual failure of ~everidge's 
project. Moreover, and as I have already explained above, that same 
process became a significant factor in frustrating the plans of the 
sociologists in their attempt to construct a synoptic science of society, 
at a time when the experiment in Social Biology was on the verge of 
collapse. Harris (1977, pp.285-287) has attempted to draw together 
the undercurrents of intellectual dissent and interpersonal conflict 
which ensued as a result of Beveridge's Natural Bases Scheme. 
From the outset, Hobhouse (then the most influential of England's sociolo-
gists) objected to the severe inductionism of Beveridge's 'science' 
of society. It clashed with the purportedly speculative, and abstract 
sociology associated 'with Hobhouse and even caused consternation within 
the Department of Social Administration, usually given to research 
and teaching within the classical, empirical tradition. It was the 
imposition of Beveridge's ideas, rather than their intrinsic, intellectual 
value, or compelling innovatory nature, that kindled hostility amongst 
some members of staff in the School. Many of the School's academic 
staff supported Beveridge, with the particulat~exception of Hobhouse. The latter 
individual protested that he had not been consulted about the Natural 
Bases Scheme, and that (Harris, 1977, p.287): 
" ... 'the non-sociological teacher in these subjects is indifferent 
and in nearly all cases ignorant of the sociological point 
of view'." 
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Harris argues that privately, Beveridge believed that, "the tradition 
represented by Hobhouse does not necessarily go with social science" 
(1977 1 P• 288) • When the move was made to establish Social Biology 
as the key discipline to occupy the borderland between the natural 
and social sciences, Hobhouse again protested that not only was the 
title an unfortunate neologism, but that much of the subject matter 
came under what he assumed to be the wider field of sociology. What 
Hobhouse and others failed to appreciate, in terms of the strategic 
aspect of Beveridge's programme, was the latter's overriding influence 
within two key executive bodies, both of which exercised significant 
control over decisions affecting the academic composition of the School. 
They were, the Emergency Committee* and the Professorial Council. 
Beveridge had influential allies within these important coteries of 
power. Harris refers also to the enthusiasm and support of Malinowski, 
Laski, and Beveridge's personal secretary and confidant, Mrs. Janet 
Mair (1977, p.287). I consider Mrs. Mair's influence among the academics 
and her relationship with Beveridge to be of considerable significance, 
particularly in terms of her alignment with the scientific social science 
lobby (Harris, 1977, p.281): 
" and she was warmly admired by 
who saw her as a consistent champion 
a more 'scientific social science'." 
Hogben and Malinowski, 
in their campaign for 
There are other aspects of the relationship between Mrs. Mair and William 
Beveridge that serve to highlight the importance of Wright Mills' (1963) 
notion of "cliques" in shaping the development of the social sciences. 
Although they are set out in greater detail in Beveridge's own work; 
'The London School of Economics and Its Problems 1919-1937', I nevertheless 
think it important to refer briefly to certain parts of that text, 
in order to give an indication of the degree and extent of influence 
* This Committee was established in 1921 with a remit to decide 
matters of academic policy, "the acquisition of property, discipline 
of students and employment of staff" (Harris, 1977, pp. 304-305). 
Its membership may have lent credence to the belie/ of some of 
the more senior staff at that time, that Beveridge was presiding 
over a benign autocracy. The Committee comprised Beveridge, Sidney 
Webb, four businessmen govenors, and two members of the Professorial 
Council (the latter increased to three in later years). 
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amongst those who were strategically placed to enhance the funding of 
Beveridge's schemes. Particular note should be taken of the extraordinary 
connections that existed between Beveridge and Mrs. Mair, and the chairman 
of the University Grants Committee, Sir William McCormick. In a period 
when state funding for the universities was on a small scale, the U.G.C. 
actively encouraged the universities to vie for funding in the 'market 
place', thus putting many of the provincial universities at a disadvantage, 
with the except~on of Oxford and Cambridge, which were relatively wealthy 
institutions via endowments. Tne notion of laissez-faire was a policy 
which governed the economic thinking of both the U.G.C. and ministers 
responsible for over-seeing the financial affairs of the universities. 
This attitude toward the financing of grants is evidenced in the following 
. 
quotations, wherein Beveridge appears to be well versed in the art 
of grantsmanship and the importance of having friends in the right 
places. When referring to the attitude of the U.G.C. toward the L.S.E. 
and its request for financial aid from the former organisation, Beveridge 
noted (Beveridge, 1960, p.22): 
"They (the U.G.C.) came to so favourable a conclusion on 
its chances that, contrary to their habit at that time, in 
addition to increasing our annual grants that they gave us 
a capital grant of £45}000 towards the buildings so desperately 
needed." 
Beveridge gives a further example of the benefits accrued through the 
fortuitous relationship between Mrs. Mair and Sir William McCormick 
(1960 1 P• 22) ; 
"Sir William McCormick had taught at st. Andrews I had taught 
Janet (Mrs. Mair) there, and thought very highly of her. 
I do not suggest that the School would not have received 
a capital grant without this happy accident; McCormick felt 
that money granted to the School would be well spent. I 
still think that it was spent well while Jance was concerned 
with it." 
And in the matter of additional financial support from the London County 
Council, another essential source of revenue used by Beveridge to expand 
the School (1960, p.22): 
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"We were fortunate also in our personal relations with the 
London Council Council where we dealt with Philippa Fawcett. 
She had been Senior Wrangler at Cambridge in the year after 
Janet's husband David has been Second Wrangler, which was 
also the year before Janet's brother William Philip became third 
wrangler. Personal contacts with the LCC could not have been 
easier." 
It should also be noted, that the Webb's relation with the L.C.C. provided 
another contact point within the array of funding agencies used by Beveridge 
to support his institutional and intellectual projects within the L.S.E. 
In order·to bring his Natural Bases Scheme to fruition, Beveridge believed 
that, before social science could ever achieve a level ofmaturity possessed 
by the natural sciences, a third group of subjects needed to be created 
in order to 'complete the circle of the social sciences' ; thus providing 
a bridge between themselves and pure science. The new area of knowledge 
would encompass several subjects with social biology as the key discipline. 
In keeping with his firm belief that economics was by far the most 
scientifically advanced of the existing social sciences, he resolved 
to appoint "a man of biological training to learn economics and politics" 
(Harris, 1977, p.287). The latter experiment 1vas beset with problems 
from the start. As Harris has said of the scheme (1977, p.288): 
"Nevertheless, from the start the social biology experiment 
was fraught with dissension and conflict - difficulties which 
stemmed partly from the lack of facilities for experimental 
research, partly from the personalities involved, and partly 
from the inherently controversial nature of social biology 
as an academic subject." 
Harris provides a candid account of the personalities, individuals 
and cliques referred to by Wright Mills, that sought actively to 
influence the depth and texture of intellectual and institutional development 
in the golden era of pre-war social science, funded by unlimited Rockefeller 
dollars. From the early 1920s up to Beveridge's resignation as Director 
of the L. S. E. in the late 1930s, the School was rent by growing dissent 
amongst the academics over the proper nature and purpose of social 
science. 
research. 
The cleavage was most apparent in the matter of empirical 
Staff divisions and intellectual preferences, along the 
lines of competing methodologies became bound up in political and moral 
remonstrations. Harris has attempted to assess the gulf between the 
methodological traditions that had given rise to the polarisation of 
faculty members (Harris, 1977, p.288): 
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"Hobhouse died in 1929, but in the early 1930s the gulf between 
the methodological traditions reasserted itself in various 
ways. On the one hand, the econornLcs department under Robbins 
and Hayek became increasingly deductive and analytical and 
increasingly hostile to 'problem-oriented' research; and 
on the other hand the department of government under Laski 
became increasingly associated with the teaching of Marxist 
political theory." 
What is absent from Harris' account and needs to be emphasised, is 
the fact that the L.S.E. was intricately enmeshed in the social, political 
and economic turmoil of the 1920s and '30s, to a degree and in a manner 
uncharacteristic of other institutions of higher education of that 
time. The range of academic subjects and the level of post-graduate 
and sponsored research ensured a continuous fermentation of conflicting 
ideas and ideologies. The rise of European Fascism, the flight of 
intellectuals in its wake, the economic crisis within Western capitalism 
and the apparent contradictions inherent in the'great Soviet experiment', 
were not merely phenomena of a theoretical nature, but affected directly 
the social science taught at the School. For some, the latter disciplines 
needed to be rescued from this worldly taint and distortion: this could 
be achieved through methodological rigour and thepurificatory powers 
of science. For others, the development of a 'relevant' science of 
society entailed praxis; the notion of the committed and involved academic 
community, articulating and pursuing ideas beyond the confines of academe. 
With the creation of a Chair in Social Biology in 1929, occupied by 
Lancelot Hogben, formerly a professor of Zoology at a South African 
university, there began a prolonged conflict within the School, centring 
on the new department. Much of the history of this episode at the 
L.S.E .. is well documented by Harris, and my reference to it is to 
emphasise the manner in which social scientists engaged in debates, 
sought allies and generally developed strategies to promote, or advocate 
preferable forms of social science to those being pursued by others. 
Harris' reference to Hogben's contempt for much of what passed as scientific 
social research animates his consideration of the situation at the 
School during those turbulent years, (Harris, 1977, pp.288-289); 
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"Hogben himself furiously opposed both the 'unscientific' 
commitment to Marxist dogma which he perceived in the followers 
of Laski, and the 'secular Platonism', 'ostentatious uselessness' 
and devotion to the 'idol' of academic purity which prevailed 
in the study of theoretical economics. Hogben 's views were 
strongly supported by Beveridge who was increasingly hostile 
to 'pure theory' and to partisan commitment in academic research." 
It would seem reasonable to assume that life for the sociologists was becoming 
increasingly difficult, in view of the hostility of those who regarded 
its practitioners, namely Hobhouse, as too metaphysical in their approach 
to their subject matter. While it could be argued that such intrigue 
and rivalry are normal aspects of inter-disciplinary and intra-disciplinary 
existence within institutions of higher education, particularly in 
terms of securing resources to maintain a sound teaching and research 
base, such a contemporary interpretation may miss the point that for 
the period in question, the different social science disciplines, and 
particularly sociology, were by no means as securely established either 
institutionally or intellectually as they are today. Events within 
the L.S.E. were to have a significant effect upon the subsequent develop-
ment of social science in Britain up to the post-war era of university 
expansion and the political direction of resources to those same disciplines. 
Beveridge, writing in 1953, remained a committed advocate of his earlier 
scheme to found social biology in the complex domain of the borderland 
between natural and social science (1953, p.251): 
"On the face of things an institution (the L. s. E.) designed 
for the scientific study of human society cannot omit study 
of man himself. Economists, political scientists, and sociolo-
gists if they are to be scientific at all, must have intimate 
co-operation with those engaged in the study of man as an 
individual, that is to say with biologists, anthropologists 
and psychologists." 
Some concessions had been made by the 1950s, but the importance of 
biology to the 'scientific enterprise' remain. The experiment in social 
biology eventually failed in 1936, with the vacation of the Chair by 
Hogben. Despite the fact that Hogben's critics were well entrenched 
in their departments, confident in the growth and continued specialisation 
of their respective disciplines, they complained continually to the 
. I 
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School's Director that Hogben and his department had received preferential 
treatment. It was not the case that other academics were being starved 
of funds to pursue their own interests, but that Beveridge appeared 
to be channelling a disproportionate amount of Rockefeller funds toward 
the social biology experiment. The response from Beveridge was that 
the programme to develop the natural basis of the social sciences was 
one agreed between himself and Officers of the Foundation in 1925, 
and ratified by the Professorial Council; it was therefore essential 
to disperse the, grant in accordance with the aforementioned agreement. 
The nature of that agreement is of crucial importance to understanding 
the development of social science at its major centre in Britain for 
the period in question, and one I shall consider shortly. However, 
before I do, I wish to conclude my examination of the case of social 
biology at the L. s. E. with a reference from Harris and Lance lot Hog ben. 
Their remarks give a clear indication of the tension, frustration and 
conflict that cha~acterised the aformentioned episode, and remains important 
to an understanding of the history of a particular field of knowledge 
and the content of its ideas. As Harris has said of Beveridge's Natural 
Bases Scheme (1977, p.290): 
"To Beveridge the eclipse of social biology was a crushing 
blow an end to his hopes of establishing a new 'science 
of society' , based on cross-fertilisation of disciplines 
and inductive methods. Among his colleagues the end of the 
experiment was generally greeted with relief, though some 
at least thought that it had never been given a fair trial. 
Many of them blamed the failure on Beveridge's own mismanagement 
- on his hostility to pure theory, his resistance to criticism 
and his failure to consult his staff." 
Under a benign autocracy, Beveridge had attempted to enforce his ideas 
within groups of practitioners of a variety of social science disciplines. 
The resulting opposition was, in part, due to the reluctance of some 
social scientists to allow their own specialist fields to become under-
labourers to some major, new branch of knowledge, which would incorporate 
existing subjects. A similar attempt to construct a synoptic science 
had been attempted by the sociologists (using the platform of several 
major conferences in the years, 1935, 1936 and 1937). Although the 
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type of disciplinary synthesis that Beveridge had in mind was unlike 
the one proposed by the sociologists, it nevertheless raised the issues 
of the possible loss of autonomy for individual social science disciplines, 
with corresponding reductions in institutional and intellectual develop-
ments that the existing level of diversity evidenced, particularly 
within the University of London and especially within the departmental 
arrangements of the L. s. E. There was also a somewhat paradoxical 
aspect to Bever~dge 's scheme: the much vaunted notion of 'cross-fertili-
sation' would seem difficult to "realise in view of the fact that the 
different social sciences had achieved varying degrees of theoretical 
and methodological sophistication. Those actually professing, or teaching 
the respective social sciences varied in number, with sociology ranking 
amongst the lowest. It would seem reasonable to argue that the better 
funded, more institutionally entrenched of the social sciences would 
be at an advantage in any scheme to create a 'new' science of society. 
They would also be disposed to either frustrate or undo similar plans: 
economics portrayed by its practitioners as the 'queen' of the social 
sciences, subsequently perceived the function of social biology in 
the proposed scientia scientiarurn as a significant threat. Indeed, 
the following observations by Hogben, reveal the success of his 'opponents' 
over the seven years in which he and Beveridge had collaborated to 
bring the Natural Bases Scheme to fruition (Harris, 1977, p.290): 
"Hogben himself, however, saw the failure as a victory for 
a factious and traditional academic establishment, obsessed 
with age-old battles between worn-out metaphysical creeds." 
Hogben, in a letter to Beatrice Webb, referred bitterly to his wasted 
years, in what turned out to be a short-lived department (1977, p.290): 
" and if there had been four people in the place with 
the determination to make a realistic programme of social 
studies I am sure he (Beveridge) would have played ball. 
The trouble was that the Left Wingers were just as dialectical 
as the Right, and the few who (like Robson) were sympathetic 
to realistic research (as opposed to tautological necromancy 
and belles letters) were not in powerful positions ... 
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That will end an inglorious and rather humiliating chapter 
of my life. Just now I am on top of the world again. The 
biological opportunities are stupendous. But if what is 
called social science is what is done at the L.S.E. thank 
Heaven I am a biologist ... " 
Another factor contributing to the demise of BeveridgJs scheme 
was his insistence that social scientists should always refrain from 
abusing their position within an academic establishment, by publicly 
expressing political opinions or any kind. Beveridge asserted, that 
a precondition for successfully establishing a science of society 
was the requirement of its practitioners to refrain from clouding scientific 
\ judgement with values: 'they had no legitimate place in the new discipline. 
Such a form of contrived detachment is evident in his assertion (Beveridge, 
Universities Quarterly, 1946-47, Vol. 1, pp.238-239): 
" that those who devote their lives to these studies should 
practice emotional detachment above all from political 
controversies and the organisation of parties." 
This was a direct reference to his experiences with radical elements 
of the student body, in addition to Laski's increasingly militant stance 
on the major political issues of the period. And yet, there is a somewhat 
paradoxical aspect to the demand he came to make on the new breed of 
social scientists implicit in his project and their function in the 
construction of an equally new field of science: the so-called 'new 
science' was founded on a fundamental contradiction. If its function 
was to discover social facts {Beveridge's princip.al obsession) , how 
would it be possible to ascertain those same facts, prior to the creation 
of a science of society? Within what scientifically informed sphere 
of activity would a researcher operate, in order to discover and collect 
social facts from which the new science was expected to emerge? The 
subordination of practitioner to his art, and of the subject-matter 
to the technology of the discipline, were two essential elements of 
Beveridge's vision of a reconstituted science of society. For, as 
he argued, 'there can be no science of society till the facts about 
society are available .' It would appear that defining the discipline 
into existence would suffice. 
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2.3 The funding of knowledge: the institutional context of the Natural 
Bases Scheme 
In this and subsequent sections of the chapter, I wish to examine the 
source and manner of funding William Beveridge 1 s Natural Bases Scheme 
for the social sciences at the L.S.E. This will entail consideration 
of the role of the private foundation, not only in terms of its involvement 
in funding Beveridge 1 s scheme, but as a primary component of American 
culture. Furthermore, I wish to explore the adoption and deployment 
of the normative structure of science as a fundamental component of 
the private foundation 1 s investment programmes, wherein the scientific 
method in particular, was regarded by both the Officers and Trustees 
of the foundation, as an exemplar for the production of all other forms 
of knowledge. Here I will focus upon the conception of science 1 s role 
in the development of social science at the L.S.E. 
science-building common to both benefactor and beneficiary. 
an agenda for 
There is an additional, yet equally important argument which is crucial 
to an understanding of the process of the funding of knowledge. This 
entails the conditional nature of the provision and distribution of 
resources for the production of knowledge. 
Large-scale benefaction, from whatever source, is never granted uncondi-
tionally and attempts to disguise or conceal a mutual interest, which 
generates or sustains the production of knowledge, becomes increasingly 
difficult to manage when the motives of both the benefactor and beneficiary 
are examined closely. Such motives may encompass a shared ideology, 
which is presented for public and professional consumption within the 
rhetoric of, say, the national need, or, a narrow definition of disci-
plinary advancement. This is not to assert that all funding of knowledge 
proceeds on a conspir~torial basis. Merely that private benefactor 
and grantee, or, the state funding agency and the recipient institution, 
regard the allocation of resources as necessarily contingent. Moreover, 
the relationship between the benefacator and beneficiary (often subject 
to intermediary direction by a third party, i.e. the U .G .C. or the 
E.S.R.C.) may depend upon a conception of knowledge, in this case certain 
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branches of the social sciences, which serve the needs of one party 
or interest group, over another. Consequently, the more technical 
and esoteric elements of a social scientist's claims for his discipline 
may, or may not be shared by a private or public funding agency. These 
issues become sharpened when economic, social and political imperatives 
impinge upon the institutional structures which support those branches 
of knowledge and practice. This in turn affects a discipline's legitimacy 
and the claims made by its practitioners on its behalf. Thevpredicament 
in which a branch of knowledge and its practitioners may find itself, 
arises as a result of the historical relationship between the cultural 
and social context of knowledge, the manner in which it is maintained, 
and how and why it relates to the objectives and interests a society 
possesses. 
It will be through a consideration of the private foundation as part 
of American culture generally, and an examination of the ideology which 
sustained the Rockefeller Foundation (R.F.) in its support of the L.S.E. 
as an important investment in social science, that the preceding argument 
on the conditional nature of funding will be pursued. 
2.4 The nature of American philanthropy: private wealth and public 
influence 
Foundations are a unique feature of American culture. Their history 
is well documented (Cf. Whitaker, 1979; Bremner, 1960; Fosdick, 1963; 
Chambers, 1948; Curti, 1963 and a rather sardonic chapter on their 
activities in Levison, 1979). 
themselves as self-evidently, 
It is in their attempts to legitimate 
non-political organisations, that is 
to be found an understanding of their creators and Trustees' desire 
to achieve public acceptance. The generosity of the foundations and 
the benefits of giving 
and Katz, 1981, p.252): 
have been considered by Karl and Katz (Karl 
"Money carefully given sometimes makes friends among its 
recipients, and that was certainly the case with the foundations. 
The universities were quickly won over, as were numero~: 
private and public agencies which had been helped by the 
philanthropists." 
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And more specifically on the role and significance of intermediary 
institutions. (1981, p.252): 
"The foundations encouraged the development of intermediary 
organisations, such as the Social Science Research Council, 
to mediate between themselves and competitors for the· support 
proffered by the foundations and they thus succeeded in creating 
a belief that they were not permanently aligned with any 
one set of individual research workers or with particular 
institutional recipients of their awards what was to 
be avoided was the appearance of investment in research which 
touched on controversial political questions even when this 
was in fact the objective of foundations and research workers." 
In fact, the above S:!:rategies failed on several noteworthy occasions: 
the extensive funding of William Beveridge's project for a natural 
basis for social science was criticised by both his academic colleagues 
at the L.S.E. and subsequently, by officers of the Rockefeller Foundation. 
The infamous Reece Commission (the 'Special .Committee To Investigate 
Tax-Exempt Foundations and Comparable Organisations' , House of Represent-
atives Eighty-Third Congress, Second Session on H. Res., 217, Dec. 
16, 1954) accused the foundations of funding research of a "leftist 
trend" in the social sciences, being "subversive" to the extent that 
they had, "worked to undermine some of our basic moral and religious 
and political principles" (1954, p. 204). Despite the nature and origin 
of criticism of the foundations as gatekeepers of contemporary intellectual 
life in the America of the 1920s and '30s, their central role as benefactors 
for the intellectural and institutional development of the social sciences 
both in America and Britain (especially at the L.S.E.), cannot be overlooked 
in the construction of historical accounts of those disciplines. 
In what came to be known as the "New Era" of the 1920s, the foundations 
engaged in what Karl and Katz refer to as a "new social-scientific 
utopianism and the development of voluntary, non-governmental systems 
of brin.~ft11:) about desired change in American society", (1981, p. 267). 
In the absence of a welfare state, or for that matter, any coherent 
structure of federal welfare or social security, a growing consciousness 
of the desirability of national programmes of social welfare emerged 
amongst a national elite of industrial reformers. Their aspirations 
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were in opposition to a general political culture which could not accept 
a national government committed to such a scale of reform. As Karl 
and Katz have argued (1981, p.238): 
"It was a culture which would have been threatened down to 
its partisan and regional roots by any attempt to create a 
nationally unified conception of social policy. Into the 
gap created by this impasse stepped the modern foundation, 
a system of national philanthropy - privately devoted to 
increa~ing the welfare of mankind." 
The crucial role played by the foundation thus began to displace its 
critics' major condemnation of it as an institutional device for 
legi timising tax evasion: as a corporate form of chari ty1 the foundations 
emerged to play a major role in the development of the modern American 
state. By supporting research and thereby influencing the choice of 
social policies, the philanthropists were able to shape governmental 
actions in what was increasingly identified as the private sector. 
By the late 1920s, the foundations had come to appear traditional, 
inevitable and acceptable. So much so, that President Herbert Hoover, 
in the early months of his office, assembled a group of America's most 
prominent social scientists to study the state of the nation. In addition, 
he approached the major foundations and obtained their organisational 
and financial support. Hoover's intentions were quite simple in principle, 
although the practicality of the intended project represented a somewhat 
unique departure in government policy making, for the reasons stated 
above. The outcome of his and the social scientists' endeavours was 
eventually published after several years of careful and meticulous 
research as, 'Recent Social Trends in the United States' (1933). It 
was intended as a document of "policy rese ar.ch for use by the President 
and as a basis for a national programme of social reform. Karl and 
Katz have estimated the significance of the project as an exercise 
in social research, and as a means to effect political change within 
a culture perennially suspicious of a centralist approach by the state, 
to manage the private affairs of its citizens (1981, p.268): 
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"No such massive social survey had been done before, nor 
has one been done since. A privately financed effort which 
utilised the support of government ~taffs and agencies as 
well as staffs from public and private research institutions, 
it remains a unique model of the kind of co-operative public-
private effort of which the founders of the major foundations 
had dreamed." 
The late 1920s and '30s in America would seem to have been a period 
of opportunity and opportunism for the nation's social scientists, 
at least in terms of insti~utional and professional consolidation 
of their disciplines (cf. Oberschall, 1972; Hinkle and Hinkle, 1954). 
The status of the disciplines in question, especially their public 
identity and respectability, were greatly enhanced by the task put 
to them by the nation's leading citizen: a greater accolade would 
be hard to come by. Without over-stating the significance of the Social 
Trends project, it would seem that as a national exercise in the conscrip-
tio..n of a branch of knowledge for political ends, a major step had 
·, been taken in the promotion and development of social science which, 
historically, may account for the essential difference between itself 
and its British counterpart. In considering the similarities and diffe-
rences between American and British social research, beyond the limitations 
of scale and funding, it could be that in the case of the· latter nation, 
no amount of 'social intelligence' could ever supplant, or positively 
influence, the political wisdom of its politicians and the inherent con-
servatism and general . myopia. of the·· Civil Service, especially during 
the: period in question. America's cosmopolitan culture seemed more 
susceptible to experiments in social engineering than Britain, whose 
governmental and civil administrations were both ancient and somewhat 
impervious to singularly personal and somewhat inspirational crusades 
of social reform. What is interesting in Karl and Katz's account of 
the Social Trends project, is the precedent that it set in the relation-
ship between social science and government; one that gained in strength 
(via philanthropic benefaction) despite the establishment of the Executive 
Office of the President (1981, p. 268) which, henceforth, would provide 
the necessary funds for the commissioning and conduct of similar research 
projects (1981, p.268): 
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"Even the hostility towards private business that ultimately 
came to dominate the New Deal did nothing.to stop the expansion 
of influence by privately supported research on the making 
of governmental policy ... 
In the period after the Second World War, the relations between 
foundations and the makers of national policy grew even closer 
as foundations provided government with international research 
opportunities which would have run into opposition from Congress ... " 
The key role played by the foundations in creating an extensive, national 
network of influentials, whose careers evolved by way of passage in 
and between the centres of power and decision making in American society, 
givat some indication of the control exerted by those same foundations 
over the culture of that nation (1981, pp.268-269): 
" at least from the perspective of a kind of organisational 
pattern developed over half a century, the inter-relations 
and interpenetrations reflected a triumph of ad hoc procedure. 
Administratively, foundations became one of the crucial foci 
in the training of the country's managerial elite and the 
creation of the research techniques and the data that the 
elite needed. They were part of a system which provided 
governments and universities with advice and staff, in turn 
drawing their own staff from universities and government. 
The course of careers from foundation to university to government 
and back again became the track which the United States depended 
upon to develop staff and leadership for its system of government, 
as well as ideas." 
Kenneth Kusmer (1973) has developed this theme of the circulation of 
influentials within a network of institutions that play a significant 
role in shaping a nation's culture, emphasising the degree of dependency 
that exists between individuals within relatively small, but strategically 
located groups, whether- in the universities 
government, civil administration and social work. 
education in general· -
Charles Levinson's book, Vodka Cola 
I 
(1980) is based on the thesis 
that the phenomenon of detente is essentially ideological and the post-facto 
servant of an economic realty. Despite his somewhat swashbuckling 
approach to the problem, he nevertheless uncovers some startling evidence 
to support many of his assertions about the contest between the official 
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doctrines of East and West. In particular, his consideration of the 
Foundations, though confined largely to their contemporary form, serves 
to locate the role of those institutions in the exercise of power and 
the management of wealth, especially in America, but with additional 
reference to other nations. The followin~ reference from Levinson's 
work, highlights the contemporary position of the most powerful Foundations, 
though the situation he refers to is rooted in the spectacular expansion 
of Foundation influence within areas such as higher education between 
the wars, (Levin'son, 1980, p.l59):. 
"In fact the Rockefeller and Ford Foundations exercise a 
decisive influence over political and social affairs. They 
direct and, 'if necessary, modify the development of morals, 
ideas, values and institutions. These private agencies take 
the place of public bodies and government and form an admini-
stration of their own with extensive means of pressure and 
ways of influencing public opinion. The fact that they represent 
the source of real power goes a long way to explaining why 
they are tolerated by politicians." 
It is the reference to the direction and modification of a culture's 
moral and institutional structures that is of relevance to my argument; 
in that it implies the actual domain within which the ideas and values 
associated with cultural development are produced and transmitted, 
namely, though not exclusively, the system of higher education. There 
is evidence to suggest that Foundations, particularly the R.F., endeavoured 
through its particular programmes and projects, to engender an approach 
to the solution of mankind's problems (a grandiose aspiration, yet 
the hallowed goal of philanthropy) that entailed the selective choice 
of particular branches of knowledge and its exponents, which shifted 
significantly the fortunes of those disciplines within their institu-
tional contexts. This in turn had implications for the manner in which 
a nation's 'problems' are defined, examined, understood and subsequently 
resolved. Such a process would seem to imply a pragmatic and yet rational 
approach to ending ignorance and chaos. Moreover, it also assumes 
that the resolution of a problem (remembering that for the Foundation, 
the problems most worthy of a solution had usually to be of at least 
national proportion) lies within the domain of those best 'qualified' 
to recognise and resolve it: this tends, as many Foundation programmes 
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do, to conceptualise problems, be they social, economic, or political 
as essentially technical and therefore amenable · to a correspondingly 
instrumental approach for their resolution. Considered thus, it is 
understandable why, when the R. F. went in search of fundable projects, 
be they the extension of an institution devoted to the resolution of 
economic and political problems (the L.S.E.), or individuals (William 
Beveridge), with ideas about the need to make the social sciences more 
scientific and therefore likely to enhance the prospects of those working 
in the latter institution to solVe the nation's problems, philanthropic 
largesse carried with it very precise implications for the most appropriate 
theoretical and methodological bases for the social sciences. 
2.5 The Rockefeller Foundation: science as a model for morally dominative 
philanthropY 
In its 1953 Annual Report, the R.F. presented a cautious and calculated 
defense of its philanthropic support of the social sciences since 
its incorporation of the earlier Rockefeller fund, The Laura Spelman 
Rockefeller Memorial in 
social science contained 
of knowle~e (in this 
1929. 
two 
case, 
The justification of its 
of the major components of 
via private benefaction) , 
support for 
the funding 
expressed in 
terms of what I have referred to above as the relationship between 
the nature and purpose of social science, and the subsequent construction 
of its agenda. The latter exercise - the construction of an agenda 
for social science entails the essential notion of its purpose - whereby 
the component disciplines are dynamic forms of knowledge, having conse-
quences for social action. Thus the sponsors of social science are 
central to its contingent status and propagators of the current imperatives 
as defined by the funding agency. The 1953 Annual Report gives a clear 
indication of the rudimentary nature and purpose of R. F. social science; 
one adhered to since the early 19205 and of a form in keeping with 
that of one of its most favoured beneficiaries, William Beveridge. 
The author of the report considered that such a social science evidenced 
the following characteristics (The Rockefeller Foundation, 1953, p.l9): 
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"There was no illusion about the rudimentary character of 
the so-called social sciences or about the severe limitations 
which are encountered in attempting to apply the methods 
of the physical sciences to man 1 s own behaviour. Nevertheless, 
it was felt that there might be sufficient regularity about 
human behaviour to permit fruitful study, and that a scientific 
approach might evolve methods of study which, if not a direct 
application of the techniques developed in the older sciences 1 
might lead to surer bases of knowledge than we now have." 
And in the matter of the purpose of the social sciences as dynamic 
forms of knowledge (1953, p.l9): 
"A further impulse behind the interest in social studies 
was a convict;ion that the strengthening of our own free insti-
tutions required a better understanding of the processes 
of a free society and the framework within which a citizen 
enjoys the privileges and bears the responsibilities of liberty 
itself. At a period when free institutions came under challenge 
from totalitarian ideology of both the left and the right, 
it was felt that penetrating studies of our own free. economic 
and political institutions would help them to withstand assault." 
The Annual Report made repeated references to the "inevitability" of 
applying the methods of the natural sciences to human affairs. This 
somewhat elementary. form of contemporary positivism remained a common 
feature of R.F. social science throughout the inter-war years and 
into the post-war era. The 1937 Annual Report gives a clear indication 
of the way in which R.F. Executives perceived the gradual maturity 
of social science from speculative to authoritative scientific disciplines 
(The Rockefeller Foundation, 1937, p.43): 
"Gradually, although as yet only in part successfully, social 
studies are freeing themselves from medieval logic and preoc-
cupation with metaphysical speculation; they are slowly cutting 
loose from the idea that the philosophising of armchair thinkers 
can take the place of observation and verification." 
Again, in a similarly confident vein (1937, pp.43-44): 
"The scientific observation of facts as the basis of theories 
in relation to political, economic and social organisation 
has been proved possible." 
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J.A. Barnes (1979) has commented on the institutionalisation of 
social inquiry, especially the status and utility of knowledge gained 
from social research, focusing on the transformation of such knowledge 
from what he has referred to as a passive form; the collection of 
information (largely descriptive), leading to informed decisions on 
ad hoc, social problems. The social policy that ensued as a result 
of such social inquiry was directed, in the main, to the solution of 
local problems within the community. In contrast to this, and according 
to Barnes' assessment of social. research over the last forty years, 
knowledge gained from social inquiry tends to be of a more active 
nature. Although the results of the former type are still used today, 
the latter tends to be associated with applied social science, 
particularly vogues in social engineering and the rise of policy science. 
However it is Barnes' reference to social engineering and its origins 
that is of greater relevance to my concern with the R. F. and its sponsor-
ship of social science at the L.S.E. As Barnes observes (1979, p. 44): 
"The possibility of social engineering, of sociologically 
informed intervention in social life, was envisaged by Jeremy 
Bentham and found a prolific advocate in Lester F. Ward, 
whose Applied Sociology appeared in 1904 (cf. Barnes, H. E., 
1966: 126-43). In practice, sociology did not begin to be 
applied in this sense until after the First World War, and 
serious issues of public principle arose only after 1945. 
Speaking very broadly, sociology and economics began to be 
applied scientifically at much the same time, with declarations 
of the possibility of application before 1914 ... " 
It is possible to gain some indication of the pragmatic nature of much 
of American academic culture, within which the Officers of the R.F. 
(who negotiated with Beveridge), would themselves have been educated. 
These influences would direct the Foundation's gatekeepers in their 
assessment of viable projects within the field of international social 
science. Another significant dimension of American academic culture 
entails the ethos and authority of science and the rise of technology, 
as major sources of images, vocabulary and metaphor deployed in the 
general construction and justification of social categories within 
fields of knowledge outside of the natural sciences. An understanding 
of the diffusion of science, its growing public visibility and influence, 
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is essential to an understanding of the rationale of R. F. philanthropy 
between the wars, and its particular effects upon the development of 
social science in Britain, especially its Officer's and their Programme 
architects' obsession with the scientific method . As Daniels (1971) 
has observed of the 'Progressive Era' and immediately afterwards (Daniels, 
1971, pp.289-91): 
" nothing was more important to that era (Progressive 
Era) than 'science'. It was a word to conjure with; award 
to sweep away all opposition by labelling it 'benighted', 
'romantic' or 'obscurantist'; a word to legitimise any programme 
no matter what fundamental reorintations it might entail 
or what sacrifices it might call upon particular groups to 
make. In the name of science, · one might reorganise a city 
government, fundamentally alter the relations between labour 
and management (sic) revolutionise a school curriculum or 
consign whole races of men to genetic inferiority." 
The central, compelling feature of science, one which seemingly mesmerised 
those who stood in awe of its achievements, was its methodology. Its 
purported powers were accorded a virtually miraculous status by its 
popularisers (1971, pp.289-291): 
"Progressive leaders believed that the successes of science 
were based upon a known technique termed the 'scientific 
methOd I 1 and ~hat thiS methOd COUld be applied tO all human 
problems. By the beginning of the Progressive Era, American 
scientific popularisers were generally agreed that the scientific 
method, which they presented as the simplistic adding up 
of 'facts' relevant to a problem, was the only gateway to 
determining truth. Science which· had been distinguished from 
other forms of knowledge in the early nineteenth century, 
had now come once again to be identified with all knowledge." 
The 'success story' of science, as an exemplar for other forms of knowledge 
and as a code of practice (a normative structure), to be emulated by 
practitioners in other fields, received wider public recognition as 
'pure' science became transformed into tangible objects of consumer 
convenience. The conversion of science into technology and its associated 
artifacts had a significant affect on the increasingly affluent American 
public (1971, p.291): 
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"Technology especially · fired Americans' imaginations giving 
them unlimited hopes for the future (they) were increasingly 
impressed by the visible manifestations of the power of technology 
that had appeared at an accelerating rate since the third 
quarter of the nineteenth century the s~e manifestation 
that had cleared the way for the rise of a pure science ideal 
among American scientists. The telephones, telegraphs and 
electric lights were more powerful arguments from the 
layman's point of view than the most elegant theorem of mathe-
matical physics." 
Daniels gives a clear indication of the influence of technology in 
shaping the publids conception of the power of science, although 
the image that was engendered owed more to the immediate familiarity 
with gadgets and public services, than the complexities of the scientific 
principles underlying the physical object. What is significant in 
this public conception of science, the disinterestedness, or deferential 
wonderment and ignorance of the complex and esoteric aspect of pure 
science, is that it reinforced and perpetuated the authority of the 
scientist, within and beyond the domain of his competence. I shall 
return to this theme when considering a similar phenomenon during the 
inter-war period in Britain. 
Science had thus begun to make significant inroads into the hierarchy 
of American values. Indeed, and particularly in America, it has played 
an influential role as an absolute, able to justify and expected to 
motivate individual behaviour. Don K. Price (1965) attempts to pinpoint 
the reason for the rapid infusion of the ethos and authority of science 
within American culture, particularly the sphere of politics (Price, 
1965, p.lOl): 
"For better or worse, science escaped from the institutional 
domination of the older culture very early in the history 
of the United States, and in its relation to the administrators 
of academic and public affairs it has been in a position 
of predominant influence ever since. The traditional culture, 
derived from theology and the old philosophy, had comparatively 
little organised influence on politics; there is simply no 
conservative political faction. of any consequence that has 
its intellectual roots in the old tradition, to counterbalance 
the newer and more radical influence in science." 
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Thus the natural sciences emerged as agents of industrial and political 
recomposition. This in turn gave rise to a construction and utility 
of science as a basis of cultural recomposition affecting especially 
the culture of work. 
by Mike Hales (1982) . 
The consequences of this have been clearly examined 
The important change taking place in science, 
apart from the process of discovery, was the inherent ideological 
form of science, whose nature and purpose became increasingly influenced 
by individuals other than its practitioners. While the older conception 
of science as a'source of power ower nature and subsequently a meaningful 
way of justifying and ordering the pursuit of knowledge remained in 
tact, this ancient tenet and the echo of the 'New Philosophy', transformed 
the ideological proje~tion of science, especially its methods, as a 
force of production. Science was no longer a marginal form ·of practice; 
its relationship to economy and culture emerged within a context of 
new institutionalised conventions - science as morality. George Simpson 
has given careful consideration to the transformation of science within 
the modern episteme, particularly its subsequent bifurcation (science 
as morality) with sociology (Simpson, 1953, pp.l3-14): 
"But there comes a point where the conquest of nature through 
science and applied technology itself develops a type of 
culture which turns science from an enemy of convention into 
a bulwark of the established order. Society wins the war 
with science by assimilating it into existent power-relations 
based upon economic organisations which dwarf those who were 
supposed to have been emancipated." 
Simpson continues with an extension of the preceding argument to encompass 
social science (1953, pp.l4-1S): 
"The conquest o:f nature is then organised to subdue man through 
a system of social relations which restricts inquiry, and 
application of basic findings, concerning its own workings. 
Morality becomes massive, not rational; and the manipulation 
of the masses itself becomes a technology. Natural science 
enslaves social science to the power-relations which its 
technology has made possible. And individuals, whom social 
science sees as the constitutive elements of a culture become 
not the actual or potential bearers of rationality but the 
recepticles of a reason in society whose chief aim is to 
render rational values impotent by blunting the edge of social 
research. Social resarch itself becomes part of conventional 
morality, and professional standing becomes judged by the 
statistical mores." 
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The importance of science, its pervasive ethos and authority within 
the system of values associated with American culture in the decades 
before the Second World war, provided a context in which social insti tu-
tions like the Rockefeller Foundation and its managers could, without 
sacrificing the principles of the Foundation's Trustees, devise strategies 
and programmes to perpetuate a cultural system which served to sustain 
and reproduce an economic elite without which the 'Free World' would 
be placed in jeopardy. From such an ideological vantage-point the 
power of science appeared a natural ally in the promotion of morally 
dominative philanthropy. In many respects, the social auspices under 
which scientific endeavours operate are themselves representative of 
a prevalent morality., Science is organised through a social process 
that accords with conventional morality. Truth is ·being discovered 
to enhance the acquisitive aggregations which subsidise it. There 
is a taint of the promiscuous and mischievous about an investigation 
which has not taken place under proper supervision. The ideology of 
philanthropy served to explain, defend, and buttress this conception 
of the instrumentality of science. Fisher (1980, p.284) gives a clear 
indication of the predisposition of the Rockefeller Foundation toward 
the development of social science and the consequences for those same 
disciplines in Britain between the wars: 
"During the inter-war period Rockefeller philanthropy consistently 
encouraged the development of the social sciences along the 
lines of the natural sciences·. The aim was to convert these 
disciplines into scientific disciplines in the mode of the 
natural sciences. Rockefeller officers cultivated the scientific 
approach, that is, the 'proper attitude' toward social problems. 
In their terms this meant that research should · be quanti ta ti ve, 
practical and realistic. They emphasised a particular methodology 
and encouraged researchers to tackle the immediate problems 
of the age. 
In the 1930s the Rockefeller Foundation was particularly 
concerned to see an increase in the cooperation between social 
scientists and the business community. They had no use for 
·abstract theorising. Rather they wanted the social sciences 
to be harnessed to solving western capitalism's problems 
and to provide on the spot service to 'men of affairs'." 
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It is through an explanation and understanding of the objectives and 
strategies of the officers of the R. F., their somewhat grandiose schemes 
for selecting and funding international sites for the promotion of 
preferred social scientific knowledge and the expansion of the institu-
tional and intellectual bases of the social sciences at the L.S.E. 
under the fostering tutelage of Beveridge, that constitute the substantive 
issues affecting the historical context within sociology sought to assert 
and sustain its autonomy during the inter-war period. 
comprise elements of sociology's advocatory dimension. 
Those same issues 
2 ·. 6 The funding of William Beveridge's Natural Bases Scheme: the 
pursuit of a common agenda. 
How important were R.F. funds to the development of social science 
in Britain, especially for the L.S.E. during the inter-war period? 
Moreover, how important was the L. S. E. to the general development of 
the social sciences in Britain during the same period? What were the 
main objectives and policies underpinning the R.F. programmes, which 
as I have argued, incorporated a scientistic conception of social science? 
The first question has been answered by William Beveridge himself (Beveridge, 
19531 P• 252) : 
"The School would never have obtained from Beardsley 
and his Memorial the magnificent grants which meant so 
for teachers and students throughout the School if we 
not planned for the Natural Bases of Social Science." 
Ruml 
much 
had 
The strategic presentation of an · appropriate form of social science 
by Beveridge and the expression of its nature in terms of an anticipated 
unity of the sciences, served as the core of his advocacy of a synthetic 
science. The common denominator in both Beveridge's notion of a science 
of society and that espoused by the funding agency upon which he and 
the L.S.E. depended for revenue (essential for the promotion of his 
experiments in science-building) , entailed an unshakeable belief in 
the techniques of modern science. The scale of private funding of 
the. social sciences has been examined by Fisher (1980) and gives a 
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clear indication of the concentration of investment in developing 
those disciplines between the wars in Britain (Fisher, 1980, p.285): 
"The two Rockefeller Foundations, the L.S.R.M. and the R.F., 
were responsible for approximately 95 per cent of the total 
expenditure (from 1919-1940 on the social sciences from the 
major Foundations) during this period ... There was no government 
research council like the Medical Research Council that dealt 
with the social sciences and government departments made 
very few research grants during the · period It becomes 
apparent that the contributions from American philanthropy, 
far from being Small 1 Were the mainstay Of the SUpport that 
social science received." 
Fisher also points ou;t that the University Grants Committee did provide 
support for social science departments, but it was generally an extremely 
small proportion of all the funding of social science for the period 
1919 to 1940. 
The L.S.E. became a focal point for R.F. benefaction. It was, as Lord 
Withenshawe pointed out, "an important world centre for the social 
sciences, " (University Quarterly, May, 19481 _ p.260). Through 
the formation of the Beveridge/Rockefeller alliance, the major institu-
tional setting of social science in Britain underwent an unprecedented 
change between the years 1923 and 1939. Again Fisher ( 1980, p. 288) 
gives an accurate indication of the scale of subventions by the R. F. 
to the School: 
"During the period 1923 to 1939 the Memorial and the R.F. 
gave approximately £430,000 (over 2 million dollars) to the 
L.S.E. During this same period the School expanded rapidly 
and came to be regarded as 1 • • • the leading centre of research 
in the Social Sciences for Great Britain and the 
British Empire ... 1 and it became the leading research library 
for the Social Sciences in Britain." 
The L. S. E. also led the field in the percentage increase of full-time 
students for the aforementioned period, with a corresponding increase 
in full-time teachers. As Fisher has observed (1980, p.288): 
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"As part of the general increase in enrolements, the number 
of students reading for higher degrees rose from 84 to 293 
in those years. The L.S.E. had by the end of the 1930s become 
an international centre training many foreign students and 
was still the only institution in Britain at which undergraduate 
teaching was devoted exclusively to the social sciences." 
The L.S.E. was also the validating agency for external degrees via 
the University of London, on whose Boards L. S. E. representatives served. 
The curricula , of other universities would therefore be affected by 
way of the composition of syllabuses designed on the model of those 
within the L.S.E. The University of London's role as a validating 
body for degrees in the social sciences, remained an influence that 
persisted even after the advent of the C.N.A.A. 
Further evidence of the L.S.E. 's influence upon the social sciences 
is contained in a published appraisal of the influence of the activities 
of the School on the University system of Britain. This piece of work 
was commissioned by the R. F. in 193 7 and was reviewed in the Review 
of the Activities and Developments of the London School of Economics 
and Political Science, 1923-1937, under the sub-heading of, 'The School 
and Recent Developments in the Status of the Social Sciences', (1937, 
pp. 24-28) . Its general argument represented a departure from the Webbs' 
original plans for the institution (1937, p.24): 
"The years since the war have witnessed a notable development 
in the status of the Social Sciences in university studies, 
in training for certain professions and in the world of admini-
stration and business." 
The Webbs had regarded the School as a socialist redoubt in the struggle 
to provide a viable political alternative to the Marshallian, individualist/ 
laissez-faire economics which had as its influential centre, Cambridge. 
This cherished belief was undermined somewhat as Hayek, Robbins, Gregory 
and Cannan embraced orthodox economic theory and persisted in refining 
it still further. The L. S. E. of the late 1930s seemed somewhat remote 
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from the spirit which inflamed its founders 1 ideals. 
has argued {Winch, 1969, p.58): 
As Donald Winch 
"Implicit in the foundation of the School was the belief 
that any impartial study of society would ultimately support 
the cause of socialism." 
External students were prepared for the degrees in Economics, Law and 
Commerce. The, Review {1937) states that most of the teaching in the 
social sciences done·. at the former University Colleges was conducted 
under the general subject areas previously mentioned. This was the 
case for the University Colleges of Exeter, Hull, Leicester, Nottingham, 
' 
and Southampton. The Review also drew attention to the contribution 
that the School had made to other autonomous universities in the United 
Kingdom, Europe and elsewhere in the world, emphasising in particular 
its influence upon departments of Economics, Economic History, Sociology 
and Social Science. Emphasis was also given to a number of 1 firsts 1 
in terms of innovations and experiments in newer branches of knowledge 
and those perhaps older and more orthodox, but yet to receive the distinc-
tion of a Chair. Among the most noteworthy were; the Chair of Anthropology, 
established at the School in 1927, believed to be the first in that 
subject in a British university; the Chair of Legal History created 
in 1931, unique in Britain at that time; the institution of the Diploma 
in Public Administration by the University of London, for which the 
School had the responsibility entirely for teaching {the latter led 
to further development of the subject elsewhere) ; the institution of 
the School of Modern Greats at Oxford and influenced by developments 
which had taken place within the School; the fo~ndation of Nuffield 
College as a research centre for the University of Oxford was in itself 
a recognition of the importance of the type of organisation of which, 
hitherto, the L.S.E. had been the sole representative in Britain. 
Related to the preceding institutional innovations, and attributable 
to and within the L.S.E., is the important aspect of the distribution 
and destination of its graduates and scholars, funded under the R.F. 
Fellowship Programme. Fisher {1980) considers this to be an important 
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feature of the Foundation's programmes, one that found expression within 
a definition of education as a form of investment. He cites the Foundations 
as among the first organisations to apply 'a theory of human capital' 
to education, referring specifically to the funding of individuals 
who showed promise within their respective fields of expertise, {1980, 
p.304): 
"Education, as represented by the institution or the man, 
was seen as a form of capital investment, the capital being 
the 'knowledge I 1 I the brains I 1 I the leadership I that education 
produced. This view of education received expression consistently 
in the Rockefeller negotiations, but has been especially 
noticeable when Foundation officers have referred to either 
the larger institutional grants or their fellowship programmes. 
Education, in these contexts, becomes almost a special 'means 
of production' that will solve all society's problems." 
Fisher supports his argument with a reference to the ideology of philan-
thropy, which may account for his contention that Foundations represent 
yet another manifestation of capitalism's tendency to maintain and 
extend a social system necessary for its preservation. In the R.F. 
Annual Report of 1941, the author proclaims the contribution of the 
social sciences to the aforementioned process {Fisher, 1980, p.305): 
" Foundation confidently believes that the work it has 
helped to finance in the social sciences has given this genera-
tion better men and better tools for analysis and judgement, 
and has contributed to the growing reserve of knowledge of 
human relationship and of those institutions and processes 
through which that relationship is organised and expressed." 
'Investment in people 1 through the establishment of training programmes 
for promising graduate students within centres of excellence, became 
a central component of the Rockefeller policy of investment in the 
social sciences in Britain during the inter-war period. 
preferential treatment was extended to those workers within 
Moreover, 
fields 
who had previously established themselves as leaders in their own subject 
areas. This was the case for scholars such as Malinowski and Carr-Saunders, 
each of whom owed a considerable debt to R. F. benefaction in the pursuit 
of their respective researches, and subsequently, their renow.ned careers. 
Through the munificence of the R.F. Malinowski toured the American 
117 
university circuit, espousing his theory of functionalism and its crucial 
role within sociology. Carr-Saunders was able to undertake an extensive 
tour of the United States, bringing him into contact with many influential 
American social scientists, before accepting the Charles Booth Chair 
at the University of Liverpool. R. F. money played a significant part 
in the careers of several of Britain's most influential social scientists, 
enabling them to consolidate their intellectual and institutional presence 
within the developing disciplines. 
I think it important not to portray British social scientists as unwitting 
pawns in a sophisticated conspiracy of American imperialism (intellectual 
or otherwise) with the R.F. and subsequently Beveridge as its central 
agents. As sophisticated and credible as Fisher's argument may be, 
it should be tempered by the fact that, however successfuly the Foundations 
had been in establishing the necessity of social science to enlightened 
social policy in America, certain cultural, political, and therefore 
structural elements within British society would not necessarily ensure 
a similar development on a scale witnessed in America between the two 
world wars. 
Beveridge had begun his ne~oritations with the Rockefeller Foundations 
as early as 1923. Commentators on that period, namely Jose Harris 
(1977), Beveridge's biographer, (and indeed Beveridge himself), refer 
to that date as the beginning of an epoch in the funding of Beveridge's 
project for a natural base to the social sciences. Although Beveridge 
regarded his new partnership with the R. F. as an indication of a common 
understanding of the need to base social scie.nce upon i;he principles 
and practice of natural science, it would seem from his account of 
the potential of social science, that other important factors contributed 
to his enthusiasm for the project. 
to the conditional nature of the 
I have quoted Beveridge's reference 
R.F. benefaction, and although it 
would seem reasonable to argue that he was conscious of the need. to 
1 comply 1 with his benefac·tors at the risk of losing much needed finance 1 
another reason may have influenced significantly the outcome of his 
early negotiations with R.F. Trustees. There existed at the time of 
his meetings with Beardsley Rum:l of the R. F. Memorial 1 an unprecedented 
success within American social science: one which greatly enhanced 
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the status of those disciplines as a national asset. It sprung from 
the extensive and prolonged investment by the R.F. in 'its' university 
(Chicago) and other academic institutions and particularly in the field 
of practical, 'problem solving' social research. While R.F. benefaction 
for medical research was a relatively safe form of philanthropy, adventures 
into the potentially dangerous field of social research (because of 
its association with policy and politics) caused considerable internal 
conflict within the Foundation. Nevertheless, the potential of social 
science as a basis of social refo~m appealed greatly to the Rockefellers. 
As Karl and Katz note (1981, p.267): 
"The decision by the Rockefeller Foundation to support social 
science had earlier roots in John D. Rockefeller Sr.'s interest 
in research in economics; but such expansion in the 1920s 
and the support of the Social Science Research Council, the 
National Bureau of Economic Research, and the Institute for 
Government Research (later named the Brookings Institution 
in honour of its philanthropic founder) were all Rockefeller 
entries in the field of research on social science with practical 
intentions." 
From the evidence considered here, it is not unreasonable to assume 
that Beveridge may have subscribed to a somewhat fiercely empiricist 
version of social science, prior to his appointment as Director of 
the L.S.E. Apart from the fact that his term of office provided an 
opportunity to insti tutionalise and develop his theories, the subsequent 
programme which arose for the scientific basis of the social sciences 
received a sustained impetus from his association with the scheme's 
major benefactor. Beveridge was well aware of the conditional nature 
of the R.F. grants, which in turn reinforced his motives for subscribing 
to a natural bases scheme. Not so much a conspiracy, rather the 
skillful management of a project that would have an effect on the develop-
ment of social science in Britain overthe next thirty years. Beveridge's 
strategy in promoting his project is clearly evident from his concession 
to the R.F. in allowing them to establish the order of priorities, 
rather than the Professorial Council to which he was accountable, (Beveridge, 
1960, p.87): 
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"Thinking over the emphasis which Ruml had laid on our developing 
the Natural Bases of Social Science, I reversed the order 
on July 16th. In the covering letter, I said to Ruml that 
I had put the Natural Bases first in the memorandum, as he 
suggested." 
The Council had made quite clear to Beveridge the need to secure endowment 
for specific capital projects, in addition to a Chair in Political 
Economy. Beveridge was well aware of this fact, yet considered the 
ordering of such priorities as the Director's prerogative, notwithstanding 
the collective wishes of his colleagues, (1960, p.85): 
"There deve~oped an interesting difference of priori ties, 
as between Beardsley Ruml and myself, as to where money 
was most needed. He was attracted immense!·y by the idea 
of promoting study of the Natural Bases of the Social Sciences. 
But though I wanted that extension of our scope, I knew well 
that there were several other things for which money was 
indispensable to us at once." 
William Beveridge was sufficiently astute in his negotiations to appreciate 
the consequences for the L. S. E. should he attempt to override the interests 
of the R.F. Sufficiently skilled in the art of grantsmanship, he knew 
the importance of being able to massage 'the system' to his own advantage. 
Of course it is important to appreciate the fact that when Beveridge 
recounted his early period as Director at the L.S.E., one in which 
he successfully attracted vast sums of R. F. money, his reconstruction 
of events seems to accord him the role of a somewhat influential, cunning 
and adroit negotiator (Beveridge, 1960, p.85): 
"It became obvious, in discussion with Ruml that the School 
would have a far better chance of dollars for these prior 
needs, if it asked also for endowment of the NatQral Bases. " 
There is no doubt that Beveridge and his colleagues did have their 
own plans for the development of the School, and that as far as a coincidence 
between their own and their major benefactor's conception of a social 
science, founded on the tenets of the natural sciences, no great conflict 
ensued. What may have been overlooked (ignored?) by Beveridge in his 
conformity to the conditions of R.F. grants, was the profoundly ideological 
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nature of the latter organisation's conception of the nature and purpose 
of such a social science. Officers and Trustees of the R. F. regarded 
social science as the most promising field of knowledge between the 
two world wars and into the post-war era, up to the debacle of the 
Reece Commission in 1954 (although the R.F. soon regained a cautious 
optimism thereafter) . R.F. social science, its stern positivistic nature 
was imbued with the morally dominative philanthropy that Fisher regards 
as the vehicle for the transmission of a correspondingly dominative 
service, pursued from a positi~n of great assurance about American, 
middle-class values. 
There was also a more subtle and binding element to Beveridge's Natural 
Bases Scheme and its benefactor, one that has been referred to by Harold 
Laski (1930) in his criticism of the relationship between foundations 
and the universities, (Laski, 1930, p.l74): 
"The foundations do not control, simply because, in the direct 
and simple sense of the word, there is no need for them to 
do so. They have only to indicate the immediate direction 
of their minds for the whole university world to discover 
that it always meant to gravitate swiftly to that angle of 
the intellectual compass." 
Laski has also considered the somewhat, paternalistic and subserviant 
aspects of grantsmanship, a theme developed in greater detail by Eduard 
Linderman, who perceived a more sinister function to the role of founda-
tions as gatekeepers (Linderman, 1936, p.l9): 
"Foundations do not merely exercise power and control over those 
who accept their money. Such influence is obvious even when 
the foundations making grants insist to the contrary. A 
more subtle and much more widespread control comes about 
by reason of the multitude of indirect relationships in which 
foundations play a part. Those who accept foundation grants 
often turn out to be radical critics, in private, of the 
control which has been exercised over them and their programmes. 
Those who live in anticipation of receiving foundation grants 
are the more servile." 
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Laski portrayed the seeker of foundation munificence as a parasitic 
individual, with weather-vane attitudes in keeping with those· of his 
or her potential benefactor. Such individuals sought to curry favour 
with the representatives of foundations, particularly on the campuses 
of the American universities and colleges (Laski, 1930, p.l70): 
"When you see him at a college, it is like nothing so much 
as the vision of an important customer in a department store. 
Deferential salesmen surround him on every hcnd anticipating 
his every wish, alive to the importance of his good opinion, 
fearful lest he be dissatisfied and go to. their rival across 
the way. The effect on him is to make him feel that he in 
fact is shaping the future of the social sciences." 
Laski considered that such a 'feeling' was in fact, a concrete strategy 
of foundations, being clearly mapped-out in their famous Programmes. 
Again, Linderman has cited another example of the foundations' strategies 
for influencing the development of a particular branch of knowledge 
(Linderman, 1936, pp.l9-20): 
"Another device for projecting foundation control has become 
popular in recent years: foundations frequently supply the 
initial funds for a new project, these funds to be used for 
exploratory and conferencing purposes. In many cases the 
foundation acts as host for such preparatory groups. By 
the time the final project. is formulated it becomes clear 
that nothing will be proposed or performed which may be inter-
preted as a challenge to the orthodox conception of value 
which characterises foundations as a whole. Very few important 
cultural projects of any size are consummated in this country 
without having experienced either the direct or indirect 
impact of foundation philosophy and influence." 
Although Linderman was referring to America between the wars, his observa-
tions have been confirmed by those who have endeavoured to trace the 
connection between private benefaction and the production of knowledge 
within an historical and cultural context (cf. Fisher, 1980). In many 
respects, Fisher has expanded Linderman's earlier thesis (Linderman, 
1936, p.l2): 
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"In other words, foundations do not represent a "conspiracy" 
on the part of the guardians of vested wealth desgined to 
influence culture in one direction. More accurate would 
be the statement that these vested funds represent a consistently 
conservative element in our civilisation, and that wherever 
their appropriations are accepted there enters at the same 
time this subtle influence in the direction of protecting 
the value system in existence, that is, conserving the status 
quo." 
Both Linderman 1 s and Laski 1 s critic isms came in an era when large-scale 
funding from state agencies was virtually non-existent, and in spite 
of the fact that such strictures might have offended the sensibilities 
of the executives of the foundations. 
Before the large-scale investment of R.F. funds in British social science, 
the Foundation concentrated its efforts in consolidating the position 
of those disciplines within the system of higher education in America. 
Perhaps the grea t~s,t_ monuments to that enterprise ~re the establishment 
of the American S.S.R.C. and the University of Chicago. However , the 
direction o:JL R .1F. funding was to shift from, a concentration upon the 
institutional centres within which social science would emerge, to 
that of investment in specific 'fields of interest. 1 Thus from the 
middle 1930s R.F. programmes in the social sciences were directed toward, 
II realistic training and research in the social sciences." The 
Annual Report of 1935 gives a clear indication of this transition within 
the funding of knowledge, and although it is in the main, directed 
toward an assessment of the influence of the R.F. upon American social 
science, it is possible to detect the implications for those same disci-
plines in Britain within the wider context of R.F. support. The aspira-
tions of Rockefeller executives via programme policy became enmeshed 
in the conditional features of their grants. This in turn would, as 
my consideration of Beveridge 1 s crusade demonstrated, have consequences 
for a form of social science that did not depart too far from the one 
envisaged by its benefactor. The R.F. considered its successes in 
American social science as proof of the value of its investment policy 
and the vehicle of the programme as the means of effecting change 
within a field of knowledge. Success in the metropolis would mean 
success in the satellite countries where the R.F. increasingly directed 
its attention, especially within the field of social science. 
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Thus the R.F. began to run down its allocation of resources for specific 
institutional research programmes (particularly in the U.S.) although 
some ground-work needed to be done in Britain, instead, directing its 
efforts toward the development of (R.F. Annual Report, 1935, · p.l94): 
" specific areas of activity which hold possibilities 
of aiding in the solution of pressing social problems." 
The purpose of ·R. F. social science reflected a trend in social research 
that had gained considerable recognition and prestige from the recent 
Social Trends project of 1933; an experiment in policy research commis-
sioned by the then ,president Herbert Hoover. Foundation programmes 
were exported to the L.S.E. in the form of grants that possessed a 
specific earmarked component to complete previously financed 'institutional 
research programmes'. The following table gives an llndication of the 
scale and nature of the resources provided by R.F. benefaction in 1935. 
Project 
PROJECTS FUNDED BY THE ROCKEFELLER 
FOUNDATION AT THE L.S.E. IN 1935* 
Improvement of facilities for research and postgraduate 
teaching 
Purchase of land 
Library development 
Research in the social sciences 
Grant to end Foundation support of 'Institutional 
Research Programmes' 
* Rockefeller Foundation, Annual Report, 1935. 
TOTAL 
Amount 
30,000 
150,000 
50,000 
17,000 
45,000 
$ 292,000 
Even taking into consideration the rate of exchange and the relative 
value of the pound then (middle 1930s), in comparison to today's value, 
the scale of R. F. benefaction was considerable. In fact it exceeded 
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the amount from ·public sources in Britain for the .funding of social 
science. In his paper, Fisher (1980, pp.299-300), states quite categori-
cally the motives of those given to such generosity.: 
"Rockefeller philanthropy had, during the inter-war years, 
clearly defined policies. The officers had explicit objectives 
which were pursued unremittingly, objectives that emerged 
from discussions in New York rather than negotiations in 
London, Oxford or Cambridge Rockefeller philanthropy 
was not impartial, did not react tq proposals that emerged 
independently. Instead., its officers pursued explicit goals 
and were actively involved in preparing the proposals that 
were made to the foundations." 
A meticulous approach to the establishment of a sound, institutional 
base for the social sciences in satteli te countries is evident in the 
R.F. annual reports of the 1930s. Such a solid institutional base 
was regarded as an essential prerequisite to the subsequent support 
for the 'production' of individual social scientists possessing the 
necessary expertise to develop training and research programmes, in 
addition to comprehensive postgraduate schools. Europe was regarded 
as a sphere of undeveloped potential for the kind of social science 
that the R. F. had underwritten in the United States. While the L.S.E. 
was receiving an increasingly larger proportion of the revenue directed 
toward its European ventures, the University of Paris was also earmarked 
as a centre of "realistic research" in the social sciences during the 
late 1920s and early 1930s (Annual Report, 1935, pp.l98-199}: 
"In 1934 a formal request (was received} from the University 
of Paris for an appropriation to further research in the social 
sciences, for which a base had been carefully laid." 
The Officers of the Foundation were committed to remedying II the 
retarded development of realistic research in the social sciences in 
France II by urging the II importance of the projected programme 
II and subsequently granting tens of thousands of dollars over a 
period of five years, (1935, p.l99). 
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Stockholm University received considerable financial ~upport from the 
R. F. in order to employ an American sociologist to train postgraduate 
students to " undertake concrete investigations" (1935, pp.l98-199). 
As in the case of the French experiment, funds were provided on a condi-
tional basis. Furthermore, the case of the University of Paris demonstrated 
the production of a programme that met a central criterion of R.F. 
benefaction of that .period: work within the social sciences must direct 
itself toward the solution of, " important current questions ... " 
(1935 1 p.l99) • 
I have considered briefly above, the importance that the R. F. attached 
to its Fellowship Programme. It is equally important to appreciate 
the significance of the Foundation's 'investment in brains' during 
the late 1920s and '30s, as it formed an integral part of its overall 
strategy to expand its interest in the social sciences through the 
medium of the programme, rather than by an extension of its earlier 
concern with establishing the institutional base of those disciplines. 
The R. F. continued to pursue abroad, the philosophy of its fellowship 
programme so well developed within the system of higher education in 
America. The latter is evident in its relationship with the S.S.R.C. 
in the United States. In fact the R.F. 's influence was of a multiple 
nature in terms of underwriting the support of chosen influentials 
within the field of social science. Not only did it fund directly 
the sponsorship of fellowships within the various university departments, 
but continued through its financial support of the s. S.R.C., to fund 
the latter's own programmes. The following table gives some indication 
of the balance between the two sources of fellowship support, emphasising 
the importance attached to it by the R.F. through both its direct and 
indirect subvention of the scheme. 
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Number of Annual Fellowship Appointments in Social Science 1924-25 
Administering 1924 '25 '26 '27 '28 '29 '30 '31 '32 '33 '34 '35 
Agency 
Rockefeller 
Foundation 16 24 44 48 45 43 44 73 60 44 53 35 
The S.S.R.C. 15 12 17 17 25 28 25 30 15 I3 l3 
TOTAL 16 39 56 65 62 68 72 98 90 59 66 48 
Summary of New Fellowship Appointments in the Social Sciences made 
by the Rockefeller Foundation and the Social Science Research Council 
from 1924-1935. 
(Rockefeller Foundation, Annual Report, 1935, p.205). 
The R.F. 's officers possessed very clear ideas about the purpose of 
the fellowship programme, which in turn implied equally precise ideas 
on the nature of the. research it expected from those whom they financed 
(Annual Report, 1935, p.200): 
" to furnish 
in the several 
experience and to 
to research." 
opportunities for promising young scholars 
social science disciplines to broaden their 
develop capacity for making useful contributions 
What passed as 'useful contributions to research' was bound up in the 
chosen R.F. Programme of the moment, i.e. social security, international 
relations, public administration and other socially ameliorative projects. 
This attitude to both the nature and purpose of social science and 
its research initiatives, the former, a rigorous pursuit of factual 
data, the latter, the transformation of research into enlightened social 
policy for benevolent social control, became the hallmarks of the R. F. 's 
conception of social science for export, and appeared as a most attractive 
import to customers like William Beveridge. I have examined previously 
the consequences of such a vision of social science above. The R.F. 
actively sought to support social scientists who displayed the qualities 
of leadership within their chosen field and who may have also possessed 
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the potential to carry such influence beyond the realm of academia 
into centres of power within government and civil administration. 
Grants, sponsorship and fellowships followed in the wake of Rockefeller 
recognition. Investment in individuals ( human capital ) , represented 
a carefully nurtured strategy for the R. F. (Rockefeller Annual Report, 
1949' p. 46): 
"These fellowships represent investments in men and in the 
future'. They are investments in intellectual capacity, imagina-
tion and character. A Foundation can find no better use 
for its money." 
Although a somewhat mechanistic notion of the production of an intellectual 
elite, it is nevertheless, in accord with what I have referred to prev-
iously as the R. F. 's instrumental approach to the method by which appro-
priate forms of social knowledge can be produced and subsequently converted 
into enlightened social policy. The latter process could only be facili-
tated (as far as R. F. social science was concerned), through a rigorous 
pursuit of a natural scientific approach to the problems of the world. 
There is evident in such a conception of social science, an explicit 
ideological component which characterises scientism; to the extent 
that the accumulation of codified knowledge can substitute for politics 
and ideology as the matrix of social choices or norms of collective 
conduct. The ethos and authority of science had been a significant 
factor in creating such an illusion and may account for the close analogy 
between the preoccupation of science with manageable problems and a 
concomitant claim of a decline of ideology, and the growth of professional 
expertise in politics and business. Rockefeller Foundation funding 
policy for the social sciences was pursued with a clear view of increasing 
the bureaucratisation and professionalisation of government and industry 
and in promoting the growth of scientific approaches to management 
and administration. Such goals may have been attainable within the 
administrative and governmental structures of American society, but 
for reasons alluded to above, such a purpose for social science, although 
in keeping with the aspirations of William Beveridge, was an unlikely 
prospect, in view of the contrasts with similar institutions in British 
society. The similarity between Beveridge and R.F. social science, 
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in terms of its specific nature, implied a cumulative_process of collecting 
scientifically certified facts or truths, which carried the force 
of socially compelling laws. 
Certainly the value of R.F. fellowships to aspiring British social 
scientists could not be overlooked. Such a programme provided a convenient 
medium to extend an individual's influence beyond professional and 
academic circles within Britain. The L.S.E., Oxford and Cambridge 
certainly took advantage of the R. F. fellowship programme. The latter 
scheme had, as I pointed out above, enabled Malinowski to visit America 
and present his functional view of anthropology to many of the notable 
social scientists of that nation. His attendance at the annual conference 
of the American S.S.R.C. in 1926 provided an occasion to argue for 
a form of sociology (the institutional and functional) that sought 
the establishment of definite laws of social process. Although he 
also regarded the introduction of scientific methods into anthropology 
as crucial to the advance of that discipline, he nevertheless perceived 
an important role for sociology within the wider field of social science. 
Accompanying the growing trend toward specialisation within the various 
branches of social science, came a move toward professionalisation 
of its practitioners. The existence of 'proven' influentials within 
the different disciplines became a crucial factor in successfully 
negotiating resources essential to their future development. The R. F. 
sought investment in both individuals (human capital) and institutions 
(centres of excellence) which demonstrated a purportedly shared conception 
of the nature and purpose of social science, yet determined largely 
on the basis of criteria propounded by the benefactor. In an era when 
the funding of social research depended largely on private sources, 
the relationship between benefactor and beneficiary was of critical 
importance. Personalities and the depth of relationships were, as 
the consideration of the Beveridge crusade has demonstrated, significant 
factors in the development of social science at the L.S.E. This is 
made quite clear by the author of the R. F. 's Annual Report of 195 3, 
(p.29) when observing the effects of the Foundation's international 
interests, especially in fields like the social sciences: 
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the Foundation has sought the most fertile ideas, the 
most urgent needs, the most capable men, and the most promising 
institutions wherever they could be found." 
The preceding quotation contains the essential components of the funding 
of knowledge, whether in relation to private or public sources, although 
the latter process does entail the additional feature of allegedly 
neutral, intermediary agencies. While notions of, 'the most fertile 
ideas, the most urgent needs, the most capable men, and the most promising 
institutions' can be employed as criteria for determining the distribution 
of resources to and within any branch of knowledge, the consequences 
for subjects like the social sciences, tends to emphasise their particu-
larly vulnerable position within the modern episteme, especially their 
cultural tension as moral forms of social thought and action. 
In considering the role of the R. F. in the development of social science 
at the L. S. E. during the inter-war period, I have endeavoured to examine 
the intellectual and institutional context within which sociology struggled 
to exist. Although I have confined my analysis generally to Beveridge's 
experiment in social science, it was essential to understand sociology's 
marginal, and certainly contested form during a period when the individual 
social sciences were consolidating their positions both within and 
outside of the L.S.E. Increasing specialisation and emerging professional-
isation within the social sciences added increasingly to the confusion 
and contention over sociology's professed autonomy. Fragmentation 
of the discipline gave rise to a significant and quite distinct cleavage 
of its intellectual and institutional forms. The competition for the 
discipline's only Chair had been 'won' by exponents of a socio-philosophical 
approach to sociological analysis, whereas those who persistently contested 
such a perspective, 
higher education. 
remained without substantial representation in 
The latter necessity had featured significantly 
on all the agendas and programmes produced by those sociologists who 
viewed such an achievement as an essential stage in the disciplin~ 
career. 
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In concentrating on William Beveridge's crusade for social science, 
I have attempted to emphasise the importance of examining the funding 
of knowledge, not only in terms of its influence upon the connection 
between cognitive form and institutional context, but also its necessarily 
condi tiona! nature. Furthermore, in presenting the evidence to support 
my argument on the funding of social science at the L.S.E. for the 
I have attempted to demonstrate both the importance 
of the use of strategic and tactical arguments as 
period in question, 
and significance 
components of the 
strategic discourse 
the development of 
art of grantsmanship. The deployment of such a 
enabled those negotiating the resources vital to 
the social sciences, to make claims on behalf of 
the disciplines without specific reference to their substantive content. 
Thereafter, constant reference to the promise, or potential of social 
science formed the basis of negotiations and subsequently sustained 
the discourse between benefactor and beneficiary. The extraordinary 
role of the R. F. in the making of British social science did not end 
with the outbreak of the Second World war. Indeed, it continued to 
influence the development of those sciences in the early years of the 
war and into the immediate post-war era. This is an episode which 
involved organisations and individuals crucial to the outcome of the 
debate initiated by the Parliamentary Committee on Social and Economic 
Research (1946), commissioned toward the end of the Second world War, 
and to which I shall return during the course of the next chapter. 
With Beveridge's resignation as Director of the L. S. E. , and the failure 
of the experiment in social biology, it appeared that the Natural Bases 
Scheme initiated by the School's Director under the guidance of representa-
tives of the R. F. , had not given the social sciences the direction and 
impetus so desirous of its architects. Although Lance lot Hog ben and 
Beveridge may have considered their project a wasted effort, the institu-
tional and intellectual expansion of social science at the L. S. E. had 
nevertheless occurred1 and largely within the framework envisaged by 
its major benefactor. The latter process was a considerable success 
when estimating the central role of the L.S.E. in generally influencing 
the course of social science in Britain, both within the inter-war 
period and the decades following the last war. Making the social sciences 
more 'scientific' had been achieved, though possibly not to the degree, 
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nor the extent envisaged by William Beveridge. The exploration of 
the 'borderland subjects' which purportedly lay between the more technically 
advanced, empirical social sciences, and the natural sciences, (emphasising 
the crucial role of social biology in bridging such a cognitive and 
technical gap) became a project that faltered increasingly as a result 
of the somewhat intolerant and uncompromising position adopted by its 
central exponent, Lance lot Hogben. Economists, demographers, political 
scientists and other practitioners within the various social sciences 
had sought to introduce what they considered to be more scientific 
methods into their respective disciplines, despite the often excessive 
claims being made for such a methodology by William Beveridge. Moreover, 
other preoccupations diverted their attention away from the more unques-
tioning zealots of the 'new science' , namely, the increased move toward 
specialisation and a concern to professionalise branches of the social 
sciences in response to the demands that were being made upon those 
disciplines from outside the confines of academia. Members 
of the Department of Sociolo~y at the L.S.E. had been severely 
criticised for their reluctance to participate in Beveridge's 
Natural Bases project. Both Hobhouse and Ginsberg saw merit in a rigorous 
approach to the study of society, but neither were willing to sacrifice 
the benefits of a socio-historical and ethical/psychological approach 
to social analysis, especially for the sake of a methodology which 
appeared to derive its compelling necessity more from the dubious 
'hard sell' by its major exponents, than from any convincing demonstration 
of its intrinsic logicality. 
Explaining the tenuous relationship between sociology and the other 
social sciences during the inter-war period, especially the development 
of the latter disciplines at the L.S.E. and the plight of the sociologists 
in attempting to establish their discipline at the heart of a synoptic 
science of society, requires consideration of evidence which, upon 
examination, is not easily contained and presented within conventional 
historical accounts. Variation within sociology, (its contested forms) 
and those of its practitioners who sought to establish the supremacy 
of one form over that of another, became gradually aware of the relevance 
of their debates to the developments taking place within other branches 
of the social sciences. 
132 
Social research was not the prerogative of sociology. The generic 
te:rm sociological may have sufficed as an inclusive category for the 
investigation of social phenomena (usually through the social survey) 
but those given to practicing 'social' research were not necessarily 
sociologists (cf. T.H. t-larshall, 1967, p.361). Indeed, there was common 
., 
and widespread cdnfusion over the precise intellectual and organisational 
activity that ought to be included within the amorphous category of 
sociology. This problem was compounded further by the disagreement 
over 'tihich disciplines actually constituted the field of social science. 
These problems have also made it difficult for the historian to discover 
sociology within the proliferation of social sciences bet\..reen the ... ·ars. 
Sociology's quest for autonomy faltered through internal disputes over 
its nature and purpose. Its claim to possess a discrete corpus of 
theory and methods was continually undermined by other social scientists 
.... r-.o in criticising sociology, sought to question its practitioners • 
clains that despite its relative infancy a~ science, its potential 
as an instrument of social analysis and social change, more than compen-
sated for its apparent intellectual and organisational shortcomings. 
Sociology appeared to be losing ground within the general advance of 
inter-war social science. 
HOI·:ever, with the onset of the Second World War, the nature, scale, 
location and composition of the participants in the debate about the 
nature and purpose of social science, would alter significantly the 
fortunes of those disciplines in the decades to come. What had been 
largely intra-disciplinary and inter-disciplinary concerns for social 
scientists, would now become an agenda i tern for Governraent consideration 
and action. Sociology was about to confront the • national interest •. 
~hat opportunities could it seize in the light of its inter-war experiences ? 
CHAPTER THREE 
The emergence of the national interest: 
a context for the evaluation of knowledge 
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The Emergence of the National Interest: A Context for the Evaluation 
of Knowledge 
l. The Second World war : from national crisis toward social recon-
struction. 
I concluded the rrevious chapter by posing the question: what opportunities 
would sociology seize in response to emerging national needs occasioned 
by the outbreak of a prolonged period of war? Sociology had, by the 
late 1930s, reached a rather crucial stage in its development. Its 
claims of intellectual and institutional autonomy had been contested 
from two quarters within the general intellectual and institutional 
milieu of the social sciences during the inter-war period. The first, 
within Britain's major centre of teaching and research in the social 
sciences, the L.S.E. The second, during the course of three consecutive 
and important annual conferences devoted to the theme on the relationship 
between the various social sciences, with special reference to sociology. 
The title of the current chapter denotes the nature of the socio-historical 
context within which sociology would confront a significantly different 
set of imperatives than those associated with its inter-war odyssey. 
Within the latter experience, the discipline and its practitioners 
endeavoured to contest and establish the· nature and purpose of sociology 
as an essentially, internally generated debate and within the general 
boundaries of the wider field of social science. However, with the 
outbreak of the Second World war, and the attendant social upheaval, 
fundamental and far-reaching changes occurred affecting the order of 
knowledge. Sociology and the other social sciences, their relationship 
to all other forms of knowledge within the episteme and its cultural 
limitations, were severely ruptured with the outbreak of the war and 
the subsequent period of social reconstruction following it. The phenomenon 
of the national need became the predominant imperative for the justifi-
cation of forms of social control unprecedented in the course of the 
nation's history. It is within the context of the production of knowledge 
and the national need that I intend to examine the development of sociology 
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during and immediately after the Second World war. It is also 
my intention to incorporate within an examination of the national 
need, a consideration of a cultural phenomenon, though emerging 
during the inter-war period, would nevertheless serve as an 
essential, intellectual and organisational resource for not 
only an increasingly larger number of social scientists, but 
politicians, civil servants and other influential groups within 
wartime Britain. Considered thus, what I shall refer to as 
the science movement, possessed political, economic, intellectual 
and social dimensions which engendered a series of imperatives 
gaining substance and expression, largely through the ethos 
and authority of 
a strategic model 
tionalisation of 
science. The science movement also provided 
the insti tu-
to the eventual 
(and associated discourse) 
knowledge and practice. 
establishment of a national 
for 
This in turn led 
framework for the 
funding of knowledge and associated criteria for the acquisition 
and disbursement of state funds to this end. The war, the 
attendant emergence of the national interest, the consolidation 
and influence of the science movement and the process of the 
evaluation of knowledge on the basis of a series of expedient 
imperatives, formed the complex milieu in which sociology would 
again strive to assert its autonomy. 
In focusing on the case of the social sciences and especially 
sociology, I will concentrate on the nature of the debate about 
the social function of social science, in contrast to its inter-
war form. Before I can proceed with any of these tasks, it 
is essential to consider briefly, some of the fundamental changes 
that occurred in British society as a result of a prolonged 
period of war. This will provide important social, economic 
and political detail to the context within which the analysis 
will proceed. 
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The Second World War was, to employ a rather overworked phrase, a water-
shed in the history of sociology's development in Britain. It was 
a period of opportunity and opportunism. A chance to transform the 
pre-war project for a sociologically centred social science into a 
project which transcended its pre-war, inter-disciplinary parochialism, 
to an issue of potentially national importance. The perceived role 
for sociology in the future would evolve within an atmosphere of initially 
limited national debate. The opportunity for sociology, as indeed 
the other social sciences, resided in the existence of an appropriate 
medium for recasting its intrinsic nature and social purpose. The vehicle 
for such a programme would be the post-war phenomenon of large-scale, 
social and economic research, or at least that was the intention of 
its architects (both social scientists and politicians), a debate animated 
by the pervasive notion of social reconstruction and the growing commitment 
to the potential of planning. The debate in question began long before 
the cessation of hostilities, and immediately engaged the attention 
and participation of not only academics and politicians, but civil 
servants and to an increasing extent, the general public. It was against 
this background of social and intellectual reconstruction and the 
growth of political commitment in favour of increased social and economic 
research, that social science was to engender a 'public' image. If 
the transition to peace and the construction of a new post-war world 
was to proceed in a manner envisaged by politicians, academics and 
the general population, then information about the social structure 
of Britain, upon which wide-ranging social policies were to be wrought, 
would become a matter of priority. Social science, including sociology, 
moved to the centre of the political stage. 
Although some branches of the social sciences (namely psychology) were 
actively engaged in the prosecution of the war itself, others were 
regarded as better able to participate in winning the peace. Crucial 
to the question of the potential of social science in the latter role 
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was the nature and purpose of those disciplines as conceived by individuals 
other than social scientists. This also applied to a conception of 
their cognitive products: in what sense was the latter knowledge 
specific to the particular theoretical and methodological practices 
of social science, rather than 'information', often construed by non-social 
scientists as the raw material for conversion into enlightened social 
policies. This is both a crucial and complex matter and I will consider 
it in due course. 
The exigencies of war wrought massive and permanent changes of an unprece-
dented nature on the social organisation of British society. Every 
institution and organisation, ancient and contemporary, every custom 
and practice, every citizen experienced the disruptive effects of war. 
The control of production, the rationalisation of public administration, 
reorganisation of the economy on a war footing, the efficient distribution 
of goods and services, indeed the control and direction of all the 
productive energies of the nation's population toward the 'war effort' 
became the sole, sustaining social activity for the six years that 
Britain was at war. The scale of this enterprise was unprecedented 
in the history of the British people. Forced into prominence as a 
result of this mammoth task of organisation and control came the expert. 
Whether the 'boffin' of back room origin, concerned with military matters 
of destruction, or, the civil servant or local administrator intent 
upon the formulation and administration of social policy, the demands 
of war meant that the commodity of expertise was at a premium for the 
successful conduct of hostilities. An important constituent of the 
growth and diffusion of technical expertise, as a fundamental element 
in the active processes of warfare, was a corresponding growth in 
the level of prestige accorded to those indi victuals and organisations 
able to demonstrate their essential contribution to the salvation of 
the nation. 
Invention and discovery, adaptation, artificiality and impermanence, all 
wrought their permanent effects upon the social structure and consciousness 
of the people of Britain. Reaction to the profound changes brought 
about by war created expectations and insights which carried over 
into the post-war era. 
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A remarkable feature of wartime Britain was the transformation which 
occurred in the political and economic management of the nation, despite 
the composition of the coalition government. 
to its highest point when there were no more 
The economy was mobilised 
labour or gold reserves 
left and Britain devoted a high proportion of her resources to actually 
fighting the war. In order to defeat the onslaught of Nazism, Britain 
adopted collectivist and socialist policies. Churchill, who constantly 
talked of liberty, was considered by his opponents to be a dictator 
who mobilised women and children in the factories and mines. Whatever 
the outward form of the government, the Emergency Powers Act of May 
1940 gave it absolute power. This was necessary, but it was not Conser-
vative or Liberal policy, and the war effort thus brouglt a swing to 
ideas put forward during the 1930s in favour of a managed economy, 
planning, a welfare state and nationalisation. Circumstances converted 
many to ideas previously thought impossible, and the impact of total 
war compelled the government to pass measures which laid the basis 
for the acceptance of Labour plans in 1945. Bevin, Cripps and Beveridge 
emerged as the well-known names on the home front, and Labour, by running 
the home policy cabinet committees, came to have a dominant voice, 
while Churchill was more concerned with strategy and diplomacy. 
Reconstruction became a prominent feature of both parliamentary and 
public debate as early as 1939 - the year in which war broke out. 
The main impetus for reform came from Labour, and this naturally aroused 
Tory fears as the ethos of reconstruction emerged as a developing theme 
in debates on most issues, whether they were directly connected with 
the conduct of the war, or, to do with the 'home front'. The latter 
provided the central context for reconstructionist politics. Reform 
was based on three main ministries: Reconstruction, under wool ton, 
Health under Willink; and Town and Country Planning under Reith. The 
war years with their upheavals and strain·s came after a period that 
many regarded as lacking in progress. But the same period had provided 
a wide range of new ideas and during the war, these were turned into 
practical politics by distinguished reformers. New ideas accepted by 
the establishment were to form the basis of economic and social thinking 
until the mid-1970s. They were to change fundamentally the direction 
of government action and to prepare the way for a collectivist, egalitarian, 
welfare state. 
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Politicians, especially within the Labour Party and the left in general 
were quick to respond to a growing tendency within large sections of 
the working class and groups of liberal intellectuals, to actively 
criticise aspects of the war effort, particularly members of the military 
and political leadership. There was a noticeable change in the social 
and political consciousness of the population, a phenomenon reflected 
in the warning issued to parliament by Clement Attlee of the betrayal 
of the people after the First World War (Parliamentary Debates, 1939, 
pp.20-21): 
"We remember what happened at the end of the last war - derelict 
areas, derelict industries, derelict human beings what 
kind of Britain is going to emerge after this war?" 
And to emphasise the significance of the deprivations and devastion 
of war with regard to its eventual outcome (1939, p.21): 
"This struggle involves us all, and it is going to have the 
most profound effect on the social structure of this country." 
Although I will be examining the role of Attlee in the establishment 
of the Clapham Committee in a later part of the argument, his warning 
to the House at such an early stage of the war, coupled to his perception 
of the effects upon the social structure of Britain of prolonged hostili-
ties, highlight not only a shrewd political awareness, but also an 
ability to perceive fundamental social change as it occurred. For 
him, the war represented a supreme, collective effort in pursuance of 
a common end victory. Victory however, beyond the field of battle 
and to the peace. His reference to a struggle involving 'us all', 
can reasonably be construed as the effect of the war on the existing 
class divisions within society for that period (1939, pp.22-23): 
"Collectivism is being 
logic of events if 
have to have a great deal 
forced upon the government by 
you want to win this war you 
of practical socialism." 
the 
will 
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Although Attlee was addressing the House in November 1939, just two 
months after the outbreak of hostilities, he, amongst others, would 
urge Parliament that (1939, p.23): 
"OUr people are 
of world, what 
asking: 
kind of 
for what 
Britain 
are we fighting? 
will emerge from 
What kind 
this war? 
Parliamentary debates subsequently took on a new dimension. While 
the business of the House necessarily revolved around the conduct of 
the war, the themes of reconstruction and planning became issues of 
major importance. Early debates on both the former and latter subjects 
inevitably contained references to the track records of past administra-
tions, particularly for the period following the First World War. 
The social, political and economic elements of post-war reconstruction 
thus became significant features of the different political parties' 
programmes for peace. Politicians of both left and right adopted the 
notion with varying degrees of commitment and for both genuine and alterior 
motives. For many Labour and socialist politicians, topics relating 
to reconstruction became virtual manifesto statements for a future 
majority government. Conservatives tended to make cautious, ambiguous, 
paternalistic and non-commi tal noises on a subject that they regarded 
as essentially impractical and dangerously utopian: 
said at the time (1939, p.30): 
as Chamberlain 
" we do not yet know enough about the changes which will 
1 inevitably have taken place before the end of 'the war to give 
us confidence that it is possible to-day to make a plan which 
will be useful then." 
For the Prime Minister and his colleagues, it was, at least in the 
early days of the war, better to, "wait and see . . . win the war first " 
(1939 1 P• 30) • A policy of 'wait and see' epitomised the Conservative 
element of the wartime coalition government in many areas of post-war 
reconstruction issues, a marked contrast to the confident and forthright 
approach of Labour politicians who believed that they sensed a change 
in the minds of the people. As Immanuel Shinwell prophesied in the 
House during the period of a possible invasion of Britain (Parliamentary 
Debates, Vol. 418, 1940-41): 
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"Is the Hon. Gentleman aware that it is going to be mighty 
difficult to ignore the constructive proposals of the Labour 
party after the war?" 
And in support of such a prediction, a Mr. Sloane M.P. asked ( 1940-41; 
Vol. 418) : 
" millions of working class workers who are regimented 
in the military and industrial machine in this fight for 
democracy are looking forward to the complete socialisation 
of industry." 
Although seemingly premature in antici.p:l. tion of the outcome of the 
war and the political complexion of the peace-time government, such 
remarks displayed a growing awareness amongst increasing numbers of 
politicians, that the mood of the people was changing, be they in industry 
or bearing arms. 
Throughout the war many White Papers and reports were produced which 
provided information for the incoming government in 1945. In many 
respects, those documents served as blueprints for the social and economic 
structure of British society after the war. The content and tone of 
the reports and White Poapers varied considerably. Those of the Coalition 
Government were cautious; those by independent observers more radical. 
There was also a fierce debate about new ideas. Keynesian economics, 
planning, welfare economics and state education were not accepted without 
a murmur. But the overall impression of that period is that planning 
was accepted. 
The blueprints for social and economic reform were also made possible 
by the close cooperation of what Peter King (1980) has referred to 
as 1 the consensus establishment 1 that had been growing in the 1930s. 
The latter had been engendered by the desire to examine the role of 
the state and to combat extremism, combined with the seriousness of 
the economic crisis and the collapse of political norms in many countries, 
which led to a wider questioning of the historical controversy between 
individualism and socialism. In the midst of the political and cultural 
contest of extremes of left and right during the 1930s, there emerged 
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a consensus in politics based on a need to find a new basis for Western 
capitalist society after the old basis had been eroded in the aftermath 
of the First World War. Although the exigencies of war gave the practice 
of large scale planning a necessity and direction quite different from 
its nascent pre-war form, the latter movement toward a planned, modernised 
and rationalised economy was at the centre of the emergent political 
consensus. A managed, mixed economy was to be the answer to the ills 
of the depression and Britain's still declining position. Thus planning 
was to be extended to a wide field of human activities, including leisure, 
to utilise resources and create a civilised society, while social policy 
was to be based on a welfare state which was ever increasing its benefits 
and thereby raising living standards. Central to the process of planning 
was the fusion of the ethos and authority of science, with a basic moral 
predisposition toward social need and welfare (expressed within political 
writing, party programmes and generally at the core of social policy 
and research) . Scientists like Julian Huxley advocated social reform 
during the inter-war years, and viewed the importance of social science 
within the context of instruments to effect beneficial social change·, 
providing its researche:s were based on a rigorous pursuit of facts. 
A number of initiatives appeared in the 1930s, with the purpose of 
developing a gradual transformation of British society. Thus was set 
in motion a gradualist/progressive movement toward social change that 
did not pose a revolutionary threat to the established order, yet met 
the criticisms of Labour, that change must exceed ineffectual state 
benevolence. The influential organisation Political and Economic Planning 
(P.E.P.) and its journal of the same name embodied much of the active 
commitment toward the potential of a rationally planned political and 
economic order. In 1931, P.E.P. began publication. By 1935 it had 
grown sufficiently 
entitled 'The Next 
in both confidence and influence to publish a project 
Five Years' (1935). This was followed two years 
later by 'A Programme of Priorities' (1937). Among P.E.P. 's: 
were nationalisation, financial planning, extended welfare, 
taxation, a national economic 'general staff', a national 
proposals 
progressive 
development 
board and educational change. Those involved in P. E. P. came from a 
wide field of public life, and included Sir Josiah Stamp, Israel Sieff, 
Lord Allen, Lionel Curtis, J.A. Hobson, Gilbert Murray, H.G. Wells 
and Archbishop Temple. 
to take an interest in 
appointing Sir Montague 
his report was one of 
peacetime Britain. 
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Inevitably, both major political parties began 
P. E. P. 's work. The government responded by 
Barlow (1937) to investigate population, and 
the major blueprints for wartime planning of 
Changes to the system of state welfare, though modest by post-war standarqs, 
was underway in the period between the wars. This must be borne in 
mind when assessing the impact of war upon a process which had its 
roots in the incremental advances in state provision for the 1920s 
and '30s. The social change brought about by the Second World War 
and a redefinition of the national need served to redirect, enhance 
and focus political attention upon the practical ·necessity and immediate 
benefits of large-scale planning for beneficial social control. 
In examining the impact of war on culture, or as Marwick (1974) has 
termed it, 'war's interaction with society', I have endeavoured to 
consider the reshaping of the historical and structural context within 
which knowledge is correspondingly reshaped and changed. The contexts 
and contingencies of war modified social and cultural conditions which 
in turn, engendered a corresponding series of objectives and interests 
articulated within notions of the national need. The evaluation of 
ideas and practical skills became established on principles and precepts 
quite different from other historical periods. Expediency, relevance 
and responsiveness to urgent and specific imperatives provided the 
categories within which to assess and ascribe the value and substance 
of various forms of knowledge. The social sciences, including sociology 
neither withdrew, nor were they excluded from the latter process. 
I wish now to focus greater attention upon those disciplines, the manner 
in which the reordering of knowledge arose, the resources, images and 
strategies employed both to ascribe and claim differential value for 
one form of knowledge over another. 
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2. The national need: a. context for change and control 
Marwick, perhaps more than any other historian of the effects of war 
on a society, has managed to extend and develop an explanatory and 
organising model to account for social change in Britain between the 
years, 1939 and 1945. His ''four tier model" (Marwick, 1974, pp.ll-14) 
and its use for explaining and analysing the social consequences of 
war, represents, a marked departure from more conventional historical 
accounts. In applying his model to the period in question, Marwick 
suggests an interesting effect, or to use his term 'test '1 brought about 
by the 'challenge' of war to an organised society. This notion of 
a test, when considered in conjunction with other elements of his model, 
(namely 'participation' and the 'psychological' experience), are suggestive 
of, but remain unstated in his analysis, of a concept employed univer-
sally throughout the war as a device to effect change and maintain 
control in every sphere of human endeavour: this I shall refer to 
as the national need. 
The meaning, history and usages of the concept of the national need, 
or alternatively, the national interest, has been examined in some 
detail by Joseph Frankel (1970) . I do not intend to consider the notion 
of the national need as a philosophical concept, rather, I wish only 
to draw upon the significance of its usage within the socio-historical 
contexts that form the parameters of my examination of the development 
of sociology in Britain. 
As a category of political analysis, the national interest has been 
examined in varying detail by several authors; Rosenau (1968), Beard 
(1934), Morgenthau (1966), Wolfers (1962) and Osgood (1953). In fact, 
there is a dearth of material dealing specifically with the concept, 
although it emerges as a frequent component of the discourse on ideology, 
especially within the field of the sociology of knowledge, and more 
specifically, Marxist critiques associated with the latter branch of 
sociology. 
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In most accounts of the nature and function 
of ideology, the national interest remains an unexpressed 
ideological assumption amongst the baggage of false conscious-
ness. Although Frankel examines the national interest as 
a central element in the foreign policies of national states, 
the concept applies equally to the domestic issues of individual 
countries. The formulation of the national interest, the 
process, the agencies involved, the images, motivations 
and values of those who determine the nature and purpose 
of such interests or imperatives, will feature during the 
course of my examination of its relevance to the differential 
value ascribed to various forms of knowledge on the basis 
of the categories and objectives outlined above. My major 
concern with the national need will be as an instrument 
of political action, serving as a means of justifying, denoun-
cing or proposing policies. 
It would be tempting to explain away the notion of the national 
interest as merely a myth, but this would deny the crucial 
significance of its often vivid and powerful imagery. Whether 
it is expressed as a manifestation of a ruling class, as 
a device to hoax the masses, or, as the true and logicically 
necessary aspirations of 'the party' as vanguard of the 
people,* the interests of the nation and its custodians 
are never the monopoly of a single, perpetual social group. 
Such a view would tend to deny the significance. of history. 
Nor is the idea of the national interest simply a rhetorical 
device for the purposes of political deception. This view 
tends to underestimate the depth and complexity of a nation's 
* Cf. Eccleshall (1976); Kay (1979); and Therborn (1979). 
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culture and political practices. Nor can the notion of 
the national interest be considered as a collective represen-
tation of the purported existence of the 'common good', 
as this tends to imply a perfect accommodation among interac-
ting partial interests. Furthermore, if national needs, 
priorities, initiatives, strategies and imperatives are 
presented as derivatives of purportedly rational political 
decisions, this may be considered as highly suspect, as 
even a cursory analysis would reveal a high incidence of 
the non-rational, emotive elements of sheer stupidity and 
of chance. In fact there is an element of circularity in 
the latter process, as political decisions are themselves 
often no more than expressions of what currently passes 
as the national interest. 
Between the years, 1939 and 1945, it is possible to detect 
several elements, or components of the national interest, 
at least to the extent that they convey a focused and coordi-
nated effort toward a universal goal - victory over an enemy 
which had threated the nation's very existence. The state 
exercised considerable control over its citizens in order 
to achieve this. Political exhortation and the subtleties 
of propaganda served to diminish overt political resistence 
to achieving an end to hostilities. Within the need to 
achieve such an end can be found the antecedents of the 
objectives and interests which would sustain those who regarded 
the war as a means for achieving a re-ordering of society, 
beginning in the period of reconstruction. Thus we have, 
as argued above, the emerging discourse of reconstruction 
in the midst of imminent invasions; the pursuance of an 
extraordinary scale of planning, though ostensibly for the 
duration, it was regarded by many as the basis of post-war 
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economic policy; a redefinition of the nature and future 
of education as an integral feature of manpower planning; 
a re-evaluation of discrete forms of knowledge in terms 
of their effectiveness for the conduct of warfare, and a 
bases upon which to construct present and future social and 
economic policies. The wartime coalition government endeavoured 
to promote a version of the national interest which was 
used as an instrument of political action to propose and 
justify policies which it regarded as essential to the sue-
cessful conduct of the war. It is therefore important to 
focus the analysis upon the decision makers within the process 
of constructing and justifying the national interest. In 
this context, it is possible to examine what I have previously 
referred to at the beginning of the chapter as the 'external' 
agents in the debate on the role of social knowledge as 
an issue which had previously been confined to a period 
(pre-war) and participants within the more exclusive domain 
of the social sciences. 
In the preceding sections of this chapter, I have often 
referred to 'the people' or 'the nation' as the respondents 
to, or bearers of the national interest and its attendant 
social, economic and political imperatives. While such 
groupings may appear to be somewhat nebulous categories, 
they are not meaningless. Moreover, a clearer understanding 
of the process of the national interst can be gained by 
examining those agencies, individuals and groups who .:a-r-e-
determined such as 'interest' and deployed it as an instrument 
of political action to justify, denounce or propose a host 
of policies with which to effect the necessary degree of 
social control. 
' 
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3. The evaluation of knowledge: political preference and professional 
assertion. 
Conventional wisdom* has it that the movement to establish the importance 
and relevance of social and economic research to the formulation of 
'sound' social policy, both during and after the war, began 
with the convening of the 'Clapham Committee', Committee on the Provision 
for Social and Economic Research (Cmnd. 6868, 1946). Apart from the 
assumption this makes about the nature and purpose of social research 
it indicates an error perpetuated in conventional historical accounts 
of the development of social 
of post-war empirical research. 
science in Britain, especially histories 
Such a misunderstanding of the genesis 
of that movement is similar to the impression gained by some historians, 
that the idea of a Research Council for the social sciences was first 
mooted amidst the deliberations of the Clapham Committee (named after 
its Chairman). Calls for such a Council have been a recurring theme 
in the history of sociology in Britain, both before the First World 
war, and during the inter-war and post 
to the early 1960s. 
Second World war periods up 
Several factors influenced the evaluation of the social sciences as 
branches of knowledge likely to contribute to the formulation of wartime 
policies on a host of social and economic issues, in addition to their 
potential to similarly serve the interests of those individuals and agen-
cies who regarded those same disciplines as fundamental to the material and 
moral reconstruction of a post-war world. Not all the social sciences 
were accorded an equivalent value, and it is this prescribed, differential 
* Payne et al (1981); Abrams (1981); Cherns (1963; 1979); MacRae 
(1961); Eldridge (1980) . 
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status for the various social science disciplines and the attempt 
by their respective practitioners to claim intellectual and institutional 
recognition (and the resources that go with it), that is at the core 
of my argument in this section of the current chapter. It is in the 
examination of the reaction of social scientists, especially the sociol-
ogists, to externally imposed models of the nature and purpose of their 
respective disciplines, that it is possible to detect any changes in 
the intellectual tensions that characterised their pre-war form. For 
sociology 
that had, 
the war offered opportunities and resistance to a discipline 
up to the outbreak of hostilities, tended toward intellectual 
polarisation (see above for the emergence of the inter-war cleavage ) . 
I shall consider the issues at stake here when I examine in detail 
the case for sociology presented to the Clapham Committee. Other 
factors influenced the process of the evaluation and re-ordering of 
knowledge as a result of the exigencies of war. Firstly, individuals 
other than social scientists carne to exercise a significant degree 
of influence over the role of social research and the use of its results. 
Politicians, Civil Servants and administrative agencies both within 
and outside of government actively engaged in this process. There 
emerged within these enclaves of non-social scientists an often enthusiastic, 
but naive COnCeption Of the nature Of thOSe disciplineS aS I SCienCeS I o 
The latter, often derived from a somewhat narrow comprehension and 
operational defition of a model of natural science which, in the 
main, entailed an expectation of a socia.J, science which produced information 
(social facts/data). Although substantially different in content from 
'scientific' data, such information was neverthless assumed to be 
similarly obtainable and of equal utility. A fusion of the ethos and 
authority of science with a basic empiricism served to displace the 
complexities and subtleties of epistemology as a central problematic 
for disciplines like sociology. Yaron Ezrahi (1972) and Oscar Handlin 
(1972) have each explored the popular conception of science and its 
consequences for social science. The unequivocal imperatives of war 
served to heighten people's expectation of the potential of science, 
which was carried over into perceptions of the social sciences and 
the forms of knowledge they generate. As Handlin says of such a phenomenon 
(Handlin, 1972, p.260): 
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"Common to all these assertions of the pre-eminence of science 
was the assumption that every deficiency in man's world was 
· definable as a problem to which the correct ways of knowing 
would supply an appropriate solution. The staggering optimism 
of this article of faith endowed science with the vital 
force to sway the opinions of the increasing number of its 
clients. Ultimately it promised that the organised use of 
intelligence, through its procedures, would perfect man." 
Handlin's observations, although concerned with the public image of 
science, nevertheless underpin the more visible manifestation of the 
union of science and technology; a phenomenon brought about by the 
exceptional circumstances of a world war. Of course the conflict within 
sociology of the natural science model and the non-natural science 
model is not just a product of the modern day, instead, it has a long 
history. Without making it a totally causal argument, one may view 
part of the conflict as coming from a need to achieve academic legitimacy. 
There is no doubt that technobg ical imperatives genera·ted by the urgent 
demands of wartime Britain did force into prominence a utilitarian/ 
instrumental emphasis on scientific products, or rather on applied 
science and technology. Considered thus, technological by-products 
provided tangible evidence of the power and potential of science, although 
this tended to be based upon assumption rather than an understanding 
on the part of the public at least, of the complex and somewhat closed 
universe of discourse of the scientist. 
Secondly, certain disciplines within the social sciences were considered 
of immediate relevance to the problems created by the intensification 
of hostilities. Albert Cherns has thrown light on this somewhat dark 
and obscure period of social science's history (Cherns, 1963, p.96): 
"The war with its attendant needs for increased control over 
the social and economic life of the nation also accelerated 
advances in economics, social statistics and the study and 
practice of social administration. With total national resources 
both physical and human, under scrutiny, a second flowering 
of statistical and factual studies and administrative reports 
helped to lay the foundations of the post-war "Welfare State"." 
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The mobilisation for problem-solving is apparent in Chern's argument, 
especially ",the belief that social knowledge derived from an authoritative 
social science would serve the needs of those who sought to, "provide 
a blueprint for the kind of society Britain was to have after the war" 
(Cherns, 1963, p.97). Cherns also sees the lack of social knowledge 
and the personnel who produce it as providing the necessary stimulus 
for government action (the Clapham Committee). The latter Committee 
c.an in retrospect, be seen to represent the pragmatic nature of much 
of the Labour Party's socialist policies, especially a commitment to 
the formulation of such policies on the basis of extensive research 
(1963, p.97): 
"Studies were made of land use, scientific manpower and the 
social services. Few of these studi.es failed to make the 
case for the need for a great increase in the supply of adequate 
data on which political decisions in the economic and social 
field should be based. This in turn pinpointed the scarcity 
of people trained in the social sciences." 
Chern's account of the events during this period present a picture 
of the social sciences on the verge of an extraordinary breakthrough 
in gaining public recognition and resources. It is quite true that 
their potential had yet to be fully recognised (all of the disciplines, 
but especially sociology had devised their programme statements for 
future development on the basis of their potential) but in keeping 
with what I have argued previously about sociology's advocatory dimension, 
Chern's account is indicative of an incrementally progressive evolution 
of social science. Such accounts render the positive achievements 
of the disciplines through the grammar of progress without much emphasis 
on the controversy and conflict which has so often surrounded their 
development since the last war. What is absent from Chern's account 
of the development of the social sciences during the period in question, 
is any consideration of the fact that the construction of agendas for 
the social sciences, including their research initiatives, became an 
area of interest for individuals and agencies outside the community 
of its practitioners. This began in earnest with the publication 
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of the Clapham Report in 1946, in addition to being influenced by the 
emerging controversy of the changing relationship between the universities 
and the state. Nevertheless, what Cherns has to say about the politicians' 
expectations (within the Labour Party at least), for the production 
of enlightened social policy, based on authoritative research is largely 
true, at least for the intra-war years and the immediate post-war period. 
Although Cherns mentions psychology, economics and statistics in his 
review of the period, greater emphasis needs to be placed on the advantages 
that both economics and statistics gained over the other social sciences, 
and the consequences tl)is had for subsequent deliberations on the level 
of social and economic research being undertaken at the time of the Clapham 
Committee. The latter committee would make important recommendations 
concerning the nature and distribution of resources vital to the develop-
ment of social science in Britain. Therefore, the relative intellectual 
and institutional strengths and weaknesses of the respective social 
science disciplines would be important factors influencing decisions 
about their future funding. 
Jay Rumney (1945) sensed the importance of the effects of war on the 
social sciences, especially sociology. His optimism is perhaps more 
indicative of a sense of opportunity for sociology, yet is predicated 
on the ubiquitous presentation of the discipline on the basis of its 
potential and future contribution to the social ·and moral reconstruction 
of post-war Britain (Rumney, 1945, p.585): 
"The present war, with its profound economic and political 
changes, may be the turning point in English sociology. 
But whether it will stimulate it or retard it depends on 
the social transformations the peace will bring. II 
His observations highlight two features of my argument about the develop-
ment of sociology: that its cognitive and institutional dimensions 
are contingent upon the cultural context in which it resides; and that 
in the case of the preceding quotation, Rumney hints at not only the 
importance of the latter condition of sociology's development, but 
that it had entered the war in a very precarious position vis-a-vis the 
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other social sciences. The latter situation became apparent during 
the years leading up to the war, an episode in the discipline's history 
considered in the previous chapter. 
What advantages had branches of the social sciences other than sociology 
managed to gain during the course of the war? What did this mean in 
terms of sociology's prospects and why was it so important? For an 
answer to the first question, it is important to consider briefly 
the intellectual and institutional strengths of some of those disciplines, 
especially economics and statistics. 
In many respects, of all the branches of social science, economics 
was bound to become a vital component of those forms of knowledge regarded 
as essential for the conduct of war. Without a strictly managed economy, 
including the control of labour, Britain would have been unable to 
wage war. Another factor which enhanced the prospects of economics 
was its central position within and influence upon political ideology. 
Labour politicians seized the initiative during the war years to 
introduce social and economic controls which reflected a longstanding 
commitment to collectivist policies. The war gave rise to the enactment 
of legislation not far removed from the principles and precepts of 
the pre-war conception of socialism. Economics had entered the war 
in a position of intellectual and institutional strength, far in advance 
of the other social sciences and despite the threat posed by Keynesian 
. theory to the prevailing orthodoxy of the middle and late 1930s. 
Prior to the war, economics was the most widely taught of the social 
sciences. E.M. Burns (1935) has highlighted the importance of the 
L.S.E. in conditioning the curricula of other institutions outside 
the University of London, emphasising too, that up to the middle 1930s, 
most of the discipline's teachers had been trained at the universities 
of Oxford and Cambridge. This, Burns contends, may account for the 
profound influence of Marshall within the discipline. Guillebaud's 
(1953) historical survey of the teaching of economics provides a comprehen-
sive description of the field from the early 19th century to the 1950s. 
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In addition to the degree of entrenchment within academia, economics 
possessed a significant institutional presence in a number of other 
organisations and associations. Among the most influential of these 
extra-curricula media for the promotion of economic research and public 
interest in the discipline generally were: The Royal Institute of 
Public Administration (founded in 1922); The National Institute for 
Economic and Social Research (founded in 1938); Section 'F' of the 
British Association for the Advancement of Science (economics incorporated 
with statistics in 1864); The Royal Economic Society (founded in 1890); 
The Association of Teachers of Economics (founded in 1924) . The preceding 
organisations were among a number of other clubs and private societies, 
all of which were dedicated to the advancement of the discipline, whether 
as a rigorous and authoritative science, or, on the part of the clubs 
and private societies, as forums for general discussion on economics 
and related topics, with a view to advocating its 'social importance'. 
Guillebaud sums up the academic presence of economics in the period 
before the Second World War (Guillebaud, 1953, p.25): 
"By the end of the inter-war period every university had 
established honours schools in which it was possible to obtain 
degrees involving a large measure of specialisation in economics 
At the same time, at most universities, economics could 
also be taken at a lower level as an important part of the 
pass degree. Nowhere was it true to say that economics could 
only be studied as a subordinate part of some other discipline." 
The confidence of some economists in the importance and potential of 
their discipline did not necessarily arise as a result of the demands 
placed upon their skills during the war and thereafter. The inter-war 
conferences, the subject of a section of the previous chapter, demonstrated 
the significance of this feature of sociology's advocatory dimension, 
whereby criticism of one discipline, (or branches within it), or the 
promotion of another, constitute strategies for disciplinary development 
without any reference to substantive issues of epistemology or methodology. 
An example of this, one which gives some indication of the predisposition 
of an influential economist of the period toward another branch of 
the social sciences, can be found in the arguments of P. Sargant Florence 
(1936, p.l46): 
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"Psychologists and sociologists should make themselves familiar 
with the economist's framework of thought, so as to be in 
a position to answer his questions that depend so fundamentally 
on human attitudes of mind and human institutions." 
It is tempting to form the impression that Sargant Florence's remarks 
bear the hallmarks of intellectual arrogance. The suggestion that 
disciplines like sociology and psychology should act as underlabourers 
to economics is not entirely absent from his criticism. His preoccupation 
with discouraging 'fads' and shoddy scholarship was directed, in the 
main, to the newer branches of the social sciences, especially social 
psychology and its particular relationship to economics (1936, p.l46) : 
" quite the little darling of the 
But unless someone deals harshly, it is 
a spoilt child, social psychology 
to and co-operative with economics." 
social sciences 
in danger of becoming 
has not been helpful 
Sargant Florence was particularly critical of what he considered to 
be the pretensions of social psychology and its apparent failure 
to serve economics in an appropriate manner. Despite its 'omissions 
and short-comings' psychology did possess a saving grace; its diligent 
application to the perfection of a sound research methodology via 
the fusion of research techniques such as observation, measurement 
and 'not too much abstract thought.' 
Sargant Florence*, considered by many to be an influential figure in 
the community of social scientists, both before and after the war, 
also singled out sociology as a discipline which would benefit ultimately 
from a closer association with economics. The following comments on 
this possible relationship give a fair indication of the general state 
of economics in a period when Keynes was about to publish his 'General 
Theory' (1936, p.l51): 
* Member of the wartime, British Association's Committee on Scientific 
Research on Human Institutions; member of the Royal Economic Society 
and contributor to the Clapham Committee. 
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"To keep in touch with sociologists generally, economists 
should adopt a more intelligible method of solving their 
problems. At present, economics is nothing but a framework 
of thought, a series of untested hypotheses. This framework 
should be adapted to fit observed and measured facts and 
effort made to state hypotheses in such a way that they can 
be tested by those facts." 
Apart form an obvious commitment to the efficacy of positivism as a 
fundamental basis in which to gound the social sciences, Sargant Florence's 
definition of the relationship between economics and the other social 
sciences tended to undermine sociology's intention to act as the coordi-
nator of those same disciplines within a synoptic science of society. 
I have discussed this at length in the previous chapter. Actually 
economics did not need sociology. Those of its practitioners who advocated 
a sociologically centred science of ·society, could not find favour 
with their fellow social scientists. Sociologists who believed this 
to be an impracticable project, and who tended toward the view that 
the role of sociology was the.developmen.t·ofan autonomous discipline, 
whose ideas and techniques could be progressively diffused within other 
branches of the social sciences, as a means of off-setting excessive 
specialisation and ultimatley the fractionation of social knowledge 
into unrelated and unrelatable categories, were also finding it difficult 
to convince other social scientists. Interestingly enough, both the 
former and latter groups of sociologists tended to represent one, or 
the other divisions within the inter-war, Marshallian 
sociology set out in Appendix Two. 
cleavage in 
In answering the first question posed above: what advantages had branches 
of the social sciences, other than sociology gained during the course of 
the war, I have also partially replied to the second question concerning 
the consequences of this for sociology. Economics had entered the 
war as a discipline of demonstrable utility, as far as the requir:ements 
of large-scale planning and control of the economy was concerned. 
Other disciplines, like psychology were pressed into service for both 
civilian and military purposes, (Cf. Cherns, 1963, pp.95-96; G. Duncan 
Mitchell, 1968). The role of the statistician also increased in importance, 
not only in the field of economics, traditionally a discipline given 
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to statistical analysis, but in other areas of civil and military work. 
Government departments required additional statistical support on 
a scale unknown before the war. However, and despite the central importance 
of economics within the reordering of knowledge in response to obvious, 
national imperatives, discernable gaps appeared in the provision of 
social knowledge, without which the Government and its administrative 
agencies were unable to exercise the degree of social control essential 
to the successful conduct of the war. 
4. The Science Movement: a model for scientific social research 
I referred above to the extraordinary increase in the activity of the 
state in imposing controls on both the immediate and long-term patterns 
of civilian life. Such activity necessitated an expansion in the field 
of social and economic research, with a view to collecting information 
of both immediate, practical utility and of a kind that would be of 
value in the construction of quite extensive plans for eventual post-war 
social policy. The emphasis tended to be upon the quest for data. 
This led academics, politicians and civil servants to question w~ther 
or not sufficient individuals and agencies existed who were competent 
enough to produce the information in terms of the desired quality and 
quantity. While demand for research may have evolved directly as a 
consequence of the national interest, a commitment to the value and 
potential of social research resulted from a combination of several 
factors. 
The evaluation of social and economic information about the poPulation 
and the manner in which it had been acquired was influenced by the 
apparent success of science and technology to sustain the needs of 
a state engaged in a global war. Science and scientists were portrayed 
increasingly as very potent institutional and intellectual agents, 
standing between the enemy and the last vestige of democracy in Europe -
Britain. A crucial component of this image of science was the seemingly 
inviolable nature of its method for establishing 1 the facts 1 • Although 
I do not wish to become embroiled in a detailed exposition of the philosophy 
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of science, a debate which continues to receive a considerable amount 
of attention, I nevertheless think it essential to examine an intrinsic 
feature of that project the conceptual potency of the methodology 
of science as an important symbolic resource. The latter informed 
the general discourse and especially, the conceptual framework within 
which the nature and potential of the social sciences would be assessed 
as branches of knowledge capable of contributing to the solution of 
both the long and short term problems brought on by a nation at war. 
What is important to bear in mind when considering the ethos and authority 
of science and its attendant models and imagery, is that such an interpre-
tation of its enterprise derived from the gradual incursion of scientists 
and their influence, into areas outside of their traditional spheres 
of technical competence and expertise, and into the domains of politics, 
civil and military administration and generally, the imagination of 
the public. Moreover, the ethos and authority of science would provide 
sociologists on the 'practical wing' of the discipline with a valuable 
conceptual device to include in their strategic repertoire. I shall 
explore the latter consequences for the development of sociology in 
the post-war period, when examining the evidence submitted to the Clapham 
Committee. 
The ethos and authority of science and the influence of its practitioners 
was not entirely a wartime phenomenon. There existed within the intellec-
tual culture of pre-war Britain, what I would suggest can be reasonably 
described as a science movement. Its particular intellectual and institu-
tional components, its progenitor and supporters, in addition to its 
general pervasiveness require an examination beyond the scope of this 
work. However, I believe that the inter-war science movement served 
to inform and sustain practitioners and supporters of sociology's practical 
wing
1 
whom, as I have argued above, lacked the vital institutional 
asset of a formal presence within higher education. The latter position 
may not have been the disadvantage that many of the protagonists of 
the practioli wing believed it to be. Once the war began, and a redefini-
tion of the role of education and the reordering of knowledge occurred, 
adherents of the latter division within sociology were able to present 
a case for their discipline that derived its substance from the categories 
and context of science's rapidly expanding position. 
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The phenomenon of a science movement is not- unique to Britain during 
the period in question. Tobey (1971) has provided convincing evidence 
of the existence of a similar movement in America during the 1920s and 
1930s*. Evidence of the diffusion of the basic tenets of such a programme 
for American science within the field of the social sciences, can 
be found in the previously examined Rockefeller Foundation support 
for 'scientifically' based, social research and the implications for 
its funding. The latter led eventually to the production of the 1Social 
Trends' project in the United States in 1933. A conscious attempt was 
made to equate the normative structure of science with the sentiments 
and morality of democracy (Cf. Price, 1965, pp.94-95). George Simpson 
(1953) has argued that the most extreme position in favour of the 
bifurcation of science and morality has been taken in sociology, citing 
George Lundberg and the emergence of the behaviourist, nee-positivist 
school of sociology in America as a prime example of that relationship. 
This was not the case for sociology in Britain during the same period 
(1930s and into the post-war era) : the point being that British sociology 
had not attained equivalent intellectual and institutional autonomy 
to that of its American counterpart (for the reasons stated above). 
Nevertheless, there were, I believe, similarities 
and British science movements, which in turn 
between the American 
had consequences for 
the development of the social sciences in their respective historical 
and cultural contexts. The scale of the 'movements'; the number and 
influence of those who supported them, the strategies and tactics deployed 
to further their respective causes; and the degree of success of their: respective 
enterprises, differed markedly between cultures. Whilst a detailed 
comparison of the two movements would be an interesting project 
in itself, it is beyond the scope of this work. However, I do intend 
to concentrate upon the essential features of the science movement 
in Britain, as it has a direct bearing on the events surrounding the 
re-evaluation of social knowledge during the last war. Furthermore, 
it will also be necessary, when appropriate, to take into consideration 
both the sociological and philosophical aspects of the norms of science, 
* R.C. Tobey (1971) has argued that during the inter-war period 
in America, an influential scientific pressure group actively 
sought to promote within government and among the general public 
the notion that democracy was the political version of the scientific 
method. 
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as they have important implications for the manner in which both scientists 
and their supporters generated styles of thought and vocabularies, 
which were used subsequently to span the boundaries between the scientific 
community and society. The political and ideological elements of the 
preceding processes are of vital importance to an understanding of 
resource (cf. R. Lapp (1965); Schoek and 
Greenberg (1969); Weingart (1970); and 
science as a potent cultural 
Wiggins (1960); Lakoff (1977); 
Haberer (1969)). 
The ascendancy of science as a major influence in the conduct of war 
was brought about by the imperatives to defend and sustain the state. 
In addition to this assertion, I have also suggested that the pre-eminence 
of S::i.ence and its practitioners was not essentially a wartime phenomenon. 
While the rise of a science movement was a notable feature of those 
decades, other changes within several important intellectual and experi-
mental fields of research occurred, giving the science movement its 
general direction and impetus. In Astronomy, major advances included 
·the discovery of the planet Pluto, with a growth in t}-ie development of optics 
leading to the construction of powerful telescopes, which in turn encou-
raged new theories of the universe. The work of Sir James Jeans (1930) 
and Sir Arthur Eddington (1933) highlighted these new developments. 
In Medicine, significant advances had been made in the field of vitamins, 
and two important discoveries had been made with the production of 
insulin by Banting and Best, and penicillin by Fleming in the late 
1920s. The subsequent isolation of penicillin by Florey and Chain 
in 1939-40 paved the way for the massive increase of drug treatment 
in medicine. Perhaps the most potent image of science, one which certainly 
created the notion of it as a mysterious and to some extent, awesome 
power, was generated by the media in its attempt to popularise the advances 
occurring in the field of physics. The concept of matter as energy 
and particles evolved through the earlier findings of Max Planck, 
followed by the growth in atomic physics. With the splitting of the 
atom and the later construction of the first accelerator, Newton's 
idea of a constant universe became a historical novelty (albeit of 
profound importance to the development of physics) as Heisenberg's 
uncertainty principle occupied the place once accorded to Newton's 
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ideas. All of the latter developments occurred against the background 
of formidably complex, though fundamental changes wrought upon physics 
by the ideas of Albert Einstein. It would seem reasonable to portray 
the period between the wars, in so much as it is possible to characterise 
the order of knowledge and its ethos, as a quest for certainty. Certainly 
within the field of philosophy, a great deal of effort had been expended 
in an attempt to develop and systematise empiricim with the aid of 
the conceptual equipment furnished by modern research on logical and 
mathematical theory. Logical positivism and the concern with the verifi-
ability principle held sway during the period in question, to the extent 
that its principles began to influence other branches of knowledge 
outside of the field of philosophy. Central to all of the preceding 
advances within the wider sphere of science, including medicine, was 
the manner in which scientists purportedly made their respective discov-
eries: through the use of the scientific method, 
In general terms, the science movement's central themes comprised a 
custodial role for science and its practitioners, the presentation 
of science as a 'mission' of truth and enlightenment, the special status 
of its knowledge via the operation of an exclusive methodology and 
discourse.* All of these themes were interrelated, and subject to 
differential emphasis according to the motives of those espousing the 
virtues of the movement, and the forum in which the case for science 
was being discussed. Thus the notion of science's normative structure 
could be said to derive from the inter-war science movement's concern 
with the extra-scientific role of its practitioners in utilising their 
authority and the ethos of their discipline within other cultural spheres. 
Moreover, the ethos and authority of science gave an authoritative 
dimension to the issues and debates in which scientists either chose 
to engage in, or were called upon to participate in. The nature and 
function of the ethos of science has been defined by Robert Merton 
(Merton, 1962, p.20): 
"The ethos of science refers to an emotionally toned complex 
of rules prescriptions, mores, beliefs, values and presupposi-
tions which are held to be binding upon the scientist. Some 
* FOOI'NOTE OVERLEAF 
* 
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While it may be thought that these themes are a particular feature of 
the normative structure of science, they were very early enshrined 
with the establishment of the London School of Economics and Political 
Science. As John Watkins has observed (Watkins, 1972, pp.l75-176): 
"The L.S.E. must therefore be an independent academic institution 
with no political bias imposed upon it. It did not matter 
what political views its members held so long as they believed 
in and practiced the methods of scientific research. 
The reason why Beatrice (Webb) attached a high value to scien-
tific methods was more romantic. She had a religious temperament; 
but she was not a believer. I get the impression that the 
vacuum was at least partially filled by a fierce belief in 
scientific method as an austere code dEananding self-abnegation 
and humility before the facts. Scientific method was a lifelong 
concern of hers." 
Watkins quotes an. especially illuminating extract from an address 
given by Beatrice Webb in 1906, at the L.S.E., which gives a fair 
indication of her commitment to the precepts and practice of the 
scientific method (1972, p.l76): 
"What we have to do in social science is to apply the scientific 
method to the facts of social life. There is only one scientific 
method - that used in physical science. It consists of three 
parts observation, conjecture as to the cause and effect 
of the facts observed, and afterwards verification by renewed 
observation. That is the scientific method." 
The preceding quotation came from Beatrice 
of Investigation', in Sociological Papers, 
(eds.), Vol. 3, p.345, London: Macmillan, 1907. 
Webb's book, 
L.T. Hobhouse 
'Methods 
et al., 
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phases of this complex may be methodologically desirable, 
but observance of the rules is not dictated solely by methodo-
logical considerations. This ethos, as social codes generally, 
is sustained by the sentiments of those to whom it applies." 
Although there are features common to both the normative structure 
of science and Merton's description of the ethos of science, the essential 
component of the latter phenomenon is the manner in which the 'complex' 
of its properties are projected into public and political spheres either 
by the scientists themselves or by those who, for a variety of motives, 
support the aims and objectives of science and its community of practi-
tioners. While it is tempting to construe the ethos and authority 
of science as simply vacuous rhetoric, it has served nevertheless, 
as a singularly important strategy in the repertoire of scientists, 
politicians, civil servants and academics, in the quest for public 
recognition and the acquisition of resources essential to the pursuit 
of research and an enhanced institutional presence. Moreover, the 
ethos and authority of science has served as a potent cultural resource 
for other disciplines aspiring to emulate its principles and practices 
for reasons other than, as Merton (1962) has argued, those 'dictated 
solely by methodological considerations.' 
Although it is difficult to provide an example of a single, definitive 
work, wherein the central tenets of the science movement are expounded·,~ 
a book by Lancelot Hogben entitled, Science for the Citizen 
(1941) does contain an important section on what I would regard as 
the embodiment of the movement's themes. It is referred to by Hogben 
as 'The New Social Contract', and differs from the remainder of his 
book, in which an attempt is made to educate the layman in the "wonders 
of science"; the popularisation of science, in which the subject is 
offered as, "an essential part of the education of a citizen" (1941, 
p.ll). 
Hogben's new Social Contract depended on the recognition and acceptance 
of his notion of "Scientific Humanism", by government and the citizen. 
He regarded the fundamental issues of scientific humanism as separate 
from the axioms of orthodox politics: thus an example of the presentation 
163 
of science as morality and as a mission of truth and enlightenment. 
In order to introduce and manage the new social contract, Hogben suggested 
an appropriate cadre of specialists (1941, p.l090): 
"Men and women who bring the live curiosity. and painstaking 
industry of the naturalist to bear on problems of contemporary 
society will not be products of an established social culture. 
Like the Webbs, they will be the symbol of a popular movement 
the makers of the New Social Contract will be the founders 
of a new social culture." 
Again, the reference to a 'popular movement' and the role of those 
who will usl":er in the new order are indicative of another theme within 
the science movement; the custodial role for science, its practitioners 
and supporters. Hog ben's Social Contract also rna d:! provision for the 
redistribution of wealth based on a notion of 'constructive democratic 
statesmanship'. The latter, which was fundamental to the envisaged, 
orderly revolution of democratic social change, could not occur unless 
the 'new intelligentsia' received an appropriate education (1941, p.l082): 
II the cleavage between mere goodwill and knowledge is 
deeper than it has ever been before, and that an education 
which will fit statesmen to take advantage of the new powers 
for social well-being or fit citizens to choose them must 
be deeply imbued with naturalistic knowledge." 
I have dwelt upon the notion of a mechanistic production of an intellectual 
elite above, when considering the Rockefeller Foundation's instrumen-
tal approach to the method by which 'appropriate' forms of social knowledge 
can be produced and subsequently converted into enlightened social 
policy. The latter process depended to a large extent upon a naturalistic 
approach to the solution of social problems. Thus conceived, social 
science exhibits an explicit ideological component jndicative of scientism: 
the assumption that the accumulation of codified knowledge can substitute 
for politics and ideology as the matrix of social choices or norms 
of collective conduct. 
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Another influential figure in the science movement, one who perhaps 
more than most contributed to the diffusion of science within the education 
system specifically and culture generally, was Sir Richard Gregory 
(Armytage, 1957). Richard Gregory strove throughout his lifetime to 
evolve a mantle for science which he believed would influence the 'affairs 
of men' within every sphere of intellectual and social endeavour. 
I shall now consider briefly, the role of Sir Richard Gregory in the 
inter -war science movement, restricting my examination to his association 
with other influentials within the movement and the consequences this 
had for the social sciences, up.ro and during the Second World War. 
W.H. Armytage's book (Armytage, 1957), is a rich source of material 
on the life and works of Richard Gregory, especially his influence 
within the science movement. In particular, Armytage's work is important 
to my concern in highlighting several of the themes which coalesced 
to give the movement its cultural dimensions and impetus. In the main, 
those who extolled the virtues of the movement rarely referred to the 
substantive issues of science itself (its theoretical and methodological 
components). Instead, the credibility and 'power' of science was sustained 
through the public management of appropriate images and accompanying 
discourse. 
Armytage's assessment of the social standing of Sir Richard Gregory 
after his Knighthood in 1919, gives an indication of the significance 
of 'informal networks' and the importance of frequenting institutions 
wherein the right connections could be made, (Armytage, 1957, p.85): 
"His respectability 
further symbolised 
Rule 2. There, 
and therefore his 
by his election to 
like Mathew Arnold, 
approaching beatitude' ... " 
authority, had been 
the Athenaeum under 
'he enjoyed something 
While it would be rash to argue that the development of science in 
Britain stemmed from the discussions of those who frequented the Athenaeum, 
it is worth remembering that the function of informal networks, as 
a means of influencing opinion, is important in any estimation of the 
institutional structure of British science during the inter-war period. 
In a prestigious institution such as the Athenaeum, there could be 
165 
found influential scientists among His Majesty's Cabinet at play. 
The contacts made there could have as King (1974) has suggested, influenced 
the professional and organisational bases of British science. As King 
has said of the period (King, 1974, p.ll): 
"Up to the Second World War, the size of the British science 
system was small enough for internal adjustments and policy 
direction to be in the hands of a few outstanding personalities 
belonging to the same coterie. Coherence and mutual understanding 
were probably achieved rather effectively, if utterly informally, 
through frequent, easy, but often unplanned contacts between 
the leading figures of the Royal Society, the research council 
secretaries, and senior civil servants, all of whom were 
habitues of the Athenaeum Club." 
Sir Richard Gregory (Armytage, 195 7) made strenuous efforts to publicise 
the value and importance of the 'scientific spirit' (1957, p.69): 
"We seek to justify the claim of science to be an enabling 
influence as well as a creator of riches For science 
is not to be measured by practical service alone, though 
it may contribute to material prosperity: it is an intellectual 
outlook, a standard of truth and a gospel of light." 
It is tempting, with hindsight, to consign such a conception of science, 
especially the manner in which Grejory portrayed it, to the category 
of absurd novelties. However, the notion of the 'spirit of science' 
was, perhaps, a sentiment easier to harbour and express publicly before 
the outbreak of a World War and the subsequent role of science in 
its conduct. A diminution in the spirit of science would be more than 
compensated for by the kindling of faith in post-war technology. Gregory's 
quasi -religious portrayal of the spirit of science is somewhat remini-
scent of the Saint-Simonian enthusiasm for 'the religion of Newton' 
(Hawthorn, 1976, p. 69) and the subsequent reverential status accorded 
the new positive philosophy. While Gregory and his supporters may 
not have intended to create a new hagiocracy of science, considerable 
effort was expended in elevating the status of the scientist in society. 
It should be remembered that the science movement and its supporters 
while espousing the virtues of the ethos and authority of science within 
the public realm, sought also to establish science within a domain 
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likely to guarantee its permanent cultural presence; the national curri-
ulum. The latter aspect of the science movement relates to my consideration 
of one of its general themes: the special status of its knowledge via 
the operation of an exclusive methodology. Gregory and his associates 
managed to alter significantly the composition of the curriculum at 
various levels within the education system through the activities 
of two corporate bodies; 'The Humanist Council' and the 'Neglect of 
Science Committee' (Armytage, 1957, pp.70-74). The former comprised 
teachers and advocates of the 'humanistic studies' and other 'traditional 
subjects', the latter, individuals from a host of intellectual fields, 
committed to the installation and development of the teaching of natural 
science within the curriculum.* As early as 1907, Gregory had been 
campaigning publicly for the recognition of science. He strove to 
emphasise the role of scientists and their special knowledge 
foundation of a democratic order (The Times, December 31, 1907): 
as the 
"It should be the object of scientific men to promote the 
extension of scientific knowledge over as wide an area as 
possible so that the scientific method and the scientific 
spirit should be known to all who are prepared to read or 
listen." 
Gregory's influential position as editor of the journal Nature, provided 
the science movement with an invaluable public platform. 
Although the 'Neglect of Science Committee' endeavoured to introduce 
the teaching of natural science within the school curriculum on a par 
with more traditional subjects, it supported generally, the aims and 
objectives of a curriculum designed to provide 'technical preparation' 
for adolescents who would eventually enter the 'professions or other 
technical occupations'. Furthermore, the Committee advocated a change 
in the school curriculum which would allow for an easier transition 
to further and higher education, again within the fields of scientific 
and technical subjects. A concerted effort was made to reform education 
* It is worth noting that among the many achievements of Sir Richard 
Gregory was his prolific production of textbooks on science, of both a 
specific and general nature; over two hundred up to his death in 1952. 
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within and across the curriculum and at every level within the system. 
Gregory and his associates made special efforts to introduce changes 
within the university curriculum, a programme that began as a result 
of the First World war and the emergence of the 'Haldane Principle'. 
Coupled to his adventures within the education system, Gregory, through 
the offices of the British Association, continued to exploit every 
available opportunity which allowed him access to what he considered 
to be his most important audience - the general public. His very close 
friendship with H.G. Wells, whose works of science-fiction Gregory 
thought an admirable medium for cultivating the scientific imagination 
of the populace, provided him with an association that would have conse-
quences for Gregory's later enthusiasm with the scientific study of 
society. Gregory regarded his responsibility toward the public and 
its enlightenment through a knowledge of science as of primary importance. 
He regarded the act of lecturing, be it in public, or in a more formal 
institutional setting, as an essential vehicle for engendering an interest 
in his cause. There is an interesting parallel between his appreciation 
of the lecture and its relevance to the period of reconstruction following 
the First world war and the circumstan.ces surrounding the use of the 
same medium during the Second World War under the auspices of the 
Army Bureau of Current Affairs. In both cases, an attempt was made 
to engage the audience in contemplating the importance of enlightened 
citizenship in a post-war world. Moreover, the role of science and 
social reconstruction were themes common to the issues raised during 
the course of his post world war One lectures and courses (British 
Association, 1916): 
"After the war (the First World war) there will be a new 
public for lectures and courses on a wide range of subjects: 
but one of the main purposes of the lectures should be to 
show as many people as possible that they are personally 
concerned as citizens with their position in the state, in 
industry, and in education." 
Bearing in mind what I have said previously about the general themes 
associated with the science movement, it is possible to detect the 
gradual attempt by Gregory and his supporters, to carry their programme 
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for science into other domains within the national culture. In doing 
so, a greater emphasis was placed upon the strategic importance of 
the project to convert those individuals and their environments toward 
a more accommodating approach to the importance of science. Gregory 
was well aware of the fact that scientific knowledge itself could not 
alter effectively the status quo (Armytage, 1957, p.Bl): 
"Science needs champions and advocates, in addition to actual 
makers of new knowledge and exponents of it." 
In the case of the inter-war science movement, a vigorous attempt was 
made to assert the authority of science within the political domain. 
The role and significance of 1 scientific knowledge 1 was a crucial factor 
in the success, or otherwise, of such a project, as Ezrahi has pointed 
out (1974, p.226): 
"The social prevalence of the view that scientific knowledge, 
which is identified with public information, is a legitimate 
and even superior basis for social choices and public policy 
is bound to provide scientists with significant resources 
of influence over the course of public life." 
The scientists, engaging in what I have referred to as their custodial 
role within the promotion of the social virtues of science, made a 
concerted effort to establish its political uses in the public domain. 
This was most apparent during the war, although advocates of the science 
movement succeeded in establishing the necessity of its enterprise 
in connection with what were considered to be the most pressing social 
issues of the decades between the wars. Members of the science movement 
endeavoured to establish the organisation of scientists in public affairs, 
in terms of political rather than intellectual association. Thus 
lay perceptions of the claims of science became contingent upon the 
public posture of the socially recognised spokesmen and spokeswomen 
of science. In the process of blurring the particular, logical and 
social limits of scientific discourse, exponents of the science movement 
could not only equate scientific with social criteria of evidence and 
rationality, but also identify the goals of science with those of society. 
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Furthermore, the emergence of a relationship between science and politics 
provided scientists and their growing lobby with an opportunity to 
influence public opinion, in addition to establishing important contacts 
within industry, commerce, civil administration and most importantly, 
those agencies, both public and private, upon which scientific research 
depended for its resources. What is important to bear in mind here, 
is the crucial role of the strategic presentation of science. The 
manufacture and management of images associated with the ethos and 
authority of science were crucial components of the repertoire of 
exponents of the science movement. Furthermore, definitions of science 
and its socio-political role within a cultural context, (essential 
elements of the discourse on the relation beween science and politics) 
were projected between the coordinates ofpolitical space and time, 
influencing social behaviour and the social distribution of power and 
influence. Although the latter distribution may not have been on a 
scale common in the decades following the Second World War, British 
scientists and their spokesmen of the inter-war period began to engage 
in debates which were directed toward an extension of the influence 
of science beyond its traditional domain, and into formally discrete, 
political and bureaucratic jurisdictions. Gregory and his supporters 
endeavoured to establish the role of the scientist within the polity, 
in a manner cons-idered by Ezrahi, (1974, p. 223) : 
"Consequently, in a democracy the 
like the authority of statesmen or 
fact it may be discretionary, may 
sustain the fiction that its roots 
or participation." 
authority of scientists, 
bureaucrats, though in 
rest on the ability to 
lie in public consensus 
The determination of the science movement's adherents to involve the 
scientist in politics and national culture would have significant 
consequences for the social sciences in Britain, especially in the 
period leading up to the Second World war, and the years of reconstruction 
following it. This was for several reasons. First, the rise of science 
within public and political domains was orchestrated within a fairly 
well defined ·•movement' and led by scientists and supporters of consider-
able influence. They occupied positions within the essential spheres 
of politics and civil administration (the Whitehall-Westminster-Athanaeum, 
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triangle). Second, science began to be widely incorporated into the 
national curriculum at all levels of the education system. Third, 
technology, the progeny of science, provided quite powerful, tangible 
'proof' of the ethos and authority of science. Every-day artifacts 
provided the citizen with ocular proof of the 'bounty of science' and 
the service it rendered mankind. Finally, the popularisation of science 
through the media and the works of science fiction, especially those 
of H.G. Wells,. assisted greatly the movement's project. All of the 
preceding features of the diffusion of science within the national 
culture and consciousness of the public represented major factors 
in existing and future debates involving the political and economic 
determinants of the map of knowledge and its relationship to the national 
need. Science and its practitioners had engendered an image of itself 
as an authoritative form of knowledge and practi~e essential to national 
progress. The credibility of such an image of science was contingent 
upon the expression and management of the compelling authority of its 
knowledge, rather than a rehearsal of its complex, substantive form. 
The professionalisation and institutionalisation of natural science 
proceeded in advance of the social sciences. The extraordinary dilemma 
for social science entailed the simultaneous tasks of evolving their 
own epistemological and methodological form, while endeavouring to acquire 
and sustain, sound and acceptable institutional and professional bases. 
It wasn't as though the social sciences had never aspired to emulate 
the natural sciences during their development. The point here is that 
the physical sciences have never achieved stability. Their internal 
organisation and their relationship to society has changed significantly 
since their initial recognition and Royal patronage in the seventeenth 
century and the disestablishment of theology1 broughtabout by the seculari-
sing rationale of science. Barnes and Dolby (1970) touch on the latter 
point in their critique of the Mertonian notion of the scientific ethos. 
For those social scientists who saw the institutional destiny of their 
disciplines (and here I include those exponents of sociology's practical 
wing ) as being a scientific one, the science movement must have provided 
an attractive model to incorporate within and subsequently deploy, 
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as part of their strategic discourse and wider quest for intellectual and 
institutional autonomy. It may also have been the case generally, that as 
the natural sciences were rapidly becoming major institutional and intellectual 
forms within the episteme during the inter-war period, the genesis of the 
spread of the pathology of the natural sciences to the social sciences in 
Britain can also be traced to this period (cf. Rex, 1970; Wright Mills, 
1963 and 1976). While certain branches of the social sciences had sought 
to establish their knowledge claims of the basis of the inductive method, 
theories and research technologies, though purportedly similar across the 
spread of disciplines, did not possess the compelling 'reality of proof' 
indicative of the natural sciences. Social scientists were thus able to capitalise 
on the authority of science by reference to its essential, methodological 
sophistication, emphasising the obvious potential for the study of society, 
by diligent application of the principles and precepts of an already proven 
method. Thus the promise of the human sciences were established, and with 
it the conditions of their future intellectual crises. 
5. Science and Labour 
Advocates of the science movement began to gather support in other institutional 
and political domains during the 1920s and 1930s. Efforts were made by H.G. Wells, 
Julian Huxley and Sir Richard Gregory to forge an alliance between labour 
(through the emergent Labour Party) and science, (Armytage, 1957, p.86): 
" the conversion of the Labour Groups to a belief in science rather than 
political action; their awakening to the importance of improving the means of 
production rather than appropriating too much of its accrued surplus." 
It is possible to view the motives of the movement's central figures as alterior 
in nature when assessing the connection between science and labour. The 
increasingly poli ticised exposition of the social role of science began to 
evolve as a distinctive ideology. Could it have been that Gregory and his 
supporters appreciated the social and economic implications of an increasingly 
disenchanted labour movement, and that perhaps the radical tendencies within 
it could be usefully employed to construct a scientific democracy, rather 
than bring about social chaos through revolution? This is implied in the 
following extract from an address by H.G. Wells to the Portsmouth Brotherhood, 
in May, 1921, wherein an attempt was made to present science as the primary, 
organising 'force' within society (1957, pp.90-91): 
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" Science will endure and rule, but that Labour with a 
capital L, as the name of a class of human beings organised 
for distinctive class ends, will pass away. if the Spirit 
of Science is to be carried right through human affairs, 
it means a complete organisation of human society for all 
common ends, educational and economic ... " 
Social evolution, without social revolution, via the 'spirit of science' 
became a political project within science. This is an early indication 
of the potenti~l role of the social sciences in such a project, one 
which emerged within the compass of the rovemen t' s conception of the 
application of the scientific method to social problems. In addition 
to the theory of a scientific estate, created through the union of 
science and labour, a concrete effort was made by Wells to establish 
his movement's ideas through election to Parliament, standing for the 
Parliamentary seat of the University of London. Those individuals 
associated with the Association of Scientific Workers (known as the 
National Union of Scientific Workers until 19271 when it adopted the 
prefix 'Association' in place of National Union) such as H.M. Langton, 
N.R. Campbell, Dr. Franklin Kidd, H. Jeffreys and the Association's 
Secretary Major A.B. Church, all became eager supporters of the science 
movement. They actively sought the patronage of Wells and Gregory 
in the hope of establishing, at some future date, a 'scientific inter-
national'. The latter intention gained substance during the Second 
World war, in the debate about the role of science in the period of 
post-war reconstruction. Nevertheless, the science movement's interest 
in the possibility of constructing a rational and progressive civilisation, 
led to the inclusion of the 'study of society' within its programme. 
Indeed, the envisaged partnership between science and the emergent 
Labour Party was intended to demonstrate the social efficacy of scientific 
research as the key to the establishment of the new social order (1957, 
p.95): 
" that is why the 
greater obligation to 
and scientific research 
and social research." 
advent of a Labour Party will mean a 
sustain and extend scientific subjects 
not only in physical, but also financial 
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Although privately, Gregory mistrusted a democracy which would allow 
"power in the hands of the people" (1957, p. 97), he and his supporters 
made strenuous efforts to maintain the momentum of the collaboration 
between science and a 'democratic' Labour movement. Much of the effort 
expended toward this end was channelled through the British Science 
Guild. As its Director, Gregory and his associates continued to 'bridge 
the gap between the public and the man of science'. 
Perhaps the most important symbol of the professed coalescence of the 
Labour and Science movements during the early inter-war period, took 
place at a conference in 1924 entitled, "Science and Labour", held 
in conjunction with the British Empire Exhibition of the same year. 
Such a joint celebration afforded science and democratic socialists 
with an opportunity to extole the much vaunted relationship betwen 
their respective manifestos and programmes for social change. The 
object of the exercise was, as Armytage explains (1957, p.lOO): 
" to illuminate the lines upon which science could be 
directed and applied more widely and effectively to increase 
human happiness and efficiency, to reduce human toil, and 
to develop human personality." 
Such noble objectives would no doubt have inspired the advocates of 
sociology on either side of the'Marshallian cleavage', yet those sociol-
ogists given to the practice of rigorous empirical analysis, rather 
than a socio-philosophical approach, would have found it easier to 
identify with the aims and objectives of the science movement. The 
latter's programme and its architects would provide allies and inspiration 
for sociologists and other social scientists within the discipline's 
practical wing. It should also be noted that the then Labour Prime 
Minister, Ramsey MacDonald, an. old friend of Sir Richard Gregory, 
actively supported the latter in his work, especially the potential 
of science (again a theme of the science movement) for enlightened 
political judgement and (1957, p.lOO): 
"to impress upon the public the necessity of treating political 
questions in a scientific spirit, and not merely in a shut-
vision, partisan frame of mind." 
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MacDonald also endeavoured to explain the reasons for the vagaries of 
the democratic process and its attendant political abuses and absurdities, 
which had direct implications for social science (1957, p.lOl): 
11 it is mainly owing to the fact that scientific methods 
have hardly yet been applied to society itself. I hope that 
as a result of your conference a beginning will be made in 
the scientific study of the problems which confront Parliament. 11 
Sydney Webb, who shared the platform at the 'Science and Labour' conference 
in 1924, and whose educational establishment, the L.S.E., embodied 
many of the principles and precepts articulated within the fusion of 
science and politics, shared in the frustration of not being able to 
fruitfully nurture the project in question, especially the alliance 
with a majority political party as the Labour government fell in the 
Autumn election of 1924. Undaunted, Gre gay and his supporters continued 
to enlist the assistance and interest of influential politicians and 
academics in the campaign to establish the science movement within 
academe and the corridors of power. Rather than maintain a strategy 
of association with a single political party, the science movement 
sought a route to the centre of political decision-making via the 
establishment of a pressure group in politics - an essential prerequisite 
to commanding political and parliamentary respect and influence, irrespec-
ti ve of the political party in power. There thus came into existence 
the 'Parliamentary Science Committee', and subsequently, privileged 
access by scientists to the political decision making process and admini-
strative centres of government. Scientists now possessed an important 
medium through which to engage the opinion of politicians on matters 
in which they had an interest. The significance of this achievement 
would become evident in the years following the Second World War, especially 
in the contests for the distribution of resources to and between the 
Research Councils for the support of research and education in the 
disciplines which those Councils funded (although the U.G.C. would 
have greater control over the disbursement of funds in the field of 
higher education generally) . Science was now poised to not only present 
itself as a major candidate to serve the nation's needs, but also to 
share in the determination of those same national needs and the cultural 
imperatives which they engendered. 
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Another important institutional change occurred · within science during 
the inter-war period. One which would have specific implications for 
the development of the social sciences. With the merging of the British 
Science Guild (passim) and the British Association, advocates of the 
science movement who considered the need to incorporate branches of the 
social sciences within the van of science were able to extend the 
scope of scientific knowledge without which, they argued, a democratic 
society was thought unable to progress. Toward the middle and latter 
part of the 1930s, the Association became increasingly preoccupied 
with 'social problems'. The Guild had, since its inception prior to 
the First World War, devoted itself to the 'promotion of scientific 
method and results to social problems and public affairs'. The Association 
possessed the necessary prestige and influence among those institutions 
and influentials likely to enhance the prospects of science,and as such 
became a natural ally of the science movement. Furthermore, the Association 
provided a direct route to the Parliamentary Science Committee (passim) 
another important aspect of the network of influence being cultivated 
within the institutional framework of science. The Association's consti-
tuent member of the Parliamentary Science Committee served as an important 
link between the professional echelon of the disciplines' practitioners 
and additionally, as an important source of influence on matters of 
science within government. 
The diffusion of the ethos and authority of science continued unabated, 
with significant consequences for the social sciences. An important 
change occurred in the British Association's disposition toward the 
latter disciplines, with the establishment of a specially appointed 
committee to (Armytage, 1957, p.l35): 
" consider how the Association might indicate the importance 
which it attaches to the development of the social sciences." 
Unfortunately, sociology was not, on the occasion in question, a candidate 
for inclusion within the Association's appreciation of those disciplines 
worthy of the accolade science. Nevertheless, such a development 
would provide social scientists with an opportunity to establish their 
credentials and the status of their respective disciplines as bone 
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fide science. Such an attraction and opportunity for the social scientists 
may account for their apparent criticism of sociology's socio-philosophical 
wing whose exponents had attempted to postulate a synoptic science 
of society under the co-ordinating influence of sociology, during the 
important conferences of the middle and late 1930s. The campaign to 
recruit social scientists to the science movement led the more prudent 
exponents of the Ginsberg 'school' of sociology to adopt a strategy 
of accommodation and negotiation, in the face of the assault upon its 
rather fragile existence within the wider field of sociology. The 
final inter-war conference did indicate a somewhat modified view from 
the sociologists toward their original project for a synoptic science 
of society. 
Toward the end of the inter-war period, the science movement had progres-
sively extended its remit to encompass those individual scientists 
whose expertise could be brought to bear on the solution of social 
and political questions. Once again, the alliance between science 
and the Labour movement became a matter of public debate. Indeed, 
as Bevin remarked in his address to the T.U.C. in 1937, (1957, p.l41): 
" the significance of scientific discovery in all fields 
of research will be of incalculable value, not only to our 
movement but also to the community. The General Council 
cordially welcomes the opportunity to consult with representative 
scientists by means of such an advisory council and panels 
of scientific workers from whom we can obtain the information 
and advice we need in dealing with our problems." 
Such an intention amounted to not only a reiteration of Labour's earlier 
commitment to the potential of science for socialism, but highlighted 
the foundation upon which Labour's social policies would be based. 
It is no coincidence that Clement Attlee would call for an enquiry 
into the adequacy of social and economic research during the latter 
stages of the war. The Labour contingent of the wartime coalition 
govenment regarded the role of scientific planning as the key to successful 
post-war social reconstruction. A social science would be the means 
by which socialist policies were to be demonstrated as the moral and 
logical necessity of a new social order. In this respect, a socialist 
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conception of social science was in keeping with the pragmatic political 
science espoused by the Webbs and derived from their version of Fabianism. 
Labour's commitment to large- scale social reform meant that the prospect 
of planning would necessarily entail a considerable increase in social 
and economic research. Such a commitment was eventually expressed thro-
ugh Labour's support for the establishment of a Scientific Advisory 
Council in 1939 (cf. Armytage, 1957, pp.l42-143). 
6. Science and war: a role for social science 
The diffusion of the ethos and authority of science within the intellectual 
and institutional milieu of inter-war Britain was extensive and permanent. 
This was the case especially in the 1930s, and particularly within 
the emergent relationship between science and political administration 
on the one hand, and as a framework within which to construct and implement 
social reform on the other. The latter, associated in large measure 
with the collaboration between the science and labour movements and 
the former, as an expression of what Armytage (1965) has referred to 
as 'state-craft'. The scientific ethos was regarded as an essential 
prerequisite for 'moulding state policy'. The Chairman of the Institute 
of Professional Civil Servants (Armytage, 1965, p.271): 
" called for a reform of entry into the administrative 
grade, so as to ensure a larger quota of entrants familiar 
with the history and methods of science and sympathetic to 
the scientific outlook." 
In examining the evolution of the science movement, I have attempted 
to explain its nature and purpose in terms of several of its constituent 
themes. In addition, I have also endeavoured to present an account 
of its influence within the inter-war current of ideas and the wider 
cultural context. What is important to bear in mind, as far as the 
aims and objectives of the movement were concerned, is that they did 
not cease, nor did its supporters disperse as a result of the outbreak 
of war. In fact, its institutional base underwent significant consolida-
tion as hostilities commenced, in addition to an intensification of 
the public debate on the moral and social function of science in 
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both war and peace. Although the Parliamentary Science Committee was 
disbanded in 1939, it re-emerged bearing a similar title and committed 
to its previous 'Aims and Objectives'. Amongst those aims and objectives 
was the belief that (Powell and Butler, 1980, p.l2): 
11 substantial benefits should result if the numerous Societies 
concerned with scientific activities combine their influence 
with the object of ensuring that Parliament shall have proper 
regard for the importance of scientific methods in relation 
to pub.lic affairs. 11 
Powell and Butler (1980) provide an interesting account of the history 
of the Science Committee, with an explanation of its establishment 
in 1939, including its official remit and attendant 'Procedures'. 
Essentially the Committee was concerned with the funding of science, 
the promotion of the 'scientific point of view', monitoring legislation 
which affected science, provide M.P.s with 'authoritative scientific 
information', and generally ensuring that science should always be 
presented as a matter of 'public interest'. The disposition of the 
'scientific viewpoint' and the presence of its lobby in the corridors 
of power, though quite separate from the substantive issues within 
science itself, were, nevertheless of equal importance to its subsequent 
development. Although social scientists possessed neither the access 
nor the influence of their scientist counterparts within the political 
domain, some measure of recognition of their work might have been possible 
through a closer association of the two groups. Sharing a common, 
public platform at conferences and symposia was one way of achieving 
this end, in addition to participation in public inquiries and Royal 
Commissions. The Committee was also to play a major role in convincing 
the government of the urgent need for scientific manpower in the immediate 
post-war era. Its own sub-committees were instrumental in preparing, 
adopting and publishing major reports on the Universities and the Increase 
of Scientific Manpower (1946); Colleges of Technology and Technological 
Manpower (1947; and Technical Education and Skilled Manpower (1950). 
In addition to the increasing institutional entrenchment of science 
within government, civil and militaY'~ administration and research, 
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scientists themselves continued to advo~ate the 
application of their methods to other economic, 
need for widespread 
social and political 
spheres. In particular, 
to be vi tal, in view of 
effect this would have 
the role of science in industry was considered 
the nature and scale of hostilities, and the 
on Britain's post-war industrial structure and 
international economic standing. It is understandable that politicians 
would give the scientists and technologists every opportunity to revive 
the industrial base of Britain's ailing post-war economy. Although 
Britai.n had benefitted from the 'Lend Lease Acts' of 1941 - providing 
the economy with over 26,000 million dollars - the agreement was suddenly 
cancelled in 1945, leaving Britain with no alternative but to raise 
a loan from the United States (cf. McCurrach, 1948). Britain's post-war 
reconstruction was intricately related to the dominant position of 
America as the directive centre of the ensuing global reconstruction 
process, both in terms of scientific and technological development, 
and capital movement. 'Ihe ruination of European industry for the second 
time within half a century consolidated America's position as the leading 
economic power, by virtue of both its massive capital reserve and its 
closely related military and tech·nological resources and expertise. 
The out-break of a world war provided the institutional base of science 
with a clearly defined context and purpose. 
between social context and the production 
The contingent relationship 
of knowledge was bound by 
the immediate demands of the state. The funding of research, discovery 
and invention ( part of the 'progress' of science) proceeded at an astoni-
shing pace. The national need provided the essential ideological impetus 
and political imperative for action. Amidst the mobilisation of science 
and the general reordering of knowledge, scientists created opportunities 
for social scientists to make a claim on behalf of their own disciplines 
and expertise. 
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The presence of a growing and influential science lobby within government 
ensured that scientists and their Parliamentary supporters were able 
to supervise not only what science ought to be done, but how it was 
to be done, thus exercising considerable control over not only science 1 s 
institutional structure, but influencing in turn the growth of scientific 
knowledge. It was within this tumult of institutional control and 
rapid expansion of scientific knowledge and practice, that social science 
sought to estaolish and consolidate its intellectual and institutional 
bases. The 1 scientific approach 1 in the administration of the affairs 
of a state at war became a litany common to the natural scientist, 
the social scientist and the politician. As Geoffrey Crowther (1942) * 
author of science and World Order argued in 1942 (Crowther, 1942, p. 25): 
"The example of science encourages the hope that the methods 
which reconcile freedom and authority in the investigations 
of nature may presently be adopted by social administrators1 
and lead to a similar reconciliation in the realm of social 
activity." 
Enter the social scientist. 
Those given to espousing the social value of science during the inter-war 
period, referred constantly to the prevailing conditions of wartime 
Britain as an example of the necessity of giving science and its practi-
tioners full reign in the cause of preserving democracy and establishing 
a new social order after victory. The pre-war association between 
the Labour and science movements strengthened, and indeed, a particularly 
strong, socialist theme emerged and became expressed through several 
very popular publications produced during and at the conclusion of 
hostilities, (Cf. Science and World Order, Crowther et al., 1942 (passim); 
Science and the Nation, Association of Scientific workers, 1946; 
The .. Social Function of Science, Berhal 1939; Science at War, 
Anonymous, 1940, (this was the first Penguin to be published 
* Crowther, an influential publicist 
the modern world, became a member 
on Social Science, established as a 
of 1946. 
for science and 
of the U. G. C. 1 s 
its role in 
Sub-Committee 
result of the Clapham Committee 
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anonymously, although Armytage (1957) explains that its contributors 
totalled twenty five) . All of these books, although some qualification 
is needed in the case of Bernal's work, concentrated on the crucial 
role of science in not only the conduct of war, but as the basis for 
the moral and social reconstruction of post-war Britain. They convey 
the essential precepts and principles of the ethos and authority of 
science, and generally exhibit what I have referred to as the science 
movement's central themes. 
Although an attempt to establish a 'Popular Front' in Britain had not 
been successful during the inter-war period, the political commitment 
to such a project had not floundered entirely. Moreover, the ascendancy 
of the science and labour movments provided an alternative vehicle 
for the unification of those social groups and class elements which, 
according to Coombes (1980) , had 'failed to achieve a common revolutionary 
purpose' under a pop.1lar front. Coombes. also suggests that such a failure 
could be attributed to a continuous. 11 assent to established class-rule 
and dynastic continuity, and of submerging the British revolutionary 
tradition", to the extent that Coombes 1980, p. 71) : 
" there was no longer available to the British Left an 
actively progressive rhetoric, capable of uniting tactically, 
workers and liberal middle and lower-class elements by reference 
to past revolutionary aims and achievements. 
Interestingly enough, science could serve equally well the aims and 
objectives of ideologues of either the left or right, as each appreciated 
the political and enconomic potential of organised science within society. 
Of the several texts referred to above, whose central theme entailed 
the social function of science in war and the subsequent reconstruction 
of Britain, Science and World Order (1942), and Science In War (1940), 
provide an invaluable amount of information on the conduct of scientists 
during the war years beyond their respective fields of technical compe-
tence and into the spheres of politics and other branches of knowledge. 
In particular, the former volume, which was based on the proceedings 
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of the 'Conference on Science and World Order', arranged by the British 
Association for the Advancement of Science, through its Division for 
the Social and International Relations of Science (held between the 
26-28 of September, 1941), serves as a singularly important example 
of an occasion when 
renee for the first 
'science and statecraft came together in open confe-
time' . The timing of the conference, the status 
and influence of the participants and the nature of its business, espe-
cially the decision to establish a Committee for the consideration 
of scientific research on human institutions, (formed during 1942), 
demonstrate clearly the opportunities created by scientists for social 
scientists to participate in the former's project to install science 
at the co-ordinating centre of Britain's struggle for survival. What 
was of crucial significance for social science, and especially sociology 
in responding to the opportunities that such an imperative re-ordering 
of national priori ties and the attendant forms of knowledge that would 
facilitate their realisation, was the fact that those disciplines, 
and the production of social knowledge, would have to evolve within 
and in response to, the epistemological and methodological criteria 
being forcefully asserted within the emergent ideological paradi.gm 
of wartime science. Science was becoming increasingly bureaucratised 
and politicised, to the extent that scientists willingly offered their 
crQ.ft as a substitute for politics, a vocation which some scientists 
at least, regarded as the reason for the national crisis. Politicians 
had failed to prevent the outbreak of war. Now it was up to scientists, 
in the words of H.G. Wells, to pull'our.scatterbrainedworld into sane, 
effective mentality.' The public and political profile of the pre-war 
science movement heightened as a result of the demands placed upon 
science during the war. Its representatives within the wartime Parliamen-
tary and Scientific Committee were ideally placed to persuade politicians 
and civil servants alike of the crucial role of science to the war 
effort, both on the home front and in the actual theatres of war itself. 
With the outbreak of war, the ethos and authority of science, a contestable 
proposition in the peace of pre-war Britain, became a universal, secular 
credo, recited with urgency and fervour amongst the legions of the 
newly converted. For many social scientists, the essence of the crede 
had always been at the centre of their faith. For other practitioners 
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of those disciplines the conversion was swift and expedient. For some, 
there would be no, on the road to Damascus experience, although a 
healthy agnosticism would safe-guard their interests in a period of 
institutional and intellectual potential for those social science disci-
plines willing to avail themselves of the opportunities being created 
through the wide-scale incorporation of science within the state apparatus. 
The crucial 'test' for disciplines like sociology would occur in attempts 
to demonstrate the contribution that it was capable of making in response 
to national imperatives. 
feature of sociology's 
It is the nature of those responses (as a 
advocatory dimension) which would determine 
the prospects of the discipline in the long-term. 
Crowther (1942) introduced his volume with a declaration of the aims 
and objectives of the 1941 Conference, emphasising the importance of 
the international element of the event,(l942, p.9): 
"They (the scientists) met to discuss the kind of world that 
must come out of the war, a world in which the plentitude 
of science would be used not for destruction, but for the 
emancipation of mankind from want and fear. " 
The pre-war science movement's central themes of science as a mission 
of truth and enlightenment, and the role of the scientist as custodian 
of science's special knowledge and practice, were projected upon this 
important gathering of scientists and their supporters as an international 
crusade, charged with the task of restoring democracy. The importance 
of the conference should not be underestimated, especially in terms 
of the alliance forged between not only statesmen and scientists in 
Britain, but the nature and degree of international co-operation estab-
lished through the extraordinary procedural arrangements. The latter 
entailed day and night radio transmissions of the proceedings around 
the world, and the added facility for 'round-table', Trans-Atlantic 
radio discussions. The Conference was convened with the intention of 
establishing a gradual but permanent momentum in the new relationship 
between science and the state. A number of 'expert committees' were 
established as a result of it and further conferences were also arranged 
184 
in order to deal with the specialist nature of some aspects of the 
original Conference proceedings. The mood of the participants and 
the fervour with which they approached their task is aptly portrayed 
in Crowther's reference to Julian Huxley's expectations of the event 
and its import for the restoration of peace and the new post-war world 
(Crowther, 1942, p.l5): 
"The greatest social revolution in the whole of human history 
is in progress. The war is a dreadful, bloody phase of it. 
But we can, as Dr. Julian Huxley pointed out to the Conference, 
. win the war and lose the peace. In the winning of the war, 
men of science are key men. They are not super-men but they 
can bring to the problems ahead of us their knowledge and 
experience. The message of the Conference on Science and 
World Order is that henceforth science and statecraft must 
work together." 
The reference to the 'winning of the peace' and the role of the scientist 
is a crucial indication of the kind of expert that the scientific community 
and its statesmen supporters would actively seek to recruit during, 
but especially in the period immediately following the end· of the war. 
The commodity of expertise, and the role of the technical expert would 
form the .. basis ·of one of the most significant post-war, Government 
Reports affecting the determination and means of increasing scientific 
manpower; The Barlow Report (1946). This report was to determine the 
immediate post-war policy for university expansion. It is noteworthy 
that in the absence of any other instrument for framing Government 
policy on higher education, it fell to this committee on scientific 
manpower to shape the first stage in a plan of expansion which led, 
step by step, to the Robbins Report in 1963. I shall return to the 
significance of the Barlow Report later when examining the expansion 
of the system of higher education and the consequences of this for 
sociology. 
How did the scientists envisage an extension of their role and .interests 
within a culture beleagued by war and in contrast to that which they 
had traditionally occupied as their own province of specialised knowledge 
and practice? Moreover, what affect would such a transformation of 
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science and its practitioners have for social science and its practitioners? 
A clue to the first question can be gained from a consideration of 
the portrayal of the new scientists by the anonymous contributors 
to the volume entitled Science in War, (1940, p.l39): 
as an ideal, but as an urgent 
situation, is the effective 
scientific advice and scien-
"What we are calling for, not 
practical need in a desparate 
utilisation of scientific method, 
tific personnel." 
In support of this, but on a more political and philosophical note 
(1940, p.l40): 
"The pre-war world has gone under in the struggle in which 
we are engaged, but its ghost still haunts our thoughts. 
Laissez-faire individualism and gentlemenly Civil Service 
Government are now only obstructive and dangerous survivals 
The only effective organisation is scientific, it is 
also the democratic one. Science and democracy are no longer 
merely desirable goals: they are conditions of survival." 
The scientists and their supporters did not content themselves with 
stirring rhetoric or tendentious critiques of the ancien "' . reg~me. 
The central tenet of the pre-war science movement - the ethos and authority 
of science - received an infusion of pragmatism, giving rise to a series 
of "necessary conditions", all of which comprised a "framework for 
organised science in war" (1940, p.l42). The dimension and substance 
of this organisational framework were not confined to the technical 
products of warfare, but extended to other spheres of social and economic 
activity; formerly alien domains for the natural scientist. Furthermore, 
social science and its practitioners were to be accommoda.ted- within 
the envisaged wartime 'framework of science'. 
The scientists were determined to conscript the social scientist 
into the service of the nation. Any reservations they may have had 
about the potential of those disciplines to respond in an appropriate 
manner, entailed the failure of other authorities to appreciate the 
contribution that they were capable of making to the war effort. The 
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scientists qualified their case for the use of social science. Attention 
should be drawn to three aspects of their argument. First, it was 
assumed that the collection of social data should be a priority directed 
toward the creation of an effective propaganda service, in conjunction 
with a nationwide assessment of morale. The central role of psychology 
is implied rather than stated in this assumption, as the authors of 
Science in War argued (1940, p.l31): 
"It is a platitude among politicians to say 
factor - (commonly called "morale" when applied 
or the "Horne Front" when civilians are meant) 
importance in war." 
that this human 
to the Services, 
- is of major 
Concerned in the main with the likely disastrous effects of uncontrolled, 
mass evacuation and a 1 refugee problem 1 (it should be remembered that 
the preceding volume was published very early in the war) the scientists 
regarded the necessity of controlling the populace as an essential 
task of the government. This was to be achieved by using the expertise 
of the social scientist (1940, p.l31): 
"It seems doubtful, however, whether the authorities are 
taking all the necessary steps to establish morale and an 
intellectual preparedness which will safely exclude the possi-
bility of such things happening in Britain. 
It is the job of the social sciences to illuminate these 
problems; to analyse morale into its constituent parts; to 
foresee the points of tension; and perhaps to suggest solutions." 
Still on the theme of the first point alluded to above, social science 
was considered by the scientists to have no precedent for the use of 
its techniques under war-time conditions, (1940, p.l32): 
"No precedent therefore exists for the use of techniques 
~r social science in wartime." 
Another important reason for the alleged non-use of social science 
~ the ignorance of politicians to the potential of its various, composite 
disciplines (1940, p.l32): 
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"Another reason for neglect was the novelty of the machine, 
a novelty which rendered it suspect to politicians." 
The second factor which the scientists regarded as a possible handicap 
to the social sciences was their tendency to intellectualism. This 
is somewhat hard to accept in view of William Beveridge's crusade for 
social science at the L.S.E. between the wars (1940, p.l32): 
"Unfortunately, there was also a weakness in social science 
itself, which further damaged its position. It was essentially 
tied up with the Universities and with a highly academic 
personnel, whereas the essential nature of its subject matter, 
the people, was unsuitable for study from above by persons 
with a strong intellectual bias. Indeed, it may truly be 
said that not only did the Government neglect social science, 
but social scientists themselves neglected what was essentially 
a main part of their studies." 
The preceding statement may not seem as misplaced as it suggests. 
The point being made is not so much an indication of an utterly, negative 
weakness inherent in social science per se, rather an unstated assumption 
about the appropriate intellectual form that the disciplines within 
social science ought to evolve in response to the immediacy of a war. 
This emerges in the third qualification of the scientists' case for 
a relevant social science, and deals with the essential methodological 
prerequisites of such a science. The following statement encompassses 
the scientists' adherence to the technical sophistication of the quanti-
tative methods associated with other, more rigorous branches of the 
applied sciences (1940, p.l32): 
"There were, therefore no established methods comparable 
in prestige with those existing in, for· example, the fields 
of aerodynamics or nutrition for studying the mass of the 
people. 
Because of all this, new techniques of social science have 
so far scarcely been applied in this war. It is clear, however, 
that their application was never more demanded." 
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Cases of civilian 'attitudes and apathies' affecting the functioning 
of several important Ministries were cited as evidence of the need 
for social science in war. A clue to a possible contender for the 
title of 'methods of appropriate exactitude' can be gleaned from the 
reference in the last paragraph of the preceding quotation, wherein 
mention is made of the 'new techniques of social science' which 'have 
so far scarcely been applied in this war' . They relate to the methods 
used in Mass Observation. Mass Observation appeared to be a form of 
social research which appealed greatly to the scientists responsible 
for the production of Science in war (1940, p.l33): 
" there has been a steady growth in the use of existing 
scientific methods for assessing reactions of the people 
and for estimating changes in public and private opinion. 
In recent weeks, moreover, official use has been made of 
both statistical methods for sampling opinion in the whole 
population, and for the analytical, penetrative methods of 
a qualitative sort, largely developed since 1937 by "Mass 
Observation". The results of this work have proved, and 
are proving, of increasing immediate value. But the adoption 
of these techniques has come very late. And their usefulness 
is not yet recognised by several Departments, especially 
by Service Departments. 
The authors of Science in War employed a very inclusivist designation 
for activities which they regarded as 'propaganda'. Nevertheless, 
they considered it to be of fundamental importance to the war effort, 
arguing that it must, (1940, p.l35): 
" today have an "almost scientific" precision based on 
scientifically accurate diagnosis." 
And on a final warning note (1940, p.l36): 
"Refusal to recognize the scientific applications of social 
research and of propaganda technique endangers everything." 
It is ironic that the authors should condone the use of 'snooping' 
as an effective aspect of propaganda, for the Ministry of Information 
was dubbed, 'Cooper's Snoopers' as a result of early attempts to ascertain 
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public opinion on a variety of often quite sensitive issues. It appeared 
obvious to most, that the government needed, as a matter of urgency, 
a comprehensive, reliable and responsive organisation capable of collecting 
and disseminating information for the control of the population. Whether 
the nature or degree of control amounted to outright propaganda, 
or, the assessment of public opinion, an effective means had to be 
found to collect the necessary data. The absence of such an arrangement 
caused both embarrassment and confusion within both Westminster and 
Whitehall. Apart from the fairly well established groups of economists 
and statisticians distributed throughout various Ministries and Government 
Departments, it soon became apparent that the state did not possess 
the hev.ewithall (either in resources or personnel), to obtain the kind 
of information which would allow it to introduce the measure of control 
in required. Indeed, some Ministers balked at what seemed like totali-
tarian manouvres to achieve an end more in keeping with a regime which 
the nation was at war with. Angus Calder highlights this apprehension 
during the period when the Wartime Social Survey was established, (Calder, 
19711 p. 542) ; 
"In the spring of 1940, the wartime Social 
up, under the Ministry of Information, yet 
doubt and hesitency which were prevalent 
of the ministry as to its necessity and value" 
found), that the enterprise was kept secret." 
Survey was set 
such was "the 
among the heads 
(as the S.C.N.E.* 
During the early period of the war, the relationship between the state 
and its citizens was forced into stark relief against the backdrop 
of imminent invasion. An expansion of the system of information gathering 
during this period has also been considered my Marjorie Ogilvy-Webb 
(1965 1 p. 56); 
"It was far from being generally accepted in Whitehall that 
government/public relations were of central importance. 
It was the approach of war which speeded up the expansion 
of government information services still further." 
* S.C.N.E. (Select Committee on National Expenditure). 
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Ogilvy-Webb has argued convincingly, that the consolidation of the information 
function of the state, as a 'service' to its politicians and civil 
servants, can in Britain be attributed to the events of the Second 
World War (1965, p.57): 
"The information services became particularly important after 
the fall of France, when it became clear that all our resources 
and the total mobilisation of the population would be needed 
if we were going to win the war; this implied a multi tude 
of special duties in the field of information. Total war 
in a democratic country can only be waged if people understand 
what the government is doing and can be persuaded to cooperate 
with it. It meant explanation to people who were unlikely 
to read Parliamentary debates or government White Papers." 
G.D. Mitchell has argued similarly (Mitchell, 1968, p.212). While 
this may generally be the case, the nature and degree of cooperation 
and willingness of both the government and the people to participate 
in the common pursuit of a shared goal is easy to portray with the benefit 
of hindsight. The cloak of the Official Secrets Act has, for decades, 
covered the less successful attempts of the government during the 
war, to gain the support of its citizens. Nevertheless, as Ogilvy-Webb 
has argued, the war did bring to the attention of the Government the 
urgent need to introduce legislation which would enhance its domestic 
intelligence service. 
In this section of the current chapter, I have argued that the science 
movement and its supporters sought to evolve and deploy a series of 
strategies which would enhance the political and moral necessity of 
science, anticipating the consequences this would have for the 'proper' 
relationship between science, the state and its citizens. In the main, 
the movement's members tended to focus upon the somewhat nebulous notion 
of the ethos and authority of science as a pretext for evoking the 
'obvious' virtuousness of the latter relationship. Science became 
an exemplar for all forms of knowledge and a basis for political action. 
Scant reference was ever made to the problems of science's substantive 
nature. 
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With the outbreak of a national crisis, such as a world war, the case 
for science seemed almost irresistable if not invincible. Other forms 
of knowledge and practice would also be evaluated with reference to 
the context and categories of the scientific enterprise. In the case 
of social science and its practitioners, natural scientists and their 
spokesmen began to prescribe the intellectual and organisational dominion 
of the former group of disciplines. In determining the division of 
labour and knowledge between the physical and social sciences, emphasis 
was given to the superiority of the methodology of the natural sciences 
(1940, p.ll5): 
"What is the scientific method as contrasted with the Platonic? 
It consists in the use of experiment guided by the constructive 
imagination. It prepares its users to recognise the novelties 
and possibilities in any situation. It produces a creative 
attitude towards facts. It is actually impossible to discover 
any new facts without scientific method." 
The authors begin the preceding definition of 1 the scientific method 1 
with reference to its philosophical basis but conclude by slipping 
into an evaluation of the normative/prescriptive nature of that method, 
as an appropriate moral disposition, readily applicable to any branch 
of knowledge. The prevalence of support for such a model of science 
would have consequences for sociology both during and after the war. 
It should also be remembered that, notwithstanding the contentiousness 
of such a philosophy of science and its consequences for other branches 
of knowledge, the circumstances of wartime Britain were not conducive 
to the important, but nevertheless leisurely, academic polemics that 
characterise contemporary debates on the issue. The case being made 
by the scientists at the outbreak of the war possessed a compelling 
urgency heightened by the national crisis. It is likely that their 
arguments were received without contest or protestation, if only because 
the potential of science and its practitioners to actively intervene 
in the conduct of war rested on a corpus of theory and methods developed 
over centuries and made manifest in the artifacts which the non-scientist 
tended to regard as ocular proof of the reality of science. If science 
could alter and control nature, then it appeared reasonable to assume 
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that it could also impose 
problems in time of war. 
itself in a similar fashion on society's 
Echoing the 'New Social Contract' espoused by Lancelot Hogben during 
the latter part of the 1930s, the authors of Science in War gave a clear 
indication of the opportunity that war presented to scientists. It 
marked both the beginning and end to the manner and degree to which 
science and the scientist formed part of the national culture. From 
a position of peripheral importance and 
its practitioners seemed poised to assert 
and historical context which, as Marcuse 
to an age in which scientific-technical 
nominal institutionalisation, 
their craft within a social 
(1968) has argued, gave rise 
rationality and manipulation 
became welded together into new forms of social control. 
In this chapter I have concentrated upon several features of the inter-war 
and intra-war period which I felt were of significance to the development 
of social science in Brit.a,in. I argued that the transition from the 
period of peace to the tumult of war engendered significant shifts 
in the processes and production of knowledge, whereby the evaluation 
of various forms of knowledge tended to reflect the needs of a state 
at war. Criteria of relevance, utility and expediency informed judgements 
and interpretations of the social, economic and political imperatives 
associated with the ubiquitous 'national interest'. I focused in 
particular on the social relations of science, especially the emergence 
of the science movement and the importance of its role in asserting 
the contribution that science could make to national culture and the 
waging of war. I endeavoured to portray the ideological underpinning 
of the ethos and authority of science, as a strategy deployed by scientists 
and their supporters, to extend their influence beyond traditional 
boundaries of disciplinary competence and cultural convention. Hence 
my reference to the assumption held by some members of the science 
movement, that democracy was the scientific method writ large. 
Although I have tended to concentrate upon the role of science and 
its social relations during the course of this chapter, my main intention 
was to focus upon those issues and contexts which would come to influence 
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the growing political debate on the role of social science in serving 
the interests of the state in time of war, and equally important, during 
the period of social and moral reconstruction following it. While 
the connection between these events and the development of sociology 
may seem somewhat tenuous, it should be remembered that it would be 
within the intellectual categories and cultural contexts of wartime 
Britain, that sociology would come to be evaluated as a resource in 
the construction of peace-time Britain. How would the sociologists 
respond to this opportunity to once again advocate the potential of 
their discipline ? 
CHAPTER FOUR 
Sociology and the evaluation of social research: 
The Clapham Debate 
194 
Sociology and the Evaluation of Social Research: The Clapham Debate 
1. The conscription of social research 
In 1943, members of the Parliamentary and Scientific Committee put on the 
House of Commons Order Paper the following motion, which received the support 
or 207 M.P.s, (Powell and Butler, 1980, p.l9): 
"To call attention to research and scientific knowledge; and to move, 
that this House, recognising the vital part which research and science 
and their effective application can play in reconstruction, as a means 
of increasing our national prosperity, raising the standard of living, 
recovering our export trade and developing the national resources of 
our Empire, urges the declaration of a bold and generous government 
policy directed to the expansion of teaching and research facilities 
in our universities and technical colleges, to the extension of pure 
and applied research in all fields by the State, by industry through 
private firms and research associations, and to the effective and rapid 
application of the results of research." 
The motion was the subject of a full day's debate in the House of Commons 
on 19 April 1944. Moreover the Lord President of the Council, Clement 
Attlee, promised that the government would give assistance 'on bold 
lines'. The Committee's advocacy of science was of fundamental importance 
to its further institutionalisation. The Motion although sincere in 
intent, nevertheless contained all the components of a carefully presented 
strategy to enhance the prospects of science during and after the war: 
scientists were to be at the forefront of post-war reconstruction; 
upon their efforts depended the nation's prosperity standard of living, 
and economic recovery in general. Reference was also made to the role 
science could play in sustaining a legitimate interest in Britain's 
Empire. Such a.declaration of intent would be difficult for any government 
to dispute or ignore (see above my reference to the shift in association 
from political party to parliamentary support by members of the inter-war 
science movement) . Through a fundamental reordering of the map of 
knowledge, Britain could recover all that she had lost and more, despite 
the social and economic disaster of a world war. 
Another important indicator of the increased interest of the state in 
all forms of scientific research can be found in the response to the 
claims being made by the scientific community on behalf of its specialised 
knowledge and practice. One of the most noteworthy respondents to 
the science lobby was the Lord President of the Council, Clement Attlee. 
He was a former teacher of social work at the L. S. E. in the early 1920s, 
and initiated the government's Committee of Inquiry into The Provision 
for Social and Economic Research, Cmnd. 6868, (1946). 
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In accepting the task to review the intellectual and institutional 
arrangement of the various social sciences in Britain for the period 
in question, sociologists would have to undertake a detailed review of both 
the nature and purpose of their discipline, and the consequences this 
would have for its future status as an autonomous branch of knowledge 
and practice. The intra-war debate on the role of science had a significant 
impact on the latter issue, one that emerges when I examine shortly 
the evidence given to the Clapham Committee (Cmnd. 6868). 
I wish now to consider the government's approach to the specific problem 
of a lack of sufficient and adequate information to info:~;"m its decision 
making, and the measures it adopted to alter the situation. 
The war created circumstances in which a government and its civil admini-
stration contemplated the prospect of large-scale, programmes of social 
and economic research. The importance and complexity of fulfilling 
the needs of the various agencies, ministries and individuals, regarding 
the commissioning and utilisation of research necessitated the creation 
of extra, specialised divisions and departments within Whitehall and 
elsewhere. While it is important to consider the general division or 
classification of the activities of the wartime 'information machine', 
attention should also be drawn to another significant consequence of 
the expansion of social research within government: this concerned 
the general awareness and acceptance of the benefits to be obtained 
by carefully organised social and economic research. While civil servants 
and politicians may not have necessarily made the connection between 
social research and social science, as the war progressed, even with 
the topic of post-war recontruction becoming an item high on the political 
agenda, the connection between planning and the necessity of research 
was an association that possessed both an apparent degree of logic and 
urgency, especially as hostilities began to draw to an end. 
The potential for salient social research was hampered by other more 
practical deficiencies. Harold Laski, writing toward the end of the 
war, lamented the fact that in the spheres of 'research and intelligence' 
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in the British Government, there existed no survey of the individual 
work of the separate Government Departments 'over the years', (Laski, 
1944, p.ll): 
"A mass of important knowledge, of course, has been accumulated 
over the years by Departments like the Board of Inland Revenue, 
the Home office, and the Board of Agriculture. Most government 
offices had their intelligence branches, and even their public 
relations officer. Yet no survey of the whole must but emphasise 
the general incoherence of the pattern involved." 
Laski went further, pointing to the inter-war situation as the basis 
for the confusion and uncertainty which characterised the attitude of 
government in attempting to come to terms with demands that a world 
war placed on the nation and its resources. 
The emphasis was upon the collection of data, which could then be converted 
to information for use by the various ministries and other government 
departments. Wideranging, longitudinal studies were not the order of 
the day. Time was of the essence, as was the timing of the various 
educational and propaganda campaigns and the subsequent initiation of 
'controls' essential to the efficient management of the home front . 
Researchers were unable to engage in scholarly exegeses and polemics; 
rather, the relentless pressure to conduct surveys and continually canvass 
public opinion, took priority over what, in time of peace, would have 
proceeded at a more leisurely and academic pace. However, such activity 
did not pass entirely unoticed, and the potential of social research 
on the scale being initiated during the war (for the post-war period 
and beyond) became the subject of a wartime, British Association 
'Committee on Scientific Research on Human Institutions' (1942) following 
on from an earlier conference on 'Science and World Order'. 
This Committee had an important bearing on the evidence given to the 
Clapham Committee (Cmnd. 6868) and I shall consider it when examining 
the deliberations of that Committee. 
The Government may have wished to increase actual and potential social 
and economic research, both during and after the war, but how extensive 
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and diverse was 
and what plans 
the nation's research base at the beginning of the 
did it have to consolidate and expand such a base 
war 
in 
order to meet the needs of the state? 
Mark Abrams (1951) gives a fairly comprehensive description of the array 
of private agencies conducting social research and canvassing public 
opinion before the Second World War. It is interesting to note, that 
approximately two thirds of all market research during that period was 
carried out by the market research departments of three advertising 
agencies; the London Press Exchange Ltd., J. Walter Thompson Company 
and Lintas Ltd. (1951, p.55). He also notes that the research managers 
of those organisations were all former students of Professor Bowley. 
In addition to market research, there existed the British Institute 
of Public Opinion, established in the 1930s. Mass Observation, established 
in collaboration with Julian Huxley, Charles Madge and Torn Harrison in 
1937 represented a cons.iderable departure from orthodox survey methods. 
Government departments continued to engage in some measure of research 
work, but it tended to be, in the main, on an ad hoc basis. The Medical 
Research Council and to a lesser extent the Department of Scientific 
and Industrial Research, (cf. Ian Varcoe, 1974), initiated what could 
be construed as social research, although the nature of that research 
tended to be rather specialised, especially in the case of the latter 
organisation. The inter-war years was also a period in which a number 
of very important poverty surveys were either repeated or initiated, 
i.e. the London, Liverpool, Middlesbrough and York surveys. University 
departments of social science (I use the term in its widest sense), 
were largely responsible for initiating the preceding surveys, although 
it often depended on the abi \ity of an influential academic, possessing 
favourable connections with a private funding agency to initiate a. 
project. A number of Royal and National Institutes for the promotion 
of social research carne into existence during the inter-war period, 
in addition to the highly productive and respected Political and Economic 
Planning organisation (P.E.P.). All of the preceding organisations, 
departments, Institutes and agencies had one thing in common: the use 
of, and confidence in administrative 
investigations. Although I have not 
statistics, surveys and empirical 
mentioned every source of survey 
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work, or producer of social statistics, I have endeavoured to give some 
indication of the variation and spread of those bodies engaged in some 
form of social research prior to the outbreak of the war. Despite 
the availability of the latter, the wartime government chose to establish 
its own information service and subsequently, a social survey unit. 
Although Laski (1944) pointed to the narrow-mindedness of politicians 
and civil servants for ignoring the abilities and experience of the 
nation's social scientists, such disregard and perhaps in some cases 
scepticism of the contribution that they may have been able to make to 
the war effort, was a result of a confusion still being perpetuated 
until quite recently (Cherns, 1979, p.30): 
"Most academic research is concerned more with the past than 
the future and is more diagnostic than predictive or prescrip-
tive, so that the university system is inadequate for, or 
inappropriate to, policy-oriented research and to interprofes-
sional activities." 
Cert?inly the government wanted to utilise the expertise of various 
social scientists: in the case of the sociologists, T.H. Marshall was 
despatched to the Foreign Office (German section); David Glass became 
the deputy director of the Statistical Division (overseas) of the Ministry 
of Supply. Economists and statisticians were brought into the service 
of many government Departments and as the war progressed, Operational 
Research was developed to include studies employing social 
scientists. The institutional pattern of social science and social 
·research, and the associated formalism of its techniques became to consoli-
dated within the bureaucratic constraints of a state at war. This develop-
ment had quite significant consequences for the kind of sociology likely 
to emerge in the immediate post-war era, especially after its formal 
definition into existence via the evidence given to the crucial Clapham 
Committee. Moreover, the Marshallian cleavage of the pre-war period 
was fast becoming a chasm in the light of intra-war developments. The 
socio-philosophical wing of pre-war sociology may have possessed the 
discipline's only Chair, but of what consequence was that in the turmoil 
of large-scale, social disruption occasioned by war? Empiricism would 
be further exalted not by virtue of its self-evidently and historically 
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proven i~dubi tableness, but because of more obvious social determinants. 
C. Wright Mills (1963) has suggested the distinction here (1963, p.l4): 
~It is not all true that only as "general principles" are 
discovered can social science offer "sound practical guidance"; 
often the administrator needs to know certain detailed facts 
and relations, and that is all he needs or wants to know." 
As I stated abC?ve, the social survey and associated methods of empirical 
investigation formed the methodological basis of pre-war, social research 
within the existing field of social science. The evolution of the survey 
method is now part and parcel of the odyssey of British empiricism, 
and I do not intend to dwell upon the various accounts of its development, 
nor do I wish to engage in a protracted debate about its validity as 
oJ 
a technique of social enquiry.* However, I will refer to aspects of 
these issues at salient points in my examination of the evidence submitted 
to the Clapham Committee, especially its examination of the work of 
the wartime Social Survey (WSS) . 
2. A government information service: the Ministry of Information 
and the Wartime Social Survey. 
The notion of a 1Ministry of Information' was not an entirely new concept. 
A Ministry of Information had been established during the First world 
war, although its successor in the Second World War was created out 
of a greater necessity to find the best ways of ''selling to people the 
commodities and attitudes which the government thought were good for 
them" (cf., Calder, 1971, pp. 542-547). Although private agencies continued 
to provide a research facility for the government, the Ministry of Infor-
mation's (MOI) Wartime Social Survey (WSS), served as the first occasion 
on which large- scale social research became an activity of its civil 
administration. At one stage during the war, the MOI employed over 
* These issues have been addressed in the works of the following 
authors: Caradog Jones (1941); Simey (1968); Kent (1981); Easthope 
(1974); Abrams (1951); Mitchell (1968); Stevenson (1977): critical 
exegeses of the latter can be found in Hindess (1973); Benton 
(1977); Wri.ght Mills (1963); Abrams et al (1981); Bell and Newby 
(1971l; Bir~bau~~ (1971); Pollock (1976); Cicourel (1964); Willer 
and Willer (1973); Phillips (1971 and 1973). 
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three thousand staff, excluding postal censorship workers, and other 
Government departments employed in excess of seventeen hundred people 
engaged in what Calder has referred to as "information work' (1971) . 
According to Ogilvy-Webb (1965), the WSS made perhaps the most important 
contribution to social research, notwithstanding the work of private 
organisations. It should also be remembered that research on some topics 
could not of necessity be contracted out to the latter agencies for 
reasons of national security. 
The origin of the WSS has been well documented, but briefly it was estab-
lished in April 1940 by the MOI as a "Machine" for carrying out statistical 
studies of public opinion and for undertaking market research studies 
for other government departments. When first established, a government 
memorandum (Tl6l/l30l) stated that, "the scientific side of its work 
Y.SS under the auspices of the National Institute of Economic and Social 
Research" (NIESR) 1 (1945 I T 161/1301) . The NIESR although established 
via the munificence of the Halley Stewart Trust, depended largely upon 
the benefaction of the Rockefeller Foundation for continued financial 
support. The latter Foundation assisted in its general budget to the 
extent of $150,000 for a five year period beginning in 1938. Interestingly 
enough, its Chairman Sir Henry Clay, members of its Council of Management, 
including Alexander Carr-Saunders, Sir Hector Hetherington (also dual 
members of the Institute's Executive Committee and Governing Body) were 
all, simultaneously, members of the Clapham Committee; the Government 
committee charged with the task of assessing whether or not adequate 
provision existed for economic and social research in Britain. It is 
important to consider carefully the arguments and evidence given by 
the former individuals in the course of the deliberations of the Clapham 
Committee, especially in the light of the Institute's 'Principal Functions', 
general objectives and programme statements.* I have ·considered 
* Among its general objectives and specific programme statements appear the following: 
"By the scope and character of its programme the Institute will keep the continuing 
support of men of affairs. It must remain free of any susp1c1on of political 
association or propaganda; to encourage the realistic study of the problems 
of contemporary society." (Rockefeller Foundation Annual Report, 1937, p.243). 
The Institute's PrincipaL Functions included: the conduct of research, provision 
of assistance and facilities for research to members of university staffs and 
others working on projects within 1 the Institute 1 s programmes 1 ; to seek funds 
for economic and social research. 
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previously . above, the conditional nature of Rockefeller funding 
and the constraints that this placed upon the recipient. 
Although the NIESR provided the 'scientific side' of the WSS 's initial 
work, the former organisation was unable to sustain such support, and 
consequently, reliance was placed upon various 'scientific consultants' 
until the establishment of a Scientific Advisory Committee of twelve 
consultants in 1944. The memorandum states (1945, T 161/1301): 
"It has been the practice for the Survey to discuss proposed 
investigations with the Scientific Advisory Committee* before 
any work is put in hand. The consultants have provided a 
link between the Survey and other scientific organisations, 
and the Survey has found their assistance to be of definite 
value." 
Of course it depends on the significance attached to the notion of 'scien-
tific' and 'scientist' when assessing the style and content ofthe memorandum. 
Yet in view of my preceding arguments on the ethos and authority of 
science and the role of the natural scientist in war, I think the author's 
understanding and presentation of the role of the Survey during the 
war to be more than a matter of semantics, and actually constitutes 
a strategy for the perpetuation of the Survey, in some form, after the 
cessation of hostilities. While conceding that the author was its Director, 
* The following were members of the Scientific Advisory Committee 
of the WSS at the time of the submission of the memorandum (1945): 
Chairman, Lord Moran, President of the Royal College of Physicians, 
Vice-Chairman, Professor F.C. Bartlett, Medical Research Council, 
Professor of Psychology, Cambridge; Professor Cyril Burt, Professor 
of Psychology, University of London; Professor A.B. Hill, Professor 
of Medical Statistics, University of London, Statistician to the 
Medical Research Council, Secretary of the Royal Statistical Society; 
A.M. Carr-Saunders, Director of the L.S.E.; D. Caradog Jones, 
formerly Reader in Sociology, University of Liverpool, Director 
of the Merseyside Survey; Aubrey Lewis, Clinical Director of the 
Maudsley Hospital; Professor D.M. Newitt, Professor of Chemical 
Technology at the Imperial College of Science; Professor J.M. Mackintosh, 
Professor of Public Health and Dean of the London School of Hygiene 
and Tropical Medicine, Mary A. Hamilton, formerly Govenor of. the B.B.C. 
and formerly of the Office of the Ministry of Reconstruction; D. Houghton, 
Secretary of the Inland Revenue Staff Federation, Member of the Civil 
Service National Whitely Council, broadcaster on Social Problems; 
Stephen Taylor, former Director of the Home Intelligence Division of 
the Ministry of Information. 
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this is no guarantee of objectivity. Those arguing the case for the 
retention of the Survey certainly indicated a resolute partisanship 
amongst its supporters. This emerges in the memorandum's reference 
to the relative efficiency and effectiveness of commercial organisations 
with that of the WSS. The author recognised the contribution that such 
agenci.es could make to the to the field of government sponsored research. 
However, two reservations were expressed with regard to the extensive 
use of private research organisations. The first concerned the need 
to ensure that any government department wishing to commission research 
outside the existing organisational arrangements should be made through 
a single 'experienced', coordinating body or department. The obvious 
candidate here would be the MOI, or, a section of the latter, namely 
the Survey division itself, in concert with the Scientific Advisory 
Committee (1945, T 161/1301): 
"In so far as use is to be made of these outside bodies it 
will be desirable that an approach to them should be made 
through a single department or organisation rather than that 
approaches should be made by departments etc., without coordina-
tion and with the risk of overlapping and excessive cost. 
Provided that the work can be allocated at a central point 
where experience is built up, it is probable that some inquiries 
can with advantage be put out to contract ... " 
The second reservation entailed the question of whether or not the private 
sector possessed the degree of skill, technical capability and scientific 
rigour to conduct research on behalf of government departments (1945, 
T 161/1301) : 
" others (research projects) should be placed with the 
Survey so that there may be complete assurance that the work 
will be impartially and objectively done with the benefit 
of the distinctive scientific and technical methods which 
the Social Survey has worked out and with the help of the 
Advisory Committee." 
The technically and scientifically privileged status being claimed for 
the WSS is difficult to account for. One possible reason may have been 
to do with its inauspicious inauguration in 1940, whereby its activities 
were likened to a "snooping Gestapo", and that its mode of enquiry was 
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merely "new fangled nonsense" (1945, T 161/1301), or, that "it was the 
business of Members of Parliament to express the state of feeling amongst 
their constituents on any given subject", (1945, T 161/1301). A poor 
public reception in the initial stages of its work caused it to be reor-
ganised and "its field limited to the scientific collection of social 
facts needed for administrative purposes and not available from other 
sources", (T 161/1301) . The wrath of the public and the condemnation 
of M.P. s were attributed to the "unsuccessful attempt to use psychiatric 
social workers to obtain statistical assessments of public morale", 
(T 161/1301). From June of 1941, the Survey worked under the general 
supervision of the MOl's Home Intelligence Division. Toward the end 
of the war it possessed a staff of 146, having conducted 337,000 
interviews on factual enquiries, which were "necessary in order to 
guide a ministry in some particular policy, and not for enquiries which 
attempt to assess morale" (T 166/1301). It had conducted research for 
sixteen government departments and ministries* in both England and Scotland. 
Research proposals needed to be casted and endorsed by the Treasury 
before they were commissioned. The results could be made public at 
the discretion of the contracting Minister. 
It is likely that the MOI was asked to submit evidence to the Clapham 
Committee for two reasons. First, its WSS division ms thought to possess 
a high degree of expertise in the field of survey work under the 
supervision of a team of scientists (the Scientific Advisory Com-
mittee). Second, the influential members of the latter committee had 
broad research experience in their own specialist fields, in addition 
to having worked oh projects sponsored by other non-governmental agencies 
and sundry Institutes. It could therefore be assumed that not only 
* The Ministry of Health, Department of Health for Scotland, Ministry 
of Food, Ministry of Agriculture, Ministry of Town and Country 
Planning, Ministry of Works, Department of Scientific and Industrial 
Research, Building Research Station, Ministry of Fuel and Power, 
Board of Trade, Irrlustrial Design Council, Ministry of Labour, 
Industrial Health Research Board, Ministry of Transport, Central 
Statistical Office and the Ministry of Information. 
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were they generally confident in the work of the WSS, to which they 
were directly attached, but that such individuals should be able to pass 
comment and make informed judgements on the question of whether or not 
the provision of economic and social research was adequate for the 
nation's needs (in effect, the remit of the Clapham Committee). 
The role of influentials, cliques and personalities is crucial to an 
appreciation of manner in which individuals were chosen for membership 
of the Clapham Committee, and the role they played in the debate on 
the extenSiM of social and economic research in Britain in the post-war 
world. It is therefore important to recall the role of Alexander Carr-
Saunders in social science's intellectual and institutional development 
between the wars. He was now a member of the WSS 's Scientific Advisory 
Committee, (also the Director of the L.S.E.), in addition to serving 
on the Clapham Committee, the body to which the MOl memorandum had been 
sent for consideration. With this in mind, it is important to remember 
that Carr-Saunders had been a major critic of sociology's inter-war 
project to construct a synoptic science of society. This 'influential' 
in British social science, along with others, discussed the work of 
the WSS at a meeting of the Clapham Committee in December, 1945 (T 161/1301). 
In view of the date recorded on the MOl's memorandum, November 1945, 
I assume that it was considered at the Clapham Committee meeting. The 
minutes of the meeting disclose Alan Barlow's confidence in the proven 
utility and potential of the WSS-(1945 T 161/1301): 
" it would have helped the Ministry 
their pre-war legislation to have had 
this at their disposal.· The study 
very valuable to making policy." 
of Labour in framing 
some organisation as 
of public reaction was 
Mr. L. Moss further urged that the continuation of the WSS · should occur 
along the organisational lines of the Department of Scientific and Indus-
trial Research or the Medical Research Council. Although Carr-Saunders 
believed that the WSS was costly, it wa,s nevertheless 'useful'. T.S. 
Simey, though not present at the meeting in question, regarded the MOl's 
Social Survey as a restriction on the po~sibilities of sociological 
research, which implied the evolution of broad generalisations within 
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a broadly defined 'problem area' (T 161/1301, meeting of the Committee, 
October 24, 1945) . The minutes of the December meeting indicate that 
the Committee's Chairman was not entirely convinced by the arguments 
of either those individuals directly involved with the MOI, or the WSS, 
nor with practicing social scientists. The proof of the WSS 's value 
as an essential adjunct to the formulation of social policy was deemed 
to rest with those government departments who had actually commissioned 
it to do research on their behalf. A decision was thus taken to ask 
for a submission of evidence from such Ministries, specifically in terms 
of the value of the services provided by the WSS. 
Several of the most important war-time ministries provided written evidence 
to the Clapham Committee on the value of the WSS to the work of their 
respective departments. Submissions were received from the following 
ministries: the Ministry of Town and Country Planning, the Ministry 
of Health, the Ministry of Food and the Ministry of Fuel and Power. 
The substance of the submissions are of sufficient importance to quote 
them at length: 
Ministry of Town and Country Planning, (Confidential letter from Mr. 
Geoffrey Whiskard, dated December 20, 1945, (CAB 124- 530)): 
"I am bound to say, however, that in my view the promise 
of the wartime Social Survey has been better than its performance, 
except in those cases where the terms of reference have been 
fairly strictly defined." 
With specific reference to the 'Middlesbrough Survey': 
"Its contents are extremely detailed, but in a large degree 
irrelevant, and it looks to us as though someone in the Wartime 
Social Survey is thinking more about producing another publica-
tion than about its use for planning purposes." 
Mr. Whiskard's assumption proved correct, for The Social Background 
of a Plan: A Study of Middlesbrough, was published by Routledge, in 
1948. The editor was Ruth Glass. In an accompanying letter to the 
above submission, Professor D. Holford added (CAB 124 - 530): 
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but if the Wartime Social Survey regards itself as competent 
to decide what should be investigated, as well as how the 
investigations should be carried out, it is liable to produce 
extremely unequal results." 
Ministry of Health, (Letter from W.S. Douglas, dated December 20, 1945, 
(CAB 124 - 530)): 
"Apart from 
in connection 
taking." 
risks 
with 
of a 
"the 
political 
snoopers", 
"blow-up" 
as risks, 
or of incidents 
they were worth 
Ministry of Food, (Letter from F.N. Tribe, dated January 4, 1946, (CAB 
124- 530)): 
"To speak quite frankly, the results have not been highly 
satisfactory. Their presentation has often been obscure 
and frequent inconsistencies in them have cast doubts upon 
the efficiency of the machine for attaining any degree of 
accuracy. The feeling here, therefore, is that, except for 
work of a very general and non-specialist character, we should 
prefer not to have to rely upon the service of the wartime 
Social Surv:ey _" 
Ministry of Fuel and Power, (Letter from D::mald Fergusson, dated January 
8 I 1946 I (CAB 124 - 530)) : 
"I personally am inclined to doubt the real value of the 
results of the Ministry of Information's Social Survey or 
the reliance that could be placed upon the results. . . There 
is a tendency because a thing is called an Official Survey 
to assume that it provides valid evidence. " 
Fergusson expressed concern over the possibly erroneous deductions that 
might ensue from unsound statistical techniques. Furthermore, he considered 
that the WSS's work in the sphere of agriculture as "exceedingly amateurish." 
It is reasonable to assume that the preceding submissions represented 
the views of the individual ministries and not the personal grievances 
of individual members of their respective staffs. If this was the case, 
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then it tends to question the received view, common to celebrations 
of the Social Survey in wartime, a feature of some historical accounts 
of empiricalresearch in Britain, (cf. P.E.P. Broadsheet, No. 250, 1946; 
Kelsall, 1960) . It cannot be claimed that the WSS was of unquestionable 
value to those government departments which called upon its services. 
No doubt it did render service to the government, but the estimation 
of its technical proficiency, the interpretation of the results of its 
researches and ~he subsequent presentation of policy options in a manageable 
form for the relevant Minister of the Crown, depended upon the technical 
ability and disposition of senior civil servants. It is understandable 
that politicians would assume that the WSS actually 'worked' as they 
were the recipients of the end product of a commissioned piece of research. 
However, administrators (in this case senior civil servants) acted as 
intermediaries between the WSS technical staff and their advisors, and 
the politicians. 
Caradog Jones (1949) , (member of the WSS 's Scientific Advisory Committee) , 
was a staunch advocate of the above separation of responsibilities. 
His arguments on maintaining the intellectual integrity and independence 
of the social scientist in the course of his or her research work are 
indicative of the moralising nature of the normative structure of science, 
especially its attendant, mythical 'spirit of science', which permeated 
the more extreme rhetoric of those espousing the intellectual virtue 
of the inter-war science movement. Of course this criticism is easy 
to make so many years after the events of the period. Nevertheless, 
the claims of scientific exactitude and analytical rigour had both been 
expressed and pursued by the WSS's technicians. The latter group regarded 
such issues as central to their responsibilities as social scientists, 
and a necessary condition of the service which they endeavoured to offer 
to those who had cause .to use the Survey's facilities. For them, any 
assessment of the efficiency and efficacy of the Survey could and should 
be justified on such grounds. For those politicians who maintained 
overall responsibility for their respective ministries, the central 
concern remained the need to acquire adequate information with which 
to make reasonable decisions (not all political decisions are necessarily 
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reasoned) . Such individuals were less likely to concern themselves with 
the technical fidelity of the scientist in producing the information. 
The politic ian was more sensitive to the demands of Party and career, 
although, as I shall show shortly, the fate of the social sciences in 
the post-war world would become a political issue. 
The role of the intermediary - the senior civil servant - may have been 
more crucial to the wider evaluation of the contribution that the WSS 
had made to, first, the war effort in general, and second, the operation 
of the individual ministries that drew upon its services. The civil 
servant possessed knowledge and experience of the operation of the wss 
and its personnel, in addition to the vagaries of political decision 
making on the part of the Minister, notwithstanding the advice of his 
'servant' advisors. As early as the summer of 1945, T. M. Wilson of 
the Treasury had written to John Clapham (Chairman of the Committee 
considering the adequacy of provision for social and economic research 
in Britain) suggesting that someone from the WSS should be invited to 
give evidence, (July, 1945, T 161/1301). In a reply to Wilson, Clapham 
expressed some reservations about the MOI and its WSS with a cryptic 
reference to the aspirations of the latter, on the basis of 'inside' 
information (July, 1945, T 161/1301): 
"With a daughter in the Ministry of Information, I know a 
little about that organisation and do not at present want 
a 'Department of Social and Economic Research1 to run a successor 
to it." 
Clapham did eventually ask for a submission of evidence from those mini-
stries who had had cause to use the Survey. Nevertheless, there is 
an element of doubt (perhaps even suspicion) in the mind of the Committee's 
Chairman about the form that a post- war research organisation may have 
taken, based, in the main, on the use to which such an organisation 
would be put, and lest it might be subject to political interference 
or control. The latter suspicions were made quite clear in the course 
of the Committee's deliberations. It seemed unlikely that the WSS would 
be dismantled at the end of the war. Therefore, the central issue revolved 
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around the post-war, organisatbrull structure of social and economic 
research, in a form that_ waul~ somehow perpetuate the apparent independence 
of the WSS, especially its. purported non-political status, allowing 
it to serve the needs of government departments. ~his was a very sensitive 
issue and may account for the political solution that eventually resolved 
the matter. 
There were two elements to the problem which highlight the political 
and cultural contingency of both the funding and production of social 
knowledge. The first entailed the fact that, despite the controversy 
over the role of the WSS, it had, for most politicians, served the needs 
of the departments for which they were individually responsible. This 
although a debateable issue, helped to sustain the case of those who 
wished to see the continuation of the WSS in some form after the war. 
Considered thus, the 'service function' of the WSS seemed politically 
uncontroversial, and within the best tradititions of scientific neutrality 
and institutional independence, especially as the Survey was serving 
the needs of a coalition government. However, with the prospect of 
an election at the end of the war and a 'socialist triumph' to follow, 
the role of social and economic research at the service of a single 
political party presented a different set of problems. Secondly, the 
war led to the creation of a state administrative apparatus of unprece-
dented scale and effectiveness, and this, coupled to an increasingly 
vociferous Labour Party, both within and outside of the House, meant 
that the issue of social and economic research would henceforth increase 
in salience and remain an intellectual and institutional activity of 
both public and political sensitivity. The discussions within the Clapham 
Committee reflect an anticipation of the changes that were taking place 
and the consequences that would arise as a result of them. 
It is clear from the evidence submitted to, and the discussions within 
the Clapham Committee, that the WSS's preservationists outnumbered the 
abolitionists, notwithstanding the criticisms of the Survey's work in 
a number of areas. However, a clearer understanding of the reasons 
why the WSS survived the war is only possible through a more detailed 
consideration of the significance of the Clapham Committee within the 
wider context of the social sciences and political practice. An integral 
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feature of the latter process entailed the emerging controversy over 
the relationship of the system of higher education to the needs of the 
state in post-war society. This issue was the subject of consider-
able importance to the Labour- Party
1 
and similarly, to those who fiercely 
contested the notion of dirigisme. The connection between the issues 
central to the Clapham Committee and those of the debate on the autonomy 
of the universities is important for two reasons. First, the actors 
central to the deliberations of the Clapham Committee were also engaged 
in the wartime debate on the fate of the universities in the post-war 
world. second, the two national issues; the provision of social and 
economic research and the role of the universities in a planned society, 
were largely features of a profound and complex transformation occurring 
within British society during the period of a world war. The political 
debates of the period clearly demonstrate a realisation, that the produc-
tion of knowledge and its relationship to the national need were contest-
able issues within the struggle for political power. The resolution 
of these issues would entail significant consequences for changing the 
social, economic and political conditions which had historically, sustained 
the objectives and interests of certain sections of British society. 
A whole range of post-war legislative measures, usually following the 
recommendations of government committees of inquiry, began to reshape 
the cultural context within which a re-ordering of knowledge occurred. 
3. The Clapham Committee and its deliberations: the sociologists' 
arguments I. 
Conventional historical accounts of the development of sociology in 
Britain, either in terms of its institutional or intellectual forms, 
tend to portray the Clapham Committee* as the genesis of a formal recognition 
* Membership of the Clapham Committee was as follows: Sir John Clapham 
(Chairman), Sir Alan Barlow, Sir Alexander Carr-Saunders, Sir Henry 
Clay, Sir Hector Hetherington, Sir Walter Moberly, Professor L. 
Robbins, Professor R.H. Tawney, Mr. T.M. Wilson (Secretary); Report 
of the Committee on the Provision for Social and Economic Research, 
Cmnd. 6868, 1946. 
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of the potential of social knowledge as a basis for social action, especi-
ally in a period following a world war when the ethos of social 
and moral reconstruction permeated all manner of public and political 
debate. In one sense this is correct. Whether or not the Clapham Commit-
tee's recommendations were carried out fully, and as a consequence 
sociology benefitted or suffered as a result, depends to a large extent 
on the importance attributed to the Committee's findings. At any point 
after the publication of the Committee's Report, the historian can relate 
the discipline ··s extant form (in institutional and intellectual terms) 
to that of its earlier prospects, the latter of which were entirely 
contingent upon not only the Committee's observations and recommendations 
(the substance of the official Report), but equally importantly, to 
the crucial arguments upon which the former Report was based. I am 
not suggesting that the Clapham Committee Report was a travesty of the 
truth, rather, I would suggest that all official committees of inquiry, 
including Clapham, publish reports on the basis of evidence and argument, 
and that such an exercise necessarily entails a less logical, coherent 
and objective process than the publication of a final Y'eport may appear 
to confer on its deliberations (cf. Rhodes, 1975). Questions then arise 
as to how accurately does the official report reflect the committee's 
deliberations? How and why was the Clapham Committee established? 
Who was chosen to serve on it, and what consequences would this have 
for a discipline like sociology? Who was asked to submit evidence and 
why? These and other questions and the answers to them gave rise to 
the context in which sociology and its practitioners and supporters 
would endeavour to make their case for the future of the discipline. 
Such a contextual ferment would therefore require the historian 
to at least attempt to consider the internal background debates 
upon which the official report was based. Herein lies a paradox. The 
historian's version of the events of the period, especially the details 
suggested in the preceding series of questions, necessarily acquire 
a greater degree of detail and accuracy if the documents relating 
to the Clapham Committee are scrutinised. However, the quality and 
detail of the historical account is not governed entirely by the ability 
and diligence of the historian, rather, it would seem to depend upon 
the operation and application of the Official secrets Act. Access to 
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the aforementioned material appeared to me to be vital, and it was therefore 
down to luck, and the requisite security clearance, that access was 
granted to the Clapham evidence. The 'Thirty Year Rule' (or for tha t 
matter, any of the 'Year Rulings') present a considerable obstacle to 
the reconstruction of history. 
The Clapham evidence has provided an unusual insight into not only the 
work:j,ngs of a government committee of inquiry, but one that was crucial 
to the development of social science in Britain both in the immediate 
period following the publication of its report, and for many years there-
after. In considering its recorded deliberations and submissions of 
written evidence, I will examine the Committee's arguments 
about social science against the back-drop of its official, published 
report. It is within this general, comparative approach, that I will 
attempt to single out the presentation of sociology's case amongst the 
many issues of concern to the Committee. 
Cherns' (1963 and 1979) account of the reasons why the Clapham Committee 
was established generally reflect the social, economic and political 
conditions of the time and the attendant reasons for a demand for social 
knowledge (1979, pp.35-36): 
"There was an acute awareness that Britain would lack resources 
other than those represented by the skills of its people 
and of the need for a social structure that would allow these 
to be fully exploited. Studies were made of land use, scientific 
manpower and the social services. Few of these studies failed 
to make the case for the need for a great increase in the 
supply of adequate data on which political decision in the 
economic and social field should be based. This in turn 
pinpointed the scarcity of people trained in the social sciences. 
Therefore in 1945 the government appointed a committee under 
the chairmanship of Sir John Clapham to consider 'whether 
additional provision is necessary for research into social 
and economic questions'." 
There are two points that need to be clarified here. First, it was 
the case that social conditions of the time seemed conducive to a closer 
and certainly more active alignment between social science and the emergent 
technological politics. However, this 'new' arrangement had been the 
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focus of the inter-war debate on the place of science in a democracy. 
Moreover, it had featured in the wartime conferences and sub-committees 
of the British Association. Such a programme for post-war social science 
required the active support of a committed political party and a corres-
ponding degree of enthusiasm within the civil service and the universities. 
Second, and in relation to the first point, political sensitivity to 
the structural changes taking place within British society became a 
cen.tral theme within debates of post-war reconstruction. The latter 
became, for the Labour Party at least, the medium for a bloodless revolu-
tion. But who in the Government (a coalition government) called for 
the establishment of the Clapham Committee and why? 
On September 20, 1944, Clement Attlee, Lord President of the Council, 
wrote to Sir John Anderson, Chancellor of the Exchequer stating that 
in the former's opinion (T 161/1301/5 4680/1): 
" adequate provision for application of the "natural sciences" 
to industry, hea.l th and agriculture already exists and needs 
are served by the Department of Scientific and Industrial 
Research, Medical Research Council and Agricultural Research 
Council, which promote research in the relevant fields." 
More importantly though, Attlee expressed a personal opinion, the strength 
of which would have consequences for the inauguration of a committee 
of inquiry (T 161/1301/54680/1) : 
"I feel the time has now come to do something for the social 
sciences. They are of increasing importance in throwing 
light upon the problems of public policy, and I am given 
to understand that we are dangerously dependent upon American 
Foundations for financing research in this wide field ... " 
The reference to being 'dangerously dependent upon American Foundations' 
for the funding of social research is an interesting remark. Although 
I have not been able to trace a direct connection between the sentiments 
expressed in the Attlee letter and the published thoughts of Harold 
Laski on the same subject, (H.J. Laski, The Dangers of Obedience, 1930), 
their long association in politics, and their connections with the 
L.S.E., may account for shared suspicions on the implications of private 
benefaction for the funding of knowledge. This collective apprehen-
siveness of American cultural imperialism was the subject of my examin-
ation of Beveridge's Natural Bases experiment at the L.S.E. during 
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the inter-war period, especially the conditional nature of Rockefeller 
likely that Attlee had knowledge of funding for 
this project. 
that scheme. It is 
Moreover, 
made him responsible for 
to in his letter. What 
nature of the funding of 
his position as 
the affairs of 
was implicit 
Lord President of the Council 
the research councils referred 
in Attlee's 
social research up to the 
argument about the 
Second World War, 
is an 
social 
intention 
sciences. 
to create an alternative arrangement 
That this should take the form of 
for financing the 
another publicly 
funded research council, was an intimation that became a controversial 
issue during the course of the Clapham Committee's lengthy deliberations. 
In the reply to Attlee's 
of the Exchequer) seemed 
meant by the collective 
first letter, Sir John 
considerably exercised 
category of 'the social 
Anderson 
over what 
sciences'. 
(Chancellor 
should be 
This he 
thought required early clarification in order to allow the suggested com-
mittee to convene with a clear remit, and a working definition of social 
science. The problem of defining clearly and precisely, those disciplines 
which were thought to comprise the social sciences, remained a constant 
source of difficulty for the Committee members. This problem was compounded 
by the differences in definition attributed to the latter disciplines 
by those who submitted evidence to the Committee. Although the Committee's 
final 't'eport concluded that 1 "the practitioners of the various social 
sciences are by no means agreed on the precise boundaries of their subjects", 
the Committee thought that it was not necessary to "give exact definitions 
of the fields of research covered" (Cmnd. 6868). This sustained confusion 
presented difficulties for those sociologists who made representations 
to the Committee. 
The whole question of an 'appropriate' designation for social science 
and its composite disciplines was characterised by the allowance of 
considerable definitional latitude on the part of the Committee's Chairman. 
Terms such as, 'sociological' , 'social science' , 'sociological research' , 
'social research', 'social studies' and the 'humanistic studies' were 
variously and indiscriminantly 
social and economic research. 
used 
The 
to designate 
latter became 
the general 
the focal 
field of 
point of 
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the Committee's activity. In 'doing something for the social sciences' , 
as Attlee requested, the Chairman and members proceeded to interpret 
such a direction, as attending to the needs of those disciplines as 
far as adequate provision could be made for their research initiatives. 
In some respects, this tended to discriminate against sociology from 
the outset. The point arises in Sir John Anderson's reply to Attlee 's 
original letter on the proposed Committee (1944, T 161/1301): 
"The so-called social sciences, with the possible exception 
of economics, have not reached the stage of exact knowledge 
at which the natural sciences have arrived. Moreover, political 
considerations affect the study of sociology much more than 
they do that of the natural sciences." 
Anderson also thought that, II 
the term "social sciences 11 II 
it would be a good thing to avoid using 
(1944, T 161/1301), and that the safest 
place for consideration of 'sociological questions' was the universities. 
Anderson's remarks reveal the conventional assumption of the supremacy 
of the natural science model for all other forms of knowledge to aspire 
to. The estimation of the scientific status of economics was common 
among economists. 
Further correspondence was exchanged between Anderson and Attlee on 
the matter of the nature and definition of subjects that the proposed 
Committee might draw within their remit,and matters to which the committee 
members should address themselves. On one point the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer and the Lord President of Council did agree (Letter from Anderson 
to Attlee, November 27, 1944, T 161/1301): 
II 
would 
that 
be 
the development of 
greatly aided by a 
of social processes." 
public policy after· the war 
rapidly increasing knowledge 
In a letter from T.M. Wilson, (of the Treasury and the Committee's Secre-
tary) to Sir John Clapham (the Committee's Chairman), one which followed 
a missive from R.H. Tawney, who expressed a hope that the terms 'economic' 
and 'social' would encompass the work of the political scientist (Tawney 
did not want the economists to dominate the work of the Committee) , 
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Wilson expressed concern over the 'time and energy' expended reviewing 
the disciplines for which the Committee had been established. The members 
of the Committee were never to aspire to the level of conceptual tidiness 
wished for by their secretary. Tawney's concern about the over-represent-
ation of the views of the economists was shared also by T.S. Simey. 
The Committee may have been taking a long time to establish the nature 
of the disciplines which it felt should be included under the rubric 
'social science', but many of the social scientists, other than the 
economists, did not want the existing, institutional and intellectual 
dominance of economics to displace other branches of the social sciences 
which were less well represented within the universities and the service 
of government during the period of wartime Britain. It is clear from 
the evidence submitted to the Committee, that many of the social scientists 
arguing the case for their respective disciplines were acutely aware 
of the somewhat vulnerable position of their subjects vis-a-vis economics; 
but more importantly, there was a degree of sensitivity and self-conscious-
ness about the status generally of their disciplines when they came 
under public scrutiny, or, when their performance was expressed as a 
measure of success in comparison with the natural sciences. The major 
problem was perceived as the difficulty of the social sciences becoming 
bona fide sciences (Cmnd., 6868, 1946): 
"As regards the study of social questions, little more than 
a beginning has been made. There exists a few Chairs of 
Social Science in British Universities. But holders are 
chiefly engaged in training social workers, and the exact 
scope of their studies on the scientific side has still to 
be determined." 
The concern of the sociologists about the ease with which economics 
could apparently attract funding for its researches is expressed in 
a reference to the relative plight of sociology (Cmnd., 6868, 1946): 
"The holder of one of these Chairs told the Committee that 
he had more difficulty in getting support for his studies 
than his colleagues, in say, economics, because they were 
not yet thought "respectable". He made no complaint, for, 
he said, sociologists had not yet done the work that they 
ought to have done to make theirs a fundamental study 
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It is unlikely that important developments will take place 
in this field (sociology) until more are engaged on it. 
We feel that, in particular, there is scope here for development 
of the study of social organisation and of the use of social 
and regional surveys." 
There are several important points in the preceding extract from the 
Clapham Committee's Report, all of which have a bearing on the subsequent 
support of the discipline in the immediate, post-war period. First, 
the 'holder of a. Chair' had reiterated an indictment against sociology 
which was commonly cited by its critics during the inter-war debates 
who argued against the discipline's attempt to assert itself as the 
co-ordinating element of a synoptic science of society. This probably 
confirmed the prejudices of those economists who were Committee members. 
Second 1 the sociologist giving the evidence in question, also prescribed 
publicly the form that sociology should henceforth take -asserting again 
its apparently perpetual state of intellectual infancy. The cue to 
the 'appropriate' form that the discipline should evolve was subsequently 
interpreted by the Committee to entail a 'useful' and constructive form 
of empiricism, indicative of the sociology associated with exponents 
of its practical wing. It should be remembered that the WSS had evolved 
a network of regional survey teams and monitoring groups: this would 
have implications for the debate on the fate of the WSS after the war. 
Third, the initial Ministerial instruction to ascertain the needs of 
the social sciences, as aids to effective policy making, had influenced 
the context and discourse within which had occurred· an evaluation of 
those disciplines likely to produce appropriate forms of social knolwedge. 
Why had the sociologist cited in the Clapham Report made the case for 
sociology in the manner stated? Examination of the evidence reveals 
that the sociologist in question was T. S. Simey. Consideration of his 
evidence to the Committee will give a clearer indication of the strategic 
component of the sociologists' case. 
The continuing confusion over the nature of sociology and its precise 
intellectual boundaries vis-a-vis the other social sciences is evident 
in the minutes of the Committee for the meeting of May 4, 1945 (T 161/1301): 
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"If more provision for research was needed it would probably 
be on the sociology side. The scope of sociology was not 
easy to define." 
Thus argued Alan Barlow, supported by R.H. Tawney, who urged that any 
interpretation of 'sociological' should be in the "broadest sense." 
Professor L. Robbins appeared to be similarly disposed toward the need 
to make provision for the social sciences by an increase in resources 
to them, though the kind of social science he had in mind is clear from 
the following minute of the May 4th meeting (T 161/1301) : 
"Economics was well established as a practice but sociology 
was of a younger growth and there was a need for expenditure 
and research. The social sciences were not so clearly recognised. 
Research was hampered by the difficulty of securing laboratory 
equipment, calculating machinery, specialised researchers, 
computers etc." 
In view of sociology's contested position during the inter-war conferences, 
it is difficult not to construe Robbin's remarks as somewhat hypocritical. 
The confusion in the Clapham Committee over the nature and relationship 
of sociology to the other social science disciplines was not as disadvan-
tageous to the position of the sociologists as it had been toward the 
end of the inter-war period. An opportunity now presented itself for 
the revitalisation of the discipline. 
In a meeting of the Committee on 24th of October, 1945, T.S. Simey lamented 
the state of sociology (T 161/1301). He regarded the 'status of sociology 
as very' precarious indeed.' His personal experience upon returning 
from the West Indies (where he served as Social Welfare Advisor to the 
Comptroller for Development, from 1940-45), was to find his own work 
"discredited and the subject considered not altogether respectable" 
(1945 I T 161/1301). Moreover, he said his colleagues in economics and 
other social sciences could get assistance more easily than he could; 
"he could not, however, complain since sociologists had not yet done 
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the work which they ought to have done to make theirs a fundamental 
study." (1945, T 161/1301). The latter statement was incorporated 
verbatum into the Committee's final report in 1946. Simey argued further, 
that the " task of sociology was the working out of fundamental prin-
ciples, and to show the relation of those principles to particular studies" 
(1945, T 161/1301). The reason for sociology's failure in making progress 
in this area was attributed to a lack of staff and facilities. Simey 
also advocated the 'essential need to work closely with government agencies, 
particularly in obtaining the vital statistical material to support socio-
logical analysis'. Furthermore, he argued that, II general theories 
would emerge from the data, which was the task of the universities to 
perform" (1945, T 161/1301). A reference was also made to the dearth 
of courses in sociology within higher education, causing Simey to make 
a reply that is characteristic of contemporary criticism of the disci-
pline (1945, T 161/1301): 
" course structures were difficult to formulate because, 
sociology was not considered respectable by employers and 
others; and until it was, by the production of the textbooks 
and the study of fundamental principles .. there must necessarily 
be a vicious circle." 
In making a case - for sociology, there is implicit in Simey 's .advocacy 
the institutional and intellectual forms that the discipline should 
evolve. This is a characteristic feature of sociology's advocatory 
dimension, in as much as any argument for sociology, though not necessarily 
a direct expression of a particular theoretical disposition or specific 
substantive issue associated with the discipline, nevertheless imply 
such. Arguments which appear to be of an essentially strategic nature, 
(the basis of sociology's contested form within the medium of a government 
committee), and which are constructed either to preserve or enhance 
the prospects of the discipline, are predicated upon a variety of internal 
tensions. Such tensions take the form of intra-disciplinary disputes 
over theoretical and methodological issues, which are central to the 
practice of sociology as an intellectual activity. 
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Simey's evidence had a significant impact on the Committee's deliberations, 
especially his recommendation that university faculties of social science 
be strengthened via additional grants to the universities through the 
University Grants Committee. The system of earmarked grants was adopted 
as a means of enhancing the funding of the social sciences (see Appendix 
Three) . Established departments of social science or social studies 
would benefit from the earmarked grant arrangements. So much so, that 
the Sub-Committee on Social Sciences of the University Grants Committee 
(established upon the advice of the Clapham Committee) found it necessary 
to give special consideration to the position of the L.S.E., which, 
because of its size and special place in the field of social science 
in Britain, might affect adversely, the finite resources available for 
funding the social sciences, whether through earmarked monies, or, the 
usual proportion of the quinquennial grant alloted by individual insti-
tutions to their respective faculties or departments of social science. 
The L.S.E. was regarded by the U.G.C. 's social science sub-committee 
as the "base" for the social sciences in England, and therefore decided 
that its status merited separate attention in the allocation of resources 
to maintain its position. Nevertheless, the L. S. E. and the manner and 
degree of its financial support would effectively reduce the finite 
sum of revenue available to support the funding of social science in 
other universities (UGC 8, Minutes of the U.G.C. Sub-Committee on the 
Social Sciences, November 6th, 1947): 
"It was also agreed that rising salaries and maintenance 
costs especially at the L.S.E. might trench upon monies available 
for other institutions." 
The recommendations of the Clapham Committee and the influence and actions 
of the U.G.C. 's sub-committee were crucial factors in the disbursement 
of funds to the social sciences in the immediate post-war period. The 
latter sub-committee had to contend with appeals for initial and extra 
funds from those universities who felt they had not received the financial 
support they deserved from the distribution of earmarked grants. This 
led the U.G.C. sub-committee to review the definition of social science 
adopted by the Clapham Committee in order to reduce the number of claims 
on the 
entails 
'Clapham Money'. 
the establishment 
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I· shall return to this matter shortly, as it 
of criteria for the alloation of resources 
which,as a bureaucratic procedure, would nevertheless have a longlasting 
effect on the definition of the legitimate field of social science which 
the state would underwrite. The same sub-committee also considered 
the consequences of State funding upon the eventual cessation of large-
. scale financial support for the social sciences from private sources. 
Attlee's initial letter to the Chancellor of the Exchequer and its reference 
to Britain's ;dangerous dependence' upon American Foundations for the 
subvention of research in the social sciences in Britain, implied the 
connection between the funding of knowledge and the interests of the 
benefactor. Many of Britain's most influential social sc.ientists had 
been the recipients of Foundation largesse 1 and it had been the policy 
of both the U.G.C. and individual universities to actively encourage 
the 'free market' approach in the competition for research funds. Those 
espousing the virtues of such a mode of funding belived it to be a safe-
guard against the incursion of the state into the realms of academic 
freedom and the independence of the universities. These issues carne 
to the fore during and immediately after the war, 
I have stated above that Simey's evidence influenced the Chairman of 
the Clapham Commit tee to the extent that a number of the former's sugges-
tions became incorporated within the Yeport's recommendations. That 
a sociologist of Simey's standing should have been summoned to give 
evidence owes more to good fortune than any objective procedure to 
seek the collective and representative views of the practitioners of 
social science, notwithstanding the confusion over the definition of 
those fields of study and research. Although Rhodes (1975) has endeavoured 
to present the phenomenon of the Committee of Inquiry as a relatively 
rational exercise in the process of parliamentary democracy 1 his thoughts 
on the manner by which such committees constitute their membership and 
subsequently decide upon who and why certain individuals and organisations 
should give evidence, seem difficult to reconcile with the events surroun-
ding the establishment of the Clapham Committee, and more especially, 
the U.G.C. 's sub-committee on the social sciences and the Interdepartmental 
Cornmi ttee on social and Economic Research (another cornmi ttee recommended 
by the Clapham Committee). 
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The membership of the Clapham Commit tee 
of the social sciences for the period 
was not entirely representative 
in question. There was not a 
sociologist amongst its members (economists, social demographers and 
an historian) . In fact, one of sociology's major critics between the 
wars, Alexander Carr-Saunders (a social demographer }1 exercised significant 
influence on the Committee's deliberations. Moreover, most of the Committee 
members were elected to serve on the post-Clapham, Interdepartmental 
Committee on Social and Economic Research and the u. G. C. 's sub-committee 
on the social sciences, thus taking with them, the ideas, opinions and 
predispositions toward the social sciences either engendered, or reinforced 
through service on the Clapham Committee. 
In choosing people who may have been 'worthwhile' consulting, there 
appears to have been no discernable, nor rational method adopted by 
the commit tee. Certainly the choice of individuals who would give oral, 
in addition to written evidence to the Committee, would influence siginifi-
cantly the discourse on the nature and purpose of those disciplines 
which the Committee considered to fall within their somewhat, incl.usivist 
category of social science/studies. Furthermore, those who would be 
called upon to submit evidence, would themselves need to anticipate 
and respond to the expectations of the Committee members, especially 
as the latter possessed preconceived notions of the intellectual and 
institutional dimensions of British social science. It should be borne 
in mind that the Committee was neither commissioned nor intent upon 
hearing elegant and esoteric presentations or treaties on substantive 
issues from those making representations on behalf of the various social 
science disciplines. This would prove more of a problem for the social-
ogists than, say, the economists, who already had the advantage of sympa-
thisers within the Committee membership. The sociologists had still 
to overcome ignorance and prejudice of their subject and more importantly, 
a suspicion of their intentions for a place within the pecking order 
of disciplines likely to be favoured with state funding in the immediate 
post-war period. 
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The emphasis had therefore to be upon the strategic presentation of 
their discipline as an academic subject and a research based activity. 
The former would be essential for securing revenue and the prospect 
of an increase in sociology's presence within higher education. The 
latter, was an essential project for the discipline, as its practitioners 
had assured ·both its critics and supporters that it had an important 
role to play in the social reconstruction of Britain (cf. Mannheim, 
1940). As components of the sociologists' case for their discipline, 
they also provided the basis of sociology's quest for intellectual and 
institutional autonomy. Least this appear to be too contrived and purpose-
fully orchestrated, it should be borne in mind that the sociologists 
had met concerted resistance from other social scientists in their pre-war 
attempt to construct a synoptic science of society. Moreover, the disci-
pline 's most influential practitioners had learned valuable lessons from 
the pre-war conferences, wherein much at ten tion had been devoted to 
considering the relationship between sociology and the other branches 
of the social sciences. The sociologists' case for an expansion of 
their subject within the sphere of higher education had been dealt a 
particularly heavy blow during the 1930s. This had been made quite 
clear in T.H. Marshall's summary of a discussion on the place of sociology 
within the university curriculum* for social science (Marshall, 1936, p.55): 
"We have not really made up our minds what it is that we are 
trying to do. Courses have not been carefully designed, or 
rather, their designers have not had a free hand. Tradition 
has been too strong, and reformers have had to proceed by 
way of bargain and compromise. This was the case, as Professor 
Morris Ginsberg (London School of Econom:ics) pointed out with 
the London Degree in Sociology." 
Such resistance to sociology was commented upon above by Simey in his 
caustic remark about other social scientists assuming that the discipline 
was somehow, not yet "respectable". However, sociology's plight in 
the late 1930s and middle '40s, was not a predicament somehow borne 
* Cf. Appendix Four for a 
and research in sociology 
Committee in 1945. 
summary 
up to 
of the provision 
the convening of 
for 
the 
teaching 
Clapham 
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of a sudden rejection of sociologists and their work: it was indicative 
of the discipline's perpetually contested status within the domain of the 
human sciences and culture generally. Of those who chose not to dismiss 
sociology out of hand, it did not follow that they necessarily embraced 
the discipline in its entirety. Those who looked to sociology for an 
indication of its intellectual worth, sought an expression of its form 
that complied with criteria of relevance and utility associat.ed with 
the exemplar of the natural sciences. 
The deliberations of the Clapham Committee are crucial to an understanding 
of the sociologists' attempt to provide yet another set of agendas and 
programme statements for a sociology able to participate in the moral 
and social regeneration of Britain. The crucial feature of a revivified, 
post-war sociology, was the fact that it was likely to be underwritten 
by the state, thereby freeing its practitioners from the pre-war patronage 
of private benefactors, the latter of whom had placed greater faith 
in forms of social science more in keeping with a preferred series of 
moral and intellectual prescriptions. Nevertheless, sociology would 
still have to contest its place within the re-evaluation of those forms 
of knowledge essential to the pursuance of the national need, which 
in turn would have consequences for the kind of sociology most appropriate 
to the tasks in hand. The sociologists had first to convince the Govern-
ment's Committee, established to assess whether or not they, and other 
social scientists, were able to respond to such an imperative. 
CHAPTER FIVE 
Teaching and research in social science: The education 
and research council debates and the 
future of sociology 
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Teaching and Research in Social Science: The Education and 
Research Council Debates and the Future of Sociology 
l. A research council for the social sciences: the hierarchy challenged. 
The co-ordination of the social sciences under the direction of some form 
of national council, whereby funding and research initiatives would become 
the subject of central, political control, is a theme which recurrs frequently 
in the written and oral submissions to the Clapham Committee. The following 
consideration of arguments for and against the establishment of some form 
of research council for the social sciences*, a project which had been mooted 
on several occasions prior to the outbreak of war, provides crucial clues 
to the prospect for sociology in the years following the war. The research 
council debate posed a threat to the established hierarchy of British social 
science: an intellectual and institutional edifice erected largely upon 
the privilege and patronage of morally dominative philanthropy and its chosen 
beneficiaries. 
The notion of a research council for the social sciences arose as a matter 
of discussion at the first formal meeting of the Clapham Committee in early 
1945. Professor Robbins, an opponent of the proposal to create such a council, 
expressed considerable disagreement from the outset. He argued that, because 
of the nature of social research, ·politicians may not be able to resist 
the temptation of 'using' a central co-ordinating body for political ends. 
Furthermore, the apparent dangers of social research might also impinge on the 
neutrality of the universities (T 161/54689, minutes of meeting, May 4th, 1945): 
"The Department of Scientific and Industrial Research did work in practical 
and non-controversial fields which would not be the case in respect 
of a central organisation covering the social sciences. The government 
could not farm out controversial matters involved in social and economic 
research to the universities, although universities should be in a 
position spontaneously to initiate its own studies." 
And in specific reference to a proposed social science research council, 
Robbins queried the need for (T 161/54680) : 
* 
any central organisation to direct research to particular problems. 
If such an organisation was an official body, it would be open to pressure 
from interested groups." 
It is possible to detect in the Clapham det>ate two quite distin.c-t, though not entirely 
mutually exclusive positions on the relationship between social knowledge and the needs 
of the state. One in which social science and its researches should- be allowed to evolve 
within modified institutional arrangements which would ensure their preservation from 
political direction or influence. The other envisaged the establishment of new institutional 
arrangements which were more conducive to the production Jf forms of social knowledge 
essential to the moral and social reconstruction of post-war Britain, and the years 
beyond. The latter position, social science in the service of a planned society, entailed 
a conception of a rational, technocratic model of social scientific knowledge being produced 
by its practitioners in the service of the state. 
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There was a discernable degree of apprehension among the participants 
of the first meeting that the social scientist would run the risk of 
becoming a servant of some new, political order. Sir Alan Barlow, while 
suggesting that the new, post-war age may require the creation of what 
he referred to as "the new scientist the genuine sociologist", he 
was nevertheless aware of the possible ·politicisation of social research 
(T 161/1301/54680/1) : 
" so long as the object was the 
did not feel that this difficulty was 
it was not possible to refrain from 
fear that the politicians might make a 
obtained." 
obtaining of facts, he 
really serious and that 
getting the facts, for 
bad use of the material 
Implicit in the above argument and indeed, much of the debate about 
the nature and function of a council for the social sciences, was the 
prospect of the political control of social research for ideological 
purposes. It would appear that none of the recipients of Foundation 
largesse, several of whom were amongst the members of the Clapham Committee, 
had considered the conditional nature of private funding for social 
research, although this had been pointed out to them during the course 
of the December. 5th meeting of the Committee in 1945. Professor Stephan, 
reviewing the arrangements for the organisation and financing of social 
science research in America stated to the Committee (T 161/1301/54680/1): 
" that often, the 
had a tendency to pay 
programmes in terms which 
National Bureau of Economic Research 
too much attention in framing their 
were likely to attract grants." 
Whether this was a warning of the 'dangers ' of private funding versus 
public financing of social research, is difficult to estimate. However, 
it is important to recall the risks attached to private benefaction 
outlined in Chapter two, especially the case made by Laski in his book, 
The Dangers of Obedience, (1930). Professor Stephan pointed out the 
manner in which social research was funded in America, i.e. that it was 
almost entirely dependant upon what he referred to as "private enterprise". 
This consideration of the manner in which social research was to be 
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funded is important for two reasons. First, the majority of funds for 
the conduct of social research in Britain between the two wars had come 
from private sources whether from Britain or America the latter 
providing a substantial proportion of the revenue. The U.G.C. had actively 
encouraged such a form of competition for grants, arguing that the free-
market approach should supplement its basic quinquennial grants. Whether 
one was committed to the philosophy which underpinned such an economic 
arrangement for the funding of knowledge or not, did not alter the fact 
that for individual social scientists and their respective disciplines, 
this was the only way to enhance the intellectual and institutional 
prospects of the social sciences. Hence the importance of individual 
'connections' with the more generous Foundations and the necessity of 
being well schooled in the art of grantsmanship. The key to successfully 
obtaining large-scale funding for projects was to be both well known 
in the world of the Foundations and their associated cliques of influen-
tials, in addition to possessing membership of an equally influential, 
professional Association, Institute or Society. The more ancient, respect-
able and august the organisation, the greater the prospect of circulating 
within those coteries of power and influence essential to the making 
of contacts and contracts between the hopeful beneficiary and the potential 
benefactor. The assumption that such an arrangement for the funding 
of knowledge, especially the more contentious domain of knowledge about 
society, stood a better chance of remaining untainted by the vested 
interests of the state, rested on a combination of political naivety 
and inter-disciplinary ~liHSiti1; the latter of which accounted for the 
differential level of professional and institutional autonomy amongst 
the various social sciences. An example of the latter was the relative 
positions of economics and sociology in terms of the preceding contexts 
and categories. 
Second, and contingent upon the first point, is the historical aspect 
of the nature of social science funding in Britain during the inter-war 
period. The arrangements tended to favour certain branches of the social 
sciences rather than others. I have argued previously, and as Simey 
had stated in his submission to the Committee, economics faired better 
than any of the other social 
to further its researches and 
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science disciplines in the quest for funds 
to swell the ranks of its practitioners 
within the universities and government departments. In view of this 
fact, it is understandable why, amongst the many reasons preferred by 
the economists (notable amongst the opponents for the establishment 
of a research council for the social sciences) they should tend toward 
the preservation of the existing arrangements for funding and co-ordinating 
research within the social sciences. There existed no alternative method 
of substantial and sustained funding of social research between the 
wars. Even in America, the mainstay of research funding carne from the 
major foundations and Trusts. Considered thus, any alternative method 
of subvention for social research, or the expansion of departments of 
social science within the universities, must have caused those who had 
benefitted most from the existing arrangements, a certain degree of 
anxiety and concern. Not only would different organisational arrangements 
constitute new and therefore unfamiliar circumstances, more importantly, 
the nature of any new conditions for the support of social science would 
be influenced by the political and economic context of a post-war, 'social-
ist Britain.' The pre-war era had not engendered a national need as 
compelling and pervasive as the post-war ethos of reconstruction. As 
a consequence of this, the production of knowledge in response to the 
national need had implications for the social sciences which had never 
before been contemplated, either within those disciplines, or within 
the universities. The implications of this for sociology, both insti tu-
tionally and intellectually, were quite significant. This was for two 
major reasons. 
First, the changing relationship between the universities and the state, 
the plethora of government inquiries and reports 1 and the establishment 
of the welfare state through planning and direct management of the economy, 
emphasised the importance of centralised control over almost every facet 
of national life. Although disputes would continue over those forms 
of knowledge essential to the development of the economy and the mainte-
nance of the state in its post-war form, the prospects of a more equitable 
distribution of resources to and within the social sciences seemed imminent. 
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The somewhat preferential, pre-war system of allocating funds to the 
aforementioned disciplines, and the economic system it reflected was 
in jeopardy. Those who had enjoyed the fruits of the pre-war system, 
especially the economists, may have developed their resistance to the 
creation of a 'collective' organisation for social science out of a 
conservative inertia in the face of radical change. What s~emed more 
likely, in view of the circumstances, was that some social scientists 
anticipated a challenge to the previously uncontested institutional 
bases of certain branches of their disciplines, especially economics. 
Economists had steadfastly adhered to the Marshallian edifice of laissez-
faire, notwithstanding the changes taking place in the management of 
the wartime and post-war economy along the lines of Keynes' ideas: 
an economist who had conducted a pre-war, frontal assault on the citadel 
of pure and perfect competition and its attendant mythology of the 
free market. This could have been perceived as a challenge to traditional, 
orthodox economic theory, and equally, to its ideological form within 
the power and social structures of pre-war Britain. It is ironic that 
the authors of the Clapham Committee Report should have warned its readers 
that there was a need to guard against the "... danger of a premature 
crystallization of spurious orthodoxies," (Cmnd. , 6868, paragraph 29) . 
Although the preceding reference to 'spurious orthodoxies' may have 
been interpreted by commentators and historians of social science as 
a warning against the production of too much abstract and tendentious 
theorising, a close examination of the Clapham evidence would seem to 
suggest that the economists at least, were fully aware of the likely 
event of a post-war election victory for the Labour Party and the prospect 
that its plans for managing the economy would be founded on the principles 
of Keynesian theory, or some hybrid version of Marxist/Leninist economic 
principles, associated with the Soviet version of a planned economy. 
Second, and in connection with the prospects for sociology; any reorgani-
sation of the system for co-=ordinating and funding the social sciences 
would necessarily have a direct ~ffect on the discipline's future institu-
tional and intellectual form. If the pre-war arrangements for the support 
of social science remained largely intact, then sociology's fragile 
autonomy would be enda-ngered. Considered thus, sociologists needed 
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a reformed system for the equitable disbursement of funds to and between 
the social sciences, a means of ensuring that U.G.C. grants to the univer-
sities would contain an element of bias toward the funding of academic 
posts, and general departmental expansion and enhanced facilities for 
research within the discipline. Such bureaucratic arrangements did 
evolve as a result of the Clapham Committee's recommendations, namely, 
the establishment of a U.G.C. sub-committee for the social sciences 
and an Interdepartmental Committee for Economic and Social Research. 
However, the effectiveness or otherwise of those bodies in making sociol-
ogy's future more secure is an issue to which I shall return shortly. 
There was a further irony associated with the Clapham debate on the 
proposal to establish a social science research council. One of the 
Committee's most influential members, and critic of the scheme, was the 
then Director of the L.S.E., Sir Alexander Carr-Saunders. The latter 
gentleman had figured prominently in the inter-war debates on the nature 
and relationship of the individual social sciences to one another, and 
with particular reference to sociology 1 (cf. Chapter two , Sciences of 
Society: Inter-war Projects, Section l.) . Reference to the latter chapter 
will show that Carr-Saunders had been sceptical of the sociologists' 
claim that they possessed a corpus of theory and research methods of 
adequate sophistication, thus enabling them to claim an autonomous status 
for sociology within the general field of social science. He was also 
quite hostile toward the sociologists' additional claim, that they were 
somehow strategically placed within the range of social science disciplines 
to manage a project for the creation of a synoptic science of society. 
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2. The co-ordination of research: the sociologists' arguments II 
In chapter four, I introduced the arguments of the sociologists, especially 
those of T. S. Simey, in their attempt to revive an earlier claim for 
a recognised role for sociology within the expanding realm of social 
science. With the outbreak of war, the case for a 'relevant' social 
sQience had become a project of the utmost importance for social scientists, 
politicians and planners, especially in the light of post-war reconstruc-
tion. As the Clapham Committee deliberations progressed, an opportunity 
arose for the sociologists to present a document in which they were 
able to restate a revised programme for sociology, on the basis of a 
significant reorganisation of the funding and organisational arrangements 
for the support of social research, and a revision of the training and 
general education of sociologists within the system of higher education. 
Although I shall shortly examine the significance and relevance of the 
'education debate' to the future of sociology and social science in 
general, I wish first to examine in detail, not only the evidence submitted 
in the confidential report from the Institute of Sociology, but several 
other written submissions presented directly to the Clapham Committee, 
including a report from a special committee of the British Association 
for the Advancement of Science concerned with 'scientific research 
on human institutions'. All of the reports and submissions deal with 
the topic of whether or not a research council for the social sciences 
should be established, in order to provide the necessary support for 
social science in Britain. The latter question and its resolution 
became crucial to the case made by the sociologists to the Clapham Committee. 
In a confidential report to the Clapham Committee, the secretary of 
the Institute of Sociology, Alexander Farquharson, endeavoured to present 
the case for sociology in its claim for adequate recognition among 
the social sciences and corresponding financial support, should the 
Committee recommend a 1 general increase in the funding of social research .1 
The Institute of Sociology did not long survive the 
though its journal, The Sociological Review 
------------~~------------
did. 
Second World War, 
The influence of 
Morris Ginsberg and T.H. Marshall upon the activities of both the Institute 
and its journal became quite apparent toward the end of the 1930s. 
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Examination of the arguments contained in the Institute's memorandum 
is important to my argument for several reasons. First, it is an example 
of another opportunity for the discipline's practitioners to advocate 
the nature and purpose of sociology within those forms of knowledge 
essential to the post-war project for the social and moral reconstruction 
of British society. Second, and in keeping with an important aspect 
of sociology's advocatory dimension, the claims made on behalf of the 
discipline tended to emphasise the potential of sociology's cognitive 
form as a basis for social praxis. Third, the. preceding first and 
second programme statements on behalf of sociology's potential were 
contingent upon the establishment of some kind of formal organisational 
arrangement, preferrably government sponsored and financed, which would 
ensure an equitable distribution of resources for the institutional 
and intellectual expansion of the discipline. Implicit in the last 
conducible condition for sociology's post-war growth, was the component 
of the control of the production of social knowledge for political ends. 
In order to understand the significance of the sociologists' case for 
the creation of a council for the social sciences (with special reference 
to sociology) it is necessary to consider both the first and second 
points raised above. 
The Institute's submission, (T 161/1301/X/P 07439, 28.1.46) gave a clear 
indication of the role it envisaged for sociology and its researches 
in the post-war period (1946, p.2, paragraph 5): 
"Wartime needs have already produced rapid and major advances 
in the study of many features of social and economic life 
in this country, and prospective changes in our social fabric 
will intensify the need for further research in the future." 
The confidence of the Institute's members in making the preceding predic-
tion of the future role of sociology was predicated on the following, 
confident assertion (1946, p.2, paragraph 5): 
"I take it that it is unnecessary here to argue the case for 
the development of sociological research." 
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Staking a claim for sociology in the post-war world implied a fairly 
clear project for the discipline, one which tended to emphasise the 
practical wing of the pre-war, Marshall ian cleavage referred to earlier. 
Accompanying programme statements on the intrinsic nature and social 
purpose of a revivified sociology indicate the emergent relationship 
between social policy and sociological research. Implicit in such a 
connection is the role of social knowledge in the construction of the 
welfare state, ,a projection of sociology within the domain of post-war 
politics, (1946, p.2, paragraph 5): 
"Fresh administrative provision will be required in economic 
and other fields; and social provision more carefully adjusted 
to the ideas and ideals of individuals and groups in our society 
is also urgently required. As a basis for policy in such 
matters, a continuous and expanding programme of research 
is essential. Such research cannot now serve its purpose 
if limited by the outlook and methods of a single social science; 
we are now becoming aware of the interrelation of the various 
influences and tendencies at wo~k in our society; the relevance 
of the all round view cultivated by the sociologist, and his 
methods of relating results in different fields, is gaining 
growing acceptance." 
The concluding remarks in the preceding quotation are of particular 
importance to my argument for two reasons. First, Farquharson's reference 
to the potential role of sociology as a policy oriented discipline, 
in the post-war period, is as much a statement about the intellectual 
predisposition of sociology as it is a strategic concession to those 
outside of the discipline who may call upon its practitioners to assist 
in the re-building of the nation's moral and social fabric, under the 
benevolent guidance of the newly elected 'people's party'. The latter 
conception of the connection between sociology and politics may account 
for, in part at least, the perennial and standard misconception: sociology 
equals socialism. Second, and more importantly, is the filtering through 
in Farquharson's programme statement of the pre-war concern of sociolo-
gists to establish their discipline's facilty for providing a synoptic 
view of society, through a composite social science, under the co-ordinating 
method of a general sociology. I argued in chapter two, section 1, 
that sociologists had anticipated the distorting affect brought about 
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by the growing tendency of individual social science disciplines to 
provide only a partial, or ~agrnented view of society from their respective, 
narrow and specialised perspectives. Farquharson's argument is interesting 
in an additional sense, for he is sufficiertly ~n,sitive to recognise 
and recall, not only the form· of pre-war sociology advocated by Ginsberg 
and Mannheim (sociology as a scientia scientiarum) , but mindful of the 
need to emphasise the importance of maintaining the empirical tradition 
of those generally associated with the discipline's practical wing (1946, 
p.2, paragraph 6): 
"Sociological research is based, broadly speaking, on activities 
of two kinds; a) field work (i.e. first hand contact with 
individuals and groups) and b) the use of records, themselves 
often derived from administrative or other enqu1r1es in the 
field. The latter resembles closely the use of records for 
historical purposes, and requires a training similar in many 
respects. Field work, with its constant and varied contacts 
with individuals and groups, requires for its success a careful 
selection of suitable workers, and a training which should 
be of some length, should be systematic, and should be in 
the hands of persons who themselves have had some years experi-
ence in such work." 
The Institute's programme for post-war sociology presents a clear and 
unequivocal commitment to empirical research, as the preceding quotation 
reveals. However, the restraining influence of Ginsberg in tempering 
a view that might be construed as insensitive empiricism is evident 
in the following reference to the crucial role of 'general sociology' 
in the Institute's project*, especially its significance in the training 
of a 'body of research workers' (1946, p.2, paragraph 7): 
* The Institute's document set out a number of definitions for the 
term 'sociology', giving emphasis to those forms it considered 
appropriate to its own fields of work and research interests. 
It defined 'general sociology' as follows: " the study of 
human society in general - its forms of organisation, institutions, 
trends and tendencies past and present, and so on; sometimes known 
as "General Sociology" (1946, p.l, Section 3(a)). 
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"It cannot, however, be too strongly urged that training in 
such sociological research will produce only a limited and 
even sterile result, unless it is associated with the broader 
view of human society that can only be obtained from the study 
of general sociology It may therefore be urged that (apart 
from any other values it may have) the development of such 
study is an essential step towards the training of a body 
of research workers capable of undertaking the tasks in view." 
Again Farquharson refers to general sociology as a means of humanising 
what some sociologists had regarded as the crude and obsessive collection 
of facts associated with the more excessive forms of empirical social 
research (cf., Mannheim, 1937 and 1940). Mannheim's concern with a 
'diagnostic sociology' in the years when the concept of large- scale 
social and economic planning had become a reality, reflected his own 
and to a certain extent, Morris Ginsberg's attempt to establish a form 
of sociology which incorporated both an historical and philosophical 
approach to social theory and research, in addition to the adoption 
of the comparative method by the other social sciences. What is made 
apparent in the preceding quotation, is an attempt by Farquharson to 
steer a reasonably steady course between the often conflicting branches 
of sociology, the author being ever mindful that the sociologists' claims 
and projects would be the subject of discussion by not only a Committee 
of Inquiry, but upon the publication of its report, a matter of political 
and public debate. 
The Institute's sociologists also endeavoured to promote another key 
aspect of their strategy for a revivified sociology. This entailed 
a claim for an increase in the number of professorships in the discipline, 
coupled to a re-evaluation of existing university departments of social 
science/social studies, as appropriate institutional sites for the 
expansion of sociology (cf. Appendix Five). 
such an argument is the recognition by 
The crucial feature of 
members of the Institute, 
that for the latter development to occur, sociology would need to establish 
an inter-disciplinary approach within the envisaged syllabuses of existing 
or new university departments. Such an argument indicated sociology's 
somewhat precarious intellectual and institutional autonomy. It also 
highlighted its continuing dependent status after the abortive, 
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pre-war, synoptic science project, and the reluctance of other social 
scientists to participate in such a scheme. There is another aspect 
to the argument contained in the Institute's memorandum which requires 
consideration. One that relates to my earlier contention, that sociology's 
meagre presence within a number of university departments of social 
science (wherein social work training courses provided a vehicle for 
the teaching of sociology} offered the discipline a tenuous existence 
outside of the L.S.E. (1946, p.2, paragraph 7}: 
"The aim should be the setting up of a permanent full professor-
ship in all universities in this country and in university 
colleges that include the social sciences in their curriculum. 
It is desirable that the possibility of close relations between 
the teaching of social anthropology, political science (in 
its more concrete form}, social psychology and sociology, 
should always be kept in mind. It is believed that such a 
development would be welcome to departments and teachers of 
other social sciences, and those concerned in training schemes 
for social work and for teaching." 
Such arrangements would serve to enhance sociology's institutional base, 
something which had handicapped its pre-war development. The important 
point to bear in mind here, is the fact that, whereas the sociologists 
had had to endure increasing isolation within the wider field of pre-war 
social science, confronting quite hostile criticism of its synoptic 
science project, the Clapham Committee presented a different set of 
opportunities for the discipline. In particular, it appeared to the 
sociologists, that, notwithstanding the reception of their current case 
by members of the Comrni ttee, general political support had grown for the 
need to review the provision of resources for what Clement Attlee had 
termed 'sociological research'. Just as the politicians had 'established' 
the importance of the wartime Social Survey to the needs of the Ministries 
that had had cause to use its facilities, so too had a similar judgement 
been made on the role of social research in post-war Britain, hence 
the creation of a government committee of inquiry. 
Not only did the sociologists concur with the general assumption, that 
more sociological research was essential, but that it was an activity 
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which was better suited to the function of the university. The Institute's 
position on this matter was unequivocal (1946, p.3, paragraph 13): 
"It was suggested above that Universities and University Colleges 
would find other reasons for promoting sociological researches, 
in addition to their value in training research workers. 
The latter function may, indeed, be considered as subsidiary 
to the duty (and opportunity) of academic bodies to develop 
and give order and system to knowledge in fresh fields 
Experience already gained makes it clear that apart from training 
schemes a large part of the burden of sociological research 
must in future be carried by Universities and University Colleges, 
and further that, given adequate resources, they will not 
be unwilling to shoulder this." 
This was an important argument for the sociologists, in that moves to " ... develop 
and give order and system to knowledge in fresh fields ... " would enhance 
greatly, the prospects of sociology amongst the existing fields of social 
science, the latter of which were relatively well established within 
the curricula of a number of universities. Sociologists needed to take 
advantage of the opportunity to advocate the importance of research 
in response to national imperatives. However, the prospects for full 
participation in any enhanced programme of social and economic research 
in the post-war period, would be significantly improved if sociology 
acquired the status of an autonomous, academic discipline, within a 
larger number of universities. Thus the strategic presentation of the 
case for sociology had reached a critical stage. To many of the pre-war 
critics of sociology's scheme to co-ordinate a synoptic science of society, 
the discipline appeared increasingly irrelevant to the development of 
the other individual social sciences. If the sociologists had been 
unsuccessful in their pre-war attempts to convince their fellow social 
scientists of the importance of sociology to the construction of a compre-
hensive science of society, then the opportunity to direct their case 
beyond the community of social scientists and into the political arena 
via the Clapham debate, would enhance significantly the prospects of 
obtaining the recognition and resources essential to its continued intel-
lectual and institutional survival. 
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The Institute's agenda for the development and expansion of sociological 
research in the post-war period was set out in a series of recommendations, 
or, as the author chose to call it, a 'general plan or scheme' . It 
is a crucial statement about the most effective means of ensuring both 
the survival and further development of sociology, on the basis of govern-
ment support via preferential disbursement of resources to the discipline, 
especially its research initiatives. Equally important is its declaration, 
that in order to ensure the equitable distribution of resources to soci-
ology, an 'independent' mechanism would need to be established to oversee 
both the allocation of resources to and within the social sciences, in 
addition to selection and co-ordination of research and course development, 
especially within the field of sociology. The 'general plan' recom-
mended the following courses of action over a period of ten years (1946, 
p.4, paragraph 17): 
"a) Further development, as opportunity occurs, of research 
by Government Departments. 
b) Widespread growth of research in Sociological Departments 
or Institutes, in Universities and University Colleges. 
c) Free initiatives and development in research, under suitable 
conditions, in independent institutions. 
d) Opportunities for individual research workers. 
e) Establishing of post-graduate training schemes for sociolog-
ical research workers. 
f) Setting up of under-graduate courses in Sociology in 
Universities and University Colleges, as a groundwork for 
training in research. 
g) As a necessary corollary, suitable provision for the coord-
ination of all these research activities." 
As I have argued previously, the key to understanding the prospects 
of sociology in the post-war era lay in the contest between those who 
actively supported the concept of a social science research council, 
and those who did not, or in the case of the latter, those who wished 
to see it play an innocuous role within the field of social science. 
The central elements of the sociologists' argument lay in their claim 
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for the potential of increased sociological research in a period of recon-
struction. Farquhar soh and his Institute colleagues pinpointed the major 
issues that needed to be settled by political intervention and decision, 
and which lay at the centre of sociology's continuing, precarious wartime 
form (1946, p.4, paragraph 18): 
"For such a general scheme generous financial provision will 
be required; and, while private benefactors may make some 
provision, it is safe to say that, if development is to be 
rapid, the main source must be grants from Government funds. 
In the case of academic institutions, provision for training 
schemes could be dealt with suitably by the University Grants 
Committee (which might make known its desire to receive proposals 
on the lines envisaged) . Provision general or specific -
for research schemes requires fresh machinery; this is needed 
also in the case of non-academic institutions (and of individuals), 
and in the task of coordination." 
Following on from the preceding outline of the nature and source of 
the envisaged large-scale funding, came a suggestion for the possible 
form that a statutorily constituted and financed coordinating body might 
take (1946, p.4, paragraph 19): 
"The main recommendation follows on this. It is the setting 
up of a Provisional Committee for sociological research, with 
full Government recognition and support, and financed from 
Government funds. Its function should be to promote sociological 
research of all types that appear useful, and to administer 
Government funds for this purpose. It should make grants 
to Universities and University Colleges for research projects; 
and should have power to assist independent institutions that 
put forward suitable schemes. While prepared to finance certain 
bodies and projects completely, it should encourage the provision 
of funds from other sources." 
It is curious that the Institute should suggest a 'Provisional Committee' 
for the coordination of sociological research, especially in the light 
of its earlier recommendation for a more formally organised 'council'. 
This may have been a compromise between the two types of organisation 
within which to supervise the support of the social sciences. Again 
it is possible to detect in the preceding quotation the kind of sociolog-
ical research favoured by the Institute, namely 'useful'. 
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It mattered not, whether the Institute's memorandum suggested the establish-
ment of a standing committee, or some form of provisional arrangement 
to control the resources going to the social sciences, for at the heart 
of the matter rested the consequences of any plan for the development 
of sociology. Although the Institute's members seemed to be advocating 
support for 'all types of sociological research', there was every likelihood 
that the more established branches of the social sciences would continue 
to receive the lion's share of any funds made available through the proposed 
scheme. Unless ·sociology received preferential treatment in the allocation 
of resources, then it seemed unlikely that its position vis-a-vis the 
other social sciences would change significantly from its pre-war situation. 
After all, when it came to an examination of the relative degree of 
autonomy for the different disciplines, sociology had not been able 
to advance its case beyond its pre-war state. Moreover, the sociologists' 
case had not been positively advanced during the course of the Clapham 
Committee's deliberations, especially by the admission of T.S. Simey, 
that sociology's plight was the fault of the sociologists, (sic) for 
they " had not yet . done the work which they ought to have done to 
make theirs a fundamental study." 
position of sociology and the 
the public regarded it as " 
Simey had also lamented the 'precarious' 
fact that both social scientists and 
not altogether respectable". 
Another crucial aspect of the case for a research council or standing 
committee entailed the connection between the arguments propounded 
by the sociologists for a synthetic science of society (a central feature 
of the pre-war conference debates) and those being presented to the 
Committee for consideration in 1946. I have suggested above, that the 
resolution of the problem as to whether or not there should be a research 
council for the social sciences, depended upon a political decision. 
Those who tended to favour some form of innocuous, titular organisation, 
merely to co-ordinate 'interest' in the diverse fields of social study 
and research, regarded a government funded and directed body as potentially, 
a politically controlled organisation (I shall explore the arguments 
of this group shortly) . The latter group regarded the independence 
241 
of social and economic research as paramount, and thus likely to remain 
so if the separation of funding and coordination of research was to 
remain largely as it had done in the past, notwithstanding a recognition 
that the war had brought about a new set of social and economic imperatives. 
This same group tended to frame their arguments within the context of 
the new and controversial debate on the relationship between the univer-
sities and the state in the post-war world. 
Those who believed that there was a need for a fundamental change in 
the financial and institutional support for social research and in partic-
ular, its academic setting, argued that government should take responsi-
bility for the transformation of existing arrangements, largely because 
the scale of that change was considered to be substantial. The future 
of sociology lay in the successful promotion of this line of thought. 
Furthermore, the sociologists probably realised that, in order to negotiate 
a place within the scheme of things, they would have to take cognisance 
of the arguments and conditions presented, or imposed from outside of 
the community of social scientists. It is possible to detect in the 
Institute's 'general plan', thematic components of the sociologists' 
pre-war programme for a synthetic approach to social science, although 
in the Institute's memorandum greater emphasis was placed upon such 
an approach within the sphere of research. The reference to an inter-
disciplinary approach to social research was a genuine one, although 
as I have stated previously, the memorandum would need to be framed and 
worded on the basis of the forum in which it would be debated (1946, 
p.5, paragraph 20): 
"More important, however, is the promotion of a synthetic 
view of research problems, with the object of bringing to bear 
upon them the work of specialists of various schools. It 
is already widely recognised that many human problems require 
for their effective study cooperation between biologists, 
psychologists, sociologists, and social anthropologists, with 
a combination of their various methods." 
The preceding quotation highlights the somewhat purposeful construction 
of the memorandum, in that the Institute had, since its inception, endea-
voured to promote the 'teaching and study of sociology' whenever and 
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wherever possible with particular emphasis upon the use of the 'sociological 
survey'. The pre-war condition of sociology had been one of dependency 
rather than autonomy, at least to the extent that the latter position 
was one enjoyed by many of the other social sciences, especially economics. 
In the case of the latter discipline, the memorandum's author made special 
reference to the shortcomings of those subjects which neglected the 
benefits of 'co-operating with other specialists' (1946, p. 5, paragraph 
20): 
"Many would add that the economist who specialises on the 
descriptive aspects of his science, and the historian also, 
have important contributions to make, and no doubt a case 
may also be made for the cooperation of other specialists." 
Once again the key role of the sociologist is advanced within a strategy 
to secure institutional space and material resources, and provides a 
clear example of sociology's advocatory dimension (1946, p.S, paragraph 20): 
"No rigid definition of the field of co-operation is required 
here: the point is stressed, as success in sociological research 
in the future may largely depend upon the co-operation of 
fully trained sociologists with other specialists." 
If social and economic research was to flourish in the post-war world 
of large-scale reconstruction, then the role of the sociologist must 
be recognised and resourced. The irony of such an argument is that 
it appeared to be a reassertion of the case made by the sociologists 
in the middle and late 1930s. In other words, sociology's future lay 
within the domain of others ' interests, at least· for the foreseeable 
future. Not so much an admission of intellectual inadequacy, rather, 
a tactical presentation of sociology's case. 
The concluding paragraph of the Institute's memorandum dealt with the 
future of the Wartime Social Survey (WSS) and the possibility of converting 
the temporary arrangement for a proposed Provisional Committee of 
the social sciences, to one of a permanent 'Council' or 'Department' . 
The reasons given for the maintenance of the WSS in some post-war form 
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are worth quoting, as they will have a bearing on my examination of 
the arguments of those who opposed the establishment of a council for 
the social sciences. 
Essentially, the Institute's members wished to see the WSS retained 
and linked, on a formal basis, with the proposed Provisional Committee 
(through a financial bond) . The memorandum suggested the following 
arrangements (1946, p.S, paragraph 21): 
"Its continuance seems useful for several reasons; it should, 
however, take its place on a peace-time basis as one important 
institution among several for sociological research. This 
might be arranged if the war-Time Social Survey became an 
incorporated or chartered body in close association with Government 
Departments, but financed by the Provisional Committee; its 
position would then be somewhat similar to that of a research 
institute associated with and financed by the Department of 
Industrial and Scientific Research." 
Those who tended to oppose the establishment of a research council for 
the social sciences, may have been somewhat alarmed by the preceding 
reference to the level of financial control intended for the Provisional 
Conunittee. Furthermore, the status of the latter Committee was viewed 
as equivalent to an existing government research organisation (in this 
case the DSIR) . If such a committee or council were to be created, 
then it would represent a significant departure from the system of funding 
and coordinating social research which had operated during the inter-war 
period. 
The Institute's memorandum concluded with a reference to the need for 
a formal organisation to both fund and coordinate research within the 
social sciences (1946, p.S, paragraph 22): 
"The name Provisional Conunittee has been suggested as it is 
thought that the small scale organisation here envisaged could 
serve its purpose for only a limited period, and would then 
suitably give place to a Council or Department of greater 
scope. A provisional development seems suitable at the moment; 
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the experience gained in the course of the Committee's activities 
would be the best guide in establishing a permanent organisation 
at a later date." 
The Institute's case for a research council was of cru.cial importante 
to the sociologists. However, what might not have occurred to 
its members, was the contingent matter of the debate on the relationship 
of the universities to the state; an argument that was gaining momentum 
as the war drew to a close1 with the prospect of a radical change in 
the political and economic structure of Britain. It was thought ,that 
this might bring with it a significant shift in the nature and purpose of 
disciplines within the social sciences. Those who foresaw the possible 
changes within the political composition of parliamentary and state 
administrative structures (with the emergence of 'state control' of the 
system of higher education were generally opposed to the creation of 
a research council, which, it was argued, might become an instrument 
of political domination. Before making a detailed examination of the 
confidential report entitled, The Vitalisation of Research in the Social 
Sciences, (Cabinet Papers, CAB 124/592), submitted to the Lord President 
of the Council, (Herbert Morrison)*, I wish first to consider what I 
shall refer to as the education debate and the relevance of it to the 
prospects of sociology. The 
1 
Vi talisation1 document contained very specific 
and crucial statements on the question of a research council for the 
social sciences, citing the funding of research and the universities 
as important factors in such a project. 
* Herbert Morrison was a staunch advocate of what I shall refer to 
in the education debate as a 'centralist', i.e. centralised funding 
and direction of higher education. 
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3. The Universities and the State: the intra-war debate 
I suggested above, that apparently innocuous, strategic arguments for 
or against sociology, carry within them certain tacit commitments to 
explicit forms of politics and morality. Furthermore, I argued that 
in large measure, the Clapham Committee's consideration of the role 
of post-war social science was predicated upon the much more politically 
contentious issue· of the changing relationship between the universities 
and the state. The latter controversy framed the more specific debate 
about those forms of knowledge considered essential to the needs of 
the state in a period of post-war reconstruction. Such issues would, 
in turn, influence those who sought to establish the fundamental role 
of the social sciences as primary sources of knowledge within the latter 
process. It is within the ferment of such controversies that I wish 
to consider the arguments of those who were generally opposed to the 
establishment of a research council for the social sciences - an institu-
tional innovation - which some social scientists, especially sociologists, 
considered essential to the development of their disciplines. 
Price (1978) has examined what I consider to be the two most important 
factors in the institutional development of sociology in post-war Britain: 
the changing relationship between the system of higher education and 
the state, and the increasing importance of state subsidised research 
activity, both within and outside of the universities. Although Price 
concentrates on the genesis of such developments (between the years 
1943 and 1946) his arguments are focused on the political and cultural 
implications of shifts in patterns of funding, directing, administering 
and discussion about the production of knowledge in the decades following 
the Second world war. As I argued earlier, the rise of science and 
the enhanced role of scientists during the crisis of war, provided the 
context and direction of the debate on the production of knowledge and 
the national need (Price, 1978, p.357): 
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"The proposal for the comprehensive forecasting of requirements 
for scientists and for the training which was to be required 
by the forecast would bear on all institutions of higher educa-
tion; it raised fundamental issues of the responsibility of 
universities for meeting "national needs", and the administrative 
co-ordination of their educational and research activities." 
It is within the central issues of the debate between those who opposed 
the " ... organisation and development of university education and research 
(as) a branch of state activity " (Price, 1978, p.361) and those 
who desired to see the replacement of the traditional arrange-
ments for controlling the aforementioned elements of the system of 
higher education, that it is possible to detect the crucial background 
arguments which framed the Clapham debate, especially the proposal 
to establish a research council for the social sciences. To the latter 
issue can also be added the matter of preferential funding of the social 
sciences (via ear-marked grants) and the establishment of ad hoc committees 
and sub-committees of the University Grants Committee (UGC). In fact 
all of the preceding proposals, with the exception of the council for 
the social sciences, actually materialised as a result of the recommenda-
tions of the Clapham Committee. Moreover, the notion of a research 
council for the social sciences became the major agenda item in subsequent 
debates on the future of the social sciences. What had been a central 
issue within the Clapham deliberations, became a reality nineteen years 
later upon the establishment of the Social Science Research Council 
in 1965. 
Those who contested the role of higher education in the period of recon-
struction can be conveniently divided into two quite distinct but opposing 
groups. 
of 
On the one hand, there were those committed to the retention 
pre-war arrangements for the funding of the universities via 
the UGC, in addition to the maintenance of the function of the Commit tee 
of Vice-Chancellors and Principals (CVCP) as an intermediary body between 
the universities and other public and private institutions, which may 
have had an interest in the universities. In many respects, the latter 
body represented the collective views of the universities in any and 
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all matters which affected them directly. On the other hand, there 
were those who regarded the preceding arrangements as no longer able 
to fulfil the needs of society in its radically altered post-war, 
economic, political and social form, and who proposed the following 
measures as a means to create a more responsive, accountable and equitable 
system for governing and resourcing the system of higher education: 
the creation of a more 'active planning body', in the form of a 'development 
committee' for the universities; the UGC to be made responsible to 
the Lord President of the Council (already responsible for the work 
of the existing research councils) and the creation of powerful 'advisory 
committees' to aid in the determination of planning initiatives (cf. 
Price, pp. 358-361). The former group, those who argued for maintenance 
of the status quo (though there were some who were willing to accept 
a degree of modification to existing arrangements) I shall refer to 
as supporters of the dispersed initiative (essentially a strategy which 
entailed the distribution of power and decision making within and among 
traditional institutions and groups in the system of higher education). 
The latter group, those who sought to alter significantly the pre-war 
structure of power and autonomy within the universities and its ideological 
basis, I shall refer to as supporters of centralised planning. 
The debate between the two groups was of significance to the development 
of sociology for the following reasons. First, the most influential 
participants in the education debate, namely Sir Hector Hetherington, 
Sir Walter Moberly and Sir John Anderson (of the dispersed initiative 
group) were also key members of the Clapham Committee. As the question 
of war and post-war planning and university autonomy had arisen as a 
contentious issue in the period, 1943 to 1946, the deliberations 
of the Clapham 
associated with 
society. The 
final report in 
Committee could not but be influenced by the arguments 
the debate on the role of the university in a planned 
Clapham Committee convened in 1944 and published its 
1946. It is most unlikely that the individuals mentioned 
above, would either subscribe to, or seek to espouse, a separate series 
of arguments on the forms of knowledge that were considered essential 
for the resolution of post-war problems of reconstruction and the most 
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appropriate institutional arrangements for funding and directing such 
a process. Such arguments implied the same political and moral dimensions, 
and tended to be framed within identical ideological presuppositions. 
These factors are thrown into sharper relief when one considers the 
fact that Sir Hector Hetherington was, during the period in question, 
Chairman of the Committee of Vice-Chancellors and Principals, Sir Walter 
Moberly was Chairman of the University Grants Committee and Sir John 
Anderson was Chancellor of the Exchequer. These individuals held positions 
of considerable power and influence within the three most important 
institutions crucial to the development of the system of higher education. 
Their additional involvement in the Clapham Committee also affected 
significantly, the outcome of the debate on the future of the social 
sciences in Britain in the years following the second World war. 
Secondly, sociology's institutional presence within the wider field 
of social science was relatively insignificant. Examination of the 
Institute's memorandum indicated clearly the importance of expansion 
in that sphere. Although the Clapham Committee's brief was to explore 
the possibility of expanding the research potential of the social sciences, 
it soon became apparent to the committee members that this could not 
occur without appropriate institutional development of existing sites 
wherein the social sciences were both taught and researched. Moreover, 
and in the case of sociology, without preferential support, the discipline 
was unlikely to make the contribution toward the production of social 
knowledge anticipated by those who would legislate the introduction 
of the welfare state, nor would it aspire to the potential being attributed 
to it by its few, but vociferous practitioners. Considered thus, the 
expansion of the universities was a debate of crucial importance to 
sociology's future. Indeed, it would be a subsequent review of the 
role of the universities within a redefinition of the nature and purpose 
of education (the Robbins Report, Cmnd. 2154, 1963-64) which would again 
provide sociology with an opportunity to gain a wider institutional 
presence within higher education. 
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Thirdly, the question of a research council for the social sciences 
became an issue which the participants in the debate on the role of 
the universities in relation to the needs of the state, were able to 
assess in terms of diminished autonomy for the universities, and the 
extra demand upon the Exchequer for resources which had traditionally 
gone to the existing research councils and institutes, notwithstanding 
the financial needs of the universities themselves. The supporters 
of the dispersed initiative tended to frame their arguments about the 
prospect of creating an additional research council for the social sciences 
within the preceding context1 coding their arguments in oppositional 
terms through contemplating the prospect of a socialist state emerging at the 
end of the war. The preceding debates highlighted the essentially moral 
basis of such arguments, 
presented as instrumental 
which the supporters of the dispersed initiative 
difficulties. However 1 they could not resist 
by the supporters of centralised planning to the attempt being 
strike at the heart 
made 
of a defense of elitism and a resistence to large-
scale social change, all of which had implications for the cultural 
context in which knowledge arises, how it is maintained, how it relates 
to reality, but also how it relates to the objectives and interests 
a society possesses by virtue of its historical development. 
Herbert Morrison (Lord President of the Council) , Sir Ernest Simon (Chairman 
of the Council; Manchester University), Professor R.H. Tawney, Sir Henry 
Tizard (members of the UGC) , Sir Maurice Hankey (Chairman of a Government 
Committee on Scientific Manpower), J.D. Bernal (Royal Society), Ernest 
Bevin (Minister of Labour and National Service) and Clement Attlee (former 
Lord President of the Council and Deputy Prime Minister) featured among 
the most influential supporters of a centralised approach to planning 
within the system of higher education. To the preceding group can be 
added the collective voices of the Association of Scientific Workers 
and the Parliamentary Scientific Committee. The former organisation 
tended to demand a more fully-fledged dirigisme, whereas the latter group, 
in common with the Association of University Teachers, tended to adopt 
a more modified version of centralised planning. For all of these indivi-
duals and organisations, the relationship between the universities and 
the state was of profound importance, especially in the light of the 
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political, economic and social changes taking place within British society 
during the course of the war. An example of the degree of expectation 
and demand for wide-ranging changes in the structure of education and 
the manner in which it was funded, administered and the curriculum devised, 
took the form of a conference sponsored by the British Association in 
1941 entitled, "Science and World Order". The British Association also 
established a special committee for the consideration of 'scientific 
research on human institutions' in 1942. The latter Committee made 
special reference to the need for a revised curriculum to incorporate 
an expansion in the field of the social sciences (cf. The Advancement 
of Science, Vol. 2, 1942, pp.345-356). 
The point here is that a growing number of individuals and organisations 
began to consider the need to redefine the concept and practice of educa-
tion at all levels, with the universities viewed as primary sites which 
had, hitherto, served to perpetuate the transmission of a culture, through 
ideas and practices, which seemed increasingly remote from the social 
and economic crises of the 1920s and '30s. The latter decade had culminated 
in a world war declared between two of Western civilisations's most cultured I 
nations. The war itself was bloody and costly, both in human and material 
terms, and had to be endured. The peace and its attendant political 
and economic forms did not. These features of society could be made, 
transformed and undone by human agency and design. In many respects 
this would entail more than a change in government: the significance 
of education as a vehicle to effect social change rather than perpetuate 
dominant and oppressive social structures became a focal point of the 
political debate on the theme of education and the role of the state. 
w. Kenneth Richmond (1945) has given a fairly clear indication of the 
scale of the emerging, wartime education debate (1945, p.l43): 
"Education was in the air. The atmosphere was a-simmer 
with expectation. "Equality of opportunity", "State control", 
"social security", "the dual system" - these were on everyone's 
lips, phrases to juggle with for the man in the street: and, 
though he had often only a remote understanding of their full 
implications, he did at any rate feel himself vaguely concerned. 
If it was not wholly front-page news, education had acquired 
a distinct copy value for the newspapers. 
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This susurrus of interest was the seedbed from which sprang 
what can only be described as a renaissance of English educational 
thought. Treatises which once upon a time would have been 
intended for specialists only suddenly found themselves vying 
the best sellers. England, still in the valley of the shadow, 
began to talk of reconstruction. Book-titles of 1940-43 
suggest something of the altering mood Diagnosis of our 
Time, Education and Social Change, Education for a New Society, 
Education for a World Adrift, Education in Transition 
or even (to compare small things with great) Blueprint for 
a Common School." 
Richmond makes an important observation regarding a feature common to 
all of the preceding works on the future of post-war education policy 
(1945, p.l43): 
"However much they differed from one another individually, 
all these works had this much in common, that they looked 
to education "to repair the ruins" in ways never dreamed 
of in Milton's philosophy. They looked to it, not as an infal-
lible nostrom, nor as some mysterious amulet against Fate, 
but as a new sociological influence without which there could 
be no betterment of human life and affairs." 
He goes on to cite the political and economic dimensions of education 
policy- making and the transformation that this process would undergo 
in the post-war era (1945, pp.l43-144): 
"In the past those affairs had been largely rough-hewn by 
circumstances; by unbridled individualism, competition, by 
the fetish of capital, by an entire code of living based on 
mistaken values. From now on the determination was to control 
circumstances of this kind, to shape the future aright even 
if it meant resorting to methods of cumpulsion and restraint. 
For whatever the solution to the problem facing modern civilisa-
tion was - and it was inextricably tied up with social, economic, 
political and religious factors the first term in it was 
concerned with education. The first duty of the planners, 
therefore, was to subordinate details of structure and admini-
stration to a thorough requestioning of basic principles. 
Long before the end of hostilities was in sight, indeed, at 
a time when the outcome was very much in doubt, England's 
appetite for a new deal in education was whetted as never 
before. II 
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In terms of the classification of individuals and groups associated 
with 'centralised planning' , Richmond was to become an ally and publicist 
for such a radical initiative in educational policy. 
Clement Attlee, author of the crucial letter to the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer, recommending the establishment of the Clapham Committee, 
wrote to Ernst Bevin, in his capacity as the Lord President, urging 
the latter to e~sure that appropriate pressure was applied in the relevant 
quarters, for an urgent expansion of the universities (Price, 1978, 
p. 363): 
"Attlee wrote to Bevin that this was "... a very serious matter, 
as we cannot hope to solve our post-war problems, unless we 
can increase the supply of trained men and women in the various 
departments of our national life"."* 
A key to the management, or central control of the universities lay 
in the direction of University Grants Committee's policy toward the 
distribution of its grant. It is this feature of the centralist approach 
to the question of the relationship between the system of higher education 
and the state, that had a direct and significant bearing on the fate 
of the social sciences, especially sociology. Supporters of a central 
planning initiative recommended the introduction of ear-marked grants 
for certain disciplines. This strategy emerged prior to the publication 
of the Clapham Committee's report, and the subsequent adoption by the 
UGC of such a means of funding specific branches of knowledge. In 
rrany important respects, the issue of ear-marked grants, a factor common 
to both the Clapham and education debates, highlighted the increasing 
emphasis on knowledge and its production. The dynamics of sectional 
interests both political and economic, forced the issue of education 
into a context wherein different forms of knowledge became the subject 
of evaluative scrutiny, based not always on financial return for investment. 
* Clement Attlee (Lord President) to Ernest Bevin (Minister of Labour 
and National Service), 29 January, 1945, Public Record Office, 
ED 46/295, quoted in Price (1978, p.363). 
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~Vith the war came a transformation in educational. policy making, 
influenced by both political ideology and the consequences for the Exchequer, 
should a vast expansion occur. To many in the dispersed initiative 
camp, the direction of large amounts of money to higher education (whether 
for teaching or research in selected fields) entailed the political 
control of the most important resource a society possessed - the medium 
for the generation and transmission of its culture. Supporters of the 
dispersed initiative sensed a profound change taking place in the political 
mood of the nation toward the end of the war. With the prospect of 
an election of a socialist government, there could well be an accompanying 
change in the nature and purpose of the university vis-a-vis the state. 
Certainly the centralists wished to transform the system of higher educa-
tion from its pre-war position in society: one portrayed by Theodore 
Roszak (1969, p.l2): 
on the fingers of one hand the eras 
has been anything better than the 
society: the social club of ruling 
school of whatever functionaries the 
"one might perhaps count 
in which the university 
hand-maiden of official 
elites, the training 
status quo required." 
If any significant change in the control of the universities (or, for 
that matter, an increase in their number) was to occur, then the role of 
the UGC would be crucial. Price (1978) actually refers to the centralists 
intention to achieve "government" of the universities' control over 
their subjects (1978, p. 364) via ear-marked grants. Resistance to such 
a possible political manoeuvre came from the Chairman of the UGC, Sir 
walter Moberly (also a member of the Clapham Committee) , (Price, 1978, 
p. 365): 
"In response to this the vice-chancellors had expressed a 
strong preference that if such a system were introduced, it 
should be "on as informal a basis as possible and for a temporary 
254 
period only. "* Moberly, as chairman of the University Grants 
Committee, was reluctant to use the "power of the purse", 
and only in the case of medical and dental education did he 
suggest to the Committee of Vice-Chancellors and Principals 
that "ear-marking" would be necessary. II 
Least it be thought that the issue was only one of an instrumental or 
organisational nature, whereby more effective and efficient administrative 
procedures would overcome the difficulties of the funding of knowledge, 
it is important,to consider the quite profound political and philosophical 
bases of the debate in question. Although Price (1978, p.365), has 
cited the argument of post-war expansion in the field of science and 
the role of the universities in achieving this, his reference to "divergent 
views" on the national distribution of science, jS perhaps more significant 
than has hitherto been appreciated. This is for two reasons, one of 
which had a direct bearing on the development of the social sciences, 
as contested within the forum of the Clapham Committee. 
First, Price has cited the example of science as a special candidate 
for extraordinary financial support and development within the post-war 
structure of the universities, focusing attention on the attempt to 
enhance the institutional basis of a particular branch of knowledge. 
This in turn implies the social context within which science evolves, 
especially its contingent status through an evaluation of its relationship 
to other forms of knowledge, a prescribed role for its practitioner~ 
and an explicit expression of its intrinsic capacity to fulfil the require-
ments of the prevailing notion of the national need. What is important 
in Price's analysis of this particul-ar episode in the history of British 
science, is not the associated round of inquiries and investigative 
committees into the 'national distribution of science in university 
departments' ~although this procedure has been applied to the social 
sciences) rather, the matter of a fiercely contested debate over the 
philosophical and social bases of science formed the crucial background 
to the whole affair. Thus a social theory of science, while largely 
* Minutes of Meeting between representatives of the University Grants 
Committee and the Committee of Vice-Chancellors and Principals, 
8 May, 1944, Public Record Office, UGC 2/25, quoted in Price (1978, 
p. 365). 
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unstated and often portrayed in crude ideological terms was, nevertheless, 
at the centre of the intra and post-war debates on the production of 
knowledge and the national need. Indeed, the latter debate encompassed 
the political assessment of the role of the social sciences in the period 
of post-war reconstruction - the remit of the Clapham Committee. 
Michael Polanyi and J.D. Bernal are cited by Price (1978, p.365) as 
the central figures in the debate on the contrasting social theories 
of science. I do not intend to examine the respective theories implied· 
in the more general wartime debate on the national distribution of science 
subjects in university departments. Polanyi 's position on the subject 
has been set out in, 'The Growth of Thought in Society' , (Economica, 
Vol. 21, 1941) and more recently in, 'The Republic of Science', (Minerva, 
Vol. 1, 1963). Bernal's thesis appeared under the title, The Social 
Function of Science, (1939) , and in a more contemporary and elaborated 
form in the four volume, Science in History, (1969) . The former author 
conceived of the development of scientific thought, in a quasi-evolutionary 
sense: a form of natural selection of the intellect. Competition for 
the 'best brains' in any field was viewed as a fundamental element of 
that process, reflecting in fact, the funding philosophy of the UGC 
and those private funding agencies which had acted quite discriminantly 
in the provision of resources to favoured quarters within higher education. 
The similarity between the principles and practice of laissez-faire, 
a preferred method for the distribution of funds to the universities 
by the UGC, and Polanyi 's theory of the 'growth of knowledge' are quite 
striking (Royal Society, 1946); 
" a satisfactory condition in each science would come about 
naturally, provided that each university chose the most distin-
guished leaders for its posts." 
In contrast to this, and included in the same Royal Society Report, 
is the view propounded by the centralists, but in this case, through 
the arguments of J.D. Bernal (1946, paragraph 3): 
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a balance would be best 
subjects in certain places, 
the country as a whole." 
secured 
regarding 
by encouraging special 
the universities of 
The Royal Society's report was eventually submitted to the UGC and the 
Vice-Chancellors of every university with the following observation 
and endorsement of Polanyi's thesis (1946, paragraph 3): 
"General opinion of those at the meeting was in favour of 
free development according to the first view." 
The reference to "the first view" represents the argument expounded 
by Polanyi, although some qualifications were made regarding grants 
for lectureships in special subjects. Consideration of the motives 
and actions of the supporters and exponents of the inter-war science 
movement (considered above) in addition to the financial policies of 
the Rockefeller Foundation during the same period, would tend to undermine 
the apparent 'extra-social' nature of the growth of knowledge according 
to Polanyi's theory. Furthermore, the nature and source of pre-war 
funding of knowledge was never the issue it had become toward the end 
of the war and into the immediate post-war period. Private, or at least, 
unregulated benefaction was supposedly subject to market forces and 
freedom of choice. With the prospect of a major change in the political 
order of British society after the war, in addition to a regulated economy, 
the relationship between the universities and the state suddenly became 
a 'problem' of profound ideological proportions: state funding was consi-
dered by supporters of the dispersed initiative, to entail not only 
an assault on the freedom and autonomy of the universities, but a serious 
threat to the very social and economic fabric of British society. A 
society whose economic system had previously given rise to and nurtured 
a system of higher education which was, according to Polanyi and his 
supporters, under threat of mindless intervention and centralised control. 
Second, those given to opposing the views of centralised planning, of 
whom Polanyi, perhaps more than most, represented the philosophical 
expression of that opposition, occupied strategic positions of power 
and influence within both the UGC and Committee of Vice-Chancellors 
and Principals. Moreover, the centralist position, tied as it was to 
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a political manifesto for radical, social and economic change, necessarily 
presented its exponents with considerable institutional and intellectual 
resistance from within those spheres of influence. Not only did the 
centralists need to forcefully advocate their case generally for a revision 
of the system of higher education, it was equally essential for those 
advocates to gain entry into the organisations, institutional arrangements 
and ad hoc commit tees of inquiry, wherein the debate on the nature and 
purpose of a university in a reconstructed Britain was taking place. 
Thus the question of access to the key forums of discussion and decision 
making was one which would ultimately affect the success, or otherwise, 
of the opposing view. The matter of J.D. Bernal and the Clapham Committee 
is a case in point. 
I have argued above that the Clapham debate took place against the back-drop 
of the more public and certainly sensitive issue of the autonomy of 
the universities. Reference was also made to the central figures engaged 
in the latter discussion, emphasising the fact they too held positions 
of influence within the Committee on the Provision for Social and Economic 
Research (Cmnd. , 6868) . During the course of nominating individuals 
to give evidence to the latter committee, the question arose of whether 
or not J.D. Bernal should contribute. In view of his arguments on the 
function of the university in society, in marked contrast to that of 
Polany.i 's, I would suggest that his rejection owed as much to his likely 
influence upon the members of the Clapham Committee (and sympathetic 
politicians, namely Attlee) than to his exclusion on the grounds that 
his work was of peripheral importance to sociological research. The 
coincidence of the increasingly heated education debate with that of 
the Clapham Committee, meant that issues central to both, would coalesce 
within a general conception and definition of higher education, its 
nature and purpose, and those forms of knowledge regarded essential 
to the fulfilment of the prevailing social, economic (and for some, 
political) imperatives. Social Science could not be excluded from such 
a controversy. 
John Clapham wrote to T.M. 
from J. Clapham, 28.8.45, 
Wilson of the Treasury (Letter to T. M. Wilson 
T 161/1301) expressing an opinion on those 
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who might be called to give evidence to the Committee. The following 
extract gives an indication of the method employed to make such a choice, 
with whim, prejudice and a measure of ignorance consigning to oblivion, 
certain individuals who may have had potentially, significant contributions 
to make to the debates in question. Moreover, I would suggest that 
the exclusion of Bernal was for reasons other than prejudice and caprice 
(T 161/1301) : 
"I am sure Hogben and Haldane would have a lot to say. Bernal 
has not, I think, written directly on our theme. His Social 
Functions of Science is a plea against pure science, and I 
think, propaganda for politically directed science. No doubt 
he touches our subject as I should say tendentiously 
Can 
All 
If 
you consult 
are really 
he thinks we 
Carr-Saunders on the 
men of science with 
ought to hear one or 
Bernal/Huxley question? 
sociological interest. 
more, then we might. " 
Carr-Saunders did not think Bernal should be heard. The role of the 
former individual as a referee is significant. Carr-Saunders exerted 
considerable influence within the wider sphere of social science and 
in view of the faith invested in his judgement on the matter of contri-
butors to the Clapham deliberations by the Chairman of that Committee, 
it is likely that he also influenced the selection of the sociologists 
who would be called upon to submit written and oral evidence. Certainly 
the prospect of hearing sociologists was almost dashed owing to Clapham's 
complaint over the length of the list of potential contributors. Clapham's 
ignorance in this matter almost put paid to the calling of Simey to 
present a case for sociology (T 161/1301) : 
"I'm afraid I know nothing about Sirney. I doubt if we will 
hear Parker, he is really a student of political thought, 
a subject for which there is, I should say, pretty ample provi-
sion several teachers at Cambridge and some in Oxford." 
The comment on political thought and its provision within higher education 
reflected a common, elitist view of what constituted 'ample provision': 
if it was taught at Oxford and Cambridge, then that was sufficient to 
cover both supply and demand within that sphere of knowledge. 
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Another important feature of the education debate entailed an estimation 
of the number of universities that would be required in the post-war 
period. Bernal and other supporters of the centralised planning approach 
believed that if there were to be sufficient numbers of graduates in 
the natural and social sciences after the war, then the need to establish 
new universities was a question which required urgent consideration. 
The matter centred on whether or not the existing system would 
be able to cope with the anticipated increase in student numbers after 
the war. This gave rise to the invidious, 'more means worse' argument, 
proffered by those opposing the centralists' case. Such an expansion 
would have greatly enhanced the institutional prospects of sociology.* 
The publication of the Barlow Report (1946) on the other hand, while 
making specific reference to the need for more scientific manpower, 
nevertheless pointed to the more fundamental need for a review of the 
system of higher education in Britain. A prospect which caused much 
disquiet in the sleepy back-waters of the Isis and Cam. In effect, 
this report was to determine the immediate post-war policy regarding 
university expansion. It is noteworthy that, in the absence of any 
other instrument for framing Government policy on higher education, 
it fell to this committee on scientific manpower to shape the first 
stage in an expansion policy which led, step by step, to the Robbins 
Report in 1963. As J. Stuart Maclure has observed of the significance 
of the Barlow Report (Maclure, 1973, p.23l): 
* 
"The main recommendation of the Committee was that the univer-
sities should be expanded so as to double the output of scientists. 
With this went the rider, not strictly within the terms of 
reference, but highly important in the event, that 'a substantial 
expansion in the number of students studying the humanities 
should not be sacrificed to the need for an increased output 
of scientists and technologists' . In a phrase which should 
be remembered in view of the spate of new university foundation 
in the 1960s, the Committee observed: 'there is nothing sacrosanct 
The irony of such a plan was that it did eventually enhance sociology's 
development, albeit some twenty years later after the publication 
of the Robbins Report (1963). Like its predecessor, the Barlow Report 
(1946), the Robbins Committee considered the adequacy of higher 
education as a system which could respond effectively to the prevailing 
national need. 
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about the present number of universities in the kingdom and 
we are attracted by the conception of bringing into existence 
at least one university which would give the present generation 
the opportunity of leaving to. posterity a monument of its 
culture'. Lord Lindsay of Birker became Principal of the 
University College of North Staffordshire in 1949." 
This concession to culture had no immediate and significant- effect 
on the institutional expansion of sociology. 
Sir Walter Moberly opposed the central argument of the Barlow Report. 
As an advocate of the dispersed initiative, Chairman of the UGC and 
supporter of the Committee of Vice-Chancellors and Principals, he continued 
to thwart the intentions and manoeuvres of the centralists. Price sums 
up the latter's position on university expansion (Price, 1978, p.366): 
"For the immediate future of the universities he believed 
the important factor would be the shortage of teaching staff, 
and he could consequently see no prospect of any rapid increase 
in student numbers which would not involve a serious decline 
in quality. He remained doubtful of the wisdom of founding 
new universities on the direct initiative of the University 
Grants Committee lest such new universities stand in a different 
position to the Committee from that of other universities." 
Although the UGC and the Committee of Vice-Chancellors and Principals 
continued to resist the move to expand the number of universities, some 
concessions were forthcoming in the area of special provision for certain 
branches of knowledge taught and researched in those institutions. 
It is interesting to note that a central recommendation of the Clapham 
Committee; the establishment of a UGC sub-committee, 1'to advise on matters 
relating to the social sciences" (Cmnd. 6868, 1946, paragraphs 27-28) , 
happened to coincide with the UGC' s agreement to establish several sub-
committees to 'fill the gaps in the existing fields of knowledge'. 
I would suggest that the presence of Sir Walter Moberly on the Clapham 
Committee and its decision to recommend the establishment of a UGC 
sub-committee on social science, owed more to a general policy within 
the UGC (a form of political resistance) to stave off whole-sale interven-
tion in the affairs of the universities -thus protecting their alleged 
autonomy, than an ad hoc decision of the Clapham Committee, based o·n the 
evidence before it. A sub-committee for the social sciences, under 
the guidance and direction of the UGC, would also enable the latter 
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organisation to nurture the development of those disciplines, within 
the universities at least,along the lines of such a strategy and in keeping 
with the ideological prescriptions of the intrinsic nature and social 
purpose of those forms of knowledge. What many historians of the social 
sciences have regarded as an initiative on behalf of social science 
by a government committee of inquiry, was largely a strategy derived 
from a policy of resistance by those who regarded any attempt to exert 
centralised control over the universities as a political threat to 
those institutions 1 autonomy. Thus, as I have argued previously, the 
development of the social sciences, including sociology, has been influenced 
significantly by the cultural context in which they have arisen, and 
in particular, how they relate to the objectives and interests a society 
possesses by virtue of its historical development. In this case, through 
the mediation of particularly powerful and influential groups of individuals 
within the realms of government and higher education. 
The fundamental questions of the constitutional position of the universi-
ties, of the adequacy of their internal administration to fit into "planning 
for national needs", and of the necessity of central direction remained 
the subject of controversy, both within the above-mentioned domains 
and up to Cabinet level throughout the war and into the immediate post-war 
era. Although the UGC had accepted that some degree of benevolent, 
political direction of its affairs was necessary within an age of centra-
lised planning, it had managed, in conjunction with the Vice-Chancellors, 
to forstall the degree of dirigisme envisaged by those who advocated 
a centralist approach to the question of the appropriate relationship 
between universities and the state in post-war Britain. Together with 
the Treasury, the Committee of Vice-Chancellors and Principals had managed 
an extended defence of that relationship, based on the principles of 
the dispersed intiative, though making some concessions to the notion 
of 1 general guidance 1 in the formulation of policy on higher education. 
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4. Further support for a research council for the social sciences: 
the hierarchy preserved. 
The education debate and the issues associated with it, give a clear 
indication of the wider context within which the case for a research 
council had been made. The following examination of Vitalisation of· 
Research in the Social Sciences (CAB 124/529) , provides further evidence 
of the connection between those two issues i.e. the funding and direction 
of social science and the most appropriate and politically acceptable, 
institutional arrangement to achieve this. 
in this section, to additional documents 
Reference will also be made 
and discussions affecting the 
establishment of a research council, and in turn, the effects that those 
debates would have on the future of sociology. 
There are essentially three interrelated themes running throughout the 
'Vitalisation' document, all of which coalesce within a comprehensive 
programme for the development of social science in the post-war period. 
They are as follows: an analysis of the existing system of higher education, 
which accounted for the institutional resistance to the emergent social 
sciences; the nature of social knowledge, which in turn implied its 
political status as a basis for social action; and a recognition by the 
author that the two previous points were relevant to the current debate 
(early to middle 1940s) on the appropriate relationship between the 
universities and the state. The document is repleat with strategic 
statements on the means by which such a programme could be formulated 
and implemented. 
The author begins his argument with two unquestioned assumptions: the 
prevailing institutional and financial arrangements for the funding of 
research, via the existing Research Councils, was adequate and that such 
an arrangement should be extended to encompass the social sciences; 
that although there were risks attached to the allocation and distribution 
of resources via the UGC to the universities, such an arrangement could, 
if carefully monitored, assist greatly the institutionalisation of 
social science. In the case of the former (the structure of support) 
the example of the natural sciences was cited as a branch of knowledge 
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which was both crucial to the realisation of the national interest and 
that such a mechanism of support for science could be adapted to the 
advantage of social science. The latter assumption was contingent upon 
an equivalency between the methods by which knowledge is produced within 
two discrete domains. I do not intend to examine the latter issue, 
other than to refer to the implicationsof such an epistemological argument 
for the case being made on behalf of social science. Although the author 
endeavoured to equate the social sciences with that of their 'natural' 
counterpart, the more contentious issues with which he had to deal 
were clearly stated in the formal title of the document itself - 'The 
Vi talisation of Research in the Social Sciences: with special reference 
to the role of the universities in a planned economy' . The second part 
of the title and the timing of the document's publication, at the height 
of the debate on university autonomy and following the publication 
of the Clapham Committee Report (Cmnd. 6868), give a clear indication 
of the wider issues and discourse which would affect directly, the develop-
ment of post-war sociology. 
The 'Vitalisation' document states its purpose clearly, (CAB 124/529, 
p.l, paragraph3): 
" by what means is it 
the Social Sciences in our 
fruitful contribution to 
with national expenditure 
possible to vi talise the study of 
universities with a view to ensuring 
the national effort commensurate 
on higher education and research?" 
The author was aware of the key role of the universities in furthering 
the interests of social science in the spheres of teaching and research. 
It is understandable that its arguments on the nature of higher education 
and the role of the professoriate within it, should find favour with 
the then Lord President (CAB 124/529, p.2, paragraphs 5 and 9): 
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"5. The professorial hierarchy of the University has been 
nurtured in a tradition of laissez-faire. In that framework 
it has been more concerned to propagate a rationale for 
the status quo, or at best to controvert Hs claims, than 
to undertake factual research to service a planned economy. 
The more senior members who have grown old in this tradition 
are unlikely to respond readily to the new situation. 
Since they control the use of University finances, allocation 
by the University Grants Commission of funds earmarked 
to encourage a more heal thy growth of the Social Sciences 
may fail therefore to accomplish any useful result through 
lack of external control. 
9. The objection which stresses the dangers of political 
control of the Universities is largely a hang-over of 
laissez-faire. Fundamental research in the social sciences 
should be concerned with exploring human needs, the material 
resources available for satisfying them and the institu-
tional machinery for implementing their satisfaction. 
In a democracy it is for the people's representatives 
to decide what immediate action such knowledge invokes 
and what are the priorities." 
The future of the social sciences became inextricably bound up in the 
political furore over the conflicting nature and purpose of the university 
in a society which had, for the first time, elected a political party 
committed to the wide-scale introduction of socialist policies within 
the framework of a welfare state. 
theoretical and substantive issues 
With the latter came many of the 
which would prov:i,de the staple diet 
of sociologists in the decades up to the 1970s. The inter-relationship 
between theories of society, of the State, of social problems and of 
social policy would soon preoccupy the sociologist and give the fledgeling 
dil:Ci pline what Urry (1981) has considered to be its 'parasitic' form. 
The latter manifesting itself in terms of the organisation of sociological 
discourse (cf. Urry, 1981, pp.27-37). The reference to 'knowledge invoking 
social priori ties' is a crucial statement, in as much as social knowledge 
has consequences for social action. Moreover,· the general argument 
contained in documents like the 'Vi talisation' and the previously consi-
de red Institute of Sociology's submission to the Clapham Committee 
(and the shortly to be considered, 'Report on the Co-ordination of Social 
Sciences', (T 161/1301)) , indicate a distinctively prescriptive role 
for social science in the post-war period, one that implies an alignment 
with a pragmatic, political consensus, finding expression through the 
265 
collectivist initiatives of a socialist government, and sustained generally 
by a cornrni tment to the ethos of planning and centralism. Vic George 
and Paul Wilding (1976, p.8) give an indication of the essential difference 
between the general approach to social policy on either side of the 
last war: 
"In spite of the criticisms levied against functionalist explana-
tions of social policy, they do have the merit of turning 
attention to the social and economic system and away from 
such individualistic explanations of social policy as those 
of Dicey and Hayek. At least they see social policy as emerging 
out of the processes associated with social and economic change 
rather than out of the fertile intellect of super-men, or 
out of a process of mass deception by well-meaning but basically 
misguided reformers." 
Social priorities and programme statements, or agendas for social science 
and its research initiatives, became intermeshed and explicated within 
differing themes of advocacy for the potential of those disciplines. 
In an era of socialism this may have accounted for the perpetuation 
and further entrenchment of the mythical equation, that social science 
and socialism were one and the same. The Vitalisation document certainly 
implied the need to establish a social role for the social scientist 
and his or her craft in the post-war world. It is also worth noting 
that in the above reference to the distinction between the production 
of social knowledge and its subsequent use, the social scientist is 
viewed as an independent agent in the process of transforming theory 
into .social praxis. This image of the neutral scientist fits in well 
with the popular, pre-war model of the similarly disposed natural scientist 
serving the interests of society first and his vocation second. The 
same argument, contained in the document, also imputes a distinct separation 
of roles and responsibilities for the politician and scientist. The 
former, a custodian and articulator of the nation's interests, the latter, 
a technical/instrumental practitioner of a craft upon which the former 
individual would come to depend increasingly in a complex, technological 
age. Such a conception of the relationship between politician and expert 
compromises the nature of social knowledge and its implication for social 
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action. At least with hindsight, this criticism is comparatively easy 
to make.* 
The second theme characterising the 'Vitalisation' document's agenda 
for an enhanced role for social science in a planned economy, entailed 
three proposals to increase the knowledge base of those disciplines. 
This latter strategy comprised the means to achieve both the intellectual 
and institutional objectives set out in not only the Vitalization document, 
but others I have referred to previously when citing programme statements 
as important declarations on the nature and purpose of sociology within 
the advocatory mode. Considered thus, the author of the Vitalisation 
programme suggested the following proposals to ensure the " fruitful 
contribution to the national effort commensurate with national expenditure 
on higher education and research "(CAB 124/529, p.l, paragraph 4): 
"(a) a greater measure 
Grants Commission 
of new departments 
of encouragement from the University 
for extension of existing and creation 
of Social Science; 
(b) creation under the Privy Council for an ad hoc body analogous 
to the M.R.C. and D.S.I.R. to subsidise individual projects 
in or outside university departments; 
(c) enlargement of the scope of War Time Social Survey to 
function as a body comparable to the National Physical 
Laboratory or the National Medical Research Institute, 
geared into the present needs of government departments 
but free to undertake enquiries of less immediacy." 
Of the three proposals, it is perhaps (b), the recommendation that a 
research council for the social sciences should be established, that 
proved to be one of the most controversial issues. And yet here again, 
the same demand for such a council appeared in a document submitted 
to the Lord President of the Council, which in turn, was passed on to 
the UGC sub-commit tee for social science. As I have argued above, such 
* It should be remembered that during the course of the inter-war 
conferences, the presentation of such an image of the sociologist 
as the new, 'expert technician' , was part of Mannheim' s reconstruc-
tionist repertoire, especially his project for a synoptic science 
of society under the controlling ethos of sociology (cf. Diagnosis 
of Our Time, (1943), Man and Society in an Age of Reconstruction, (1940), 
Freedom, Power and Democratic Planning, (1950), Essays on the Sociology 
of Knowledge, (1952)). 
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a proposal remained a contentious issue throughout the Clapham deliberations 
and never ceased to be a major 'issue' within social science, until 
the creation of the Social Science Research Council in 1965. Although 
proposal (c) was adopted eventually, this was despite the criticisms 
made of the Survey's work by those Ministries which had cause to use 
its facilities. The w.s.s. 's continued existence rested on the estimation 
of its 'success' by the political heads of government departments. 
The political support for the w.s.s. was quite widespread, despite 
the suspicions of some of its opponents that it too would become an 
instrument of state investigation and oppression. Thus the issue of 
the W. S. S. , although a distinctly political affair, was less contentious 
perhaps, than the case of (a) and (b) above. In both the latter proposals, 
issues of university autonomy and the funding of knowledge were at 
stake, and this placed them within the wider and certainly more politically 
sensitive context of the national debate on education. 
Another feature of the Vitalization document's argument in support 
of a council for the social sciences, was its assumption that the existing 
model of a similar organisation for the natural sciences, would suit 
the organisational and research needs of the social sciences. There 
are two points which I think require clarification here. First, such 
a conception of both the organisational and intellectual/research needs 
of social science being similar (if not identical) to those of the 
natural sciences confuses and conflates the essential differences which 
characterise the two activities in their cognitive and practical forms. It 
could have been that the author viewed the nature and function of existing 
research councils as the only appropriately, practicable media of extra-
mural support for scientific research upon which to base a scheme for 
the social sciences. However, this implies another related aspect of 
such a strategy, and this leads me to my second point. There is something 
of the Rothchild, 'customerjcontractor' principle (Cmnd. 4814, 1971) 
in the case being made for a research council similar to that of the 
system of support for the natural sciences. Such a model for the funding 
and direction of research tends to underestimate the problem of the 
use or applicability of discrete or divergent forms of knowledge. This 
tends to be based upon a common misconception of the manner in which knowledge 
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is institutionally generated* i.e. scientific knowledge arises as a result 
of a common, or universal process, which is neither contextually bound 
by culture, nor influenced by sectional interests within it. Although 
this conception of the sociology and philosophy of science has been 
largely undermined in recent years, the author of the Vitalisation 
document assessed the factor.s affecting the process of the production 
of scientific knowledge as a series of quite discrete variables, presenting 
only instrumental and organisational problems (CAB 124/529, p.l, paragraphs 
1-2): 
* By 
of 
"1. With reference to the application of natural science 
(here taken to include medicine, engineering and agriculture) 
to industrial organisation and social services, there 
exists: 
(a) recognised bodies of experts such as the Royal Society 
or the Royal College of Physicians to whom Administrators 
and Statesmen can turn for information concerning 
relevant knowledge available; 
(b) institutes and university departments where research 
is actively prosecuted outside government service 
with direct support from 
by the Privy Council; 
(c) university departments or 
students receive practical 
for technical appointments 
industry. 
public funds administered 
technical schools 
training which fits 
in public service 
where 
them 
and 
2. Outside the domain of the natural sciences with just 
as strong a cLai'TI to public support there is a wide field 
of contemporary social studies, including: finance and 
international trade, organisation, control, and location 
of indus try, labour relations, growth o.f population, 
standards of life, selection of personnel, town and country 
planning, public administration, and welfare of colonial 
this I mean the external system of support for the productio_n 
knowledge in Shils' sense of the concept (Shils, 1970, p. 763) : 
"It (institutionalisation) also entails the organised support 
of the activity from outside the particular institution and 
the reception Of' use of the results of the activity beyond the 
boundaries of the institution." 
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peoples. While day to day work of government departments 
involv.es an ever-increasing volume of ad hoc enquiries into 
social conditions and economic organisation with a view to 
implementing public policy, there exists outside government 
service: 
(a) little organised research into social institutions 
human relations, prospecting and anticipating issues 
which the administration may have to concern itself; 
and 
with 
(b) little machinery of instruction to supply government offices 
with experts trained in the practical techniques of such 
social investigations as fall within their province." 
What was lacking in the field of social research was an institutional 
structure of support, equivalent to that in the natural sciences. Again 
the model of science is employed as a feature of the strategy to advocate 
the potential of social science. This strategic association between 
natural and social science, is made clear in the following demand for 
equivalancy in national recognition and status for social science, (CAB 
124/529, p.3, paragraph 10): 
"The problem of fitting the pursuit of social studies in our 
universities into the framework of a planned national economy 
is indeed the problem of endowing them with a recognised social 
function as explicitly (or implicitly) recognised as the need 
for the natural sciences." 
The whole project of vitalising the social sciences rested on the question 
of whether or not the universities could be induced to make wider provision 
for them, in addition to the establishment of a social science research 
council. The creation of the latter had, as I have argued above, serious 
consequences for the former, in so much as the UGC and the Committee 
of Vice-Chancellors and Principals (and other supporters of the dispersed 
initiative) regarded such a proposal as a move in the direction of overt 
political control over the production of knowledge. The author of the vi tali-
sation document endeavoured to tactfully present a proposal for a research 
council that would not immediately undermine the nature and function 
of existing councils, (CAB 124/529, p. 2, paragraphs 6-7) : 
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"6. In so far as a Social Research Council on all fours with 
the MRC and DSIR could (with proper safeguards) exercise 
a necessary modicum of control, proposals 4 (a) and 4 (b) 
are therefore complementary, and are jointly in line 
with the existing set-up which guarantees for departments 
of the natural sciences within the universities a necessary 
minimum of freedom to undertake projects with no promise 
of an early return and ensures a close link of such research 
to its applications. The essential feature of this set-up 
is that every department of natural science has both 
(a) an ample basic grant allocated directly from university 
funds; (b) access to public funds from the MRC, ARC, 
DSIR, or Development Commission for ad hoc projects which 
it is possible to justify as deserving public encouragement." 
. The matter of the future role of the Wartime Social Survey under the 
control of a research council for the social sciences, and the need 
for an expansion of university departments in the latter disciplines 
was of particular concern to the author (paragraph 7): 
"7. The proposal to set up a Social Research Council is also 
complementary to proposals to enlarge the scope of the 
Social Survey. Under the control of a statutory body 
comparable to the MRC, Social Survey could in fact fill 
a niche comparable to that of public research institutes 
within the existing set-up of the natural sciences; but 
it cannot of itself undertake the training of university 
graduates to undertake factual research of value to a 
planned economy. Such training presupposes the existence 
of university departments where active factual enquiries 
provide a basis for instruction in the requisite statistical 
techniques, sources of data and methods of field study. 
Neither indiscriminate allocation of funds to the universities 
nor an ample appropriation for Social Survey can suffice 
to remedy the moribund state of the Social Sciences in 
the universities and ensure that graduates trained in 
university departments of the social sciences will have 
adequate qualifications for the tasks of government service." 
The preceding paragraph contains most of the essential elements of the 
pre-war debate on the nature of social science, which were given particular 
prominence during the three conferences referred to in an earlier chapter. 
More important than this though is the reference to the "moribund state 
of the social sciences" up to the conclusion of the Second World War. 
The latter observation had been made by contributors to the Clapham 
Committee, and in so doing, provided an opportunity for the social scien-
tists themselves to devise a programme of revivification, in addition 
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to new initiatives for their ailing subjects. · As I have argued earlier, 
any such programme for social science would necessarily include a claim 
upon the system of higher edu:ation1 in addition to other forms of extra-
mural support and resources. The 'new social science' would also encompass 
quite clearly defined objectives, in keeping with the post-war, reconstruc-
tionist ethos: the training of competent technicians geared to the "tasks 
of government service" and prepared to "undertake factual research of 
value to a planned economy." The post-war patterns of teaching and research 
had been cleariy defined, thus reasserting a tradition within the field 
of social research and thought, which had faltered during the inter-war 
years and had only begun to gain its momentum once again toward the 
end of that same period. Furthermore, a striking feature of the Vitalisa-
tion document, and also a characteristic of programme statements or 
agendas for social science expressed within the advocatory dimension, 
was the virtual absence of any specific reference to substantive issues 
within those disciplines. 
There is another feature of the document, especially the content of 
paragraphs 6 to 9, which is worth noting. In those sections can be detected 
echoes of the Beveridge/LSE/Rockefeller episode. Certainly the preferred 
form of post-war social science meant a continuation of the empirical 
tradition, with the LSE as the vanguard of that tradition. With the 
probable withdrawal of the Rockefeller Foundation as the major benefactor 
of future, large-scale expansion within British social science, the 
argument for the creation of a research council became of crucial importance 
to the continuation of funding for those branches of knowledge. Conse-
quently, the argument for the creation of such an organisation led to 
a critique of the social and political arrangements which had previously 
sustained the disciplines in question. Within such a critique lay specific 
critic isms of those social institutions which supporters of the dispersed 
initiative had sought strenuously to defend. 
An attempt to ascribe a social function for social science in 
post-war Britain was another feature of the author's Vitalisation argument 
(CAB 124/529, pp.2-3, paragraphs 9-11): 
* 
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"9. Within the scope of this understanding there is room 
for ample freedom of enquiry, as experience of the way 
in which the MRC, ARC, DSIR, work has shown. A more 
serious objection is that the personnel of such a Council 
would inevitably be drawn from the existing hierarchy 
of the Universities, and would carry on the existing 
tradition of university departments under its umbrella. 
10. To circumvent this danger it is necessary to recognise 
the historical background of the situation Within 
the milieu of laissez- faire, society had practical tasks 
for experts in the natural sciences; and these were recognised 
community targets as a basis for public encouragement 
of their work. Hence the dichotomy already emphasised. 
A laissez-faire society delegated no such function to 
the academic student of social conditions and social 
institutions. Socially profitable research into social 
conditions or social institutions was largely the outcome 
of individual initiative such as that of the Webbs, Charles 
Booth and Seebohm Rowntree, none of whom had any direct · 
affiliations with higher centres of so-called learning. 
The problem of fitting the pursuit of social studies 
in our universities into the framework of a planned national 
economy is indeed the problem of endowing them with a 
recognised social function as explicitly (or implicitly) 
recognised as the need for the natural sciences. As 
the Webbs themselves recognised, factual study of social 
conditions as a recognised academic discipline has received 
its most powerful impetus from the impact of medicine. 
This is of special importance, because the universities 
are already responding to the call of a National Health 
Service by the creation of Chairs of Social Medicine 
to encourage the study of health and disease in relation 
to the social conditions of all sorts. 
11. This means that there does exist a nucleus of professional 
personnel alive to the role of science in a planned economy 
of human welfare and deeply concerned with the study 
of social conditions or social institutions as themes 
of enquiry with peculiar problems and difficulties of 
their own. Thus the danger that a Social Research Council 
would merely confer addi tiona! prestige on the mandarins 
of the so-called humanities in our universities can be 
circumvented by placing it under the direction of an 
administrator having at the same time a lively sympathy 
with the peculiar claims of social studies as such and 
direct affiliations to interfacial problems of medicine 
like those for which the Industrial Research Board of 
the MRC is responsible. That such a choice is administra-
tively feasible is evident from the fact that Dr. Stephen 
Taylor* himself a medical man, was appointed as Director 
of Wartime Social Survey, and in that capacity has contacts 
both with research in the social and in the natural 
sciences." 
Dr. Stephen Taylor was also a member of the Scientific Advisory 
Committee of the wartime Social Survey. 
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Negotiating the 'social function' of social science thus became a central 
feature of the document's strategy to establish the primary role of 
social knowledge in the construction of the welfare state. Science, 
in both its institutional and cognitive forms, served as a vital resource 
for the social scientists and their supporters. In addition, the moral 
and political bases of social research and its consequences for social 
action, became explicit in attempts to demonstrate not only the social 
function of social science, but that such forms of knowledge were, in 
themselves, potential critic isms of the prevailing economic and political 
systems. 
Paragraphs 12 and 13 (CAB 124/529, p. 3), of the document give a clear 
indication of the direct connection between the case being made on behalf 
of all the social sciences, and the more contentious 
on the autonomy of the universities. 
public debate 
The content of 
those paragraphs highlight the contingent status of the former disciplines 
upon the resolution of the latter problem. Furthermore, it is also 
possible to detect the author's position vis-a-vis the education debate and 
the manner in which it had been publicly discussed, through exponents of 
either the dispersed initiative or centralised planning. The following 
extract from the document gives a clear indication of where the author's 
allegiance lay, gaining expression within an argument about the possible 
establishment of a research council for the social sciences (CAB 124/529, 
paragraphs 12-13, p.3): 
"12. By the creation of a Social Research Council, enjoying 
parity with MRC and DSIR, the Privy Council would become the custo-
dian of all university research with reasonable claim to public 
support. -rl would thus be in a position both to safeguard 
the interests of research in the universities and to 
exercise a reasonable control on expenditure for university 
research in the national interest. such a step would 
therefore have far-reaching and salutary consequences 
with reference to the anomalous position of the universities 
vis-a-vis their claims to public support. 
13. A lukewarm reaction of the universities to the need for 
educational expans.l.on in response to demands for a wider 
distribution of educational opportunity in the national 
interest reinforces the case for bringing the administration 
of the universities within the province of the Ministry 
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of Education. Admittedly, there are good reasons for 
advocating such a proposal, if only because progressive 
democratisation of our educational system presupposes 
eventual integration of all instruments of higher education 
including agricultural colleges, teachers training colleges 
and polytechnics in larger regional units comparable 
with the Middle West State Universities. Only by such 
coordination is it possible to promote closer contacts 
between theoretical and practical research, to disperse 
more widely the intellectual freedom of the university 
life and to bring the life of the universities into more 
intimate contact with community needs." 
It can be appreciated from the above quotations why the creation of 
a research council for the social sciences seemed an unacceptable propo-
sition for those members of the Clapham Committee who opposed it. To 
have given the scheme unqualified support would have undermined a firm 
commitment to the principle of university autonomy. Preferential treatment 
of one branch of knowledge over another entailed the prospect of 'inter-
ference' with that form of knowledge's allegedly, 'natural evolution' 
within the system of higher education - at least according to Polanyi 's 
theory, advanced in support of the dispersed initiative. 
The Vitalisation document concluded with a further reference to the 
essential connection between the potential of the universities in producing 
knowledge in response to the national need, providing the system for 
controlling those institutions lay within the jurisdiction of an office 
above that of the UGC. Such a proposal struck at the very heart of 
the defence of the universities (as expressed within the argument of 
the dispersed initiative) (paragraph 14, p.3): 
"If there is a good case for a closer tie-up between universities 
and other levels of the educational system now directly under 
the authority of the Ministry of Education, there is an equally 
strong case for comprehensively safeguarding the interests 
of university research by making the University Grants Commission 
an organ of the Privy Council. Pending further examination 
of these issues, it would seem that the creation of a Social 
Research Council could act as a powerful stimulus to an all-
round development of socially useful research in the universities." 
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Much of the evidence considered above on the general debate about the 
autonomy of the universities had a direct bearing on the future of the 
social sciences in the post-war era. Central to those arguments was 
the claim being made by social scientists on behalf of their respective 
disciplines, should a research council responsible for the initiation, 
funding and coordination of social research, be established as a major 
part of a strategy to encompass those disciplines within the van of 
national reconstruction. It should be pointed out, that both the education 
debate and the enquiry into the provision for social and economic research 
(the remit of the Clapham Committee) became vital, public issues after 
an earlier event to assess the potential of social science as a national 
asset. The latter review of social science occurred some three years 
prior to the convening of the Clapham Committee, 
before the question of the relationship between 
and at least one year 
the universities and 
the state became a public issue. 
features of that debate and the 
I wish to consider briefly, the general 
context in which it ensued, this will 
then enable me to assess the success, or otherwise, of the social scien-
tists' attempts to pursue their programme for revived investment in 
the intellectual and institutional potential of their respective disciplines. 
In the preceding sections 
politicians and groups of 
of social knowledge in the 
I examined in detail, the attempt by certain 
social scientists to reassess the potential 
post-war reconstruction of British society. 
The latter group of individuals sought to produce programmes for a revivi-
fied social science that would respond to a definition of the national 
need determined increasingly by the exigencies of war and the aspirations 
of a Labour movement given to wide-scale planning in every sphere of 
national life. Hence the length to which I have gone in order to explain 
the consequences of the latter transition within politics and social 
theory, for the system of higher education, as a crucial medium for 
the production and transmission of knowledge. The emergence of the 
expert and technician and the ethos and authority of science, provided 
important conceptual models and resources for both the politician and 
social scientist to incorporate in their respective conceptions of 
the nature and purpose of social knowledge. While the spread of this 
vision of a rational/technical social science began in the middle and 
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late 1930s, the period of war and the attendant social, economic and 
political upheaval that accompanied it introduced an urgency into the 
assessment of those forms of knowledge that had become, and would certainly 
in the future, be assessed in ~elation to a host of new and historically 
different, cultural imperatives. 
I pointed out that Labour members of the wartime government and leading 
socialists had sensed the depth of feeling in the population, that with 
the onset of a world war, there must follow a profound change within 
British society. For the majority of the population the war meant the 
end of more than the tyranny of international facism. With it came 
an opportunity for ending social inequality and recurring economic recession. 
Politicians of the left in particular sensed this and promised to fulfil 
the expectations of those who looked beyond victory and to a period 
of social justice and economic prosperity. In order to achieve the latter, 
the politicians would need to engage the assistance of a host of specialists, 
within fields that, under normal circumstances, would have been considered 
anathema to traditional customs and protocols of 'political wisdom' 
and especially, the principles and practices of the civil service. 
It will be recalled that Clement Attlee had suggested a potential 
form of social intelligence gathering, with his letter to the Chancellor 
of the Exchequer. An opportunity for the social scientists and their 
knowledge had been created within an official context; but this 'call 
to arms' had been preceded by an earlier attempt by social scientists, 
including sociologists, to co-ordinate their efforts and to provide 
their services in the formulation of public policy. 
A committee* for the consideration of 'scientific research on human 
institutions' was formed during 1942 under the auspices of the British 
Association for the Advancement of Science, holding its first meeting 
on August 26. It subsequently met about once a month until June 9, 
1943. Its terms of reference were as follows (The Advancement of Science, 
Vol. 2, 1942, p.245): 
* The Committee consisted of: Professor P. Sargant Florence (Chairman); 
Mr. L.J.F. Brimble (Hon. Secretary); Mr. H.J. Braunholtz; Professor 
G. Catlin; Professor C.H. Desch, FRS; Mr. A. Farquharson; Professor 
Morris Ginsberg; Professor Lancelot Hogben, FRS; Dr. Julian Huxley, FRS; 
Professor Harold Laski; with the President and General Officers of the 
British Association. 
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"To consider how the results of scientific 
institutions and human needs and their 
best be co-ordinated and brought to bear 
of public policy." 
research on human 
interrelations can 
on the formulation 
Within the above- mentioned terms of reference can be found the basic 
elements of the pre-war programme statements of those social scientists 
committed to 'progress' in the field of social research, on the basis 
of empirical analysis. The onset of war appeared to enhance the latter's 
case, especially the increased need to produce information on an immediate 
and ad hoc basis. The relationship between public policy formation 
and social research, in the main a pre-war aspiration, had now become 
a feasible enterprise, with only instrumental difficulties to surmount. 
Certainly Lancelot Hogben's presence on the Committee bore testimony 
to the most ardent and sustained pre-war attempt to establish social 
science (at the LSE at least) within the framework of 'pure science'; 
though the connection between the practice of scientific research and 
the process of policy making may not have been a prospect he relished, 
especially_ in view of his experiences at the LSE during the 1930s. 
Morris Ginsberg's inclusion as a committee member is not altogether 
surprising in view of the fact that he was then, England's foremost 
sociologist and would have been invited to participate on the basis 
of his additional work in the field of psychology. Huxley, Catlin, 
Desch, Flugel and Braunholtz's participation indicated the source of inspira-
tion for the convention of such a body, in addition to their involvement 
in the pre-war science movement. The chairman, Professor Sargent Florence 
had been critical of sociology and psychology in his remarks to the 
inter-war conferences. To him scientific research and its application 
to public policy meant economic analysis and its relationship to economic 
policy. The interesting feature of the final report of the Committee, 
presented in 1943, is the evident attempt to incorporate the often prev-
iously conflicting views of the social scientists. The apparent consensus 
evidenced in the British Association's (B.A.) report, would seem to 
support my earlier contention, that the construction and presentation 
of programme statements on the nature and purpose of social science 
(especially its existing and intended research initiatives) could be 
significantly influenced by the social context in which such agendas 
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were set. The war had provided an ideal opportunity for social scientists 
to demonstrate the potential of their respective disciplines. This 
aspect of a public assertion of the promise of social research as 
a vital aid to enlightened policy making - was as much a result of the 
sincerity of social scientists in promoting such a conception of their 
craft, as it was a strategy promulgated and reinforced by the exceedingly 
influential group of scientists associated with the science movement 
and other radical, natural scientists, who regarded social science as 
a major component of a centrally organised and rationally planned society. 
An indication of the scope and depth of the B.A.'s Report can be obtained 
from the areas it examined under its remit, (1943, p.345): 
II I. Introduction 
II. Scope and Method of Research on Human Institutions and 
Needs and their Inter-relations. 
III. Education in the Social Sciences and their Relation 
to the Natural Sciences. 
(a) The Present Situation. 
(b) Plan for a Co-ordinated Syllabus. 
IV. A Council for the Social Sciences. 
(a) Need for 
and in the 
(b) The Need 
Co-ordination in Direction of Research 
Disbursement of Funds. 
for Advice on the Preparation of official 
Social Statistics. 
(c) Need for Initiation and Supervision of Practical 
Training. 
(d) Need for Publication of Information and Results. 
(e) The form of Organisation." 
The document and the occasion which gave rise to it, is of considerable 
importance for several reasons. First, it represented the first occasion, 
since the inter-war conferences, whereby eminent practitioners from 
the various disciplines came together under the auspices of the highly 
respected British Association, with a view to reconsidering issues which 
had been the subject of those conferences. Second, the B.A.'s 
Committee and subsequent report, was less of an academic affair than 
the reports of the pre-war conference proceedings. There was therefore 
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a greater opportunity for its recommendations to be carried to more 
influential quarters, either within westminster or Whitehall. Third, 
the period in which the Committee was convened and reported, was one 
of national crisis. The national need had been clearly defined and 
constantly extolled, with the emphasis on not only victory, but reconstruc-
tion. Again the convening of the Committee had followed the British 
Association's spectacularly successful three day, international conference 
in 1941 on "Science and World Order", the prime mover of which had been 
Sir Richard Gregory, president of the B.A. during the war, and a leading 
figure in the pre-war science movement. On the occasion of the B.A. 
conference, the social scientists would negotiate the construction of 
a programme of development for their respective disciplines in conjunction 
with natural scientists. This would entail a common understanding of 
the nature and purpose of science, and presupposed a model of the produc-
tion of scientific knowledge (which may not have been shared by all 
of the Committee's members). This is apparent in the section of the 
B.A. 's report on "Scope and Method of Research on Human Institutions 
and Needs, and their Interrelations". However, it should be remembered, 
that the British Association was generally regarded as a progressive 
agent in coordinating the natural and social sciences, and that this 
would have important consequences for sociology's future. 
The report was unequivocal on the universal nature of the scientific 
method, as the common, unifying element in the project to "co-ordinate" 
the fields of natural and social science, and especially what it referred 
to as "the borderland subjects" that lay between them (1943, p.346): 
"The natural and social sciences are not distinguished by 
the use of different methods but by the subject-matter which 
they investigate; for both employ deduction, classification 
and induction. They are alike in that they take no account 
of values, but are concerned with the assembly, analysis and 
classification of data from their chosen fields. 
All sciences are concerned with specification of laws of behaviour. 
Some laws of behaviour are relevant to idiosyncrasies of socially 
organised mankind, others to idiosyncracies of molecular orien-
tation in plastic products." 
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The Commit tee considered that among its various tasks was the need to 
carry the debate about the relationship between natural and social science 
beyond the limitations of purely academic discourse. The Committee's 
report dealt with two matters crucial to the co-operation between the 
fields of natural and social science (1943, p.346): 
"(a) how far workers in the natural and social sciences can 
co-operate in the conduct of border-line research which 
impinges upon both types of enquiry. 
(b) to what extent common action is desirable to promote 
more effective research in the latter." 
The Report placed great emphasis on the need for quantitative precision, 
in what it termed1 "profitable fields for the study of human relations". 
In examining such fields, every effort was to have been made to ensure 
(1943 1 P• 346): 
"(a) recognition of available methods for attacking them; 
(b) a clearer understanding of the extent to 
trained in the natural and social sciences 
contribute to such studies; 
which people 
can severally 
(c) examination of the adequacy of existing methods of training 
in our universities to development of fruitful themes; 
(d) the relevance of investigable topics to pressing social 
needs in the period of post-war reconstruction." 
The last element of the proposed strategy is of significance for two 
reasons. First, it established the potential role of the social sciences 
in their proposed relationship with the natural sciences in the service 
of the state. Second, the prediction that social science would be able 
to fulfil such a role, was made approximately three years prior to Clement 
Attlee's request that the government should investigate the needs of 
those disciplines, in view of the contribution that they might be able 
to make in the years of peace and planning. The influence of the B.A. 
and the members of the 'Committee on Scientific Research on Human Insti-
tutions' may have been a significant factor in Attlee' s decision. The 
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membership of the Committee had Harold Laski amongst its number, and 
it is likely that senior Labour members of the coalition government 
would be receptive to the notion that social science could facilitate 
a more effective and efficient system of wide-scale planning, the vehicle 
for the Labour Party's social and economic policies. 
Certainly from an examination of the Committee's report it is possible 
to detect what . I have referred to as a reaffirmation of the empirical-
analytic philosophy of social science, characteristic of the inter-war 
period. By this I mean the acquisition of social knowledge (in most 
cases, nomological knowledge about social relations), whereby the particular 
status of that knowledge is constituted by an interest in technical 
control, in increasing the possible extent of human domination over 
social reality. Such a model of social science was viewed as an essential 
prerequisite for the accumulation of information required for rational, 
feedback-controlled 1 instrumental activity. The latter was based on 
the assumption, set out in the Committee's report, that there was little, 
or no significant discrepancy in the actual nature of both natural and 
social science: they both operated within the empirical-analytic mode 
(1943, p. 347): 
"The distinction between pure and applied science is, however, 
much less clear and much less important in the social than 
in the natural sciences; less clear because no social fact 
is devoid of human interest; less important because all social 
sciences can be applied to solve social problems, and indeed 
because most of those who undertake pure study have an eye 
to its application. Thus it seems best not to make this distinc-
tion in the case of the social sciences." 
The ideological component of such a philosophy of social science, especially 
its consequences for social theory and political action, emerge from 
the report's consideration of the 'ends/means' question (1943, p.347): 
"It should be stressed, however, that questions of value are 
outside the scope both of the natural and the social sciences. 
Sciences ask what things are and how they work: they do not 
ask whether things are good or beautiful, but the fact that 
value judgements are outside the scope of science, whether 
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natural or social, does not invalidate the relevance of such 
research to issues of pressing topical importance. We commonly 
accept certain social objectives, such as the health of the 
individual and the survival of the community, social security, 
efficiency of production and minimum standards of living, as 
targets of community endeavour. In so far as we do so, practical 
social problems (e.g. of reconstruction) are problems about 
means rather than ends. The study of social institutions 
should therefore be able to prescribe what social techniques 
are best fitted to promote acceptable ends." 
Brian Fay (l97S) has given careful consideration to the implications 
of this approach to the 'ends-means' question as it applies to the construc-
tion of a policy science, a programme made quite explicit in the B.A.'s 
report (Fay, 1975, p.Sl): 
"So it is that a policy science that attempts to provide a 
structure in terms of which political questions could be settled 
'rationally' must involve reference to just those considerations 
that the idea of policy science was designed to eliminate, 
namely, notions of significance and worth. As a result, debates 
between policy scientists about the most efficient means would 
still be inherently 'political' in the sense that the choice 
of standards of what is to count as evidence and proof of 
some social policy being the 'best' (in this case, the meaning 
of the criterion of efficiency) would necessarily reflect 
the values of the disputants. 
This argument is related to the difficulty of drawing a sharp 
and enduring distinction between what is an end and what is 
means. For every means is an end relative to the means required 
to achieve it, so that any given course of action may be either 
a means or an end depending upon the point of view which one 
adopts." 
Such a view of science, as set out in the report implies a distinct, 
though unacknowledged project for politics. The quest for a rationally 
ordered society, via the canons and axioms of a scientific social science 
also imply a prescribed status for science. Implicit in such a belief 
that an applied science can perform the tasks now seen as political, 
is the tacit presumption that science provides the paradigm example 
of proper thinking, and that as long as any human enterprise is not 
treated in a scientific way it is being treated in an imperfect way. 
The style and tone of the B.A.'s report is indicative of much of the 
discourse on the ethos and authority of science between the wars and 
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during the intra-war period. It tended to permeate and reinforce the 
viewpoint which underlies the single most important element in the whole 
social engineering view of politics, namely, that there is a correct 
way of proceeding in human affairs and that it is the responsibility 
of the decision-maker to discover what this way is. 
In excluding the relevance of values to the scientific enterprise, the 
authors of the B.A.'s report sought to explain why mankind had hitherto 
been deprived of an enlightened, rational and "ethically neutral" science 
of society (1943, p.347): 
"At the present day it is often said that the resources of 
science are not· sufficiently used for the benefit of mankind, 
and in this there is no doubt much truth. one reason for 
this is that there is not enough applied science; this is 
as true of the natural as of the social sciences, and is espec-
ially true of those fields the elucidation of which demands 
collaboration between social and natural scientists. Another 
and more important reason is that those responsible for political 
and social action are only to a very limited extent aware 
of and guided by such applied scientific knowledge as exists. 
In short, the difficulty lies precisely within our terms of 
reference: in the interrelations of the sciences and in bringing 
the results of scientific research to bear on the formation 
of public policy." 
In order to resolve the latter difficulty, the report set out a programme 
of appropriate educational measures. 
A special section of the report dealt with several aspects of the academic 
status of the social sciences, making a number of recommendations concerning 
the composition of future syllabuses in those disciplines. It also 
dealt specifically with the nature of academic sociology and its signifi-
cance for a comprehensive science of society. In setting out a model 
for a "co-ordinated syllabus", the report highlighted the central elements 
of the sociologists' case, as stated in their submission to the inter-war 
conferences. 
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Under the heading of the "Study of Human Society and Institutions" (1943, 
p. 348), the authors of the report endeavoured to present a synthesis 
of existing specialist fields within social science, on the assumption 
that, "each has problems at the interface of natural science" (1943, 
p. 348). It is within this synthesis that a definition and purpose of 
sociology is elaborated (1943, p.348): 
"Under this heading we include (i) the natural history of 
social. structure, i.e. types of human association and organisa-
tion economic, political and voluntary; the comparison of 
the social structure and the urban and rural 'class', and 
other distribution of the population, of different countries 
and the effect of geographical and material conditions. 
(ii) Connected with this intimately is the study of social 
function, i.e. the_ way in which the structure works, is regulated 
and sustained. This clearly involves a study of the actual 
operation of law, morals, and religion in society, and of 
other forms of social sanction and control, including the 
economic price mechanism. (iii) Dynamics of social change 
or the study of short- and long-range trends in the life of 
societies, and the conditions, often technological, underlying 
these trends." 
Considered seperately, the preceding elements of a 'study of human society 
and institutions' reflect the dominance of several fields within the 
wider domain of the social sciences. Moreover, there is a distinct 
indication of the importance of structural-functionalism (the uncontested 
paradigm within British anthropology at that time) to the enterprise 
in question. 'comparative Social Institutions' was also considered to 
be an essential feature of the co-ordinated syllabus; this being already 
a feature of the B.A. Sociology degree at the LSE. However, perhaps 
the most important feature of the proposed syllabus was the emphasis 
upon a synoptic dimension via a specifically 'sociological' approach 
(1943, p. 348): 
"These studies in close interconnection may be called sociology. 
It will be readily seen that for their proper development 
the help and co-ordination of many disciplines are required. 
For example, social change can be studied through history. 
Parts of the structure are, or should be studied by other 
disciplines e.g. political science (in so far as factual), 
and realistic economics. These should not be unduly isolated 
but treated in relation to the rest of the social structure. 
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In the study of social functions reference is made to law, 
morals and religion. These, of course, have their own disciplines, 
but what is wanted here is a treatment of them from the point 
of view of the part they play in the life of societies: in 
other words, law not as studied by the lawyer, or religion 
by the theologian, but rather the sociology of law, morals 
and religion. The task can only be successfully achieved 
with the co-operation of specialists willing to look at their 
problems as part of an integrated social science." 
The preceding quotation is of crucial importance in view of the sociolo-
gists' pre-war attempt to construct a synoptic science of society, under 
the direction of sociology. I have argued above that the attempt to 
promote sociology within a composite social science arose as a result 
of the sociologists' attempt to arrest the process of disciplinary special-
isation which had, according to Mannheim, led to a progressive fractionation 
of knowledge about society. Ironically, the pre-war disputants in the 
debate on sociology's intended role within a reconstructed social science, 
namely demographers, economists, psychologists and historians had again 
(in 1943) to reconsider the potential of sociology as a co-ordinating 
mechanism within a similar project, but on this occasion, at the behest 
of natural scientists. The latter individuals were acting, not in the 
capacity of arbitrators, rather as architects of a grand synthesis of 
two previously distinct domains - the natural and social sciences -with 
the borderland 
between the two. 
subjects providing the essential, cognitive bridge 
Social science was generally being coopted within 
the scientists' scheme to produce a comprehensive scientia scientiarum 
with a distinct social function, in the Bernal ian sense of the concept. 
The determination of scientists to encompass social science w·ithin their 
grand synthesis received impetus from another source: the political commit-
ment of some scientists, and certainly a number of members of the B.A. 's 
Cornrni ttee, to the principles and practice of planning and state control, 
beyond the exigencies of wartime measures and into the post-war period. 
The report contains a reference to the ideological conflict in which 
the whole 'co-ordination project' had been immersed (1943, p.348): 
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"Some of us have maintained that the social sciences should 
be ethically neutral. Great confusion has certainly resulted 
from the failure to keep distinct the study of society as 
it is and society as it ought to be." 
I would suggest that this was a direct reference to the running conflict 
between Harold Laski and his opponents.* It should be remembered that 
the role of science in society and the associated issue of its proper 
place within higher education, had become issues of very heated debate 
throughout the war, and that the division of contestants in such a dispute 
tended to divide also along ideological lines commensurate with the 
larger issue and accompanying debate on the changing relationship between 
the universities and the state. Social scientists could not exclude 
themselves from those issues, neither could they shed the moral and 
political consequences of aligning themselves with the participating 
factions in the latter disputes. Such dilemmas give sociology and the 
other social sciences and the knowledge they produce, their essential 
moral and social dimensions within a culture. The disclaimer cited 
in the preceding quotation unwittingly underlines the private recognition 
of this crucial feature of social science, which in turn gave rise 
to a public denial by its practitioners, in the quest for authentic 
science and professional credibility. 
The direct reference to the role of sociology in the B.A. 's proposed 
'co-ordination scheme' provides some clues to the kind of sociology 
the natural scientists and members of the B.A.'s various divisions thought 
appropriate to the task in hand. I have given some indication of the 
nature of such a sociology, though it is important to consider the origin 
of it in terms of its pre-war constitution and practice. In so doing, 
it soon becomes apparent that concessions seem to have been made between 
the groups of sociologists who had previously gathered under what I 
have hitherto referred to as the discipline's professional and practical 
* Laski had caused 9- stir at the LSE throughout the inter-war period 
with his political writings and the effect they had on both William 
Beveridge and Lancelot Hogben. Laski was also to become the victim 
of Winston Churchill's attempt to raise a 'Red Scare' during the 
run-up to the 1945 General Election. 
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wings. In outlining the essential features of the co-ordination project, 
especially the methodology common to the different component disciplines, 
it can be seen that those sociologists who fostered a strong empirical 
tradition 1 with particular emphasis on survey work and sociography, seemed 
to have had an influence upon, or their form of sociology conformed 
more closely to, the prescriptions of the natural scientists, . than those 
sociologists who tended to operate within a more philosophic/eclectic 
tradition. This issue was highlighted in the proposals for a co-ordinated 
syllabus (1943, pp. 348-349). What was interesting about the proposed 
syllabus, was the reference to the need to incorporate social philosophy, 
thus offsetting the prospect of creating too harsh a mixture of empiricism 
and pragmatism. I would suggest that the presence of Morris Ginsberg 
on the Committee gave rise to this provision. He was, after all, England's 
foremost sociologist (occupying the discipline's only Chair) in addition 
to teaching the discipline at the LSE, which awarded the B.A. degree 
in the subject. Furthermore, the British Association Committee viewed the 
inclusion of social philosophy as a component of a possible policy science 
(1943, pp.348-349): 
"'The formation of public policy' (to quote our terms of refer-
ence) involves questions not only of fact, i.e. of the actual 
conditions of social life, but also of values, i.e. of the 
goals or ends of human endeavour and of the just distribution 
of the means available for their realisation though social 
science and social philosophy are different disciplines, both 
are necessary for an effective handling of human problems 
the study of social science should be accompanied by a 
study of social philosophy, which for this purpose may be 
described as dealing with the ethical elements in social relations, 
e.g. the basis of political authority, the criteria of just 
law, the legitimacy and limits of the political use of force, 
the problem of conflicting loyal ties, the moral basis of the 
family, of property and other social institutions. As was 
pointed out above, ethical problems raise issues of fact suscept-
ible of analysis by the methods of natural science.~ 
The concluding sentence in the preceding quotation emphasises the confidence 
of the scientists in the power of their methodological techniques. 
One can only speculate on the reaction of Morris Ginsberg to this claim, 
especially in view of his thoughts on the matter set out in the pre-war 
conferences. Although the B.A. report did not incorporate conflicting 
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views on substantive issues, Ginsberg must nevertheless have 
agreed to the document's content, for at the very least, 
he was generally cornrni ted to a synthetic basis for a science 
of society, with sociology playing a major co-ordinating 
role. It was in this possibility that the future of sociology 
lay, and the prospect of enhancing the discipline's future 
had now been placed on the agenda by not only a prestigeous 
organisation such as the British Association, but that this 
had occurred at the behest of the natural scientists, and 
shortly (in 1944) the Lord President of the Council and the 
Deputy Prime Minister, Clement Attlee. 
The most ironic feature of the co-ordination scheme related 
to the two pre-war projects in the development of social 
science in Britain, each of which I have already examined 
in some detail, yet nevertheless, indicate the priority attached 
to the proecess of co-ordinating the natural and social sciences 
(and to diffuse the methods of science within the latter 
domain) and the fact that within the B.A.'s programme, another 
opportunity had arisen to revive the pre-war debate on the 
matter. Resurrecting elements of the pre-war schemes referred 
to earlier, may have resulted from the fact that the Committee's 
membership contained several of the c'~tral participants 
in the social science projects. It is certainly possible 
to detect specific strands of those pre-war debates woven 
into each part of the B.A.'s co-ordination programme. 
As I shall show shortly, it was not so much the problem of 
formulating a programme of co-ordination that threatened 
the B.A.'s plans, rather, it was one of the major components 
of the project - the intention to establish a research council 
for the social sciences - which placed the scheme in jeopardy. 
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The B.A. report contained four "reasons" for the establishment of a 
council for the social sciences (1943, p.349): 
"There is a need to co-ordinate the direction of research 
and the disbursement of funds devoted to social research; 
there is the need to advise public and private departments 
and agencies on the co-ordination of methods of presenting 
data, of ensuring accuracy of data and of securing completeness 
of data; there is a need for initiating and supervising the 
training for practical administration of civil servants and 
other persons charged with forming and carrying out public 
policy in the use of scientific methods and results; and finally 
there is the need for publishing the results of research and 
information of interest to social science as a whole." 
The four preceding functions of a proposed council for the social sciences 
remained largely 
for consideration 
intact, when again submitted to the Clapham Committee 
almost three years later. However, on the latter 
occasion, the supporters of such a scheme would have to contend with 
the issues of alleged political control of such a council for specific 
political ends and a general wariness on the part of the opponents 
of such a scheme that alternatives to the existing, pre-war structure 
of financial support for social research may seriously undermine the 
existing institutional and intellectual order of the social sciences, 
in which economics held perhaps the most favourable and influential 
position. The sociologists were depending on a significant alteration 
to the existing system for the funding of knowledge. The Report's argument 
for a council was related directly to the terms of reference for the 
B.A.'s Committee, especially the need to co-ordinate research and to 
bring it to 'bear on the formation of public policy'. It even went 
so far as to cite several 'problems' urgently in need of a co-ordinated 
and well funded research effort (1943, p.350): 
"The practical problems 
in the immediate future 
involving the use of a 
we may instance: 
with which society will have to deal 
are largely of this border-line nature 
number of sciences, natural and human. 
(a) Population resettlement after dispersion and evacuation. 
(b) The managerial control of large-scale industry. 
(c) Public policy on venereal disease. 
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(d) Anthropological studies bearing on colonial government. 
(e) The use of natural resources for the greatest public benefit." 
In putting forward a plan for a research council, the B.A. hoped to 
arrest the process of excessive specialisation. It also highlighted 
a key argument which was to reappear in the Clapham deliberations, 
(1943, p.350): 
" more funds are required in the social than in the natural 
sciences since a large number of workers are involved in social 
surveys, and publication of statistical findings is expensive." 
I dare say that not all the natural scientists would necessarily agree 
with such an estimation of comparative costs in the field of research. 
Nevertheless, the report's arguments gave an indication of the potential 
costs of social research, citing examples of existing organisations which 
could have been used as models on which to base such a council. In 
particular the authors refer to the American Social Science Research 
Council as an example of a II sound working organisation" (1943, 
p. 350). The American SSRC being founded and funded by the Rockefeller 
Foundation and dependent for its continued existence upon private benefac-
tion, may have seemed an appealing model for a similar U.K. council, 
especially as it appeared to be without any direct connection to the 
state apparatus, a fear that had caused a .number of Clapham Committee 
members to reject the creation of a research council for the social 
sciences. In fact, the B.A. report was sensitive, to a minimal degree, 
to the possible poli ticisation of social research, or, research conducted 
for specific ideological purposes (1943, p.355): 
"The proposed Council should be independent of the Government 
and should not admit Government nominees." 
In attempting to highlight the deficiencies in British social and economic 
research, the report contained a reference to an attempt by a number 
of social scientists to organise a 'Consultative Conference on Social 
and Economic Research' as a means of correcting this. The history of 
the Conference is of importance to my argument on the funding of knowledge 
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within the domain of social science, especially the attempt to convince 
members of the Clapham Committee to support a scheme for a research 
council. The opponents of the scheme and their arguments - to be considered 
shortly - provide important evidence of an attempt by several influential 
social scientists and their supporters, to perpetuate a system of funding 
social science in Britain, which would sustain its hierarchical, disci-
plinary structure and simultaneous ly1 provide a buttress against those 
who were advocating a re-ordering of knowledge on the basis of the national 
need. I shall consider separately, the significance of the 'Consultative 
Conference' to the Clapham debate on the question of a research 
council for the social sciences1 following the current examination of 
the B.A.'s report. 
The British Association's report also examined in considerable detail 
the need for 'Official Social Statistics~ under the general heading 
of a proposal for a research council. The reason for such an emphasis 
on statistics and their consequences for the kind of social research 
considered appropriate by the B.A., is made quite clear in the following 
section of the report, (1943, p.351): 
"If scientific research on 
is to be brought to bear on 
policy such research must 
human institutions and human needs 
the formation of a practical public 
be founded on accurately recorded 
and measured facts and comparison of facts." 
Coupled to the detailed exposition of the need for factual data as a 
prerequisite to public policy formation, was the additional need to 
create sufficient numbers of competent research technicians. Here the 
report's authors had in mind the establishment of "refresher courses" 
actually under the direct control of a research council (1943, p. 353): 
"Refresher courses should also 
the social sciences under the 
experience. For particular 
a specific career, practical 
be initiated 
control of a 
purposes such 
courses need 
for training in 
council of wide 
as training for 
to be initiated 
and supervised, and linked up to the career in prospect." 
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Amongst those groups of professionals considered likely to benefit from 
such an arrangement were; colonial officers, civil servants, those working 
in the field of social medicine and social workers. The reference to 
social work is an interesting one in as much as it makes the observation 
and prediction, that the demand for social workers had expanded considerably 
during the war, and was likely to increase in the post-war period and 
thereafter. The relevance of the social sciences to the teaching and 
training of social workers was clearly stated in the report, an initiative 
which gave rise eventually, to the creation of institutional sites for 
the subsequent expansion of sociology as an academic discipline, (cf. 
Appendix Five). 
The recommendations on the role of a research council as an "initiator" 
and "controller" of specific courses in the social sciences, connected 
directly with the professional careers of specific groups of public 
servants must have given cause for concern amongst the members of the 
Clapham Committee who had endeavoured to oppose such a scheme. Not 
only did such a programme of 'practical instruction and training' have 
consequences for the distribution and hierarchical composition of those 
influentials within the community of social scientists, but the suggested 
scheme also had implications for the autonomy of the universities, in 
terms of the degree of control over those discipline·s they were willing 
to support and accredit. These became some of the key issues at the 
centre of the Clapham debate. 
The report also considered another significant deficiency in British 
social science, which the creation of a 'British Society for Factual 
Research' could help to overcome. This entailed the creation of an 
effective system for the collection and publication of information and 
results of research. Its suggestions on this matter included a reference 
to the system that existed in the field of the natural sciences. Lancelot 
Hogben had campaigned for such a facility within the field of social 
science throughout his period at the LSE in the Department of Social 
Biology. The interesting feature of the report's recommendations on 
this subject was its reference to the importance of the social survey 
as the most significant contributor to the accumulation of 1 social facts 1 
(1943, pp.353-354): 
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"In this country the most important contributions to the quanti-
tative study of social phenomena in recent times have been 
made in connection with the various forms of social surveys. 
From this point of view of methodology their contribution 
has been chiefly in two directions. First they attempt to 
set up certain standards, such as Rowntree's 'Human Needs 
Standard', approximation to which by individuals or groups 
is then measured. Second, they have sought to perfect various 
sampling methods, which have enormously simplified the task 
of securing the necessary data." 
The· report also considered the need for an authoritative social science 
journal for the compilation and presentation of 'the positive results 
of social research.' The authors argued that without such a medium 
for recording the work of social scientists, practitioners in the various 
fields of the discipline would be severely disadvantaged in comparison 
with their colleagues in the natural sciences (1943, p.354): 
"Partly, if not wholly, as a result of this situation, the 
research worker in Britain, who is primarily concerned with 
the discovery of new information about social phenomena does 
not enjoy a prestige or influence among his colleagues comparable 
with that of the research worker in the natural sciences. 
The young research worker who undertakes factual enquiries 
in the social sciences does so with proportionately less hope 
of gaining the respect of elders or of getting promotion and 
consequent enlargement of opportunities. For the copious 
means of publication which minister to the circulation of 
discoveries in the natural sciences, assure the prestige of 
those most active in carrying them out, bring their names 
and work before the attention of their colleagues and provide 
the teacher with means of keeping abreast of new techniques 
as well as of new results, are denied to those who now take 
up factual social research as a career." 
From every point of view. poverty of available means of publica-
tion, indeed the absence of any medium of publication exclusively 
devoted to factual research in the social sciences is of 
pivotal importance ... " 
The case of a 'Society for Factual Research' was closely aligned to that 
of the one for a research council. The former was regarded as complemen-
tary to the latter. However, within the arguments in support for such 
a Society lay several recommendations which would prove difficult to 
the fragile discipline of sociology (1943, p.355): 
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"Its inauguration would guarantee the removal of out-
standing obstacles to the prosecution of social research 
of a factual nature, a due measure of prestige to the 
rising generation of research workers, and funds to 
active departments capable of carrying out such research. 
By its existence it would co-ordinate the most pressing 
needs of the social sciences, in so far as the social 
sciences are factual in their own right". 
A major function of the Society was to have been the co-ordination 
of research results, with the express purpose of "influencing 
public policy" (1943, p. 355). Such a function was also regarded 
as a If necessary prerequisite of effective popularisation 
of accredited research in the social, no less than in the natural 
sciences" (1943, p.355). If the Society in question was to 
have been instrumental in the 'removal of obstacles' in the 
way of creating more factual social research, encouraging the 
disbursement of funds within 'active departments capable of 
carrying out such research' , then the prospects for sociology 
may not have been very auspicious under such arrangements. 
After all, there were no such departments in British Universities 
at the time, at least none that would have been able to measure 
up to the criteria postulated by the report's authors. Those 
departments in which social scientists did exist, tended to 
be economics and statistics, political science, demography 
and history. The L.S.E. could boast a Chair in sociology, 
but the research carried on under the supervision of Morris 
Ginsberg seemed somewhat remote from the kind envisaged in 
the report. 
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In examining the preceding aspects of the B.A.'s report, I have endeavoured 
to show that there were many features of the project which would have 
given social scientists other than the sociologists, cause for concern. 
I am not suggesting that the report's proposals were entirely negative, 
nor that the aims of the natural scientists constituted a sinister plot 
to undermine British social science. Rather, I would suggest that in 
putting foward such a scheme, the existing intellectual and institutional 
hierarchy of social science may have been somewhat threatened. The 
reason for this is that the B.A.'s project implied a political function 
for social knowledge, and although this may not have been stated categori-
cally, the constant reference to the relationship between social knowledge 
and public policy (in accordance with a specific cultural imperative) 
implied such, notwithstanding the disclaimer outlined in the report. 
A primary example of the resistance to the establishment of a research 
council for the social sciences, by a significantly influential group 
of social scientists, can be found in a report submitted eventually, 
to the Clapham Committee, and referred to in the B.A.'s report under 
the Consultative Conference on Social and Economic Research (1943, p.350). 
As the history of the latter 'Conference' is important to my examination 
of the significance of the research council debate, I wish now to consider 
its relevance to the latter issue. 
In an earlier chapter, I endeavoured to point out the degree of influence 
within British social science of the Rockefeller Foundation (R.F.); 
by virtue of its financial investment in the funding of knowledge, and 
the apparent consensus it shared with its beneficiaries on the philosoph-
ical and ideological bases of the nature and purpose of disciplines 
like the social sciences. The British Association's account of the 
inauguration of the above-mentioned 'Consultative Conference', corresponds 
with that of Alexander Carr-Saunders', though the latter's account of 
the origin of the 'Conference' was contained in a covering letter to 
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Sir John Clapham, some three years after the former's version. The 
common feature of both accounts relates to the role of the R.F. in directing 
the organisations it had previously and currently funded (1939), to 
'take steps' to avoid any unnecessary overlapping in the research programmes 
of the recipient institutions. In fact, the organisations who responded 
to the R.F. 's request, constituted virtually the entire institutional 
basis of social science up to the out-break of the Second world war. 
They were as follows: The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 
The National In'stitute of Economic and Social Research, Nuffield College 
(University of Oxford), The Oxford Institute of Statistics, Political 
and Economic Planning (P.E.P.), The London School of Economics (University 
of London) the Manchester Economic Research Section (University of Manchester), 
and Chatham House, (British Association, 1943, p.350 and T 161/1301, 
Letter from Alexander Carr-Saunders to Sir John Clapham, 7. 8. 45) . The 
B.A. and Alexander Carr-Saunder's statements on the frequency of the 
Consultative Conference's meetings contradict one another, with the 
former organisation saying that the Conference met 'thrice yearly' and 
the latter stating that it convened 'roughly once a year'. Although 
a minor point, it is somewhat puzzling, as Carr-Saunders acted as the 
Conference Chairman from its inauguration until 1945. 
As I have stated above, the Consultative Conference was regarded by 
the B.A. as the closest approximation to the American Social Science 
Research Council that could be found in Britain. The Conference had 
no executive functions and acted as a consultative body. Its main purpose 
was the " interchange of information, with the object of ensuring 
so far as possible that the energies of research workers and the expenditure 
of the limited financial resources available are not wasted by avoidable 
duplication" (British Association, 1943, p.350). However, I would suggest 
that the R. F. mctives went beyond the practice of prudent management 
of its affairs and investments abroad. As the war progressed, and there 
' 
arose a move toward centralisation and large scale planning of the. economy, 
in addition to a corresponding shift in the political climate of the 
nation, it may have occurred to the Officers of the R.F., that future 
investment in British social science should be rationalised and suspended 
until the end of the war in Europe. No doubt the outcome of the education 
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debate would be another factor influencing the future plans of the Founda-
tion. It is also interesting to note, that the Consultative Conference 
added representatives from the Reconstruction Secretariat and the Office 
of the war Cabinet to its membership during the course of the war. In 
time, a member organisation, the National Institute of Economic and 
Social Research, undertook to produce a 'Register of Research in Progress 
or in Plan'. It is also worth noting that Alexander Carr-Saunders, 
apart from his chairmanship of the Consultative Conference, was also 
the Director of· the LSE (another member organisation of the 'Conference') and 
a member. of the Council of Management of the National Institute of Economic 
and Social Research (the latter organisation could also boast five members 
of the Clapham Committee, in addition to Hector Hetherington, Chairman 
of the Committee of Vice-Chancellors and Principals, and Sir William 
Beveridge, former Director of the LSE) . It is the relationship between 
the British Association's Committee on Scientific Research on Human 
Institutions, the report of which I have just been discussing, and 
the Consultative Conference on Economic and Social Research's ad hoc 
Committee's report, entitled, Report on Co-ordination of Social Science 
(T 161/1301, 1945), that I wish now to examine, as the latter document 
opposes a number of recommendations in the former. The document was 
also critical generally, of the proposal to establish a council for 
the social sciences and does not correspond to the central thesis of 
the Institute of Sociology's report, nor to the case set out in the 
document 'Vitalisation of Research in the Social Sciences'. 
In a letter to Sir John Clapham (T 161/1301, 7.8.45) from Alexander 
Carr-Saunders, the author explained 
Co-ordination of Social Sciences'. 
the origin of the I Report on the 
The same letter also referred to 
the disagreement that existed among the members of the Consultative 
Conference on the British Association report, which included the previously 
considered strategy for a research council for the social sciences (T 
161/1301, 7.8.45): 
" Professor Sargent Florence brought formally before the 
meeting a report issued by the British Association, which 
recommended a Social Science Research Council for this country. 
A debate followed from which it became clear that there was 
considerable divergence of view among those present. I was 
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asked to nominate a small committee to consider the whole 
programme and to make a report. The committee consisted of 
D.N. Chester, Henry Clay, L. Farrer-Brown, T.H. Marshall and 
myself." 
In view of my previous consideration of the pre-eminent position of 
economics and economists within the intellectual and institutional hierarchy 
of British social science up to the Second World War, the likelihood 
of a "considerable divergence of view" on the question of a research 
council for the social sciences should have come as a suprise to no 
one, especially the sociologists and their supporters within the British 
Association. It was ironic that Carr-Saunders should have been asked 
to select the members of a committee to debate the research council 
question, particularly in view of his pre-war conference criticism 
of the sociologists' case of a synoptic science of society; a project 
which would have involved the co-ordination of the social sciences through 
sociology. Perhaps even more crucial to an understanding of Carr-Saunders' 
role in convening the committee and its stated opposition to the establish-
ment of a research council, is the influential position he held within 
British social science throughout the period in question, and the relation-
ship he maintained with the Rockefeller Foundation while holder of the 
Charles Booth Chair of Social Science at the University of Liverpool, 
and subsequently, as Director of the L. S. E. Carr-Saunders would have 
been well aware of the extraordinary generosity of the R.F. in funding 
not only his own projects, but those of the researchers and their depart-
ments during the inter-war period and into the war years. There was 
no guarantee that the establishment of the proposed research council 
would actually come to fruition, and to support such a scheme, with 
the consequences it entailed, may have jeopardised significantly, the 
longstanding financial relationship that existed between British social 
science and its major benefactor, the Rockefeller Foundation. As I have 
argued previously, such a relationship entailed a common understanding 
of the nature and purpose of social science, one that appeared to be 
based on methodological and theoretical consensus, though in fact, tended 
to arise from the ideological prescriptions of the benefactor. The 
matter of William Beveridge's Natural Bases Scheme was a case in point. 
There was also the matter of the conditional nature of funding: Foundation 
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benefaction tended to be regarded as deriving from a neutral source, 
whereas the prospect of State funds was thought to imply state control 
and the conduct of social research in the service of a dominant political 
ideology. The latter suspicion became a subsidiary argument of the 
education debate referred to above, though it arose during the Clapham 
Committee deliberations. It is also possible to detect elements of 
the same issues in the 'Report on Co-ordination of Social Science'. 
The 'Co-ordination' document set out several major functions of a proposed 
research council for the social sciences, based on the B.A. 's report, 
submitted to the 'Consultative Conference', and the deliberations of 
the latter's sub-commit tee established to examine the former organisa-
tion 's report. The functions of the council were described as follows 
(T 161/1301/56~80/2, p.l): 
"(a) to 
and 
advise the Government on the conduct 
the collection of data for research 
Sciences: 
of enquiries 
in the Social 
(b) to advise educational trusts on the allocation of grants 
for social research: 
(c) to improve the 
scientific world 
standing of the 
and urge their 
Social Sciences in the 
claim to a larger place 
in the Universities: 
(d) to prevent overlapping: 
(e) to cover ground lying neglected between the existing 
specialist societies in the field of the Social Sciences, 
and particularly to provide opportunities for publication 
of work at present lacking an outlet: 
(f) to promote co-operation in developing border-line studies 
between the natura~ and Social Sciences: and 
(g) to secure a co-ordinated approach from different angles 
to problems in the field of the Social Sciences of which 
existing specialisms studied only isolated aspects." 
It is interesting to note that the preceding programme for a research 
council for the social sciences possessed features common to several 
other agendas and proposals for a council, many of which arose during 
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the course of the war, and examined in detail in the current chapter. 
However, there was one component of the Co-ordination document that 
reflected an important, recurring theme throughout the decades up to 
the Second World war, namely (c) above; "to improve the standing of 
the Social Sciences in the scientific world and urge their claim to 
a larger place in Universities." As early as 1903, sociologists and 
their supporters had been advocating an almost identical requirement 
of their discipline (and social science in general) to achieve the essential 
institutional status of a bona fide university subject; both taught 
and researched and without which, intellectual development was thought 
impossible (Branford, 1928, p.340): 
"To aid in establishing the academic status of sociology in 
the universities of this country in general and more particularly 
in that of London, and to create a body of academic opinion 
in favour of reorganising the curricula of social studies 
in universities, on a basis which more adequately recognises 
synthetic sociological conceptions." 
The preceding extract from a memorandum submitted to the University 
of London prior to the establishment of the first chair in sociology 
gives some indication of the central and recurring importance of programme 
statements to an effective advocatory strategy for disciplines within 
the field of social science, especially sociology. The 1903 memorandum 
and the Co-ordination document possessed another common statement on 
the 'possibilities' of social science (Branford, 1928, p.340): 
"To show that the special social sciences of man and the general 
or philosophical studies of Humanity will each and all gain 
by being brought into more direct relation with each other." 
The preceding statement from the 1903 memorandum, apart from being an 
inter-war conference theme for the sociologists, resonated again within 
the case being considered in the Co-ordination document (T 161/1301/, 
p.l): 
"(g) to secure a co-ordinated approach from different angles 
of problems in the field of the Social Sciences of which 
existing specialisms studied only isolated aspects." 
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The issue of specialisation referred to above, had been a pre-war develop-
ment within the various branches of the social sciences and had led to 
the increasing difficulty of sociologists in establishing their discipline 
as the central, co-ordinating subject within a synthetic science of 
society. The revival of the issue, albeit within the framework of a 
scheme to create a research council, lent credence to its pre-war case. 
However, the oppositional strategy of the Co-ordination discussion would 
undermine not only the case of those in favour of a research council, 
but simultaneously, erode the prospect of sociology deriving the benefits 
that such an institutional innovation could have bestowed upon the disci-
pline. 
I will consider now, in order, the seven points referred to in the 
Co-ordination document, emphasising their implications for sociology. 
The first point examined by the members of the Consultative Conference 
on Economic and Social Research's sub-committee* was the function of 
a research council as an advisory body to the Government on the range 
of work being carried out within the various branches of the social 
sciences. Its opinions on the matter did not bode well for the future 
of sociology (T 161/1301, 7.8.45): 
"We are of the opinion that the existing specialist societies, 
representing economists, statisticians, geographers, psycholo-
gists, etc. , if used, should be able to meet most needs that 
the Government may experience. The best safeguard against 
the employment by the Government of advisors who are technically 
inadequate is the development of the sciences concerned and 
the establishment of professional standards of competence 
in them. This will also ensure that the Government will have 
its attention called to such matters as the collection and 
presentation of official statistics which are needed if devel-
opment is to take place." 
Even if we assume that sociology is included somewhere in the category 
of "etc." of the 'specialist societies' mentioned above; the more estab-
lished social sciences, with their equally well established professional 
* The membership of this committee was as follows: D.N. Chester, 
Henry Clay, L. Farrer-Brown, T.H. Marshall and Alexander Carr-Saunders. 
302 
societies and associations, were, in comparison to sociology, better 
placed strategically to both respond to and influence the 'needs that 
the Government may experience.' This was certainly the case for economics 
and statistics. It should also be remembered that sociology's own 'profes-
sional' Institute, was about to undergo dissolution, and that this would 
have consequences for the discipline, especially in terms of the Co-ordi-
nation document's recommendations on the appropriate relationship between 
'specialist societies' and the research and information needs of the 
government. Members of the committee also regarded the social sciences 
as essentially technical sciences, whose practitioners possessed esoteric 
knowledge and practical skill. 
The second function of the research council considered in the Co-ordination 
document entailed the funding of research in the social sciences. The 
comments of the committe on this crucial matter extended to the 'appropriate' 
relationship between a possible research council and the then existing 
mechanism of funding the social sciences, namely the private Foundation, 
(T 161/1301, 1945, p.2): 
"The educational trusts making grants have their own organisation 
for assessing claims on them; their policy must be related 
not only to the claims on them but also to the total amount 
of funds they have at their disposal and the policies they 
are following. It would be difficult, therefore, for any 
committee or council, representative only of claimants to do 
more than respond to requests for advice. Even this function 
would be difficult to perform adequately unless the council 
was accepted as completely representative; it is probable 
that older, more specialised bodies would continue to prefer 
their claims direct, and certain that the Universities would 
do so." 
There is an element of contradiction in the stand taken by the committee 
on the matter of funding the social sciences, especially in regard to 
the first sentence of the preceding quotation. One of the major criticisms 
of those who opposed the establishment of a research council was that 
it would become an organ of the state, through which a government could 
seek to direct social research for 'political ends'. Recipients of 
private benefaction were either oblivious to, or studiously avoided 
the conditional nature of funding when financed from such a source. 
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Harold Laski (1930) remained convinced that the latter case applied 
to the transactions between benefactor and beneficiary. Within the 
reference to the 'policies they are following' as it applied to the 
Foundations, lay the crux of the rna t ter on the conditional nature of 
the funding of knowledge. The funding of the social sciences at the 
L. S. E. during the Directorship of William Beveridge is a case in point. 
As to whether or not such a council could be considered as 1 'accepted 
as completely representative' indicates two of the most striking features 
of inter-war social science in Britain, one of which caused many problems 
for a fledgling sociology. First, the established framework of funding 
for social science had served as a most satisfactory arrangement for 
those influentials and disciplines within the traditional, intellectual 
and institutional hierarchies of British social science. The example 
of the American Social Science Research Council may often have been 
cited as a model for a British counterpart, but the system already in 
operation in Britain had served the needs of those who had benefitted 
most. Second, whatever was to be construed as a council which could 
be considered as "completely representative" of the disciplines that 
it would serve, dependend largely on the prescriptions of the most influen-
tial among the community of Britain's social scientists. In view of 
the willingness of individuals and institutions to accept Foundation benefac-
tion during the inter-war period, and especially in the light of the 
extraordinary role of the Rockefeller Foundation in dominating the funding 
and direction of research within the social sciences and latterly, its 
instruction to its recipient organisations to 'consult together' to 
avoid overlap in research and wasted investment (the origin of the Consul-
tative Conference) the following statement by the committee members 
appears somewhat hypocritical (T 161/1301, 1945, p.2): 
"At the present stage in the development of the Social Sciences 
the complete centralisation of advice on the disbursement 
of funds is undesirable. Even in more evenly and maturely 
developed fields of study, alternative sources of authoritative 
advice are an advantage. There should be a sensible exchange 
of information between the advisory bodies, but their advice 
should be framed independently." 
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It would seem· from the comments on the efficacy of diversity in framing 
advice on the disbursement of funds for research, that rather than presen-
ting a response to a· suggested function of a proposed research council, 
the committEe in fact, proceeded to extol , the virtues of the Consultative 
Conference in that sphere. Furthermore, referring to the social sciences 
as a group of under-developed disciplines became a judgement which was 
incorporated in the Clapham Committee's final report (Cmnd. 6868, 1946), 
although T.S. Simey must shoulder some of the blame for that. In 
addition, such caution about the state of the social sciences was conspicu-
ously absent in the pre-war conference debates on the nature and relation-
ship of the social sciences to one another. Again we have an example 
of those discipline's perpetual infancy, though on the occasion in question, 
no reference was made to their potential. 
The third function of the proposed research council related to the 'standing 
of the social sciences in the scientific world and their claim to a 
larger place in the universities'. I have dwelt at length on each of 
the aspects of social science's claims (or rather, of the social scientists 
and their supporter's claims) to be authentic sciences and worthy of 
a place within the universities. The commnets of the committee on this 
matter are somewhat brief though poignant (T 161/1301, 1945, p.2): 
"This purpose was one that seemed to us of importance, but 
not one to be achieved merely by setting up a representative 
organisation. Immediately it called for the building up of 
comprehensive departments of Social Science in the Universities 
severally. Ultimately, it can be achieved only by work of 
a quality that compels recognition. It is only if there are 
branches of the Social Sciences which lack the means of publishing 
their work and so asserting their claim that a mere organisation 
could help." 
Once again, the committee members asserted the importance of extending 
the institutional basis of social science as a crucial factor in its 
achievement of a status similar to that of the natural sciences. Although 
mention is made of the necessity for the social sciences to produce 
work 'of a quality that compels recognition', no attempt was made to 
cite any substantial examples that would constitute good practice. 
There is an element of a 'catch 22' situation in such a recommendation: 
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work of compelling quality is regarded as a qualification of intellectual 
worth and a passport to entry into the wider domain of the system of 
higher education, and yet, without a significant presence within the 
universities, the social sciences could not engage in the level and 
variety of research that would enable its practitioners to 'improve 
the standing of the social sciences in the scientific world' (T 161/1301, 
1945, p.l) 0 
The fourth function considered in the committee's report received scant 
attention, although it had exercised the time and patience of social 
scientists, especially the sociologists throughout the inter-war period. 
The notion of "overlapping" was regarded as an effective method of 
co-ordinating specialists subjects within the field of social science. 
Such a remark, made almost in passing, ignored the fact that specialisation 
within the various fields of social science, had been the major pre-occupa-
tion of those disciplines during the pre-war period. Sociologists had 
sought to arrest such a process, as they believed that it would lead 
to a partial, or fragmented view of society. 
The three remaining functions of a proposed research council were taken 
into consideration together. They entailed, the "neglected ground between 
the existing specialist societies", and .the provision of opportunities 
for publishing "work at present lacking an outlet"; promoting the 'border-
line' studies "between the Natural and Social Sciences"; to encourage 
an eclectic approach in the analysis of 'problems' 1 "which existing 
specialisms studied only in isolated aspects" (T 161/1301, 1945, p.l). 
There appears to be a confusion of the functions considered by the committee, 
especially in regard to the notion of 'overlapping' (point four) and 
that of encouraging an eclectic approach in social research (point seven) . 
It is the extraordinary role accorded to the professional association 
or 'Society' that animates the position of the committee on the whole 
question of the possibility of a research council. Hence the following 
statements on the implicit and explicit role of existing organisations 
and their actual and potential ability to cope with the demands of repre-
senting practitioners and their respective disciplines (1945, p.3): 
306 
"They (the remaining three functions) constitute in our opinion 
the only sound reason for adding to the burden already resting 
on scholars the labour of maintaining an additional organisation. 
we had examples of inquiries which were not adapted to any 
existing society's transactions or journal, and of inquiries 
that called for the co-operation of several types of specialist." 
It is in examining the committee's consideration of "certain difficulties" 
which they felt faced any attempt to create an organisation representative 
of the whole field of the social sciences, that it is possible to detect 
the central reasons for rejecting the proposal for such a research council. 
Ironically, the Co-ordination document sets out many of the issues which 
continue to trouble social scientists today. One of the first "difficul-
ties" entailed the hetrogeneity of the social sciences and the corresponding 
variability of methodological sophistication of the individual disci-
plines, and the consequences this had for the "authority of their results" 
(1945, p.3). The authors of the report then equate this to the relative 
level of 'scientific standing' of the 'Societies', which in turn, is 
thought to have consequences for any attempt 'to combine a number of 
societies in any sort of federation'. Considering the fact that social-
ogists had raised the issue of a need for uniformity of methodology 
within the field of social study during the inter-war conferences, 
it is interesting to note that the members of the committee viewed 
as a primary function of a research council, the formation of a "grand 
society 11 to foster and promote the collective interests of individual 
societies (1945, p.3): 
"A broad uniformity of standard and identity of aim are requisite 
if a number of societies are to be combined in any sort of 
federation. This condition is lacking in the Social Sciences." 
Such a 'condition' was also lacking in the natural sciences, yet the 
committee members seemed to regard the organisational arrangements within 
those disciplines as a model worthy of emulation. Moreover, a condition 
of that nature appeared to be based upon a similar conception of science 
as an exemplar. The authors of the report are quite clear on the difficul-
ties of achieving the necessary degree of uniformity (1945, p.4): 
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"Thus the field is divided between societies which have a 
purely scientific object and others which (though aiming at 
scientific objectivity in their inquiries) have primarily 
a practical or political aim. Since most propagandist societies 
undertake some inquiry it is difficult to draw the line if 
any socieites with practical object are included. Again, 
among purely scientific societies, some exist merely to provide 
facilities for publication and impose no tests or standards 
on admission; others hold meetings and require evidence of 
ability to profit by membership, while others again insist 
on technical qualifications which give membership something 
of the characater of a degree or diploma. These differences 
are important in a field in which there is wide public interest 
most of which is not of an expert or scientific character, 
so that a danger exists of any general organisation being 
swamped by a popular unscientific membership." 
No doubt some social scientists became increasingly anxious about the 
politicisation of certain branches of their disciplines. In the main, 
the so called popularisation of their work tended to be based on the 
potential of social science in the period of reconstruction following 
the end of the war. Here one can think of the works and arguments of 
It is clear that members of the committee were Mannheim and Laski. 
sensitive to the association between socialist politics and social science, 
a connection that many practitioners had been at pains to discredit for 
decades. Perhaps the socialist science of J.D. Bernal had heightened 
the sensitivity of the social scientists to the issue. Furthermore, 
the reference to a 'general organisation being swamped by a popular 
unscientific membership' may also have had something to do with the fact 
that many within the Sociological Society became increasingly conscious 
of the catholicity of its membership, despite the attempt by its founders 
(Branford, 1928) to establish a somewhat elite membership, devoted to 
the rigours of a scientific study of society. The establishment of the 
Institute of Sociology represented an attempt (short-lived as it was) 
to arrest the rise of 1popular sociology'. Donald MacRae has also pointed 
to the decline in the quality of material published in the Sociological 
Review, another 'risk' to the public credibility of social science as 
a scientific enterprise (MacRae, 1961, p.22): 
" The Sociological Review despite some excellent articles 
touched a nadir of quality and sentiment in these years (inter-war 
period) . (It even published lengthy and uplifting free verse) . " 
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There could no longer be a mingling of expert and layman; of esoteric 
knowledge and received wisdom the age of the technocrat had been ushered in 
with the war. The language and culture of the 'technopolis' was in m gue, 
engendered by a new and more urgent set of industrial and technological 
imperatives. 
The report dealt also with the effect upon the existing institutional 
arrangements should a research council be established, referring to 
the division between university departments of social science and the 
extra-mural arrangements for Societies and Associations (the report's 
use of the genric term 'organisation' is most confusing) . In giving 
an example of the adverse affects associated with the creation of a 
research council upon existing organisational arrangements for social 
science, citing the case of Economics, it is possible to assess not 
only the relatively superior position enjoyed by the latter discipline, 
both within and outside of higher education, but also the necessity 
for establishing a research council as a means to improve the intellectual 
and institutional prospects of sociology (T 161/1301, 1945, p.4): 
"In Economics for example, there co-exist the large and flourish-
ing Royal Economic society and the series of University 
departments of Economics, linked with one another by a variety 
of professional ties, and linked also in most Universities 
with other branches of Social Science. To ignore the latter 
type, would not in our opinion be an effective way to promote 
the co-ordination and extension of scientific studies." 
The preceding reference gives a clear indication of the well established 
position of economics. Any 'new' organisation created to foster the 
co-ordination of the social sciences would hardly lead to the disestablish-
ment of economists from their positions of influence referred to in 
the above quotation. 
The 'Consultative Conference's 
a carefully qualified proposal. 
sub-cornrni ttee concluded its report with 
One that sought to maintain the existing 
institutional arrangements within which social science received the 
bulk of its funding; preserve the professional status of its practitioners, 
and perpetuate the hierarchical structure of the respective, component 
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disciplines, in addition to sustaining the individual prestige of its 
most noteworthy influentials. Considered thus, the proposal was (1945, 
p. 5): 
" directed to creating the minimum of new organisation 
needed to effect the object we have defined. It would not 
supercede or disturb any existing organisation, but would 
supplement the existing provision in such a way as to provide 
an opportunity for co-ordinated study by specialists of different 
disciplines and at the same time offer an opening to specialists 
who have no existing outlet for their work." 
Apart from offering another medium for publication of lesser known work 
in the social sciences, the proposal would not harm the status quo, 
in fact, such an arrangement would not assist sociology in enhancing 
either its intellectual or institutional development· to any significant 
degree. Moreover 1 a new arrangement could not compel specialists from 
other disciplines to co-operate through inter-disciplinary initiatives. 
The authors of the report specified the detail of their proposal as 
follows (1945, p.5): 
"The organisation we propose is an Annual Conference of the 
Social Sciences with a Standing Committee. The purpose of 
the Conference would be to bring together specialists from 
different fields in the examination of some selected problem, 
or problem which is of interest to several specialists." 
Such an arrangement was a far cry from the British Association's proposal 
for a research council, the consideration of which formed the remit 
of the sub-committee. It should be recalled, that the 'Consultative 
Conference on Social and Economic Research' had been established upon 
the direction of the Rockefeller Foundation, and in meeting as often 
as thrice annually, had fulfilled partially, the proposed function of 
the 'Standing Conference'. The key to understanding the effect that 
such a standing conference would have upon sociology can be gained from 
the following reference to the suggested composition of the conference's 
membership (1945, p.5): 
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"Membership of the Conference should be individual, not by 
federation of existing societies; in order to ensure that 
discussions and contributions were scientific in their approach 
membership should be confied to University teachers and research 
workers (present and past)." 
Such a condition of membership would discriminate against the less 
well established social sciences in the universities, especially sociology. 
The dominance of economics and statistics would be ensured and the nature 
of the 'discussions and contributions' predictable and untainted by 
the unscientific pretentions of lesser disciplines within the wider 
realm of social science. The function of the Conference's Standing 
Committee would ensure the essential 'quality' of the material to be 
submitted for discussion at the annual Conference. Such a ga tekeeping 
function would be essential for maintaining the standard of proceedings 
and the enforcement of the membership regulations. It would also contribute 
to sustaining the prevailing institutional and intellectual hierarchy 
within British social science. 
It is also possible to detect in the proposal for an annual conference 
referred to above, elements of the then current theory of the growth 
and diversity of knowledge gaining currency in the ideas of Michael 
Polanyi ('The Growth of Thought in Society', Economica, Vol. 12, 1941). 
Although I have considered previously the implications of Polanyi's 
ideas for the growth of scientific thought and the appropriate relationship 
between the universities and the state, there are echoes of his theory 
in the arguments of the sub-committee's report, especially the notion 
of 'automatic selection' and 'spontaneous individual association'. 
The membership was also thought to be a crucial determinant in the gradual 
collaboration between the natural and social sciences (T 161/1301, 1945, 
p.6): 
"The basis of this proposal is a belief that the students 
who need and desire some form of new organisation would be, 
as it were, selected automatically by the opportunity of taking 
part in conference discussions on some actual subject of common 
interest to all (or most) specialists in the field of the 
Social Sciences. Since membership would be open to all University 
teachers and research workers, the way would be opened for 
collaboration and discussion between the natural and the Social 
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Sciences. At the same time, since membership would be by 
spontaneous individual association, no need would arise to 
define either societies to be adrni t ted or branches of study 
to be recognised." 
A further indication of the reluctance of the sub-committee to support 
a council for the social sciences is evident in the following reference 
to the perpetual infancy of the disciplines, and the general level of 
inexperience in the field of science-building: such a negative stance 
on the matter tends to reveal the determination of the more influential 
social scientists (although I find it hard to believe that T.H. Marshall 
could have whole-heartedly supported the recommendations contained in 
the report), not to alter significantly the institutional structure 
which had sustained the social sciences up to the Second World war (1945, 
p.6): 
"This is a starting point; until we have more experience, 
it seems to us unnecessary and unwise to attempt to create 
any elaborate organisation. What we propose is the minimum 
required to provide an opportunity of co-operative study, 
not anything in the nature of a new Sociological Society." 
It is difficult to estimate whether the reference to a new 'Sociological 
Society' meant that the existing organisation of that name already fulfilled 
a specific function in the field of what the report referred to as, 
'co-operative study', or, that the term 'sociological' was being used 
in its generic sense, to denote all forms of social study, analysis or 
thought, which would embrace the social sciences under that rubric. 
If it was in reference to the then, existing Sociological Society, then 
surely T. H. Marshall would have been aware of the parlous state of its 
affairs. In any respect, the proposal did not bode well for sociology. 
The report dealt finally with the matter .of the relationship between 
the 'Consultative Conference' (which had commissioned the report in 
response to the B.A.'s proposal for a research council), and a council 
for the social sciences, should one be established. The authors were 
careful in their distinction between the nature and function of their 
own 'Conference', namely to review the work in progress and prospect with-
in the wider field of social science, and in receipt of Rockefeller 
funds, and that of a proposed Standing Conference, rather than a fully 
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fledged research council. The former exercised considerable influence 
within the sphere of social science in Britain via its funding of research 
and institutional provision for those disciplines. The latter, prospective 
'research council' (the proposed Annual Conference) was certainly a 
less authoritative and permanent institution within the domain of social 
research. A rather innocuous organisational framework, providing an 
annual medium for those interested in a common aspect of social phenomena, 
and the prospect of inter-disciplinary collaboration. The concluding 
sentence of the· report gave a clear indication of where the committee's 
allegiances lay:in perpetuating the careers of established social scientists 
and the hierarchy of disciplines that comprised the edifice of British 
social science (1945, p.7): 
"It will be clear from the general tenor and conclusions of 
our argument that we consider any such formal and elaborate 
organisation as that proposed by the British Association Committee 
to be undesirable in the present state of the Social Sciences 
in this country." 
Once again, the authors argued that the social sciences were immature 
and therefore unable to benefit from an organisation like a research 
council. Such conservative resistance to the project represented a 
minority view, especially in the light of the efforts of others, expressed 
in the programmes and documents I have examined above. Considered thus, 
the Consultative Conference's sub-committee document, although a dissenting 
view on the subject, was, nevertheless, an influential one, and in keeping 
with the attitude adopted by the members of the Clapham Committee on 
the subject. 
deliberations, 
However, before, during and after the Clapham Commit tee 
other influential individuals and organisations had, 
in making their case for a research council, referred to the general 
importance of sociology to the revivification and utilisation of social 
science during the war and especially in the period of reconstruction 
following it. All of the issues that would continue to remain crucial 
to sociology's post-war expansion, especially in the early 1960s, had 
been raised either prior to, or, during the Second World War. 
313 
In concluding my examination of the evidence submitted to the Clapham 
Committee, its subsequent deliberations and final report, I would like 
to give some indication of the effect that several of the preceding 
documents (and correspondingly, the influence of their authors) had 
upon the Committee's decision on the case for the establishment of a 
research council. This will then enable me to consider the consequences 
of the Clapham Committee's findings for the development of sociology 
in the post-war period, as the report's conclusions would entail the 
establishment of at least two institutional innovations that should 
have enhanced the discipline's prospects in the post-war period1 up to 
the mid-1950s. Considered thus, it will be possible to appreciate the 
significance of my earlier contention, that it is possible to detect 
within what I referred to as the Clapham debate, two quite distinct 
positions on the relationship between social knowledge and the needs 
of the state. One in which social science and its researches should 
be allowed to evolve within modified, institutional arrangements, which 
would ensure their preservation from political direction or influence. 
The other, a general conception of the role of post-war social science, 
which envisaged the establishment of new institutional arrangements 
more conducive to the production of forms of social knowledge 
considered essential in the post-war ·period. 
Among the Clapham Committee's recommendations can be found the following 
judgement on the question of whether or not the establishment of a research 
council for the social sciences would aid the advancement of those disci-
plines (Cmnd., 6868): 
"The creation of a special council disposing of special funds 
is in our judgement, unnecessary. As a matter of fact we 
doubt whether the desire for this sort of development is wide-
spread. If a few of those whom we consul ted were in favour 
of the proposals, more were definitely unfavourable. These 
latter, we believe,were more likely to be representative of 
the majority among social scientists." 
This was quite an extraordinary statement in view of the number of formal 
and detailed submissions made directly to the Committee, either by indivi-
duals, or, in the form of comprehensive, written depositions from other interested 
·, 
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institutions and organisations. I have considered above, a number of 
the latter, with only the Consultative Conference's, sub-committee 'Report 
on the Co-ordination of Social Sciences' (T 161/1301, 1945) evidencing 
a dissenting view. In view of the Clapham Commit tee's recommendation, 
I would suggest that the considerable influence of vested interests 
prevailed over the compelling demonstration of a need for a council 
for the social sciences. An example of this was the contribution to 
the Committee's discussion on the form of social research considered 
to be most appropriately conducteq within the university. At the Committee 
meeting of February 4~ 1946, T.H. Marshall, consulted in his capacity 
as a sociologist, stated that his " primary interest was in Social 
Survey work " (T 161/1301, Minutes of meeting 4. 2. 46 )1 arguing that 
"great opportunities" lay ahead in the field of social science, providing 
the "new psychological technique" could be applied extensively throughout 
its various disciplines. More importantly though, was his assertion 
that (T 161/1301, 1946): 
" there was a prima face case for establishing a research 
council for the social sciences, to give stimulus to new work 
and to direct it into fruitful channels." 
What is remarkable here is the fact that Marshall had been a member 
of Alexander Carr-Saunders' Consultative Conference sub-committee to 
examine the British Association's formal proposal to establish just 
such a research council. Morris Ginsberg had served on the latter Associa-
tion's 'Human Institutions' committee to address the research council 
question. The sociologists' case had been ignored on two important 
occasions, which may account for the specific criticism expressed by Carr-
Saunders and memebrs of the Clapham Committee, notwithstanding the general 
opposition toward the case for the creation of a research council. 
I would suggest that in supporting the latter project, the sociologists 
had associated themselves with a programme of change within British 
social science, which would alter significantly, the existing hierarchy 
of those disciplines and those most influential within them. This, coupled 
to the critique of the discipline by other social scientists, would not 
have assisted sociology's continuing struggle to attain intellectual and 
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institutional autonomy. It is also worth noting, that at the same meeting 
(4.2.46) Professor Firth added his support to the research council project. 
I have argued previously, that without such an institutional innovation, 
the prospects for sociology's post-war development would be handicapped 
significantly. Again, and contrary to the evidence, the Committee could 
not countenance the creation of a council to promote greater collaboration 
between the individual social science disciplines, a project that 
had been championed by the sociologists throughout the inter-war period, 
and again, during the course of the war (Cmnd., 6868, paragraph 30) : 
"Such a proposal is 
is little evidence 
to be stimulated by 
both premature and misconceived there 
that this desirable co-operation requires 
an external council, or that the absence 
of such a council is the main impediment." 
It would appear from the above statement that the influence of Carr-Saunders 
and his colleagues on the Committee's deliberations was significant, 
for such a recommendation had been made by the Consultative Conference 
sub-committee, of which he was a member (in addition to the chairmanship 
of the Consultative Committee). The Clapham Committee had also assumed 
that with the establishment of a research council would come the "danger 
of a premature crystallisation of spurious orthodoxies", (Cmnd., 6868, 
paragraph 29) . 
The minutes of the Clapham Committee meetings contain many references 
to the issue of whether or not a research council would aid the development 
of the social sciences. In addition to those occasions cited previously, 
the following highlights the persistence of those individuals continuing 
to argue the necessity of keeping the issue alive (T 161/1301, Minutes 
of meeting, 25.6.45): 
"The 
scope 
steps 
investigation of sociological 
of research councils. They 
to fill what they regarded as a 
problems was outside the 
could not themselves take 
'real need' . " 
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This argument was made by Mr. Barnard from the Department of Scientific 
and Industrial Research (one of the aforementioned existing research 
councils). Furthermore, he suggested that a fourth research council 
be established to cover 'problems that were arising from research in 
the physical sciences and requiring examination within the domain of 
the social sciences'. Carr-Saunders used the occasion of the meeting 
to argue that the D. s. I. R. might consider extending its remit to conduct 
research on 'social and economic matters'. Moreover, he also proceeded 
to prescribe the role of the universities within the field of social 
research, an argument which reflected the case of those who supported 
the dispersed initiative stance on the appropriate relationship between 
the universities and the state (T 161/1301, 25.6.45): 
"The universities ought to pay more attention to social accountancy. 
Great care would be needed to avoid the dangers that would 
arise if they got too deeply involved in political questions." 
Such an assertion emphasises my earlier contention that the Clapham 
debate and the education debate were directly inter-related. Carr-Saunders' 
position in this matter placed him squarely within the dispersed initia-
tive camp. As it turned out, the Clapham Committee recommendations 
did not undermine the traditional role of the universities ·in maintaining 
the right to self- determination. The Committee thus acknowledged the 
autonomy of the universities, a decision which reflected the presence 
of the Chairman of the University Grants Committee and the Chairman 
of the Committee of Vice-Chancellors and Principals, both of whom served 
on the Clapham Committee throughout the period of its existence (Cmnd. 
6868, paragraph 28): 
" while the universities should spontaneously initiate 
developments on the lines we have indicated, the University 
Grants Committee should (as part of its duty) survey systemati-
cally the range of work in this field (social sciences) undertaken 
by the several universities, if gaps are revealed, they are 
to offer such stimulus as may be necessary to secure that 
they are effectively filled." 
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In an earlier meeting, Sir Walter Moberly had raised the issue which 
was at the heart of the Clapham and education debates, one which served 
to highlight the suspicions of those who subscribed to the principles 
of the dispersed initiative (T 161/54680, Minutes of meeting for 1.10.45): 
"Sir Walter Moberly thought the 
the Government of the day would 
suspicion unavoidable that 
be suspected of subsidising 
enquiry on lines suitable to its political complexion." 
In the same meeting, and in connection with the proposal to establish 
a rese::u-ch council on the basis of the role of universities in the field 
of social research, Sir John Clapham argued (T 161/54680): 
that clear cu~ Social Science departments in the universities 
did not yet exist and a supervisory organisation could hardly 
be erected on this non-existent foundation." 
At the following meeting of the Committee on November 26, 1945, the 
whole of the business concerned the problematic relationship between 
the universities and the state, in reference to the appropriate role 
that the respective organisations should play in the conduct of social 
research. Once again the suggested solution was the establishment of 
an intermediate body, in the form of a research council (T 161/54680, 
26.11.45): 
the field for investigation in the social sciences was 
so wide and the amount of public money needed so considerable 
that Ministers of the Crown must have an overall responsibility 
for the choice of field and the machinery of coverage." 
Thus argued Mr. Leonard Elmhurst, a suggestion which must have mortified 
those members of the Cornmi ttee whom in their other capacities, had consi-
dered such an idea anathe.ma to the separation of government and the 
system of higher education. However, Elmhurst did perceive the consequences 
for the universities of complete control over 'applied research' in 
the field of social science (T 161/54680, 26.11.45): 
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"It would be straining the function of the universities to 
give them anything approaching complete responsibility for 
applied research and it might easily lay them and their staffs 
open to a variety of economic pressures from outside." 
Sir Walter Moberly recognised such a possibility although he thought 
that rather than economic pressure being the major 'threat', it would 
in fact be that of political interference (T 161/54680): 
it was unavoidable that there would 
government interference in the event of 
and that the universities could be counted 
everyday political factors to interfere." 
be a tendency to 
government control, 
upon not to allow 
To avoid such an eventuality, Elmhurst suggested the following, (T 161/54680): 
II 
then 
if public money was to be used in social science research, 
a Research Council would be the most appropriate agency 
to create." 
At other meetings of the Committee, namely on the 4.5.45; 20.7.45; 7.8.45; 
1.10.45; 26.11.45; 5.12.45 and the 4.2.46, members discussed or heard 
evidence on the question of a research council for the social sciences. 
On each of those occasions, a somewhat negative stance was adopted by 
the more influential members of the Committee. Even well documented 
and carefully argued submissions to the Committee could not sway the 
decision in favour of a research council, mainly for the reasons stated 
previously. Moreover, it would seem, in examining the Clapham Committee 
report, that its recommendations tended to reflect the opinions and 
prejudices of the few, rather than any apparent consensus based on 
the evidence. This is why it is important to appreciate the significance 
of the Clapham debate as an historical source in the reconstruction 
of the history of sociology and social science in general. 
In several respects, the Clapham Committee provided the necessary revivifi-
cation of a declining pre-war- debate on the nature and purpose of sociology: 
an opportunity for its practitioners to devise a series of strategies 
with which to capture the institutional space crucial to the discipline's 
further intellectual development. 
tions in such a manner, I hope 
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In portraying the Committee's delibera-
te have altered the received view of 
the Clapham Committee as merely a State, bureaucratic exercise, giving 
rise to a number of obligatory recommendations, or, in a more grandiose 
sense, accord it the status of the genesis of sociology 'as we know 
it' in Britain, as some commentators have suggested. In some respects, 
the Clapham Committee did represent such a beginning for sociology, 
although this needs to be qualified carefully. What is perhaps more 
significant to the development of S?ciology in the years following the 
Second world war, were the social, economic and political changes within 
British society and an associated series of imperatives which generated 
national interests and the growth of knowledge (cf.. Barnes, J., 1979; 
Barnes, B., 
of post-war 
1977; and Arblaster, 1974) . 
Britain provided firmer 
Certainly the political terrain 
foundations for an investment of 
both faith and resources in the potential of social and economic research, 
especially during the period of immediate, post-war reconstruction. 
The latter notion of reconstruction became an exceedingly effective 
precept and practice within the sphere of policy-making during the 
years of the war, and shortly thereafter. In particular, Karl Mannheim 
used the notion of reconstruction as his central concept in the production 
of a sociological programme for the social and moral regeneration of 
a war-torn world (Mannheim, 1940; 1943 and 1950). In the construction 
of such a programme, Mannheim had portrayed sociology as a primary 
vehicle for the generation and transmission of ideas essential to the 
maintenance of a democratic society. Implicit in such a project was 
the equally vital role of the sociologist; an individual indispensible 
to the reconstruction of modern Britain. 
Although I have argued above, that the Clapham debate provided clues 
to the prospects of sociology's future development, it is important, 
nevertheless, to bear in mind some of the Committee's recommendations 
included in its final report. A brief consideration of these will provide 
a clearer understanding of the essential institutional developments 
which followed upon those recommendations. 
320 
There were two recommendations included in the Clapham Committee's final 
report (Cmnd., 6868, 1946) which tended to ensure that any developments 
within the field of social science would be kept under the control and 
influence of individuals and institutional arrangements, which had prev-
iously managed to successfully resist attempts to bring their respective 
domains of power and autonomy within the collective authority of the 
state1 and the process of centralised planning. The first was the establish-
ment of a sub-committee of the University Grants Committee (UGC) specifi-
cally for the social sciences. The second comprised the appointment 
of an Interdepartmental Committee on Social and Economic Research. 
The former remains in existence to this day; the latter ceased to function 
several years after its creation. These two post-Clapham developments 
appeared to many as both appropriate and necessary to sustain the develop-
mental impetus initiated with the convening of the Clapham Committee. 
Furthermore, they appeared to be two complementary institutional ini tia-
tives which would both ensure the equitable disbursement of future resources 
to and between the various social science disciplines, in addition to 
enhancing their respective research potential, through the supervision 
of 'planned growth' of social and economic research, between the hitherto 
and purportedly autonomous domains of the state and higher education. 
However, was this actually to be the case in the years following the 
war? The answer to this question lays in a consideration of the recommen-
dations themselves and a detailed analysis of the activities of both 
the UGC social science sub-committee and the Interdepartmental Commit tee 
on Social and Economic Research. It is beyond the scope of the present 
project to give a detailed account of the work of the two committees 
apart from brief references to their activities as they impinged on 
the future development of sociology after the war. 
The first of the two Clapham recommendations was as follows (Cmnd., 
6868, 1946, paragraph 32 (c)): 
"That the University Grants Committee be asked to consider 
the establishment of a sub-committee to advise on matters 
relating to the social sciences." 
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Such a recommendation arose as a result of an argument set out elsewhere 
in the Clapham report, (1946, paragraph 32b): 
"That favourable consideration be given to increases of the 
university grant with a view to strengthening developments 
conducive to the spread of research into economic and social 
questions, both through the provision of more chairs and other 
teaching posts, and through much more liberal provision for 
libraries, calculating machines, computing assistants, and 
similar facilities." 
I think it more than a coincidence that the central plank of such an argument 
should have coincided with the long-standing aims of the National Institute 
of Economic and Social Research. Economics was by far and away the 
most institutionally developed and intellectually established of the 
social sciences up to the outbreak of the Second World War, and as such 
was bound to benefit from any increase in the resources made available 
under Clapham. Moreover, the most influential and numerous members 
of the Clapham Committee were economists. Departments in sociology 
were virtually non-existent and could not mount the necessary lobby 
to influence the new state benefactors. This was in marked contrast 
to the position of departments of economics. Control of resources and 
the growth of 'newer' social science disciplines could also be maintained 
through the auspicies of the UGC, a mechanism central to the intra-war 
debate on the question of the control of higher education. 
The second recommendation referred to above was as follows (1946, paragraph 
32 (a)): 
"That a standing Interdepartmental Economic and Social Research 
Committee be set up to survey and advise upon research work 
in government departments." 
This suggestion arose largely as a result of the arguments of the economists 
on the Committee (1946, paragraphs 9-10): 
"9. It is highly desirable that the Government departments 
which collect and analyse material relevant to social 
and economic research should be in continuous contact 
with outside experts who can keep them aware of the needs 
322 
which are arising in the speculative branches of the 
field, and who can assist in assessing the value and 
possible uses of material which is already being collected. 
10. There is a need for improved efficiency of the interdepart-
mental mechanisms for collation, correlation and assessment 
of potential value of material (data) that separate depart-
ments suggesting new methods of areas of collection." 
The preceding recommendation and the paragraphs from which it is derived, 
is important for two reasons. First, there existed prior to the war, 
an extra-governmental standing committee, known as the 'Consultative 
Conference on Economic and Social Research'. The latter Consultative 
Conference . was chaired by the influential Alexander Carr-Saunders (I 
have discussed the significance of this Conference above, when referring 
to the Report on the Co-ordination of the Social Sciences (1945)) whom, 
under the direction of the Rockefeller Foundation sought to establish 
a network of communication between those research organisations and 
institutes, which the latter Founation. continued to finance. The aim 
of the Standing Conference was to avoid the overlap and duplication 
of research, and to provide an annual report of social and economic 
research, in both progress and prospect.* Second, the Consultative 
Conference served as a model of an established and functioning framework 
of liaison, fostering a series of mutually beneficial, organisational 
and individual connections within the field of social science. The 
latter clique of influentials within the wider domain of social science 
would provide what the Clapham Committee report described as the necessary 
intermediaries between government departments and the sphere of higher 
education. These so-called "outside experts" (1946, paragraph 9) were 
to become the organised body of consultants serving on the Interdepartmental 
Committee on Social and Economic Research. 
* There had also been established in 1928, a 'Social Science Research 
Training Committee'. This Committee's function was, according 
to the Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences, (1935, Vol. 1, p.246), 
" ... to encourage the scientific development of economics and sociology, 
and to secure the advantages of inter-changeability and comparability 
in the results of research work at different universities. The 
Committee awarded scholarships for research which would demonstrably 
emphasise 'the methodological potentialities of a problem chosen 
for investigation' rather than any intrinsic importance in the 
subject itself. I have been unable to trace the fate of this Committee, 
but it would appear from the criteria fo~~.awarding scholarships, 
that at the time, economics was likely to ,.fair better than sociology. r!IN n 
·, 
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There is another reason why the two recommendations contained in the 
Clapham Committee's report may be construed as frustrating the aims 
and objectives of the sociologists. Both recommendations gave rise 
to the establishment of specific institutional arrangements which prevented, 
or at least, postponed the creation of a research council for the social 
sciences. The sociologists had, as I have attempted to demonstrate 
above, argued strongly and frequently of the need for such a research 
council to co-ordinate the activities of the various social science 
disciplines. They regarded the existence of a social science research 
council as a forum in which sociology would be able to receive a fair 
hearing in its requests for disciplinary recognition and the receipt 
of resources necessary to sustain and expand its activities as 
frail as they may have been, prior to the convening of the Clapham Committee 
in 1944. Furthermore, the likelihood of sociology receiving immediate 
recognition and resources seemed somewhat remote, in view of the operational 
policies of both the Interdepartmental Committee and the UGC social 
science, sub-committee. The former, focusing on the primacy of government 
research needs, the latter, tending to maintain the status quo, as far 
as the existing structure of British social science within the universities 
was concerned. In fact, the UGC sub-committee had established a gate-
keeping function shortly after its inauguration. This had the effect 
o.f determining what were, in the eyes of the committee, the legitimate 
branches of the social sciences, thus preventing a proliferation of 
subjects from seeking recognition and funding from the UGC. The categories 
of recognised branches of the social sciences were as follows (CAB/UGC 
8, 1947): 
"In view of the recommendations of the Clapham Committee, 
the criteria should be: 
a) Are the activities in the Universities being carried on 
in the interests of the social sciences. 
b) Are they expanding. 
c) Will they expand if they are not grant aided. 
The conclusion was; that there should be two classes of subjects: 
1. Those obviously belonging to the social sciences. 
2. Those on the borderline. 
It would consequently be one of the functions of the sub-committee 
to discriminate between the two classes." 
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The preceding quotation came from the minutes of the UGC social science 
sub-committee* of September 9th, 1947. A meeting at which the Chairman, 
Sir Walter Moberly, (Chairman of the UGC, and ardent supporter of the 
dispersed initiative) argued, that any funds available for distribution 
by the UGC were limited, and if 'too many subjects were included in 
the social sciences, there might not be enough money to finance them' . 
As a consequence of this, a memorandum was drawn up for submission to 
the UGC, in which the following subjects were included as having a legiti-
mate claim on the Exchequer (CAB/UGC 8, 1947): 
"1. Economic Theory and Organisation. 
2. Economic and Social History. 
3. Sociology. 
4. Statistics and Demography." 
In the case of Economic Theory and Organisation, members of the sub-committee 
agreed that the qualification, "pure" and "applied" should be added 
to the sub-title Economics. Agricultural Economics was considered to 
Economic and Social History was a subject be a borderline subject. 
area which generated considerable debate among the committee members, 
with a resolution being passed (six votes to three) for the retention 
of the full ti tle 1 Economic and Social History. History proper was 
excluded from the subject category. Sociology was subjected to a critical 
examination, resulting in the addition of a qualification; that the 
discipline should be classed as "General" and "Applied", and that crimin-
ology should form a separate 'sub-title'. Statistics and Demography, 
the sub-committee argued, should also specify statistical theory as 
it 'applies to the social sciences' . It is interesting to note that 
those who were active in the field of demography, would, in later years, 
be referred to, or describe themselves as, sociologists. 
* The following individuals were members of the first UGC sub-committee for the social 
sc1ences: Sir Walter Moberly (Chairman), Professor D.W. Brogan, Sir Henry Clay, 
Professor G.O.H. Cole, Mr. Geoffrey Crowther, Professor H.C. Darby, Professor J. 
Jewkes, Professor T .H. Marshall, Professor L.C. Robbins, Mr. E.A.G. Robinson, Professor 
T.S. Simey, Mr. J.R.N. Stone and Professor R.H. Tawney. It will be noted that 
five of the UGC sub-committee members served on the Clapham Committee, which in 
itself comprised of only eight members (excluding the Secretary) of whom· one member, 
Sir John Clapham, had died before the convening of the sub-committee. 
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An intriguing feature of the early activities of the UGC sub-committee 
on the social sciences involved the bureaucratic definition of the field 
of social science. Thus defined, the field received 'official' recognition, 
as described above, for a number of years, notwithstanding the intellectual 
division of labour that had characterised the debates of the pre and 
intra-war periods preceding the Clapham Committee. It is important 
not to underestimate the significance of the establishment of a UGC 
sub-committee for another reason. The Clapham Committee and 
the institutional arrangements which ensued from its recommendations, 
gave rise to the first occasion on which the social sciences had been 
given not only political recognition, through state support via the 
UGC and in underwriting its research and teaching requirements, but 
that this same support, or rather, social evaluation of a branch of 
knowledge, had occurred within the wider context of a redefinition of 
the nature and purpose of higher education. The latter development 
reflected the political determination of the production of knowledge 
on the basis of the national need. For the incoming Labour government 
of 1945, committed to the centrality of large-scale planning in every 
quarter of the economy and society, the realisation of its manifold 
policies required the radical revision of those social institutions 
without which its aims would never be more than manifesto promises. 
The spheres of manpower control, the changes to be introduced in education, 
at all levels, the introduction of health and welfar~ policie~, the management 
of the economy through industrial and labour reforms etc., would, according 
to senior Labour Cabinet Ministers, require not only a socialist commitment, 
but the skills of individuals and forms of knowledge and practice which 
Clement Attlee believed could only be made available, if the field of 
social science received the necessary support it required. Hence his 
letter to the Chancellor of the Exchequer in 1944, the result of which 
gave rise to the convening of the Clapham Committee. 
The· UGC sub-commit tee for social science and the Interdepartmental committee 
provided an infrastructure of coordination and financial support for 
British social science. Unfortunately, the scale of financial support 
for social science in general, and sociology in particular was rather 
small and tended to enhance the future of the more established disciplines 
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like economics. In addition, although the state was preparing, henceforth, 
to provide the resources necessary to the maintenance and subsequent 
development of disciplines like sociology, thus removing the dependency 
of the social sciences on private benefaction, some sources of financial 
support did remain available to those disciplines from the latter domain. 
I have argued above, 
to state funding of 
in the universities, 
that the transition from 
much of the research and 
had proved to be a major 
private benefaction 
even whole departments 
issue in the education 
debate, as well as the Clapham debate. For many of the participants 
in those debates, the issue of state funding implied the notion of state 
control, anathema to the principles and practices upon which higher 
education in Britain had been founded and, ironically, controlled. 
With the gradual diminution of private benefaction for the social sciences, 
it is possible to understand the resistance of social scientists to 
the significance of establishing a research council for the social sciences, 
especially during a period when a socialist government appeared to be 
set on the direct control of all institutional arrangements crucial 
to the fulfilment of its policies. The spectre of such an ideologically 
directed council, in the service of a government, had been conjured 
up by members of the Clapham Commit tee, serving in the end as a reason 
for opposing the establishment of such an institution. However, the 
research council debate was never to disappear. In fact, its major 
exponents, the sociologists and their supporters, were to sustain the 
pressure for an 1 SSRC 1 , until the convening of the Heyworth Committee 
in the early 1960s. The latter Committee followed the publication of 
another government report crucial to the future of sociology, also publi-
shed in the early 1960s - the Report of the Committee on Higher Education 
(the Robbins Report, 1963). 
The issue of the funding of knowledge became and remains a central political 
issue: one which has implications for the determination of those forms 
of knowledge which governments and other powerful interest groups consider 
to be in keeping with a series of preferred aims and objectives - something 
which may not coincide with the national interest, although the latter 
notion is employed as a token to invoke an assumed, collective need. 
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Concerted political action as a means of realising the national interest, 
especially through manipulation of the nation's system of education, 
can either enhance or destroy a culture. Cultural Revolutions, the 
alleged supremacy of the Aryan race, or the myth of market forces in 
'freeing the people', all necessitatErl the creation and transmission 
of the ideas central to such beliefs. A nation's system of education 
thus becomes a crucial medium for the generation of such 'knowledge'. 
It is beyond the scope of the present work to devote the time and space 
necessary for a detailed analysis of the importance of the Interdepartmental 
Committee· on Social and Economic Research. Much important and relevant 
detail about the activities of the Committee can be found in its periodic 
reports (cf. · First Report of the Committee, Cmnd. 7357 (1948); Second 
Report of the Committee, Cmnd. 8091 (1950) and Third Report of the Committee, 
Cmnd. 9621 (1956)). Lest it be thought that the Interdepartmental 
Committee was largely a remote government quango, quite distant from 
the aims and aspirations of the sociologists, it should be remembered 
that such an institutional arrangement provided virtually the only active 
forum (in an extra-curricula sense) in which sociologists were able 
to act, in either a liaison capacity, or, through membership of its 
many sub-committees. Moreover, several sociologists had made a number 
of promises concerning the potential of their discipline during the 
course of the Clapham debate, and the opportunity now arose for them 
to fulfil them through a contribution to social research. Certainly 
those sociologists whom I have previously referred to as belonging to 
the discipline's practical wing, made significant contributions to the 
work of the Committee, thus helping to sustain the ethos and authority 
of empirical research as a fundamental tradition within sociology. 
Association with the Interdepartmental Committee also provided an oppor-
tunity for sociologists to demonstrate the intrinsic value of social 
research to the wider process of social reconstruction and the period 
following it. Thus the discourse of planning and administration became 
infused with the ideas, concepts and practices which were part and parcel 
of the sociologists' repertoire. 
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The Interdepartmental Committee's activities may have been pragmatic 
and ad hoc, yet it never varied its original terms of reference (Cmnd., 
8091, 1950): 
"To survey and advise upon research work in government departments, 
and in particular; (a) to bring to the notice of departments 
the potential value for research purposes of the material 
which they collect and to suggest new methods and areas of col-
laboration; (b) to advise on how there could be made available 
to research workers, information gathered for their own purposes 
by the departments, which has potential value as material 
for research. 
It is our continuing aim to stimulate and foster collaboration 
in the field of research between departments and the universities 
and other research institutions and to help to bring them 
together in those cases where our help is needed and sought." 
It became apparent from reading the Committee's reports that it acted 
as a clearing house, in addition to a gate-keeper and co-ordinator of 
research in a number of spheres. It tended to evaluate potential research 
proje·cts on the basis of the needs of government departments and their 
associated administrative. apparatuses, thus engendering research in 
areas connected directly with the requirements of the government of 
the day. This process aided also the fulfilment and subsequent assessment 
of its social and e·conomic policy objectives.* The same process , in 
* The Committee 1 s report of 1950 sets out the criteria which engendered such a need, 
in addition to the affect it had subsequently on the nature and scope of the sociological 
research of the period (Cmnd., 8Qgl, 1950, p.l): 
"Our raison d 1 etre lies in the increasing extent to which central government 
departments which need themselves to obtain information for their own purposes 
of day-to-day administration, have become in consequence important sources 
of the raw material necessary for research in the social sciences." 
And in relation to the connection between government policy and its social consequences 
(lg5Q, p.l): 
11 This has been brought about partly by the extended field of government enquiry, 
partly by the introduction of new forms of statistical enquiry such as the 
Census of Distribution, and partly because, as the result of changes in the 
administration of such services as those connected with public assistance, with 
hospitals and social insurance, information formally colle.cted by local authorities 
or private agencies is now gathered into department files." 
The Mannheimian notion of 'democratic planning' would appear to have been realised, 
through the creation of an extensive state administrative apparatus. Government 
departments were, henceforth, to adopt the role of "consumers" in the process of 
initiating its research needs. In many respects a novel precursor to the Rothchild 
principle of the "customer/contractor" arrangement (Cmnd., 4814, lg7l). 
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the nature turn, had a direct affect upon 
research for the period in question. The 
and range of sociological 
following examples give a 
the Cornrni ttee 1 s work up to fair indication of the scope 
the late 1950s. 
and depth of 
1. Co-operation between research institutions and government departments: 
2. 
(a) The Board of Trade: research carried out on behalf of the afore-
mentioned department by, the National Institute of Economic 
and Social Research, the University of London and the University 
of Birmingham. 
(b) Ministry of Food: the Department of Economics at Cambridge 
University. 
Collaborative work between 
departments, in addition to 
agency: 
several institutions and government 
the involvement of a private funding 
The London School of Economics, the Nuffield Foundation, the 
Ministry of Labour and National Service and the Central Office 
of Information. This collaborative group produced an occupational 
and social mobility study (a long-term study) , in addition 
to the work of the Population Investigation Committee, all 
under the auspicies of the Interdepartmental Committee. The 
result of the research assisted the then Labour Government 
in its plans for full employment. Other by-products of the 
work contributed information on 'employment problems of young 
persons 1 and the socio-psychological aspects of job/career 
patterns. 
3. A number of sub-committees of the main Interdepartmental Committee 
were formed for the purpose of collating and coordinating existing 
material within various 
co-opted as a means to 
time, that the latter 
in particular fields. 
government departments. Academics were 
achieve this end. It was argued at the 
individuals possessed "special knowledge" 
(a) The Ministry 
reviewed. In 
of Education's 
1950, a Staff 
resources and data sources were 
Inspector for Educational Research 
was appointed. 
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(b) The Board of Trade: A survey of the department's divisions 
to establish its information and research needs. 
(c) A number of "Guides to Official Sources" (first published in 
1948, H.M.S.O.) were inaugurated. 
(d) The selection and preservation of documents was commenced under 
the auspicies of the Interdepartmental Committee. This applied 
to material which was thought to possess a use for "social 
and economic research", (1950, p.ll). 
The Committee's report for the year 1956 contained a review of the work 
of both the Interdepartmental Committee and its various sub-committees. 
Mention is made of "fostering a number of worthwhile research projects 
which might not otherwise come to full fruition" (Cmnd., 9621, 1956, 
p.5). In fact, the Committee was responsible for the production of 
six extensive lists of unpublished government papers which were circulated 
to sixty-nine , ll.braries; 184 unpublished documents were made available 
and approximately 20 government departments co-operated on a continuing 
basis to supply information amounting to the production of thousands 
of copies of individual reports and documents. Other significant pieces 
of research which arose as a direct result of the Committee were as 
follows: Study of Labour Mobility in Great Britain 1945-49; Social Mobility 
in Britain, edited by Professor David Glass (1953); a national income 
study of Scotland under the auspices - of the University of Glasgow's 
Department of Economics and Social Research; an investigation on the 
consumption of food, in conjunction with the Department of Economics 
at the university of London; various publications including, Studies 
on Medical and Population Subjects; Internal Migration (Newton and Jeffery), 
External Migration (Carrier and Jeffery) , Statistics on the use of Land 
in the U.K., Statistics on Crime (T.S. Lodge, Home Office publication), 
and Britain: An Official Handbook (Central Office of Information publica-
tion) . * Another important feature of the Committee's activities entailed 
a consideration of the tabulations used in the 1951 Census. The Report 
for 1956 makes specific reference to the co-operation of the sociologists 
Professor David Glass (L.S.E) and Professor T.S. Simey (Liverpool University). 
* All of the publications cited here, although without dates, appear 
in the Report of the Interdepartmental Committee for 1956. 
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The Clapham Committee and the events associated directly with its recommen-
dations can in many respe,cts be interpreted as the genesis of a clearly 
discernable and coherent institutional and intellectual movement within 
British social science. 
the case of the Clapham 
especially, the role of 
In particular, I have endeavoured to show that in 
Committee, notions of strategy and tactics and 
cliques and influentials (in the sense portrayed 
by C. Wright Mills to account for their function in shaping social science 
(1963)), played a significant part in determining the outcome of its 
deliberations. However, it is worthwhile reiterating my earlier considera-
tion of the difference between the appearance and impact of an 1 official 1 
government report, and the background to its initiation, especially 
the consequences such factors have on the course of its deliberations. 
As I have argued above, the relative significance attributed to the 
Clapham Committee Report, depends upon whether or not the historian 
places greater emphasis upon its findings and recommendations, and the 
subsequent effect these would have on the development of disciplines 
like sociology, or, whether, as I believe, that the document published 
at the conclusion of the Clapham debate, represented a less logical, 
coherent and objective process than the production of a final report 
may appear to have conferred on its activities. I would suggest, that 
in the case of the Clapham Committee, the evidence submitted and the 
arguments recorded, provide a remarkable insight into the intellectual 
and institutional hierarchy of British social science during the inter-war 
period and up to the conclusion of the Second World War. This is why 
the outcome of what I have referred to as the Clapham debate, became 
so crucial to the future development of sociology in Britain. 
CONCIDSION 
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CONCLUSION 
Taken together, the preceding chapters in this work provide an historical 
account of the development of sociology over a relatively short period 
of its history in Britain. Considered individually, each chapter examines 
a particular feature of that history within the analytical framework 
discussed in the first chapter. In keeping with similar historical 
accounts, mine has not proven anything other than the fact that, hopefully, 
in producing a somewhat different insight into the growth of sociology, 
some measure of understanding can be gained of how and why the discipline 
has achieved its current, social and intellectual presence among other 
branches of knowledge and culture generally. 
At one point in the argument, I referred to the function of the historical 
account, suggesting that the motives of the historian influence signifi-
cantly the way in which he or she choses to portray the growth of the 
discipline over time, notwithstanding specific concerns with objectivity, 
accuracy and the focus of the narrative, i.e. an institutional, intellec-
tual, or biographical account. Considered thus, history becomes a useful 
resource to assert and sustain a preferred sociology. In accepting 
or rejecting one sociological theory rather than another (though not 
in the Popperian sense) , or, adopting or denying one corpus of methods 
in preference to others, entail the notion of the purpose of sociology. 
The central ideas and contrasting perspectives within sociology, its 
constitutive form, remain contingent and controversial as ever. The 
latter state of affairs (sociology's purpose) gives rise to an associated 
series of moral obligations and political consequences through the pursuit 
of the discipline, affecting in turn, the status of sociological knowledge. 
An unfortunate example of this can be found in the infamous Gould Report 
(1977). 
In examining the process of science-building, the major preoccupation 
of sociologists and their supporters for the period covered in this 
project, I have endeavoured to highlight both the relevance and importance 
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of a strategic presentation of sociology by its practitioners and sponsors, 
as a fundamental activity within the general quest for institutional 
and intellectual autonomy. Although my analysis has ranged across and 
within conventional categories of; institution, ideas, biography and 
socio-political contexts, often combining specific elements of those 
individual categories, I have sought to maintain the integrity of socio-
logy's composite form, both in terms of its history and actuality. 
Thus the pursuit of sociology implies the existence of institutional 
resistance to it, whereby the history of its ideas becomes contained 
and shaped by those same institutional resistances and opportunities. 
In the opening chapter, I considered a number of historiographical issues 
associated with an account of sociology's history, particularly the 
explanatory framework to be adopted for the project. Through an earlier 
and subsequently abortive attempt to examine British sociology as a 
series of major, 'British' theories, espoused by a correspondingly discrete 
set of theorists, (a project assumed to be quite feasible on the basis 
of work carried out by Nicolas Mullins (1974)), I realised that many 
significant aspects of the discipline's institutional development would 
be excluded from the account. Moreover, such a project indicated a 
naive conception on my part of the origin and nature of what I had assumed 
to be British sociological theory. Further consideration of a project 
based on Mullins' model made it quite obvious that I held a number 
of questionable assumptions about the institutional and intellectual 
dimensions of sociology in Britain, especially the degree of contingency 
between the former and latter dimensions. While there appeared to be 
an astonishing array of intellectual diversity and institutional variation 
within the field, sociology's apparently consolidated state in Britain 
owed much to a number of quite recent events, all of which appeared 
to have originated, or culminated in the 1960s and subsequently affecting 
its contemporary form. While the 1960s and 1970s were certainly periods 
of rapid expansion in sociology, the growth that took place in those 
decades seemed to have been the result of a number of conducible conditions 
affecting the general growth of knowledge. An expansion of intellectual 
activity engendered by often conflicting, but clearly discernable, economic, 
political and social imperatives. Sociology's growth sprang from the 
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changes taking place in the system of higher education, and the transformation 
of the nation's research base, in terms of its general ethos and direction, 
giving rise to a proliferation and variation of sites in which to conduct 
research. This was accompanied by a widespread commitment to the importance 
of postgraduate research in all fields of knowledge, all of which were 
predicated on a changing political climate, wherein the determination 
of the national need became expressed increasingly through a common 
faith in the potential of science and technology as means to sustain 
continued economic growth. It therefore seemed that a project concerned 
with the development of sociology in Britain since the early 1960s, 
would need to take account of the aforementioned conducible conditions 
and their effects upon the growth of the discipline, both as an intellectual 
and institutional activity. A complete revision of my original research 
project led me to conclude amongst other things, that the factors affec-
ting the development of a branch of knowledge and practice, in this 
case sociology, must be common to all fields and that they could perhaps, 
be of an invarient rather than a transient nature. A primary example 
of this was the mechanism, or rather, process of the funding of knowledge. 
Although the latter example and its ;effect upon the development of sociology 
since the last war presented itself as a somewhat straightforward element 
of the project I had in mind, the situation as it obtained before the 
last war was quite a different matter altogether. This also seemed 
to be the case for all the other factors that I had managed to identify 
above. 
The early revision of the project mentioned above also helped to clarify 
another problem, one which I have dealt 
namely, the identification of an 
Several options appeared to fit in 
with in the chapter on methodology, 
appropriate approach to analysis. 
with the account that I wished to 
give, yet having conceived of the methodological dimension of my research 
in such a manner - a shopping list mentality - for the 'selection' of 
the 'correct' analytical framework, I soon realised that the adoption 
and rigorous adherence to a single method, just for the sake of methodo-
logical fidelity, may have led to the exclusion of arguments, seemingly 
awkward evid·ence and alternative lines of investigation. I knew that 
my work would entail a combination, or, at the very least, a variation 
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on conventional lines of analyses, such as, the sociology of sociology, 
the sociology of knowledge and the general category of a history of 
ideas. My approach therefore became eclectic, open-ended and somewhat 
experimental. I then decided to direct my investigation to a period 
in sociology's history from the early years of this century, to the 
late 1940s. In the early period of my work, those years appeared to 
be bereft of what I had come to know as sociology in its prolific, contem-
porary form. I now believe that my initial conunitment to an historical 
account which would go beyond mere description of sociology's institutional 
and intellectual activities for the period in question, led gradually 
to the conclusion, that the sociologists' project in the years under 
examination, involved them in an activity which I have referred to as 
the pursuit* of their discipline, a project that coincided with the 
practice of sociology itself. Although contemporary sociologists are 
engaged in a similar activity, confronting similar opportunities and 
constraints, in the case of 'modern sociology', its practitioners continue 
to develop their activities within an increasingly defensive mode 
the defence of the sociological realm - whereas sociologists of the 
formative period (the focus of my investigation) were intent on establishing 
the kingdom. The latter activity seemed to be a major component of 
the sociological enterprise and crucial to the future of a discipline 
that, until the Second world war, seemed destined to oblivion. 
In the first chapter, I gave careful consideration to the work of several 
authors whose ideas I considered to be suggestive of the kind of approach 
required for my own project. Indeed, it was through a consideration 
of some seemingly diverse methodological frameworks that I decided 
to introduce an additional, but complementary category to the more conven-
tional approaches referred to above, namely, sociology's advocatory 
* Pursuit in the sense that sociologists and their supporters endeavoured 
to evolve and deploy a strategic approach to the development of 
their discipline, whether in relation to other branches of the 
social sciences, or, in terms of other fields of knowledge gene-
rally. The establishment and extension of intellectual and insti-
tutional boundaries thus constitutes the processes of pursuing 
sociology, rather than a specific endeamur to attain some objec-
tively defined goal for the discipline. 
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dimension. This posed a number of problems, especially the need to 
be specific about the nature and function of such a category, 
intended in the main, as an aid to the construction of the kind of 
historical account that I had in mind. The concept possessed a dual 
function in terms of its deployment in the aforementioned account. 
In one sense it represented the actions of sociologists - a contingent 
dimension wherein practitioners either individually or collectively 
pursue strategies crucial to the social construction of sociology. 
In another sense, the advocatory dimension could also be employed as 
a category for the classification of the phenomena associated with 
the aforementioned, contingent dimension. An example of the latter 
was, as I have suggested, the engagement of sociologists with others, 
in a very subtle, complex and purposive process of negotiating sociology's 
autonomy through the deployment of what I have referred to as strategic 
discourse. In the former sense of the concept, Donald MacRae's notion 
of a 'prescriptive history of sociology' provided an example of the 
technical format for my own account, whereas Michel Foucault's notion 
of the development of the human sciences as a series of 'acts of justifica-
tion' served as a basic organising idea. The notion of an advocatory 
dimension seemed to facilitate an exploration of the evidence within 
the somewhat, conceptually flexible notion of acts of justification 
and the more pragmatic exercise of chronicling history. The degree 
of detail involved in the latter exercise was a direct result of endea-
vouring to 
the effort 
history of 
adhere to one 
required, ·the 
sociology' . 
minutiae are as relevant 
of MacRae's 
consequences 
For MacRae, 
conditions, 
of his call 
or, in 
for a 
and important 
institutional and 
to the history 
the light of 
'satisfactory 
biographical 
of sociology_ 
as a grand tour of its major ideas and influentials. Another dimension 
of such a history would be, according to MacRae, the recording and 
analysis of sociology's failures: without such a component, the 'story' 
would be distorted and biased and likely to attract the criticism, that 
sociology's development was but a succession of intellectual triumphs, 
untouched and unaffected by the social milieu in which it had evolved. 
The future of the discipline depended as much on the value ascribed 
to its ideas and practice, as the ability of sociologists to establish 
sociology's intellectual autonomy in relation to the proximate disciplines 
within the domain of social science itself. 
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In the second chapter, I endeavoured to explore the progress of sociology 
in the middle and late 1930s through an examination of what I considered 
to be two major events affecting the intellectual and institutional 
form of social science during the inter- war period. I did not dwell 
to any significant extent upon the discipline's substantive content, 
apart from one or two issues associated with a series of inter-war confe-
rences. My major concern was to examine sociology within the analytical 
framework set out in the first chapter, and this necessitated a consider-
ation of the construction of sociology by its practitioners through 
a series of strategies not connected directly with its substantive dimension. 
The emphasis here was upon the process of negotiation and the resources 
employed and the method of their deployment in making the case for sociology 
as the coordinating discipline within a synoptic science of society. 
In the second part of chapter two, I developed the argument that expres-
sions of the nature and purpose of sociology, through the postulation 
of various agendas, programme statements and intellectual initiatives, 
including a synoptic science of society, implied a corresponding set 
of contingent political, economic and social conditions, all of which 
impinge on sociology's extant and potential nature. In electing to 
use a case study of the development of the social sciences at the L.S.E. 
during the 
influences 
form. The 
examination 
inter-war period, I hoped to demonstrate the effect of diverse 
within the process of institutionalisation upon intellectual 
central theme of that part of the work entailed a detailed 
of William Beveridge's Natural Bases Scheme. That scheme 
and its consequences for the future development of British social science 
generally and sociology particularly, was examined within several, 
related categories, all of which would have a subsequent bearing on 
the evidence and associated arguments contained in the remainder of 
the work. They were as follows: the valuation of knowledge, in terms 
of intrinsic and social criteria; the funding of knowledge, a process 
in which the aforementioned criteria of valuation are defined and deployed; 
the role of influentials, cliques and interest groups (in Wright Mills 
sense) outside of the community of practicing social scientists, who 
have influenced significantly the development of social science during 
the period in question; and the increasing importance of the pursuit 
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of sociology on the basis of its latent potential or promise. In the 
case of the first category, the valuation of knowledge, I examined William 
Beveridge's Natural Bases Scheme, with special reference to its somewhat 
contrived and fiercely positivist philosophy of social science. I suggested 
that such a scheme and its attendant philosophical basis had not only 
consequences for the epistemological status of those forms of knowledge 
known collectively as social science, but that the same scheme also 
implied an ideological dimension for those disciplines. This became 
clear in the accompanying examination of the funding of knowledge, wherein 
I dealt at length with the funding of Beveridge's various p.r:ojects at 
the L. s. E. In portraying the relationship between the benefactor (the 
Rockefeller Foundation) and the beneficiary (Beveridge and the L.S.E.) 
as a contractual one, in both a formal and informal sense; the former 
through contracts and specified revenue grants, the latter, through 
an implicit, yet shared and binding understanding of the nature and 
purpose of social science, I endeavoured to demonstrate the connection 
between a conceptual scheme for a group of disciplines and the material 
means by which they were to evolve. Considered thus, the history of 
those disciplines was shown to be intimately bound up in their institutional 
setting. Furthermore, large- scale benefaction, from whatever source, 
did not seem to be granted unconditionally, and attempts to disguise 
or conceal a mutual interest, which generates or sustains the production 
of knowledge, appeared to become increasingly difficult to manage when 
the motives of both the benefactor and beneficiary were examined closely. 
It appeared that those motives encompassed a shared ideology, presented 
for professional and public consumption within the rhetoric of the national 
need, or a narrow definition of disciplinary advancement. 
The second chapter provided an opportunity to consider the increasingly 
precarious position of sociology throughout the middle and latter part 
of the 1930s. This arose as a result of two, inter-related developments 
within British social science. First, sociologists became increasingly 
sensitive to their declining influence within that period, espe-
cially in terms of their attempts to provide sociology with a coordinating 
role within a reconstituted science of society. Second, toward the 
end of the inter-war period, sociology became increasingly irrelevant 
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to a growing and diversifying number of social science disciplines. 
The latter disciplines became preoccupied with tasks of specialisation 
and professionalisation and the acquisition of resources with which 
to develop and consolidate their respective research bases. 
Although chapter three was somewhat lengthy and detailed, this arose 
as a result of the need to explore the social con text of wartime Britain. 
The focal point of the argument at that stage, concerned the production 
of 
of 
knowledge 
knogf~edge, 
and the national need, 
affected directly the 
whereby interests and the growth 
order of knowledge itself. The 
implications of this for sociology were quite clear. vJhereas the pre-war 
period was one in which sociology had struggled to assert and sustain 
its intellectual and institutional autonomy, the debate and the issues 
central to it tended to be confined to the domain of the social sciences 
and their somewhat limited institutional settings. The Beveridge 'experi-
ment' revealed the ideological underpinning of the funding of knowledge, 
which in turn had consequences for the valuation of knowledge based 
upon a series of criteria engendered by implicit and explicit conditions 
of the contractual relationship between benefactor and beneficiary. 
Sociology seemed to be losing ground within the general advance of inter-
war social science. sociology's 'troubles' remained largely private. 
It appeared as though sociology would no longer be able to sustain its 
case for autonomy within the domain of British social science. However, 
the contexts and contingencies of war modified significantly, the social 
and cultural conditions of Britain, which in turn engendered a corres-
ponding series of objectives and interests articulated within notions 
of the national need. Thus the evaluation of ideas and practical skills 
became established on principles and precepts quite different from other 
historical periods. Expediency, relevance and responsiveness to urgent 
and specific imperatives provided the categories within which to assess 
and ascribe the value and substance of various forms of knowledge. 
The social sciences, including sociology, neither withdrew, nor were 
they excluded from the latter process. The debate about the relationship 
of sociology to the other social sciences was transformed from a largely 
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I 
interdisciplinary issue, to one in which the production of social knowledge, 
the stated objective of those same disciplines, became incorporated 
within the much wider, public debate on the production of knowledge 
in response 
provided an 
to the national need. 
important opportunity 
The initiation of the latter debate 
for sociologists to engage in a much 
wider discussion on the status and potential of their discipline, especially 
as a medium for the generation of 'sociological knowledge', essential 
to the moral and social reconstruction of post-war Britain. 
The war 
control 
gave rise to the 
by the state. 
imposition of large-scale social and economic 
The formulation and implementation of social 
and economic policies required the collection and organisation of informa-
tion about the population. Without such information there could be 
no planning, organisation, or control of the populace. Although the 
mechanism of control could quite easily have been invoked through general legisla-
tion and additional emergency powers, a gap existed in so far as the 
state did not possess sufficient nor adequate information about its 
citizens. The consequences of this could have meant defeat. There 
thus occurred a mobilisation for problem solving. As I argued in part 
four of the chapter in question, the evaluation of individual branches 
of knowledge proceeded on the basis of criteria which encompassed a 
notion of demonstrable utility and expediency. Thus the importance 
of research technologies (methodology) became a key feature of the evalua-
tive process. Even though the social, political and economic imperatives 
which engendered such a quest for 'data' by agencies of the state would 
be superceded by a different version of the national need in the post-war 
period, the framework essential to the evaluative function had been 
established during the war. This framework consisted of a whole series 
of personal relationships, organisational contingencies, institutional 
arrangements, mediating factors and interest groups. 
An integral component of the aforementioned evaluative framework entailed 
a corresponding conceptual dimension, namely, a preferred method or 
rather, an exemplar with which to assess the various other forms of 
knowledge which may have been able to contribute to the war effort. 
In postulating the existence of a Science Movement, I hoped to demonstrate 
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the predominance of the ethos and authority of science as a central 
resource for not only those who sought to establish science as a fundamental 
component of the national curriculum, but as a method to be adopted 
in the sphere of politics: a technological politics implying a policy 
science. The Movement's most influential supporters, both scientists 
and non-scientists, did not seek to proscribe the human sciences from 
their project. Rather, they viewed the role of social science in wartime, 
but more importantly, in the post-war period, as of fundamental importance 
to the process of reconstruction. An authentic social science should, 
according to the exponents of the Movement, be founded upon· the principles 
and practices of natural science. The diffusion of the scientific method 
(in effect the normative component of science) within the social sciences 
was a prerequisite to their attaining scientific maturity and social 
utility. The pre-war, Beveridgian dream had not yet faded. 
Chapter three encompassed another dimension of the widening public debate 
on the role of social science in the war and reconstruction. This entailed 
the evolving alliance between the Labour Party and the Science Movement. 
As the war progressed, Labour's commitment to large-scale social reform 
meant that the prospect of planning would necessarily entail a considerable 
increase in social and economic research. Furthermore, the conditions 
of war led to the establishment of an infrastructure of formal communication 
and the sustained funding and control of science by and for the state. 
An institutional pattern of support and containment of science once 
established, would be likely to remain in existence in the post-war 
period. With the emergence of a national debate on issues such as planning 
and the role of the state in the management of the war effort, there 
arose a number of additional problems which, when given sufficient political 
and public attention, 
of those institutions 
would have far-reaching consequences for the future 
wherein the nation's culture evolved and subse-
quently became transmitted from generation to generation - the universities. 
The questions beginning to be asked in the light of people's wartime 
experience were: whose universities; whose culture? The role of the 
state in wartime, the valuation of knowledge for immediate and obvious 
ends, the prospect of radical political change, the general acceptance 
of the need for social and economic planning beyond the period of war 
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and the contribution of the universities to the war effort, provided 
a complex and controversial context within which sociologists sought 
to reassert and sustain their claims for intellectual and institutional 
recognition. The deputy Prime Minister, Clement Attlee, provided the 
necessary opportunity for the sociologists to once again pursue their 
discipline; the convening of the Committee of Inquiry into Social and 
Economic Research. 
In chapter four, I focused attention on the various opportunities and 
frustrations confronting social science as it responded to the imperatives 
of a nation at war. All of the issues referred to immediately above, 
constituted the political and social turmoil within which sociology 
sought to revive itself. Sociology had become enmeshed in the controversy 
of the funding and control of the production of knowledge. Educational 
policy, and especially the distribution of resources to sustain research 
became, henceforth, some of the most important items on the political 
agenda. Understanding the implications of such a transformation in 
the funding and ordering of knowledge would, I argued, provide a correspon-
ding appreciation of the issues which would confront sociology well 
into the post-war period. The social conditions of the time seemed 
conducive to a closer and certainly more active alignment between social 
science and the emergent, technological politics. The Clapham Committee, 
instigated at the request of Clement Attlee, represented the beginning 
of that association. 
In chapter five, 
Clapham debate in 
I endeavoured 
terms of the 
to highlight 
effect that 
the significance of the 
its outcome would have on 
the hierarchy of British social science: an edifice erected in the pre-war 
era of seemingly limitless Rockefeller largesse and often, the selective 
interests of a few influential individuals. In particular, I focused 
on what I perceived to be two distinct lines of argument proffered 
by those participating in the aforementioned debate. There were those 
social scientists who regarded any form of control over the nature and 
direction of social and economic research (this also included the construc-
tion of the curriculum) as an unwarrented encroachment by the state 
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for political ends. Others contributing to the debate regarded the role 
of the state as a less totalitarian intervention, a somewhat more benign 
intrusion, with the added advantage of public funds to support research 
and teaching within the social sciences. The former group tended to 
comprise those social scientists who were well established in their 
respective fields, having enjoyed and benefitted from the institutional 
expansion of pre-war social science via the mechanism suggested above. 
Furthermore, their continued influence within the wider domain of social 
science might be seriously 
endeavours be entrusted to a 
undermined, should public funding of their 
central agency of the state. The question 
that arises here is whether or not this group of social scientists possessed 
genuire or alterior motives in springing to the defence of their respective 
disciplines. The latter group of social scientists, especially the 
sociologists welcomed the prospect of a reordering of the previously 
mentioned hierarchy. The sociologists had virtually everything to gain 
should social and economic research and teaching be centrally funded. 
This was, of course, based on the assumption that such funding would 
occur on an equitable basis and that all social science disciplines 
would receive the resources necessary for their future development, 
both as teaching and research activities. Public subvention of social 
science also appeared to threaten the structure of the private and voluntary 
funded research agencies and organisations which had evolved and prospered 
both before and during the war. The resolution of this conflict of 
interests revolved around the issue of a research council for the social 
sciences. 
The research council debate occurred against the background of a more 
controversial though related issue; that of the relationship of the 
universities to the state in an age of social and economic planning. 
The Mannheimian project of a sociology engaged in such a reconstructionist 
exercise seemed in some large measure to indicate clearly, the general 
disposition of sociologists toward the role of the state in the sphere 
of higher education. This was for two reasons. First, as I pointed 
out in chapter five, the sociologists were looking to the universities 
to provide the necessary sites for sociology's future academic development. 
Second, the education debate, examined in chapter five, revealed the 
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major distinction between those who viewed the universities as invio.lable 
institutions, to be protected from the political machinations of party 
and state; and those who regarded the universities as potentially the 
most essential group of institutions which could, if sufficiently democra-
tised and equitably funded, 
reconstruction of post-war 
play a vital 
Britain. The 
role in 
former 
the moral and social 
group of individuals 
I referred to as supporters of the di.spersed initiative, the latter 
contingent as _proponents 
I endeavoured to show the 
of centralised planning. Considered thus, 
connection between the education debate and 
the issues which sustained the deliberations of the Clapham Conuni ttee. 
The arguments of the sociologists though directed in the main toward 
a strategic presentation of a case for a revived post-war, reconstruc-
tionist sociology, were, nevertheless, contingent upon, and yet derivative 
of the issues central to the debate on higher education. 
The arguments put forward in the document entitled Vitalisation of Research 
in the Social Sciences, examined in chapter five,. gave a clear indication 
of the inter-relationship between the education and research council 
debates. The author of the 1 Vitalisation 1 document made the fundamental 
connection between socio-political interests and the growth of knowledge, 
citing the 1 imaginary 1 danger of political control over the production 
of knowledge as a hang-over from laissez-faire. In retrospect, this 
may appear to be a somewhat naive assumption on the part of those espousing 
the virtues of an unfettered social science, yet such an argument consti-
tuted a central component of the strategic discourse employed by sociol-
ogists during the period in question. 
The dismissal of the case for a research council for the social sciences 
could be viewed as a victory for those members of the Clapham Conunittee 
who, o,stensibly, viewed its establishment as a manifestation of state 
control of social science. Their views were, as I have suggested, influ-
enced by the corresponding debate on the role of the state in relation 
to the universities. The arguments and strategies devised and deployed 
on the part of the sociologists and other sympathetic social scientists 
to counter the former case, failed to succeed for reasons other than 
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their inherent cogency and committed presentation. Rather, those who 
opposed the case for a council and an increased role for the state in 
education, held key appointme:1ts within those institutions and organisa-
tions engendering and espousing a concerted opposition (i.e. the University 
Grants Committee, the Committee of Vice-Chancellors and Principals, 
members of existing research· councils and research institutes, and a 
number of the most influential of Britain's social science community, 
especially economists, in addition to the director of the L.S.E.). 
Furthermore, the 
elitist notion of 
objectors' arguments were framed within a somewhat 
the hierarchy of the social sciences, with economics 
as the apex and the other, under-labouring disciplines comprising the 
base. Such a conception of social science sprang from many intellectual 
and institutional sources, a number of which I have alluded to throughout 
the course of the text. When collectively expressed, they formed the 
impediments frustrating the aspi~ations of sociologists seeking to enhance 
the prospects of their fledgling discipline. The century was by then 
almost half way through and sociology, though clinging to the chances 
that may have arisen from the findings of the Clapham Report, coupled 
to the opportunities that may have arisen from the election of a Labour 
government intent on educational reform, had at least had the opportunity 
to participate in a debate that provided it with a platform to advocate 
its potential as a branch of knowledge and practice, crucial to the 
reconstruction of the post-war world. At least the hierarchy had been 
challenged and sociology had been placed on the agenda of not only those 
who would henceforth deliberate its intrinsic contribution to the field 
of social science, but it had also entered the public domain through 
the work of the Army Bureau of Current Affairs, gained allies and support 
through the interest of the British Association for the Advancement 
of Science, sought and found support within the coalition and Labour 
administrations. There was cause for a degree of optimism. 
In the future, the sociologists' preoccupation with intra-disciplinary 
issues (i.e. methodology and epistemology and the nature and social purpose 
of post-war sociology) would . henceforth, become activities of interest 
to non-sociologists within a number of organisations and for a variety 
of reasons. With the establishment of the welfare state, there arose 
a general consensus on the necessity of planning, the need for social 
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and economic information with which to formulate·, implement and assess 
the effects of an increasing number of social and welfare policies, 
whether in the spheres of· erlucation, social security and social services, 
housing, or industry. The 'new world' may have arrived, but sociology 
had not entered it in very auspicious circumstances. The new political 
and social order of the post-war period seemed poised to create the 
opportunities sociologists needed, and yet, they would not be able to 
realise their aspirations to any significant degree until the middle 
1960s. Ironically, the two issues which had previously given rise to 
the possibility of enhancing the prospects of sociology's wartime and 
post-war expansion, namely the establishment of a research council for 
the social sciences and the expansion of the system of higher education 
(albeit on a significantly larger scale), once again provided the institu-
tional conditions and intellectual opportunities for sociologists to 
pursue their discipline by advocating its potential. 
Ideally, I would like to have extended my examination of sociology's 
quest for autonomy into the decades of the 1960s and 1970s. However, 
to have done so, at least with the degree of detail in evidence in the 
present text, would have taken the work well beyond the conventional 
restrictions of a thesis. In attempting to fulfil some of the conditions 
of Donald MacRae's project for a history of sociology, namely the considera-
tion and presentation of the minutiae of institutional history, it became 
essential to limit the period under investigation. This can have an 
adverse effect on the production of an historical account to the extent 
that, whatever may be gained ·in narrative detail, tends to be at the 
expense of an adequate timescale. The latter is essential in order 
to grasp some sense of change occurring within not only the social milieu 
of which sociology is part and parcel, but the corresponding cognitive 
and organisational transformations within sociology itself. Although 
I have touched upon several aspects of the development of sociology 
from the turn of the century to the immediate post-war period, it was 
through the adoption of an additional category to the more conventional 
approaches to analysis (namely, sociology's advocatory dimension) which 
allowed me to select what I considered to have been certain crucial 
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moments in sociology's history. They represented what I believe to 
be features 
autonomy. In 
than inclusive. 
of sociology's quest for intellectual and institutional 
one sense, the account has tended to be exclusive rather 
It was not possible to encompass every event which 
have either a direct or indirect bearing on sociology's appeared 
becoming. 
to 
There is certainly a need to extend the use of the concept of sociology's 
advocatory dimension beyond the historical period covered in this project. 
This would then establish whether or not for instance, sociologists' 
tendency to deploy what I have referred to as strategic discourse in 
the pursuit of their discipline, characterises only the formative stages 
of the social construction of sociology. Is such a feature of sociology's 
acts of justification a fundamental and perennial component of its changing, 
historical form? The items included in the categories attributed to 
sociology's advocatory dimension represent phenomena which, although 
partially explored within the scope of this project, nevertheless require 
They would include areas of post-war additional, detailed investigation. 
and post Robbins changes in higher 
of sociology syllabuses within the 
vi tal connection between indi vid ual 
education, especially the negotiation 
universities and polytechnics. The 
sociologists' biographies and the 
history of the discipline; changing patterns of research, i.e. the 'resolu-
tion' of the research council debate and the expansion of postgraduate 
research in sociology. An examination of changing national needs, 
their inherent imperatives and the 
the ordering of knowledge in the 
war. The effect of the latter on 
subsequent effect they 
decades following the 
transformations within 
have had on 
Second World 
the national 
research base and the consequences of this for the development of sociology. 
A ft,rther examination of the criteria for the evaluation of knowledge 
and the problems this has posed for sociology since the last war and 
an analysis of the formulation and deployment of strategies by sociologists 
and others within the field of the human sciences, in response to contemporary 
criticism of sociology's knowledge claims. Finally, a comparative analysis 
of early and contemporary Inaugural Lectures for the reasons set out 
in chapter one. Such categories and contexts of sociology do not comprise 
an exhaustive list. However, they do suggest possible sites and media 
in which to explore the intellectual and institutional opportunities 
and constraints which have, and continue to affect sociology's quest 
for autonomy. 
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If I appear to have portrayed sociology' s development as a continuous 
and unremitting struggle, with its practitioners perpetually contesting 
its identity within, and its authenticity without, then I think that, 
rather than view sociology's becoming as a pessimistic and crisis ridden 
odyssey within the western intellectual tradition, its continuously 
contested and contestable nature and purpose actually contain the source 
of sociology's vitality. Although Norman Birnbaum (1971) viewed sociology's 
'fatal and recurrent crux' as the '.tension between ideology and science', 
I rather think it is the perpetual tension between sociology and its 
social agencies, in which it 
are contained that constitute 
acts and by which those same activities 
its central dynamic. This is bound to 
affect sociology's substantive dimension. Moreover, it would seem that 
in the 1980s, sociology's struggle to overcome such constraints provide 
the source of such intellectual and spiritual dignity as it possesses. 
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The Inaugural Lecture in Sociology 
The inaugural lecture is important for several reasons, but especially 
because such an occasion presents sociology and its most recently and 
ritualistically esteemed professor, an opportunity to advocate on behalf 
of his, or her, chosen field within the discipline. It represents the 
creation or entrenchment of institutional space, in addition to a public 
proclamation of the kind of sociology that the 1 professor 1 bears witness 
to, bearing in mind the current status of the discipline and the risk 
involved in shattering consensus. Most inaugural lectures therefore 
take the following form (Abrams, 1972), comprising three basic themes 
which may be treated either in combination, or, with one being given 
particular emphasis: a general survey of the discipline; acknowledgement 
of past achievements of predecessors and the identification of a singularly 
important tradition to be further advanced; the presentation of an agenda 
pointing to the important work to be done in the future. The inaugural 
lecture thus provides an ideal opportunity to advocate sociology amongst 
representatives of other branches of knowledge and within an institutional 
setting crucial to its existence. While it may be reasonable to criticise 
such an occasion as one of arcane tradition, or hollow ritual, in the 
formative period of sociology, such achievements were rare and opportune 
moments. 
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T.H. Marshall's classification of the i.ntellectual c.leavage within British 
inter-war Sociology. 
During the inter-war period, the processes of specialisation and profes-
sionalisation continued to affect the differential growth of the various 
social sciences. Such differences were thrown into sharp relief when 
the competition for scarce resources, essential to the expansion of 
any branch of knowledge, became a focal point in their respective institu-
tional careers. Moreover, it is worth contemplating the manner in which 
the case for sociology may have been presented for a synthetic science 
of society, had one of the practitioners on the other side of the pronounced 
intellectual cleavage within the discipline, occupied the strategic 
position of Chair-holder at the L. S. E. It is likely that the "field-study-
empiricists" (one of a selective number of designations ascribed to 
this group by T. H. Marshall) may have encountered a less hostile and 
suspicious opposition to sociology's project, elaborated in detail during 
the pre-war conferences. Marshall's experienc~ of this crucial period 
in sociology's history have been alluded to previously, but it is,neverthe-
less, worthwhile citing his recollection of the general cognitive divide 
within the discipline during the inter-war period (Marshall, 1967, p.36l): 
"And underlying all their (Hobhouse and westermarck's) work 
was the search for a theory on the grand scale, a theory of 
social development which would include within itself a theory, 
or theories, explanatory of the compatibility of institutional 
forms and the coherence of social systems. 
Meanwhile slow 
front, that of 
but steady progress was being made on the other 
the field survey and quantitative analysis .... 
The result of this unfortunate cleavage was that academic 
or "professional" sociology had too little to do with fieldwork, 
had too little to do with sociological theory or, which is 
equally important, with the perspective that can be derived 
from historical and comparative studies. It was, of course, 
in the first of these two schools that the young sociologists 
were being trained." 
Marshall's reference to the importance of the historical and comparative 
methods is significant, in that it highlights their central position 
within the particular methodological frameworks of those sociologists 
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who endeavoured to establish sociology at the core of a reconstructed 
science of society. This was an integral feature of my examination 
of that episode of its inter-war history. Although schematic diagrams 
can often deprive an explanation of essential historical context and 
related structural form, the following representation of sociology's 
inter-war cleavage - encompassing its professional/academic and practical 
wings - may serve as an indication of the discipline's diverging intellec-
tual and subsequently, institutional pre-war forms. It is based, in 
the main, on T. H. Marshall's classifications (see Diagram l on following 
page). 
Geddes and Branford were associated with the discipline's practical 
wing, and from the period around the First World War, the Society's 
journal, the Sociological Review, tended to reflect their influence. 
The latter was reinforced with the foundation of the Le Play House Trust 
in 1920, by supporters of the Geddes school. Increasing emphasis began 
to be placed on the correlation of the numerous civic surveys associated 
with this group of sociologists. At about the same time, 1918/19, Hobhouse 
established his 'sociological Club' within the L.S.E., aimed at qoordinating 
the work of students 'in the fields of the social sciences.' The latter 
move by Hobhouse may have represented a genuine attempt to stimulate 
an interest within academic circl~ for a project to construct a syn-
thetic science of society. However, his gradual e-strangement from the 
activities and somewhat conflicting interests of the Sociological Society 
would seem also to have been a contributory factor in his attempt to 
cultivate support for a programme of development for sociology, that 
diverged significantly from those associated with the Society. It should 
also be remembered that while Hobhouse and subsequently Ginsberg occupied 
the sole Chair in 
practitioners and 
sociology in England during the 
protagonists of the discipline's 
inter-war period, 
practical wing 
found important support within the same University and its School of 
Economics and Political Science. Toward the end of the 1930s, Mass 
Observation contributed to the popularisation of a form of sociological 
analysis that its exponents regarded as infinitely superior both in 
terms of scientific exactitude and 'relevance', to that of the detached 
and grandiose abstractions of its academic counterpart. Those associated 
with the discipline's practical wing tended to support the work of Torn 
Harrison and his Mass Observation movement. 
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Diagram 1 
SOCIOLOGY IN BRITAIN: 1919-1939* 
Professional Wing Practical Wing 
Sociology as an academic subject: 
"professional sociology." 
E 
M 
R 
G 
I 
N 
G 
Sociology as a rigorously scien-
tific and empirical study based on 
quantitative analysis via the 
social survey. II I 
Chair at the L.S.E., 1907. Sociological Society founded in 1903. 
II 
Tending toward 'grand theory'; 
evolution of moral ideas expressed 
in institutional behaviour. 
Work evidenced sparse reference to 
social theory: sociography rather 
than sociology. 
II 
Data/evidence derived via histo-
rical documents, first-hand 
observations/second-hand 
commentaries recorded by others. 
c 
L 
E 
A 
v 
A 
G 
E 
The social survey employed as 
the central method of obtaining 
data/evidence. 
I 
The Sociological Society divided into 
several factions: practitioners repre-
senting various social sciences, specialists 
engaged in research, and those with general 
interests and, 'practical workers', encoun-
tering 'sociological problems' in the course 
of their work. 
As diversity of subjects appeared in the 
Society's debates and publications, an attempt 
was made to broaden the view of the specialists 
in their respective fields, rather than attempt 
to develop a new 'synthetic science'. 
/ \ 
Adherents of this 'school' Proponents of the practical wing 
propounded a synthetic sociology. advocated the diffusion of a quan-
The conferences of the 1930s used titativejempirical1 "sociological 
as a vehicle to advocate such a approach" within the emerging 
programme. specialisms. 
* Based on T.H. Marshall's classification; T.H. Marshall, 'British 
Sociology Today', Contemporary Sociology, 1967. 
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Although it is convenient to portray the development of sociology within 
this period as comprising essentially, two distinct intellectual forms, 
this would tend to obscure the level of overlap and synthesis that often 
characterised sociological analysis in the years between the wars. 
Sociology's struggle extended beyond its internicine warfares to contests 
within the domain of what Beveridge referred to as, the more highly 
developed social sciences, especially economics. 
boundaries were continually in dispute, with 
made to construct programmes and agendas as 
Sociology's intellectual 
repeated attempts being 
a means of giving the 
discipline an element of disciplinary coherence and direction. However, 
such strategies implied the additional commitment to a definition of 
the subject, a 
over what could 
dilemma which was compounded by 
be effectively substantiated as 
profound disagreement 
a distinct corpus of 
theory and methods under the rubric, sociology. From such disagreement 
arose a number of disaffected groups and individuals who held the conviction 
that perhaps socialism, and not sociology, would usher in a polity which 
the latter discipline, for some of its aspirants at least, would serve 
only to provide endless social analysis, rather than social action. 
The 'promise' of sociology remained unfulfilled. 
APPENDIX THREE 
Institution 
Birmingham 
Bristol 
Cambridge 
Durham Colleges 
Durham King's 
College 
Exeter 
Hull 
Leeds 
Leicester 
Liverpool 
London 
Bedford College 
King's " 
University " 
L.S.E. 
Manchester 
Nottingham 
Oxford 
Reading 
Sheffield 
Southampton 
Wales 
Aberdeen 
Edinburgh 
Glasgow 
St. Andrews 
(including Dundee) 
Notes 
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SOCIAL SCIENCE 
TABLE OF EARMARKED GRANTS 
1 
Total additional 
Expenditure for 
1947/48 involved 
in Universities' 
proposals to the 
UGC. 
£ 
5,000 
1,500 
6,000 
1,045 
4,255 
3,700 
2,000 
5,000 
690 
7,500 
1,000 
600 
3,000 
41,000 
5,000 
2,000 
19,000 
800 
8,850 
2,000 
4,000 
2,500 
2,500 
129,000 
2 
Installments of 
Grant for 1947/ 
48 already on 
account. 
£ 
2,500 
3,000 
2,500 
1,000 
1,000 
1,000 
2,000 
1,000 
30,000 
1,000 
9,000 
2,000 
1,500 
1,000 
58,000 
3 
Recommended 
additional 
grants for 
1947/48. 
£ 
1,500 
1,000 
2,000 
1,750 
1,250 
1,000 
3,000 
500 
4,000 
500 
1,500 
7,500 
3,000 
1,500 
6,000 
1,000 
1,500 
2,000 
1,000 
2,000 
43,000 
l. ''The figures in column 1 are (a) those extracted from the quinquennial estimates as repre-
senting expenditure on new developments in the social sciences, plus (b), one fifth of the 
extra expenditure given in supplementary statements from the universities as likely to be 
incurred during the current quinquennium. 
2. It was not thought worthwhile to propose any grant for the remainder of the session for 
those universities whose total expenditure is under £1,000. 11 (UGC8; 6/11/47). 
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A Summary of Existing Provision for Sociological Teaching and Research in 
England and Wales (1945)* 
l. Universities 
London School of Economics and Political Science 
The largest and most comprehensive School specialised in the Social Studies. 
Functions 
Teaching - undergraduates and postgraduates. Also a centre 
of research in the abovementioned fields. 
Chairs/Readerships Martin White Chair of Sociology. Readership in 
Sociology. Two teaching posts in Sociology. 
One lectureship in Social Science. 
Studentships/Fellowships - The Leon Fellowship: for the promotion of post-
graduate or advanced research on any subject 
but preferably in the fields of Economics or 
education. 
Cambridge 
Chairs/Readerships 
Oxford 
Chairs/Readerships 
Institutes and Special 
Departments (Oxford) 
Gerstenberg Studentship: an award to post-
graduates in Economics. 
Fellowships/scholarships offered by the L.S.E. -
tenable only at the School. 
- No Chair in Sociology. No Readerships in 
Sociology, Social Studies or Social Science. 
One in Political Science. Two readerships in 
Economics and one in Statistics. 
- One Chair in Political Theory. No Readerships. 
- Institute of Social Anthropology - Nuffield 
College - a 'special case' as far as Oxford is 
concerned. Established for the purpose of 
"objective research in social and economic 
problems", with the special intention of promo-
ting collaboration in the study of these problems, 
between those engaged in academic work and those 
occupied in business and the social services. 
The College is designed exclusively for post-
graduate research. 
* Based on a memorandum submitted to the Clapham Committee by Sir Henry 
Clay, (Tl6l/l30l/54680/3, 1945). 
Manchester 
Chairs/Readerships 
Birmingham 
Chairs/Readerships 
Liverpool 
Chairs/Readerships 
Leeds 
Chairs/Readerships 
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No Chairs in Sociology. One in Social Economics. 
No Readerships. Significant concentration on 
Economics and Statistics. A research section 
in the Faculty of Commerce and Administration. 
No Chairs in Sociology. A Department in Social 
Studies. 
- Charles Booth Chair of Social Science. Two 
Readerships in Social Statistics. One lecture-
ship in Social Science, with the remainder in 
Social Statistics and Economics. 
-No Chairs or Readerships in Sociologyor Social 
Studies. One lecturer in Social Policy and 
Economics. Diploma course on 'Social Organisa-
tion'. 
University College Nottingham 
Chairs/Readerships - None in Sociology. Lecturers in Political and 
Social Theory. Director and ASsistant Directors 
in Social Studies. 
Wales University College Aberystwith 
Chairs/Readerships - None in Sociology. Political Science 'well 
represented here'. So too Economics and Political 
Science. 
University College South Wales 
Chairs/Readerships - Chair in Political Science. 
University College Swansea 
Chairs/Readerships - Chair in Economics. Assistant Lectureship in 
Economics. 
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2. Societies which promote, sponsor or initiate sociological research. 
Royal Statistical Society - For the study and application of statistical 
methods in industrial and agricultural 
production. 
Royal Economic Society 
Manchester Statistical 
Society 
unspecified. 
For the collection of facts illustrating the 
condition of society. The discussion of 
political and social theory on a non-party 
political basis. 
Royal Geographical Society - Unspecified. 
Royal Anthropological Society -Unspecified. 
British Association for 
the Advancement of 
Science 
Institute of Sociology 
Comprising a number of specialist 'Sections', 
including, Economics, Psychology, Geography 
and Anthropology. 
Le Play House, formerly the Sociological 
Society. Its object is to 1promote the 
investigation and education of the social 
sciences.' To promote 1common ground for the 
meeting of workers from all fields and schools 
concerned with social phenomena.' 
3. Institutes which promote, sponsor or initiate sociological research. 
Institute of International - For the encouragement of scientific study of 
Affairs international affairs. 
National Institute of 
Economic and Social 
Research 
National Institute of 
Industrial Psychology 
Institute of Public 
Administration 
- A specialised, independent institution supple-
menting university departments and acting as a 
channel of communication between academic 
research and government departments. Concerned 
with 1 realistic and statistical work in the field 
of economics and social studies.' Its field of 
work lies mainly in the 'measurement of changes, 
the discovery of trends and the analysis of 
structure.' 
- For research into the problems of industrial 
and vocational psychology affecting the human 
factor in occupational life. 
- For the development of the Civil Service, 
municipal and other public services as a 
profession. 
Political and Economic 
Planning 
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- Main objective: to define the 'facts' bearing 
on any given problem in the social and economic 
fields; to interpret them accurately and 
honestly.; to draw sound conclusions and policy 
from them. PEP defined as an 'Educational 
Trust' governed by Trustees on a Governing 
Council. Non-political and non-profit making. 
Maintains close contact with industry. 
4. Other Associations, Societies and Groups 
The Fabian Society 
The Association for 
Planning & Regional 
Reconstruction Ltd. 
Association for Education 
and Citizenship 
Barnet House 
5. Trusts and Foundations 
(British) 
a) Leverhulme Trust 
b) Pilgrim Trust 
c) Nuffield Trust 
d) Halley Stuart Trust 
e) Seebolme Rowntree Trust 
f) Rowntree Trust 
g) Bournville Village Trust 
h) Carnegie Trust 
- 'For the education of the public in the general 
problems of socialist policy; research into 
these problems, preparation of detailed and 
practical schemes for implementing such policy.' 
- For the preparation of surveys and plans on a 
regional scope in any area. For the encourage-
ment of 'factual' research. 
- Its main object was, "to advance training in 
the moral qualities necessary for the citizens 
of a democracy; the encouragement of clear 
thinking in every day affairs and the acquisi-
tion of the knowledge of the modern world." 
The Association started its work through an 
investigation of the "best" methods for educa-
tion in citizenship for different sections of 
the educational system of Great Britain. It 
appointed committees to investigate and report 
on the work of its seven different sections. 
- "To advance the systematic study of social and 
economic questions. To advise and train men 
and women who wish to take-up social work, 
either under the state, or in settlements, or 
the voluntary organisations." 
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(Foreign) 
a) The Rockefeller Foundation 
b) Carnegie Corporation 
I have not listed the entire contents of Clay's memorandum to the Clapham 
Committee. The above sections are representative of almost all of 
the organisations engaged in the promotion of "sociological" teaching 
and research. The contents also give a fairly accurate indication 
of both the liberal interpretation of the notion 'sociological', 
and the hetrogenous nature of the institutional context in which such 
research was either sponsored, promoted or initiated. 
.. 
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SOCIOLOGY AND SOCIAL WORK TRAINING: THE UNIVERSITIES 
It was not uncommon in the first years of this century to hear arguments 
which considered universities as quite disreputable institutions for 
the pursuit of studies about social questions and their possible solution 
by practical methods. This represented the extreme view. Others were 
more tolerant of the potential for attaching 'schools' of training 
in social work to the universities, their arguments being tempered 
by the belief, that although they may be inappropriate institutions 
they could, nevertheless, facilitate a more practical basis for that 
vocation. Leubuscher (1946, p. 22) refers to these attitudes in a short 
survey of facilities for training in social service: 
"Affiliation to 
point of view 
University and 
London." 
the university 
especially by 
by Professor 
was opposed from an academic 
Professor Chapman, Manchester 
Foxwell of University College, 
The universities had to be protected from mixing up theory and practice 
in its teaching. Furthermore, and indicative of a perennial and invincible 
prejudice which frustrated early attempts to introduce sociology into 
higher education (1946, p.22): 
"It was imperative that 
should be free from any 
matters." 
the teaching of 
suspicion of bias 
the Universities 
in controversial 
This is in contrast to Leubuscher's citation of another commentator 
on the prospect of introducing courses for those training in social 
service (Leubuscher, p.22): 
" that they would be wiser to keep clear of the universities 
which, in social questions, were amateurish and academic 
and were designed to produce graduates." 
Notwithstanding the latter's admonition, it was generally argued that 
the inclusion of social work training within the realm of the university 
and in accordance with strict scientific principles, would somehow 
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imbue the service with professional status. 
workers a systematic and soundly practical 
The attempt to give social 
training via the creation 
of departments of social science and social study, provides an explanation 
of the evolution of several of the older departments bearing those 
titles in English universities. I wish to examine briefly the history 
of the School of Sociology as an example of this development. 
A history of the School is contained in Charlotte Leubuscher 1 s contribution 
to a short work co-authored with T. H. Marshall (Marshall and Leubuscher, 
1946). The transformation of the School into the Social Science Department 
of the London School of Economics is an episode in the history of sociology 
which is noticably absent from Philip Abrams 1 definitive work on the 
subject (Abrams, 1968) . This is somewhat puzzling in view of the depth 
of his analysis and requires brief consideration if only to highlight 
Leubuscher 1 s account. 
Abrams examines the apparent parallelism of Edwardian sociology (I 
use the term in its broadest sense) and the eventual institutionalisation 
of the major strains of sociological thought of the period. On the 
one hand there was the 1 pure 1 , theoretically oriented account of the 
nature of sociology. Hobhouse carried this tradition with him to the 
new Department of Sociology at the L.S.E. in 1907. Although much is 
made of the fact that this was the first Chair in the subject, it in 
no way represented the academic enshrinement of the pre-eminent tendency 
within prevailing sociological thought. On the other hand, there was 
the Sociological Society, an organisation which served the needs of 
those who espoused an eclectic, pragmatic and empirical brand of sociology. 
Statistics, Eugenics, Civics, Education and Social Economy were well 
represented within the Society. In fact, all the aforementioned, apart 
from statistics enjoyed committee status within the Society. This 
structure was dominated by two of the committees, which in turn, owed 
their strength to the power and influence of their most prestigious 
members. Abrams argues that with the creation of the Department of 
Social Science, the divergence of academic sociology had been confirmed. 
For Abrams the intellectual and organisational differences within the 
Sociological· Society had, by the First World War, been carried into 
the L.S.E. (Abrams, 1968, p.ll3): 
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the recognition in the 1920's that peaceful coexistence 
between divergent modes of social science and not an integrated 
sociology was the best that could be expected in the immediate 
future." 
The School of Sociology and Social Economics was established in 1903* 
on the initiative of Charles Loch. It became the Social Science Department 
of the London School of Economics + in 1913. In its pre-university form, 
it enjoyed the patronage and active support of a number of university 
lecturers, who, as Leubuscher points out, "supplied a large part of 
the theoretical instruction" (Leubuscher, p.22). Loch, Tooke, Price, 
Geddes and W.H. Beveridge were among those who performed the aforementioned 
task. They were also major contributors to the Sociological Soceity 
and its journal. Its Director, E. J. urwick, headed the new Department 
at the L.S.E. upon its establishment in 1913. Abrams may have described 
him as an advocate of the older ameliorist tradition of the National 
Association for the Promotion of Social Science, but during his office 
as director of the School of Sociology, he encouraged an approach to 
social problems which was reminiscent of Hobhouse's philosophical construe-
tion of them. Such an approach in no way displaced the emphasis upon 
training and the interventionist theme of social work education. Rather, 
it was to serve as a complementary dimension to the syllabus. This 
is an important point, in view of the subsequent institutionalisation 
of sociology, albeit in its divergent academic forms. Leubuscher summarises 
the attempt by the School's Director to balance the curriculum (Leubuscher, 
p. 23): 
* 
+ 
"The 
for 
to 
School lived up to 
the syllabus showed 
social problems, and 
practical concerns ... " 
the obligation implied in its name, 
a distinctly sociological approach 
was less determined by immediate 
D.C. Marsh has the date as 1901 (cf. 
Introduction to the Study of Social 
and Kegan Paul. 
Marsh, D.C., (1965)), An 
Administration, Routledge 
Again Marsh has the year as 1912, (Marsh, 1965). 
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The syllabus was divided into three areas: Social Theory and Administration; 
Sociology, which, according to Leubuscher, included the analysis of 
social structure, the history of social growth and change, and the 
theory of the 'social forces' and their interactions; and practical 
instruction. in Poor Law Administration. It could be that the somewhat 
fierce partisanship implied in Abrams' account of the divergence between 
the two major traditions within sociology, coalesced in the Department 
of Social Science's embryonic form- the School of Sociology. There 
are two additional points to bear in mind when considering the importance 
of the School and its subsequent transition to a university department. 
First, the School served, in many respects, as a model for the schools 
of social work training which were established in other parts of the 
country in the period before the First World War. For example, the 
School in Liverpool. This School was eventually fully incorporated 
into the University of Liverpool before the First World war. The School 
had had a long and close association with the University prior to this. 
Second, other universities began to introduce Social Studies courses 
either by way of coordinating series of isolated courses of lectures 
on 'social subjects', or, from the outset as quite separate schools 
in their own right. Birmingham, Leeds and Bristol were universities 
where this pattern of institutionalisation occurred. Apart from the 
professional kudos which accrued from inclusion within the system 
of higher education, the emerging departments of social studies/sciences 
provided not only a basis for social work training, but served as institu-
tional sites for incorporating later developments within the field 
of sociology. Understanding the intellectual ethos and institutional 
function of such departments enhances a clearer appreciation of sociology's 
developmental form between the wars and into the post-war era. Moreover, 
Leubuscher' s account explains the importance of the department of s.ocial 
study;s·cience to the less well established subjects within the wider 
field of British social science (Leubuscher, 1946, p.25): 
"Within the universities, 
framework for instruction 
with the study of society, 
relative novelty, there was 
the Departments have supplied the 
in a number of subjects, concerned 
for which, mainly because of their 
little interest in other Departments. 
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It is thus to a large extent due to the Social Science Depart-
ments that subjects like Social Economics, Social Administration, 
Social Psychology, and Criminology have found a place in 
the curricula of some universities." 
I think it reasonable to add sociology to Leubuscher's list of disciplines, 
as subjects which benefitted from the post-war expansion in social 
science in Britain, especially during the post- Robbins/Heyworth period 
(cf. K. Jones, 1971). 
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